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TOMOYO Linux Cross Reference
Linux/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst

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Diff markup

Differences between /Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst (Architecture mips) and /Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst (Architecture m68k)


  1 .. _embargoed_hardware_issues:                      1 .. _embargoed_hardware_issues:
  2                                                     2 
  3 Embargoed hardware issues                           3 Embargoed hardware issues
  4 =========================                           4 =========================
  5                                                     5 
  6 Scope                                               6 Scope
  7 -----                                               7 -----
  8                                                     8 
  9 Hardware issues which result in security probl      9 Hardware issues which result in security problems are a different category
 10 of security bugs than pure software bugs which     10 of security bugs than pure software bugs which only affect the Linux
 11 kernel.                                            11 kernel.
 12                                                    12 
 13 Hardware issues like Meltdown, Spectre, L1TF e     13 Hardware issues like Meltdown, Spectre, L1TF etc. must be treated
 14 differently because they usually affect all Op     14 differently because they usually affect all Operating Systems ("OS") and
 15 therefore need coordination across different O     15 therefore need coordination across different OS vendors, distributions,
 16 silicon vendors, hardware integrators, and oth     16 silicon vendors, hardware integrators, and other parties. For some of the
 17 issues, software mitigations can depend on mic     17 issues, software mitigations can depend on microcode or firmware updates,
 18 which need further coordination.                   18 which need further coordination.
 19                                                    19 
 20 .. _Contact:                                       20 .. _Contact:
 21                                                    21 
 22 Contact                                            22 Contact
 23 -------                                            23 -------
 24                                                    24 
 25 The Linux kernel hardware security team is sep     25 The Linux kernel hardware security team is separate from the regular Linux
 26 kernel security team.                              26 kernel security team.
 27                                                    27 
 28 The team only handles developing fixes for emb     28 The team only handles developing fixes for embargoed hardware security
 29 issues. Reports of pure software security bugs     29 issues. Reports of pure software security bugs in the Linux kernel are not
 30 handled by this team and the reporter will be      30 handled by this team and the reporter will be guided to contact the regular
 31 Linux kernel security team (:ref:`Documentatio     31 Linux kernel security team (:ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/
 32 <securitybugs>`) instead.                          32 <securitybugs>`) instead.
 33                                                    33 
 34 The team can be contacted by email at <hardware     34 The team can be contacted by email at <hardware-security@kernel.org>. This
 35 is a private list of security officers who wil     35 is a private list of security officers who will help you coordinate a fix
 36 according to our documented process.               36 according to our documented process.
 37                                                    37 
 38 The list is encrypted and email to the list ca     38 The list is encrypted and email to the list can be sent by either PGP or
 39 S/MIME encrypted and must be signed with the r     39 S/MIME encrypted and must be signed with the reporter's PGP key or S/MIME
 40 certificate. The list's PGP key and S/MIME cer     40 certificate. The list's PGP key and S/MIME certificate are available from
 41 the following URLs:                                41 the following URLs:
 42                                                    42 
 43   - PGP: https://www.kernel.org/static/files/h     43   - PGP: https://www.kernel.org/static/files/hardware-security.asc
 44   - S/MIME: https://www.kernel.org/static/file     44   - S/MIME: https://www.kernel.org/static/files/hardware-security.crt
 45                                                    45 
 46 While hardware security issues are often handl     46 While hardware security issues are often handled by the affected silicon
 47 vendor, we welcome contact from researchers or     47 vendor, we welcome contact from researchers or individuals who have
 48 identified a potential hardware flaw.              48 identified a potential hardware flaw.
 49                                                    49 
 50 Hardware security officers                         50 Hardware security officers
 51 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^                         51 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
 52                                                    52 
 53 The current team of hardware security officers     53 The current team of hardware security officers:
 54                                                    54 
 55   - Linus Torvalds (Linux Foundation Fellow)       55   - Linus Torvalds (Linux Foundation Fellow)
 56   - Greg Kroah-Hartman (Linux Foundation Fello     56   - Greg Kroah-Hartman (Linux Foundation Fellow)
 57   - Thomas Gleixner (Linux Foundation Fellow)      57   - Thomas Gleixner (Linux Foundation Fellow)
 58                                                    58 
 59 Operation of mailing-lists                         59 Operation of mailing-lists
 60 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^                         60 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
 61                                                    61 
 62 The encrypted mailing-lists which are used in      62 The encrypted mailing-lists which are used in our process are hosted on
 63 Linux Foundation's IT infrastructure. By provi     63 Linux Foundation's IT infrastructure. By providing this service, members
 64 of Linux Foundation's IT operations personnel      64 of Linux Foundation's IT operations personnel technically have the
 65 ability to access the embargoed information, b     65 ability to access the embargoed information, but are obliged to
 66 confidentiality by their employment contract.      66 confidentiality by their employment contract. Linux Foundation IT
 67 personnel are also responsible for operating a     67 personnel are also responsible for operating and managing the rest of
 68 kernel.org's infrastructure.                       68 kernel.org's infrastructure.
 69                                                    69 
 70 The Linux Foundation's current director of IT      70 The Linux Foundation's current director of IT Project infrastructure is
 71 Konstantin Ryabitsev.                              71 Konstantin Ryabitsev.
 72                                                    72 
 73                                                    73 
 74 Non-disclosure agreements                          74 Non-disclosure agreements
 75 -------------------------                          75 -------------------------
 76                                                    76 
 77 The Linux kernel hardware security team is not     77 The Linux kernel hardware security team is not a formal body and therefore
 78 unable to enter into any non-disclosure agreem     78 unable to enter into any non-disclosure agreements.  The kernel community
 79 is aware of the sensitive nature of such issue     79 is aware of the sensitive nature of such issues and offers a Memorandum of
 80 Understanding instead.                             80 Understanding instead.
 81                                                    81 
 82                                                    82 
 83 Memorandum of Understanding                        83 Memorandum of Understanding
 84 ---------------------------                        84 ---------------------------
 85                                                    85 
 86 The Linux kernel community has a deep understa     86 The Linux kernel community has a deep understanding of the requirement to
 87 keep hardware security issues under embargo fo     87 keep hardware security issues under embargo for coordination between
 88 different OS vendors, distributors, silicon ve     88 different OS vendors, distributors, silicon vendors, and other parties.
 89                                                    89 
 90 The Linux kernel community has successfully ha     90 The Linux kernel community has successfully handled hardware security
 91 issues in the past and has the necessary mecha     91 issues in the past and has the necessary mechanisms in place to allow
 92 community compliant development under embargo      92 community compliant development under embargo restrictions.
 93                                                    93 
 94 The Linux kernel community has a dedicated har     94 The Linux kernel community has a dedicated hardware security team for
 95 initial contact, which oversees the process of     95 initial contact, which oversees the process of handling such issues under
 96 embargo rules.                                     96 embargo rules.
 97                                                    97 
 98 The hardware security team identifies the deve     98 The hardware security team identifies the developers (domain experts) who
 99 will form the initial response team for a part     99 will form the initial response team for a particular issue. The initial
100 response team can bring in further developers     100 response team can bring in further developers (domain experts) to address
101 the issue in the best technical way.              101 the issue in the best technical way.
102                                                   102 
103 All involved developers pledge to adhere to th    103 All involved developers pledge to adhere to the embargo rules and to keep
104 the received information confidential. Violati    104 the received information confidential. Violation of the pledge will lead to
105 immediate exclusion from the current issue and    105 immediate exclusion from the current issue and removal from all related
106 mailing lists. In addition, the hardware secur    106 mailing lists. In addition, the hardware security team will also exclude
107 the offender from future issues. The impact of    107 the offender from future issues. The impact of this consequence is a highly
108 effective deterrent in our community. In case     108 effective deterrent in our community. In case a violation happens the
109 hardware security team will inform the involve    109 hardware security team will inform the involved parties immediately. If you
110 or anyone else becomes aware of a potential vi    110 or anyone else becomes aware of a potential violation, please report it
111 immediately to the Hardware security officers.    111 immediately to the Hardware security officers.
112                                                   112 
113                                                   113 
114 Process                                           114 Process
115 ^^^^^^^                                           115 ^^^^^^^
116                                                   116 
117 Due to the globally distributed nature of Linu    117 Due to the globally distributed nature of Linux kernel development,
118 face-to-face meetings are almost impossible to    118 face-to-face meetings are almost impossible to address hardware security
119 issues.  Phone conferences are hard to coordin    119 issues.  Phone conferences are hard to coordinate due to time zones and
120 other factors and should be only used when abs    120 other factors and should be only used when absolutely necessary. Encrypted
121 email has been proven to be the most effective    121 email has been proven to be the most effective and secure communication
122 method for these types of issues.                 122 method for these types of issues.
123                                                   123 
124 Start of Disclosure                               124 Start of Disclosure
125 """""""""""""""""""                               125 """""""""""""""""""
126                                                   126 
127 Disclosure starts by emailing the Linux kernel    127 Disclosure starts by emailing the Linux kernel hardware security team per
128 the Contact section above.  This initial conta    128 the Contact section above.  This initial contact should contain a
129 description of the problem and a list of any k    129 description of the problem and a list of any known affected silicon. If
130 your organization builds or distributes the af    130 your organization builds or distributes the affected hardware, we encourage
131 you to also consider what other hardware could    131 you to also consider what other hardware could be affected.  The disclosing
132 party is responsible for contacting the affect    132 party is responsible for contacting the affected silicon vendors in a
133 timely manner.                                    133 timely manner.
134                                                   134 
135 The hardware security team will provide an inc    135 The hardware security team will provide an incident-specific encrypted
136 mailing list which will be used for initial di    136 mailing list which will be used for initial discussion with the reporter,
137 further disclosure, and coordination of fixes.    137 further disclosure, and coordination of fixes.
138                                                   138 
139 The hardware security team will provide the di    139 The hardware security team will provide the disclosing party a list of
140 developers (domain experts) who should be info    140 developers (domain experts) who should be informed initially about the
141 issue after confirming with the developers tha    141 issue after confirming with the developers that they will adhere to this
142 Memorandum of Understanding and the documented    142 Memorandum of Understanding and the documented process. These developers
143 form the initial response team and will be res    143 form the initial response team and will be responsible for handling the
144 issue after initial contact. The hardware secu    144 issue after initial contact. The hardware security team is supporting the
145 response team, but is not necessarily involved    145 response team, but is not necessarily involved in the mitigation
146 development process.                              146 development process.
147                                                   147 
148 While individual developers might be covered b    148 While individual developers might be covered by a non-disclosure agreement
149 via their employer, they cannot enter individu    149 via their employer, they cannot enter individual non-disclosure agreements
150 in their role as Linux kernel developers. They    150 in their role as Linux kernel developers. They will, however, agree to
151 adhere to this documented process and the Memo    151 adhere to this documented process and the Memorandum of Understanding.
152                                                   152 
153 The disclosing party should provide a list of     153 The disclosing party should provide a list of contacts for all other
154 entities who have already been, or should be,     154 entities who have already been, or should be, informed about the issue.
155 This serves several purposes:                     155 This serves several purposes:
156                                                   156 
157  - The list of disclosed entities allows commu    157  - The list of disclosed entities allows communication across the
158    industry, e.g. other OS vendors, HW vendors    158    industry, e.g. other OS vendors, HW vendors, etc.
159                                                   159 
160  - The disclosed entities can be contacted to     160  - The disclosed entities can be contacted to name experts who should
161    participate in the mitigation development.     161    participate in the mitigation development.
162                                                   162 
163  - If an expert who is required to handle an i    163  - If an expert who is required to handle an issue is employed by a listed
164    entity or member of an listed entity, then     164    entity or member of an listed entity, then the response teams can
165    request the disclosure of that expert from     165    request the disclosure of that expert from that entity. This ensures
166    that the expert is also part of the entity'    166    that the expert is also part of the entity's response team.
167                                                   167 
168 Disclosure                                        168 Disclosure
169 """"""""""                                        169 """"""""""
170                                                   170 
171 The disclosing party provides detailed informa    171 The disclosing party provides detailed information to the initial response
172 team via the specific encrypted mailing-list.     172 team via the specific encrypted mailing-list.
173                                                   173 
174 From our experience, the technical documentati    174 From our experience, the technical documentation of these issues is usually
175 a sufficient starting point, and further techn    175 a sufficient starting point, and further technical clarification is best
176 done via email.                                   176 done via email.
177                                                   177 
178 Mitigation development                            178 Mitigation development
179 """"""""""""""""""""""                            179 """"""""""""""""""""""
180                                                   180 
181 The initial response team sets up an encrypted    181 The initial response team sets up an encrypted mailing-list or repurposes
182 an existing one if appropriate.                   182 an existing one if appropriate.
183                                                   183 
184 Using a mailing list is close to the normal Li    184 Using a mailing list is close to the normal Linux development process and
185 has been successfully used to develop mitigati    185 has been successfully used to develop mitigations for various hardware
186 security issues in the past.                      186 security issues in the past.
187                                                   187 
188 The mailing list operates in the same way as n    188 The mailing list operates in the same way as normal Linux development.
189 Patches are posted, discussed, and reviewed an    189 Patches are posted, discussed, and reviewed and if agreed upon, applied to
190 a non-public git repository which is only acce    190 a non-public git repository which is only accessible to the participating
191 developers via a secure connection. The reposi    191 developers via a secure connection. The repository contains the main
192 development branch against the mainline kernel    192 development branch against the mainline kernel and backport branches for
193 stable kernel versions as necessary.              193 stable kernel versions as necessary.
194                                                   194 
195 The initial response team will identify furthe    195 The initial response team will identify further experts from the Linux
196 kernel developer community as needed.  Any inv    196 kernel developer community as needed.  Any involved party can suggest
197 further experts to be included, each of which     197 further experts to be included, each of which will be subject to the same
198 requirements outlined above.                      198 requirements outlined above.
199                                                   199 
200 Bringing in experts can happen at any time in     200 Bringing in experts can happen at any time in the development process and
201 needs to be handled in a timely manner.           201 needs to be handled in a timely manner.
202                                                   202 
203 If an expert is employed by or a member of an     203 If an expert is employed by or a member of an entity on the disclosure list
204 provided by the disclosing party, then partici    204 provided by the disclosing party, then participation will be requested from
205 the relevant entity.                              205 the relevant entity.
206                                                   206 
207 If not, then the disclosing party will be info    207 If not, then the disclosing party will be informed about the experts'
208 participation. The experts are covered by the     208 participation. The experts are covered by the Memorandum of Understanding
209 and the disclosing party is requested to ackno    209 and the disclosing party is requested to acknowledge their participation.
210 In the case where the disclosing party has a c    210 In the case where the disclosing party has a compelling reason to object,
211 any objection must to be raised within five wo    211 any objection must to be raised within five working days and resolved with
212 the incident team immediately. If the disclosi    212 the incident team immediately. If the disclosing party does not react
213 within five working days this is taken as sile    213 within five working days this is taken as silent acknowledgment.
214                                                   214 
215 After the incident team acknowledges or resolv    215 After the incident team acknowledges or resolves an objection, the expert
216 is disclosed and brought into the development     216 is disclosed and brought into the development process.
217                                                   217 
218 List participants may not communicate about th    218 List participants may not communicate about the issue outside of the
219 private mailing list. List participants may no    219 private mailing list. List participants may not use any shared resources
220 (e.g. employer build farms, CI systems, etc) w    220 (e.g. employer build farms, CI systems, etc) when working on patches.
221                                                   221 
222 Early access                                      222 Early access
223 """"""""""""                                      223 """"""""""""
224                                                   224 
225 The patches discussed and developed on the lis    225 The patches discussed and developed on the list can neither be distributed
226 to any individual who is not a member of the r    226 to any individual who is not a member of the response team nor to any other
227 organization.                                     227 organization.
228                                                   228 
229 To allow the affected silicon vendors to work     229 To allow the affected silicon vendors to work with their internal teams and
230 industry partners on testing, validation, and     230 industry partners on testing, validation, and logistics, the following
231 exception is provided:                            231 exception is provided:
232                                                   232 
233         Designated representatives of the affe    233         Designated representatives of the affected silicon vendors are
234         allowed to hand over the patches at an    234         allowed to hand over the patches at any time to the silicon
235         vendor’s response team. The represen    235         vendor’s response team. The representative must notify the kernel
236         response team about the handover. The     236         response team about the handover. The affected silicon vendor must
237         have and maintain their own documented    237         have and maintain their own documented security process for any
238         patches shared with their response tea    238         patches shared with their response team that is consistent with
239         this policy.                              239         this policy.
240                                                   240 
241         The silicon vendor’s response team c    241         The silicon vendor’s response team can distribute these patches to
242         their industry partners and to their i    242         their industry partners and to their internal teams under the
243         silicon vendor’s documented security    243         silicon vendor’s documented security process. Feedback from the
244         industry partners goes back to the sil    244         industry partners goes back to the silicon vendor and is
245         communicated by the silicon vendor to     245         communicated by the silicon vendor to the kernel response team.
246                                                   246 
247         The handover to the silicon vendor’s    247         The handover to the silicon vendor’s response team removes any
248         responsibility or liability from the k    248         responsibility or liability from the kernel response team regarding
249         premature disclosure, which happens du    249         premature disclosure, which happens due to the involvement of the
250         silicon vendor’s internal teams or i    250         silicon vendor’s internal teams or industry partners. The silicon
251         vendor guarantees this release of liab    251         vendor guarantees this release of liability by agreeing to this
252         process.                                  252         process.
253                                                   253 
254 Coordinated release                               254 Coordinated release
255 """""""""""""""""""                               255 """""""""""""""""""
256                                                   256 
257 The involved parties will negotiate the date a    257 The involved parties will negotiate the date and time when the embargo
258 ends. At that point, the prepared mitigations     258 ends. At that point, the prepared mitigations are published into the
259 relevant kernel trees.  There is no pre-notifi    259 relevant kernel trees.  There is no pre-notification process: the
260 mitigations are published in public and availa    260 mitigations are published in public and available to everyone at the same
261 time.                                             261 time.
262                                                   262 
263 While we understand that hardware security iss    263 While we understand that hardware security issues need coordinated embargo
264 time, the embargo time should be constrained t    264 time, the embargo time should be constrained to the minimum time that is
265 required for all involved parties to develop,     265 required for all involved parties to develop, test, and prepare their
266 mitigations. Extending embargo time artificial    266 mitigations. Extending embargo time artificially to meet conference talk
267 dates or other non-technical reasons creates m    267 dates or other non-technical reasons creates more work and burden for the
268 involved developers and response teams as the     268 involved developers and response teams as the patches need to be kept up to
269 date in order to follow the ongoing upstream k    269 date in order to follow the ongoing upstream kernel development, which
270 might create conflicting changes.                 270 might create conflicting changes.
271                                                   271 
272 CVE assignment                                    272 CVE assignment
273 """"""""""""""                                    273 """"""""""""""
274                                                   274 
275 Neither the hardware security team nor the ini    275 Neither the hardware security team nor the initial response team assign
276 CVEs, nor are CVEs required for the developmen    276 CVEs, nor are CVEs required for the development process. If CVEs are
277 provided by the disclosing party they can be u    277 provided by the disclosing party they can be used for documentation
278 purposes.                                         278 purposes.
279                                                   279 
280 Process ambassadors                               280 Process ambassadors
281 -------------------                               281 -------------------
282                                                   282 
283 For assistance with this process we have estab    283 For assistance with this process we have established ambassadors in various
284 organizations, who can answer questions about     284 organizations, who can answer questions about or provide guidance on the
285 reporting process and further handling. Ambass    285 reporting process and further handling. Ambassadors are not involved in the
286 disclosure of a particular issue, unless reque    286 disclosure of a particular issue, unless requested by a response team or by
287 an involved disclosed party. The current ambas    287 an involved disclosed party. The current ambassadors list:
288                                                   288 
289   ============= ==============================    289   ============= ========================================================
290   AMD           Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@a    290   AMD           Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
291   Ampere        Darren Hart <darren@os.ampereco    291   Ampere        Darren Hart <darren@os.amperecomputing.com>
292   ARM           Catalin Marinas <catalin.marina    292   ARM           Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
293   IBM Power     Michael Ellerman <ellerman@au.i    293   IBM Power     Michael Ellerman <ellerman@au.ibm.com>
294   IBM Z         Christian Borntraeger <borntrae    294   IBM Z         Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
295   Intel         Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>    295   Intel         Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
296   Qualcomm      Trilok Soni <quic_tsoni@quicinc    296   Qualcomm      Trilok Soni <quic_tsoni@quicinc.com>
297   RISC-V        Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.    297   RISC-V        Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
298   Samsung       Javier González <javier.gonz@s    298   Samsung       Javier González <javier.gonz@samsung.com>
299                                                   299 
300   Microsoft     James Morris <jamorris@linux.mi    300   Microsoft     James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
301   Xen           Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@c    301   Xen           Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
302                                                   302 
303   Canonical     John Johansen <john.johansen@ca    303   Canonical     John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
304   Debian        Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org    304   Debian        Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
305   Oracle        Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.w    305   Oracle        Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
306   Red Hat       Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat    306   Red Hat       Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
307   SUSE          Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>      307   SUSE          Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
308                                                   308 
309   Google        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.or    309   Google        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
310                                                   310 
311   LLVM          Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@    311   LLVM          Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
312   ============= ==============================    312   ============= ========================================================
313                                                   313 
314 If you want your organization to be added to t    314 If you want your organization to be added to the ambassadors list, please
315 contact the hardware security team. The nomina    315 contact the hardware security team. The nominated ambassador has to
316 understand and support our process fully and i    316 understand and support our process fully and is ideally well-connected in
317 the Linux kernel community.                       317 the Linux kernel community.
318                                                   318 
319 Encrypted mailing-lists                           319 Encrypted mailing-lists
320 -----------------------                           320 -----------------------
321                                                   321 
322 We use encrypted mailing lists for communicati    322 We use encrypted mailing lists for communication. The operating principle
323 of these lists is that email sent to the list     323 of these lists is that email sent to the list is encrypted either with the
324 list's PGP key or with the list's S/MIME certi    324 list's PGP key or with the list's S/MIME certificate. The mailing list
325 software decrypts the email and re-encrypts it    325 software decrypts the email and re-encrypts it individually for each
326 subscriber with the subscriber's PGP key or S/    326 subscriber with the subscriber's PGP key or S/MIME certificate. Details
327 about the mailing list software and the setup     327 about the mailing list software and the setup that is used to ensure the
328 security of the lists and protection of the da    328 security of the lists and protection of the data can be found here:
329 https://korg.wiki.kernel.org/userdoc/remail.      329 https://korg.wiki.kernel.org/userdoc/remail.
330                                                   330 
331 List keys                                         331 List keys
332 ^^^^^^^^^                                         332 ^^^^^^^^^
333                                                   333 
334 For initial contact see the :ref:`Contact` sec    334 For initial contact see the :ref:`Contact` section above. For incident
335 specific mailing lists, the key and S/MIME cer    335 specific mailing lists, the key and S/MIME certificate are conveyed to the
336 subscribers by email sent from the specific li    336 subscribers by email sent from the specific list.
337                                                   337 
338 Subscription to incident-specific lists           338 Subscription to incident-specific lists
339 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^           339 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
340                                                   340 
341 Subscription to incident-specific lists is han    341 Subscription to incident-specific lists is handled by the response teams.
342 Disclosed parties who want to participate in t    342 Disclosed parties who want to participate in the communication send a list
343 of potential experts to the response team so t    343 of potential experts to the response team so the response team can validate
344 subscription requests.                            344 subscription requests.
345                                                   345 
346 Each subscriber needs to send a subscription r    346 Each subscriber needs to send a subscription request to the response team
347 by email. The email must be signed with the su    347 by email. The email must be signed with the subscriber's PGP key or S/MIME
348 certificate. If a PGP key is used, it must be     348 certificate. If a PGP key is used, it must be available from a public key
349 server and is ideally connected to the Linux k    349 server and is ideally connected to the Linux kernel's PGP web of trust. See
350 also: https://www.kernel.org/signature.html.      350 also: https://www.kernel.org/signature.html.
351                                                   351 
352 The response team verifies that the subscriber    352 The response team verifies that the subscriber request is valid and adds
353 the subscriber to the list. After subscription    353 the subscriber to the list. After subscription the subscriber will receive
354 email from the mailing-list which is signed ei    354 email from the mailing-list which is signed either with the list's PGP key
355 or the list's S/MIME certificate. The subscrib    355 or the list's S/MIME certificate. The subscriber's email client can extract
356 the PGP key or the S/MIME certificate from the    356 the PGP key or the S/MIME certificate from the signature so the subscriber
357 can send encrypted email to the list.             357 can send encrypted email to the list.
358                                                   358 
                                                      

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