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Linux/Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst

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  1 .. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
  2 
  3 =============================================
  4 Asymmetric / Public-key Cryptography Key Type
  5 =============================================
  6 
  7 .. Contents:
  8 
  9   - Overview.
 10   - Key identification.
 11   - Accessing asymmetric keys.
 12     - Signature verification.
 13   - Asymmetric key subtypes.
 14   - Instantiation data parsers.
 15   - Keyring link restrictions.
 16 
 17 
 18 Overview
 19 ========
 20 
 21 The "asymmetric" key type is designed to be a container for the keys used in
 22 public-key cryptography, without imposing any particular restrictions on the
 23 form or mechanism of the cryptography or form of the key.
 24 
 25 The asymmetric key is given a subtype that defines what sort of data is
 26 associated with the key and provides operations to describe and destroy it.
 27 However, no requirement is made that the key data actually be stored in the
 28 key.
 29 
 30 A completely in-kernel key retention and operation subtype can be defined, but
 31 it would also be possible to provide access to cryptographic hardware (such as
 32 a TPM) that might be used to both retain the relevant key and perform
 33 operations using that key.  In such a case, the asymmetric key would then
 34 merely be an interface to the TPM driver.
 35 
 36 Also provided is the concept of a data parser.  Data parsers are responsible
 37 for extracting information from the blobs of data passed to the instantiation
 38 function.  The first data parser that recognises the blob gets to set the
 39 subtype of the key and define the operations that can be done on that key.
 40 
 41 A data parser may interpret the data blob as containing the bits representing a
 42 key, or it may interpret it as a reference to a key held somewhere else in the
 43 system (for example, a TPM).
 44 
 45 
 46 Key Identification
 47 ==================
 48 
 49 If a key is added with an empty name, the instantiation data parsers are given
 50 the opportunity to pre-parse a key and to determine the description the key
 51 should be given from the content of the key.
 52 
 53 This can then be used to refer to the key, either by complete match or by
 54 partial match.  The key type may also use other criteria to refer to a key.
 55 
 56 The asymmetric key type's match function can then perform a wider range of
 57 comparisons than just the straightforward comparison of the description with
 58 the criterion string:
 59 
 60   1) If the criterion string is of the form "id:<hexdigits>" then the match
 61      function will examine a key's fingerprint to see if the hex digits given
 62      after the "id:" match the tail.  For instance::
 63 
 64         keyctl search @s asymmetric id:5acc2142
 65 
 66      will match a key with fingerprint::
 67 
 68         1A00 2040 7601 7889 DE11  882C 3823 04AD 5ACC 2142
 69 
 70   2) If the criterion string is of the form "<subtype>:<hexdigits>" then the
 71      match will match the ID as in (1), but with the added restriction that
 72      only keys of the specified subtype (e.g. tpm) will be matched.  For
 73      instance::
 74 
 75         keyctl search @s asymmetric tpm:5acc2142
 76 
 77 Looking in /proc/keys, the last 8 hex digits of the key fingerprint are
 78 displayed, along with the subtype::
 79 
 80         1a39e171 I-----     1 perm 3f010000     0     0 asymmetric modsign.0: DSA 5acc2142 []
 81 
 82 
 83 Accessing Asymmetric Keys
 84 =========================
 85 
 86 For general access to asymmetric keys from within the kernel, the following
 87 inclusion is required::
 88 
 89         #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 90 
 91 This gives access to functions for dealing with asymmetric / public keys.
 92 Three enums are defined there for representing public-key cryptography
 93 algorithms::
 94 
 95         enum pkey_algo
 96 
 97 digest algorithms used by those::
 98 
 99         enum pkey_hash_algo
100 
101 and key identifier representations::
102 
103         enum pkey_id_type
104 
105 Note that the key type representation types are required because key
106 identifiers from different standards aren't necessarily compatible.  For
107 instance, PGP generates key identifiers by hashing the key data plus some
108 PGP-specific metadata, whereas X.509 has arbitrary certificate identifiers.
109 
110 The operations defined upon a key are:
111 
112   1) Signature verification.
113 
114 Other operations are possible (such as encryption) with the same key data
115 required for verification, but not currently supported, and others
116 (eg. decryption and signature generation) require extra key data.
117 
118 
119 Signature Verification
120 ----------------------
121 
122 An operation is provided to perform cryptographic signature verification, using
123 an asymmetric key to provide or to provide access to the public key::
124 
125         int verify_signature(const struct key *key,
126                              const struct public_key_signature *sig);
127 
128 The caller must have already obtained the key from some source and can then use
129 it to check the signature.  The caller must have parsed the signature and
130 transferred the relevant bits to the structure pointed to by sig::
131 
132         struct public_key_signature {
133                 u8 *digest;
134                 u8 digest_size;
135                 enum pkey_hash_algo pkey_hash_algo : 8;
136                 u8 nr_mpi;
137                 union {
138                         MPI mpi[2];
139                         ...
140                 };
141         };
142 
143 The algorithm used must be noted in sig->pkey_hash_algo, and all the MPIs that
144 make up the actual signature must be stored in sig->mpi[] and the count of MPIs
145 placed in sig->nr_mpi.
146 
147 In addition, the data must have been digested by the caller and the resulting
148 hash must be pointed to by sig->digest and the size of the hash be placed in
149 sig->digest_size.
150 
151 The function will return 0 upon success or -EKEYREJECTED if the signature
152 doesn't match.
153 
154 The function may also return -ENOTSUPP if an unsupported public-key algorithm
155 or public-key/hash algorithm combination is specified or the key doesn't
156 support the operation; -EBADMSG or -ERANGE if some of the parameters have weird
157 data; or -ENOMEM if an allocation can't be performed.  -EINVAL can be returned
158 if the key argument is the wrong type or is incompletely set up.
159 
160 
161 Asymmetric Key Subtypes
162 =======================
163 
164 Asymmetric keys have a subtype that defines the set of operations that can be
165 performed on that key and that determines what data is attached as the key
166 payload.  The payload format is entirely at the whim of the subtype.
167 
168 The subtype is selected by the key data parser and the parser must initialise
169 the data required for it.  The asymmetric key retains a reference on the
170 subtype module.
171 
172 The subtype definition structure can be found in::
173 
174         #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
175 
176 and looks like the following::
177 
178         struct asymmetric_key_subtype {
179                 struct module           *owner;
180                 const char              *name;
181 
182                 void (*describe)(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m);
183                 void (*destroy)(void *payload);
184                 int (*query)(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
185                              struct kernel_pkey_query *info);
186                 int (*eds_op)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
187                               const void *in, void *out);
188                 int (*verify_signature)(const struct key *key,
189                                         const struct public_key_signature *sig);
190         };
191 
192 Asymmetric keys point to this with their payload[asym_subtype] member.
193 
194 The owner and name fields should be set to the owning module and the name of
195 the subtype.  Currently, the name is only used for print statements.
196 
197 There are a number of operations defined by the subtype:
198 
199   1) describe().
200 
201      Mandatory.  This allows the subtype to display something in /proc/keys
202      against the key.  For instance the name of the public key algorithm type
203      could be displayed.  The key type will display the tail of the key
204      identity string after this.
205 
206   2) destroy().
207 
208      Mandatory.  This should free the memory associated with the key.  The
209      asymmetric key will look after freeing the fingerprint and releasing the
210      reference on the subtype module.
211 
212   3) query().
213 
214      Mandatory.  This is a function for querying the capabilities of a key.
215 
216   4) eds_op().
217 
218      Optional.  This is the entry point for the encryption, decryption and
219      signature creation operations (which are distinguished by the operation ID
220      in the parameter struct).  The subtype may do anything it likes to
221      implement an operation, including offloading to hardware.
222 
223   5) verify_signature().
224 
225      Optional.  This is the entry point for signature verification.  The
226      subtype may do anything it likes to implement an operation, including
227      offloading to hardware.
228 
229 Instantiation Data Parsers
230 ==========================
231 
232 The asymmetric key type doesn't generally want to store or to deal with a raw
233 blob of data that holds the key data.  It would have to parse it and error
234 check it each time it wanted to use it.  Further, the contents of the blob may
235 have various checks that can be performed on it (eg. self-signatures, validity
236 dates) and may contain useful data about the key (identifiers, capabilities).
237 
238 Also, the blob may represent a pointer to some hardware containing the key
239 rather than the key itself.
240 
241 Examples of blob formats for which parsers could be implemented include:
242 
243  - OpenPGP packet stream [RFC 4880].
244  - X.509 ASN.1 stream.
245  - Pointer to TPM key.
246  - Pointer to UEFI key.
247  - PKCS#8 private key [RFC 5208].
248  - PKCS#5 encrypted private key [RFC 2898].
249 
250 During key instantiation each parser in the list is tried until one doesn't
251 return -EBADMSG.
252 
253 The parser definition structure can be found in::
254 
255         #include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
256 
257 and looks like the following::
258 
259         struct asymmetric_key_parser {
260                 struct module   *owner;
261                 const char      *name;
262 
263                 int (*parse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
264         };
265 
266 The owner and name fields should be set to the owning module and the name of
267 the parser.
268 
269 There is currently only a single operation defined by the parser, and it is
270 mandatory:
271 
272   1) parse().
273 
274      This is called to preparse the key from the key creation and update paths.
275      In particular, it is called during the key creation _before_ a key is
276      allocated, and as such, is permitted to provide the key's description in
277      the case that the caller declines to do so.
278 
279      The caller passes a pointer to the following struct with all of the fields
280      cleared, except for data, datalen and quotalen [see
281      Documentation/security/keys/core.rst]::
282 
283         struct key_preparsed_payload {
284                 char            *description;
285                 void            *payload[4];
286                 const void      *data;
287                 size_t          datalen;
288                 size_t          quotalen;
289         };
290 
291      The instantiation data is in a blob pointed to by data and is datalen in
292      size.  The parse() function is not permitted to change these two values at
293      all, and shouldn't change any of the other values _unless_ they are
294      recognise the blob format and will not return -EBADMSG to indicate it is
295      not theirs.
296 
297      If the parser is happy with the blob, it should propose a description for
298      the key and attach it to ->description, ->payload[asym_subtype] should be
299      set to point to the subtype to be used, ->payload[asym_crypto] should be
300      set to point to the initialised data for that subtype,
301      ->payload[asym_key_ids] should point to one or more hex fingerprints and
302      quotalen should be updated to indicate how much quota this key should
303      account for.
304 
305      When clearing up, the data attached to ->payload[asym_key_ids] and
306      ->description will be kfree()'d and the data attached to
307      ->payload[asm_crypto] will be passed to the subtype's ->destroy() method
308      to be disposed of.  A module reference for the subtype pointed to by
309      ->payload[asym_subtype] will be put.
310 
311 
312      If the data format is not recognised, -EBADMSG should be returned.  If it
313      is recognised, but the key cannot for some reason be set up, some other
314      negative error code should be returned.  On success, 0 should be returned.
315 
316      The key's fingerprint string may be partially matched upon.  For a
317      public-key algorithm such as RSA and DSA this will likely be a printable
318      hex version of the key's fingerprint.
319 
320 Functions are provided to register and unregister parsers::
321 
322         int register_asymmetric_key_parser(struct asymmetric_key_parser *parser);
323         void unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(struct asymmetric_key_parser *subtype);
324 
325 Parsers may not have the same name.  The names are otherwise only used for
326 displaying in debugging messages.
327 
328 
329 Keyring Link Restrictions
330 =========================
331 
332 Keyrings created from userspace using add_key can be configured to check the
333 signature of the key being linked.  Keys without a valid signature are not
334 allowed to link.
335 
336 Several restriction methods are available:
337 
338   1) Restrict using the kernel builtin trusted keyring
339 
340      - Option string used with KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING:
341        - "builtin_trusted"
342 
343      The kernel builtin trusted keyring will be searched for the signing key.
344      If the builtin trusted keyring is not configured, all links will be
345      rejected.  The ca_keys kernel parameter also affects which keys are used
346      for signature verification.
347 
348   2) Restrict using the kernel builtin and secondary trusted keyrings
349 
350      - Option string used with KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING:
351        - "builtin_and_secondary_trusted"
352 
353      The kernel builtin and secondary trusted keyrings will be searched for the
354      signing key.  If the secondary trusted keyring is not configured, this
355      restriction will behave like the "builtin_trusted" option.  The ca_keys
356      kernel parameter also affects which keys are used for signature
357      verification.
358 
359   3) Restrict using a separate key or keyring
360 
361      - Option string used with KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING:
362        - "key_or_keyring:<key or keyring serial number>[:chain]"
363 
364      Whenever a key link is requested, the link will only succeed if the key
365      being linked is signed by one of the designated keys.  This key may be
366      specified directly by providing a serial number for one asymmetric key, or
367      a group of keys may be searched for the signing key by providing the
368      serial number for a keyring.
369 
370      When the "chain" option is provided at the end of the string, the keys
371      within the destination keyring will also be searched for signing keys.
372      This allows for verification of certificate chains by adding each
373      certificate in order (starting closest to the root) to a keyring.  For
374      instance, one keyring can be populated with links to a set of root
375      certificates, with a separate, restricted keyring set up for each
376      certificate chain to be validated::
377 
378         # Create and populate a keyring for root certificates
379         root_id=`keyctl add keyring root-certs "" @s`
380         keyctl padd asymmetric "" $root_id < root1.cert
381         keyctl padd asymmetric "" $root_id < root2.cert
382 
383         # Create and restrict a keyring for the certificate chain
384         chain_id=`keyctl add keyring chain "" @s`
385         keyctl restrict_keyring $chain_id asymmetric key_or_keyring:$root_id:chain
386 
387         # Attempt to add each certificate in the chain, starting with the
388         # certificate closest to the root.
389         keyctl padd asymmetric "" $chain_id < intermediateA.cert
390         keyctl padd asymmetric "" $chain_id < intermediateB.cert
391         keyctl padd asymmetric "" $chain_id < end-entity.cert
392 
393      If the final end-entity certificate is successfully added to the "chain"
394      keyring, we can be certain that it has a valid signing chain going back to
395      one of the root certificates.
396 
397      A single keyring can be used to verify a chain of signatures by
398      restricting the keyring after linking the root certificate::
399 
400         # Create a keyring for the certificate chain and add the root
401         chain2_id=`keyctl add keyring chain2 "" @s`
402         keyctl padd asymmetric "" $chain2_id < root1.cert
403 
404         # Restrict the keyring that already has root1.cert linked.  The cert
405         # will remain linked by the keyring.
406         keyctl restrict_keyring $chain2_id asymmetric key_or_keyring:0:chain
407 
408         # Attempt to add each certificate in the chain, starting with the
409         # certificate closest to the root.
410         keyctl padd asymmetric "" $chain2_id < intermediateA.cert
411         keyctl padd asymmetric "" $chain2_id < intermediateB.cert
412         keyctl padd asymmetric "" $chain2_id < end-entity.cert
413 
414      If the final end-entity certificate is successfully added to the "chain2"
415      keyring, we can be certain that there is a valid signing chain going back
416      to the root certificate that was added before the keyring was restricted.
417 
418 
419 In all of these cases, if the signing key is found the signature of the key to
420 be linked will be verified using the signing key.  The requested key is added
421 to the keyring only if the signature is successfully verified.  -ENOKEY is
422 returned if the parent certificate could not be found, or -EKEYREJECTED is
423 returned if the signature check fails or the key is blacklisted.  Other errors
424 may be returned if the signature check could not be performed.

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