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Linux/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst

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  1 .. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
  2 
  3 GDS - Gather Data Sampling
  4 ==========================
  5 
  6 Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
  7 speculative access to data which was previously stored in vector registers.
  8 
  9 Problem
 10 -------
 11 When a gather instruction performs loads from memory, different data elements
 12 are merged into the destination vector register. However, when a gather
 13 instruction that is transiently executed encounters a fault, stale data from
 14 architectural or internal vector registers may get transiently forwarded to the
 15 destination vector register instead. This will allow a malicious attacker to
 16 infer stale data using typical side channel techniques like cache timing
 17 attacks. GDS is a purely sampling-based attack.
 18 
 19 The attacker uses gather instructions to infer the stale vector register data.
 20 The victim does not need to do anything special other than use the vector
 21 registers. The victim does not need to use gather instructions to be
 22 vulnerable.
 23 
 24 Because the buffers are shared between Hyper-Threads cross Hyper-Thread attacks
 25 are possible.
 26 
 27 Attack scenarios
 28 ----------------
 29 Without mitigation, GDS can infer stale data across virtually all
 30 permission boundaries:
 31 
 32         Non-enclaves can infer SGX enclave data
 33         Userspace can infer kernel data
 34         Guests can infer data from hosts
 35         Guest can infer guest from other guests
 36         Users can infer data from other users
 37 
 38 Because of this, it is important to ensure that the mitigation stays enabled in
 39 lower-privilege contexts like guests and when running outside SGX enclaves.
 40 
 41 The hardware enforces the mitigation for SGX. Likewise, VMMs should  ensure
 42 that guests are not allowed to disable the GDS mitigation. If a host erred and
 43 allowed this, a guest could theoretically disable GDS mitigation, mount an
 44 attack, and re-enable it.
 45 
 46 Mitigation mechanism
 47 --------------------
 48 This issue is mitigated in microcode. The microcode defines the following new
 49 bits:
 50 
 51  ================================   ===   ============================
 52  IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_CTRL]   R/O   Enumerates GDS vulnerability
 53                                           and mitigation support.
 54  IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_NO]     R/O   Processor is not vulnerable.
 55  IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_DIS]    R/W   Disables the mitigation
 56                                           0 by default.
 57  IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_LOCK]   R/W   Locks GDS_MITG_DIS=0. Writes
 58                                           to GDS_MITG_DIS are ignored
 59                                           Can't be cleared once set.
 60  ================================   ===   ============================
 61 
 62 GDS can also be mitigated on systems that don't have updated microcode by
 63 disabling AVX. This can be done by setting gather_data_sampling="force" or
 64 "clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel command-line.
 65 
 66 If used, these options will disable AVX use by turning off XSAVE YMM support.
 67 However, the processor will still enumerate AVX support.  Userspace that
 68 does not follow proper AVX enumeration to check both AVX *and* XSAVE YMM
 69 support will break.
 70 
 71 Mitigation control on the kernel command line
 72 ---------------------------------------------
 73 The mitigation can be disabled by setting "gather_data_sampling=off" or
 74 "mitigations=off" on the kernel command line. Not specifying either will default
 75 to the mitigation being enabled. Specifying "gather_data_sampling=force" will
 76 use the microcode mitigation when available or disable AVX on affected systems
 77 where the microcode hasn't been updated to include the mitigation.
 78 
 79 GDS System Information
 80 ------------------------
 81 The kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For
 82 GDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
 83 
 84 /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling
 85 
 86 The possible values contained in this file are:
 87 
 88  ============================== =============================================
 89  Not affected                   Processor not vulnerable.
 90  Vulnerable                     Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled.
 91  Vulnerable: No microcode       Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
 92                                 mitigation.
 93  Mitigation: AVX disabled,
 94  no microcode                   Processor is vulnerable and microcode is missing
 95                                 mitigation. AVX disabled as mitigation.
 96  Mitigation: Microcode          Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
 97                                 effect.
 98  Mitigation: Microcode (locked) Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
 99                                 effect and cannot be disabled.
100  Unknown: Dependent on
101  hypervisor status              Running on a virtual guest processor that is
102                                 affected but with no way to know if host
103                                 processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
104  ============================== =============================================
105 
106 GDS Default mitigation
107 ----------------------
108 The updated microcode will enable the mitigation by default. The kernel's
109 default action is to leave the mitigation enabled.

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