1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2 /* 2 /*
3 * Implementation of HKDF ("HMAC-based Extract 3 * Implementation of HKDF ("HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation
4 * Function"), aka RFC 5869. See also the ori 4 * Function"), aka RFC 5869. See also the original paper (Krawczyk 2010):
5 * "Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivatio 5 * "Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme".
6 * 6 *
7 * This is used to derive keys from the fscryp 7 * This is used to derive keys from the fscrypt master keys.
8 * 8 *
9 * Copyright 2019 Google LLC 9 * Copyright 2019 Google LLC
10 */ 10 */
11 11
12 #include <crypto/hash.h> 12 #include <crypto/hash.h>
13 #include <crypto/sha2.h> 13 #include <crypto/sha2.h>
14 14
15 #include "fscrypt_private.h" 15 #include "fscrypt_private.h"
16 16
17 /* 17 /*
18 * HKDF supports any unkeyed cryptographic has 18 * HKDF supports any unkeyed cryptographic hash algorithm, but fscrypt uses
19 * SHA-512 because it is well-established, sec 19 * SHA-512 because it is well-established, secure, and reasonably efficient.
20 * 20 *
21 * HKDF-SHA256 was also considered, as its 256 21 * HKDF-SHA256 was also considered, as its 256-bit security strength would be
22 * sufficient here. A 512-bit security streng 22 * sufficient here. A 512-bit security strength is "nice to have", though.
23 * Also, on 64-bit CPUs, SHA-512 is usually ju 23 * Also, on 64-bit CPUs, SHA-512 is usually just as fast as SHA-256. In the
24 * common case of deriving an AES-256-XTS key 24 * common case of deriving an AES-256-XTS key (512 bits), that can result in
25 * HKDF-SHA512 being much faster than HKDF-SHA 25 * HKDF-SHA512 being much faster than HKDF-SHA256, as the longer digest size of
26 * SHA-512 causes HKDF-Expand to only need to 26 * SHA-512 causes HKDF-Expand to only need to do one iteration rather than two.
27 */ 27 */
28 #define HKDF_HMAC_ALG "hmac(sha512)" 28 #define HKDF_HMAC_ALG "hmac(sha512)"
29 #define HKDF_HASHLEN SHA512_DIGEST_ 29 #define HKDF_HASHLEN SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
30 30
31 /* 31 /*
32 * HKDF consists of two steps: 32 * HKDF consists of two steps:
33 * 33 *
34 * 1. HKDF-Extract: extract a pseudorandom key 34 * 1. HKDF-Extract: extract a pseudorandom key of length HKDF_HASHLEN bytes from
35 * the input keying material and optional s 35 * the input keying material and optional salt.
36 * 2. HKDF-Expand: expand the pseudorandom key 36 * 2. HKDF-Expand: expand the pseudorandom key into output keying material of
37 * any length, parameterized by an applicat 37 * any length, parameterized by an application-specific info string.
38 * 38 *
39 * HKDF-Extract can be skipped if the input is 39 * HKDF-Extract can be skipped if the input is already a pseudorandom key of
40 * length HKDF_HASHLEN bytes. However, cipher 40 * length HKDF_HASHLEN bytes. However, cipher modes other than AES-256-XTS take
41 * shorter keys, and we don't want to force us 41 * shorter keys, and we don't want to force users of those modes to provide
42 * unnecessarily long master keys. Thus fscry 42 * unnecessarily long master keys. Thus fscrypt still does HKDF-Extract. No
43 * salt is used, since fscrypt master keys sho 43 * salt is used, since fscrypt master keys should already be pseudorandom and
44 * there's no way to persist a random salt per 44 * there's no way to persist a random salt per master key from kernel mode.
45 */ 45 */
46 46
47 /* HKDF-Extract (RFC 5869 section 2.2), unsalt 47 /* HKDF-Extract (RFC 5869 section 2.2), unsalted */
48 static int hkdf_extract(struct crypto_shash *h 48 static int hkdf_extract(struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm, const u8 *ikm,
49 unsigned int ikmlen, u 49 unsigned int ikmlen, u8 prk[HKDF_HASHLEN])
50 { 50 {
51 static const u8 default_salt[HKDF_HASH 51 static const u8 default_salt[HKDF_HASHLEN];
52 int err; 52 int err;
53 53
54 err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac_tfm, de 54 err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac_tfm, default_salt, HKDF_HASHLEN);
55 if (err) 55 if (err)
56 return err; 56 return err;
57 57
58 return crypto_shash_tfm_digest(hmac_tf 58 return crypto_shash_tfm_digest(hmac_tfm, ikm, ikmlen, prk);
59 } 59 }
60 60
61 /* 61 /*
62 * Compute HKDF-Extract using the given master 62 * Compute HKDF-Extract using the given master key as the input keying material,
63 * and prepare an HMAC transform object keyed 63 * and prepare an HMAC transform object keyed by the resulting pseudorandom key.
64 * 64 *
65 * Afterwards, the keyed HMAC transform object 65 * Afterwards, the keyed HMAC transform object can be used for HKDF-Expand many
66 * times without having to recompute HKDF-Extr 66 * times without having to recompute HKDF-Extract each time.
67 */ 67 */
68 int fscrypt_init_hkdf(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkd 68 int fscrypt_init_hkdf(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, const u8 *master_key,
69 unsigned int master_key_ 69 unsigned int master_key_size)
70 { 70 {
71 struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm; 71 struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
72 u8 prk[HKDF_HASHLEN]; 72 u8 prk[HKDF_HASHLEN];
73 int err; 73 int err;
74 74
75 hmac_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(HKDF_HMA 75 hmac_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(HKDF_HMAC_ALG, 0, 0);
76 if (IS_ERR(hmac_tfm)) { 76 if (IS_ERR(hmac_tfm)) {
77 fscrypt_err(NULL, "Error alloc 77 fscrypt_err(NULL, "Error allocating " HKDF_HMAC_ALG ": %ld",
78 PTR_ERR(hmac_tfm)) 78 PTR_ERR(hmac_tfm));
79 return PTR_ERR(hmac_tfm); 79 return PTR_ERR(hmac_tfm);
80 } 80 }
81 81
82 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crypto_shash_digestsi !! 82 if (WARN_ON(crypto_shash_digestsize(hmac_tfm) != sizeof(prk))) {
83 err = -EINVAL; 83 err = -EINVAL;
84 goto err_free_tfm; 84 goto err_free_tfm;
85 } 85 }
86 86
87 err = hkdf_extract(hmac_tfm, master_ke 87 err = hkdf_extract(hmac_tfm, master_key, master_key_size, prk);
88 if (err) 88 if (err)
89 goto err_free_tfm; 89 goto err_free_tfm;
90 90
91 err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac_tfm, pr 91 err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac_tfm, prk, sizeof(prk));
92 if (err) 92 if (err)
93 goto err_free_tfm; 93 goto err_free_tfm;
94 94
95 hkdf->hmac_tfm = hmac_tfm; 95 hkdf->hmac_tfm = hmac_tfm;
96 goto out; 96 goto out;
97 97
98 err_free_tfm: 98 err_free_tfm:
99 crypto_free_shash(hmac_tfm); 99 crypto_free_shash(hmac_tfm);
100 out: 100 out:
101 memzero_explicit(prk, sizeof(prk)); 101 memzero_explicit(prk, sizeof(prk));
102 return err; 102 return err;
103 } 103 }
104 104
105 /* 105 /*
106 * HKDF-Expand (RFC 5869 section 2.3). This e 106 * HKDF-Expand (RFC 5869 section 2.3). This expands the pseudorandom key, which
107 * was already keyed into 'hkdf->hmac_tfm' by 107 * was already keyed into 'hkdf->hmac_tfm' by fscrypt_init_hkdf(), into 'okmlen'
108 * bytes of output keying material parameteriz 108 * bytes of output keying material parameterized by the application-specific
109 * 'info' of length 'infolen' bytes, prefixed 109 * 'info' of length 'infolen' bytes, prefixed by "fscrypt\0" and the 'context'
110 * byte. This is thread-safe and may be calle 110 * byte. This is thread-safe and may be called by multiple threads in parallel.
111 * 111 *
112 * ('context' isn't part of the HKDF specifica 112 * ('context' isn't part of the HKDF specification; it's just a prefix fscrypt
113 * adds to its application-specific info strin 113 * adds to its application-specific info strings to guarantee that it doesn't
114 * accidentally repeat an info string when usi 114 * accidentally repeat an info string when using HKDF for different purposes.)
115 */ 115 */
116 int fscrypt_hkdf_expand(const struct fscrypt_h 116 int fscrypt_hkdf_expand(const struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, u8 context,
117 const u8 *info, unsign 117 const u8 *info, unsigned int infolen,
118 u8 *okm, unsigned int 118 u8 *okm, unsigned int okmlen)
119 { 119 {
120 SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, hkdf->hmac_t 120 SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, hkdf->hmac_tfm);
121 u8 prefix[9]; 121 u8 prefix[9];
122 unsigned int i; 122 unsigned int i;
123 int err; 123 int err;
124 const u8 *prev = NULL; 124 const u8 *prev = NULL;
125 u8 counter = 1; 125 u8 counter = 1;
126 u8 tmp[HKDF_HASHLEN]; 126 u8 tmp[HKDF_HASHLEN];
127 127
128 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(okmlen > 255 * HKDF_H !! 128 if (WARN_ON(okmlen > 255 * HKDF_HASHLEN))
129 return -EINVAL; 129 return -EINVAL;
130 130
131 desc->tfm = hkdf->hmac_tfm; 131 desc->tfm = hkdf->hmac_tfm;
132 132
133 memcpy(prefix, "fscrypt\0", 8); 133 memcpy(prefix, "fscrypt\0", 8);
134 prefix[8] = context; 134 prefix[8] = context;
135 135
136 for (i = 0; i < okmlen; i += HKDF_HASH 136 for (i = 0; i < okmlen; i += HKDF_HASHLEN) {
137 137
138 err = crypto_shash_init(desc); 138 err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
139 if (err) 139 if (err)
140 goto out; 140 goto out;
141 141
142 if (prev) { 142 if (prev) {
143 err = crypto_shash_upd 143 err = crypto_shash_update(desc, prev, HKDF_HASHLEN);
144 if (err) 144 if (err)
145 goto out; 145 goto out;
146 } 146 }
147 147
148 err = crypto_shash_update(desc 148 err = crypto_shash_update(desc, prefix, sizeof(prefix));
149 if (err) 149 if (err)
150 goto out; 150 goto out;
151 151
152 err = crypto_shash_update(desc 152 err = crypto_shash_update(desc, info, infolen);
153 if (err) 153 if (err)
154 goto out; 154 goto out;
155 155
156 BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(counter) ! 156 BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(counter) != 1);
157 if (okmlen - i < HKDF_HASHLEN) 157 if (okmlen - i < HKDF_HASHLEN) {
158 err = crypto_shash_fin 158 err = crypto_shash_finup(desc, &counter, 1, tmp);
159 if (err) 159 if (err)
160 goto out; 160 goto out;
161 memcpy(&okm[i], tmp, o 161 memcpy(&okm[i], tmp, okmlen - i);
162 memzero_explicit(tmp, 162 memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
163 } else { 163 } else {
164 err = crypto_shash_fin 164 err = crypto_shash_finup(desc, &counter, 1, &okm[i]);
165 if (err) 165 if (err)
166 goto out; 166 goto out;
167 } 167 }
168 counter++; 168 counter++;
169 prev = &okm[i]; 169 prev = &okm[i];
170 } 170 }
171 err = 0; 171 err = 0;
172 out: 172 out:
173 if (unlikely(err)) 173 if (unlikely(err))
174 memzero_explicit(okm, okmlen); 174 memzero_explicit(okm, okmlen); /* so caller doesn't need to */
175 shash_desc_zero(desc); 175 shash_desc_zero(desc);
176 return err; 176 return err;
177 } 177 }
178 178
179 void fscrypt_destroy_hkdf(struct fscrypt_hkdf 179 void fscrypt_destroy_hkdf(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf)
180 { 180 {
181 crypto_free_shash(hkdf->hmac_tfm); 181 crypto_free_shash(hkdf->hmac_tfm);
182 } 182 }
183 183
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