1 What: /sys/kernel/security/evm !! 1 What: security/evm
2 What: /sys/kernel/security/*/evm <<
3 Date: March 2011 2 Date: March 2011
4 Contact: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> 3 Contact: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
5 Description: 4 Description:
6 EVM protects a file's security 5 EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs)
7 against integrity attacks. The 6 against integrity attacks. The initial method maintains an
8 HMAC-sha1 value across the ext 7 HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the
9 value as the extended attribut 8 value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'.
10 9
11 EVM supports two classes of se 10 EVM supports two classes of security.evm. The first is
12 an HMAC-sha1 generated locally 11 an HMAC-sha1 generated locally with a
13 trusted/encrypted key stored i 12 trusted/encrypted key stored in the Kernel Key
14 Retention System. The second i 13 Retention System. The second is a digital signature
15 generated either locally or re 14 generated either locally or remotely using an
16 asymmetric key. These keys are 15 asymmetric key. These keys are loaded onto root's
17 keyring using keyctl, and EVM 16 keyring using keyctl, and EVM is then enabled by
18 echoing a value to <securityfs 17 echoing a value to <securityfs>/evm made up of the
19 following bits: 18 following bits:
20 19
21 === ==================== 20 === ==================================================
22 Bit Effect 21 Bit Effect
23 === ==================== 22 === ==================================================
24 0 Enable HMAC validati 23 0 Enable HMAC validation and creation
25 1 Enable digital signa 24 1 Enable digital signature validation
26 2 Permit modification 25 2 Permit modification of EVM-protected metadata at
27 runtime. Not support 26 runtime. Not supported if HMAC validation and
28 creation is enabled !! 27 creation is enabled.
29 31 Disable further runt 28 31 Disable further runtime modification of EVM policy
30 === ==================== 29 === ==================================================
31 30
32 For example:: 31 For example::
33 32
34 echo 1 ><securityfs>/evm 33 echo 1 ><securityfs>/evm
35 34
36 will enable HMAC validation an 35 will enable HMAC validation and creation
37 36
38 :: 37 ::
39 38
40 echo 0x80000003 ><securityfs 39 echo 0x80000003 ><securityfs>/evm
41 40
42 will enable HMAC and digital s 41 will enable HMAC and digital signature validation and
43 HMAC creation and disable all 42 HMAC creation and disable all further modification of policy.
44 43
45 :: 44 ::
46 45
47 echo 0x80000006 ><securityfs 46 echo 0x80000006 ><securityfs>/evm
48 47
49 will enable digital signature 48 will enable digital signature validation, permit
50 modification of EVM-protected 49 modification of EVM-protected metadata and
51 disable all further modificati !! 50 disable all further modification of policy
52 deprecated in favor of:: <<
53 51
54 echo 0x80000002 ><securityfs !! 52 Note that once a key has been loaded, it will no longer be
55 !! 53 possible to enable metadata modification.
56 as the outstanding issues that <<
57 signatures have been solved. <<
58 <<
59 Echoing a value is additive, t <<
60 existing initialization flags. <<
61 <<
62 For example, after:: <<
63 <<
64 echo 2 ><securityfs>/evm <<
65 <<
66 another echo can be performed: <<
67 <<
68 echo 1 ><securityfs>/evm <<
69 <<
70 and the resulting value will b <<
71 <<
72 Note that once an HMAC key has <<
73 be possible to enable metadata <<
74 HMAC key has been loaded will <<
75 For example, if the current va <<
76 <<
77 echo 1 ><securityfs>/evm <<
78 <<
79 will set the new value to 3 (4 <<
80 <<
81 Loading an HMAC key is the onl <<
82 modification. <<
83 54
84 Until key loading has been sig 55 Until key loading has been signaled EVM can not create
85 or validate the 'security.evm' 56 or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns
86 INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. Loading ke 57 INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. Loading keys and signaling EVM
87 should be done as early as pos 58 should be done as early as possible. Normally this is
88 done in the initramfs, which h 59 done in the initramfs, which has already been measured
89 as part of the trusted boot. 60 as part of the trusted boot. For more information on
90 creating and loading existing 61 creating and loading existing trusted/encrypted keys,
91 refer to: 62 refer to:
92 Documentation/security/keys/tr 63 Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst. Both
93 dracut (via 97masterkey and 98 64 dracut (via 97masterkey and 98integrity) and systemd (via
94 core/ima-setup) have support f 65 core/ima-setup) have support for loading keys at boot
95 time. 66 time.
96 67
97 What: /sys/kernel/security/*/evm/evm !! 68 What: security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs
98 Date: April 2018 69 Date: April 2018
99 Contact: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.c 70 Contact: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
100 Description: 71 Description:
101 Shows the set of extended attr 72 Shows the set of extended attributes used to calculate or
102 validate the EVM signature, an 73 validate the EVM signature, and allows additional attributes
103 to be added at runtime. Any si 74 to be added at runtime. Any signatures generated after
104 additional attributes are adde 75 additional attributes are added (and on files possessing those
105 additional attributes) will on 76 additional attributes) will only be valid if the same
106 additional attributes are conf 77 additional attributes are configured on system boot. Writing
107 a single period (.) will lock 78 a single period (.) will lock the xattr list from any further
108 modification. 79 modification.
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