TOMOYO Linux Cross Reference
Linux/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c

   // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
   /*
    * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
    *
    * This module enables machines with Intel VT-x extensions to run virtual
    * machines without emulation or binary translation.
    *
    * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc.
    * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
   *
   * Authors:
   *   Avi Kivity   <avi@qumranet.com>
   *   Yaniv Kamay  <yaniv@qumranet.com>
   */
  #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
  
  #include <linux/highmem.h>
  #include <linux/hrtimer.h>
  #include <linux/kernel.h>
  #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
  #include <linux/module.h>
  #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
  #include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
  #include <linux/mm.h>
  #include <linux/objtool.h>
  #include <linux/sched.h>
  #include <linux/sched/smt.h>
  #include <linux/slab.h>
  #include <linux/tboot.h>
  #include <linux/trace_events.h>
  #include <linux/entry-kvm.h>
  
  #include <asm/apic.h>
  #include <asm/asm.h>
  #include <asm/cpu.h>
  #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
  #include <asm/debugreg.h>
  #include <asm/desc.h>
  #include <asm/fpu/api.h>
  #include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
  #include <asm/fred.h>
  #include <asm/idtentry.h>
  #include <asm/io.h>
  #include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
  #include <asm/reboot.h>
  #include <asm/perf_event.h>
  #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
  #include <asm/mshyperv.h>
  #include <asm/mwait.h>
  #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
  #include <asm/vmx.h>
  
  #include <trace/events/ipi.h>
  
  #include "capabilities.h"
  #include "cpuid.h"
  #include "hyperv.h"
  #include "kvm_onhyperv.h"
  #include "irq.h"
  #include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
  #include "lapic.h"
  #include "mmu.h"
  #include "nested.h"
  #include "pmu.h"
  #include "sgx.h"
  #include "trace.h"
  #include "vmcs.h"
  #include "vmcs12.h"
  #include "vmx.h"
  #include "x86.h"
  #include "x86_ops.h"
  #include "smm.h"
  #include "vmx_onhyperv.h"
  #include "posted_intr.h"
  
  MODULE_AUTHOR("Qumranet");
  MODULE_DESCRIPTION("KVM support for VMX (Intel VT-x) extensions");
  MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
  
  #ifdef MODULE
  static const struct x86_cpu_id vmx_cpu_id[] = {
          X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_VMX, NULL),
          {}
  };
  MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, vmx_cpu_id);
  #endif
  
  bool __read_mostly enable_vpid = 1;
  module_param_named(vpid, enable_vpid, bool, 0444);
  
  static bool __read_mostly enable_vnmi = 1;
  module_param_named(vnmi, enable_vnmi, bool, 0444);
  
  bool __read_mostly flexpriority_enabled = 1;
  module_param_named(flexpriority, flexpriority_enabled, bool, 0444);
  
  bool __read_mostly enable_ept = 1;
  module_param_named(ept, enable_ept, bool, 0444);
  
 bool __read_mostly enable_unrestricted_guest = 1;
 module_param_named(unrestricted_guest,
                         enable_unrestricted_guest, bool, 0444);
 
 bool __read_mostly enable_ept_ad_bits = 1;
 module_param_named(eptad, enable_ept_ad_bits, bool, 0444);
 
 static bool __read_mostly emulate_invalid_guest_state = true;
 module_param(emulate_invalid_guest_state, bool, 0444);
 
 static bool __read_mostly fasteoi = 1;
 module_param(fasteoi, bool, 0444);
 
 module_param(enable_apicv, bool, 0444);
 
 bool __read_mostly enable_ipiv = true;
 module_param(enable_ipiv, bool, 0444);
 
 /*
  * If nested=1, nested virtualization is supported, i.e., guests may use
  * VMX and be a hypervisor for its own guests. If nested=0, guests may not
  * use VMX instructions.
  */
 static bool __read_mostly nested = 1;
 module_param(nested, bool, 0444);
 
 bool __read_mostly enable_pml = 1;
 module_param_named(pml, enable_pml, bool, 0444);
 
 static bool __read_mostly error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config = true;
 module_param(error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config, bool, 0444);
 
 static bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcs = 0;
 module_param(dump_invalid_vmcs, bool, 0644);
 
 #define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC          1
 #define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV    2
 
 #define KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX     0xffffffffffffffffULL
 
 /* Guest_tsc -> host_tsc conversion requires 64-bit division.  */
 static int __read_mostly cpu_preemption_timer_multi;
 static bool __read_mostly enable_preemption_timer = 1;
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 module_param_named(preemption_timer, enable_preemption_timer, bool, S_IRUGO);
 #endif
 
 extern bool __read_mostly allow_smaller_maxphyaddr;
 module_param(allow_smaller_maxphyaddr, bool, S_IRUGO);
 
 #define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_OFF (X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD)
 #define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST X86_CR0_NE
 #define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON                            \
         (KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST | X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE)
 
 #define KVM_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST X86_CR4_VMXE
 #define KVM_PMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON (X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_VMXE)
 #define KVM_RMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON (X86_CR4_VME | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_VMXE)
 
 #define RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS (~(X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_VM))
 
 #define MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS_MASK (~(RTIT_STATUS_FILTEREN | \
         RTIT_STATUS_CONTEXTEN | RTIT_STATUS_TRIGGEREN | \
         RTIT_STATUS_ERROR | RTIT_STATUS_STOPPED | \
         RTIT_STATUS_BYTECNT))
 
 /*
  * List of MSRs that can be directly passed to the guest.
  * In addition to these x2apic, PT and LBR MSRs are handled specially.
  */
 static u32 vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS] = {
         MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
         MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD,
         MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD,
         MSR_IA32_TSC,
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
         MSR_FS_BASE,
         MSR_GS_BASE,
         MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE,
         MSR_IA32_XFD,
         MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR,
 #endif
         MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS,
         MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP,
         MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP,
         MSR_CORE_C1_RES,
         MSR_CORE_C3_RESIDENCY,
         MSR_CORE_C6_RESIDENCY,
         MSR_CORE_C7_RESIDENCY,
 };
 
 /*
  * These 2 parameters are used to config the controls for Pause-Loop Exiting:
  * ple_gap:    upper bound on the amount of time between two successive
  *             executions of PAUSE in a loop. Also indicate if ple enabled.
  *             According to test, this time is usually smaller than 128 cycles.
  * ple_window: upper bound on the amount of time a guest is allowed to execute
  *             in a PAUSE loop. Tests indicate that most spinlocks are held for
  *             less than 2^12 cycles
  * Time is measured based on a counter that runs at the same rate as the TSC,
  * refer SDM volume 3b section 21.6.13 & 22.1.3.
  */
 static unsigned int ple_gap = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_GAP;
 module_param(ple_gap, uint, 0444);
 
 static unsigned int ple_window = KVM_VMX_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW;
 module_param(ple_window, uint, 0444);
 
 /* Default doubles per-vcpu window every exit. */
 static unsigned int ple_window_grow = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_GROW;
 module_param(ple_window_grow, uint, 0444);
 
 /* Default resets per-vcpu window every exit to ple_window. */
 static unsigned int ple_window_shrink = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_SHRINK;
 module_param(ple_window_shrink, uint, 0444);
 
 /* Default is to compute the maximum so we can never overflow. */
 static unsigned int ple_window_max        = KVM_VMX_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_MAX;
 module_param(ple_window_max, uint, 0444);
 
 /* Default is SYSTEM mode, 1 for host-guest mode */
 int __read_mostly pt_mode = PT_MODE_SYSTEM;
 module_param(pt_mode, int, S_IRUGO);
 
 struct x86_pmu_lbr __ro_after_init vmx_lbr_caps;
 
 static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(vmx_l1d_should_flush);
 static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(vmx_l1d_flush_mutex);
 
 /* Storage for pre module init parameter parsing */
 static enum vmx_l1d_flush_state __read_mostly vmentry_l1d_flush_param = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
 
 static const struct {
         const char *option;
         bool for_parse;
 } vmentry_l1d_param[] = {
         [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO]         = {"auto", true},
         [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER]        = {"never", true},
         [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND]         = {"cond", true},
         [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS]       = {"always", true},
         [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED] = {"EPT disabled", false},
         [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED] = {"not required", false},
 };
 
 #define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4
 static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;
 
 static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
 {
         struct page *page;
         unsigned int i;
 
         if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF)) {
                 l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
                 return 0;
         }
 
         if (!enable_ept) {
                 l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED;
                 return 0;
         }
 
         if (kvm_host.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH) {
                 l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
                 return 0;
         }
 
         /* If set to auto use the default l1tf mitigation method */
         if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO) {
                 switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
                 case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
                         l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER;
                         break;
                 case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
                 case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
                 case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
                         l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND;
                         break;
                 case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
                 case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
                         l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS;
                         break;
                 }
         } else if (l1tf_mitigation == L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE) {
                 l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS;
         }
 
         if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER && !vmx_l1d_flush_pages &&
             !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) {
                 /*
                  * This allocation for vmx_l1d_flush_pages is not tied to a VM
                  * lifetime and so should not be charged to a memcg.
                  */
                 page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
                 if (!page)
                         return -ENOMEM;
                 vmx_l1d_flush_pages = page_address(page);
 
                 /*
                  * Initialize each page with a different pattern in
                  * order to protect against KSM in the nested
                  * virtualization case.
                  */
                 for (i = 0; i < 1u << L1D_CACHE_ORDER; ++i) {
                         memset(vmx_l1d_flush_pages + i * PAGE_SIZE, i + 1,
                                PAGE_SIZE);
                 }
         }
 
         l1tf_vmx_mitigation = l1tf;
 
         if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
                 static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
         else
                 static_branch_disable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
 
         if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND)
                 static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
         else
                 static_branch_disable(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
         return 0;
 }
 
 static int vmentry_l1d_flush_parse(const char *s)
 {
         unsigned int i;
 
         if (s) {
                 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmentry_l1d_param); i++) {
                         if (vmentry_l1d_param[i].for_parse &&
                             sysfs_streq(s, vmentry_l1d_param[i].option))
                                 return i;
                 }
         }
         return -EINVAL;
 }
 
 static int vmentry_l1d_flush_set(const char *s, const struct kernel_param *kp)
 {
         int l1tf, ret;
 
         l1tf = vmentry_l1d_flush_parse(s);
         if (l1tf < 0)
                 return l1tf;
 
         if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_L1TF))
                 return 0;
 
         /*
          * Has vmx_init() run already? If not then this is the pre init
          * parameter parsing. In that case just store the value and let
          * vmx_init() do the proper setup after enable_ept has been
          * established.
          */
         if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO) {
                 vmentry_l1d_flush_param = l1tf;
                 return 0;
         }
 
         mutex_lock(&vmx_l1d_flush_mutex);
         ret = vmx_setup_l1d_flush(l1tf);
         mutex_unlock(&vmx_l1d_flush_mutex);
         return ret;
 }
 
 static int vmentry_l1d_flush_get(char *s, const struct kernel_param *kp)
 {
         if (WARN_ON_ONCE(l1tf_vmx_mitigation >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmentry_l1d_param)))
                 return sysfs_emit(s, "???\n");
 
         return sysfs_emit(s, "%s\n", vmentry_l1d_param[l1tf_vmx_mitigation].option);
 }
 
 static __always_inline void vmx_disable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         u64 msr;
 
         if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear)
                 return;
 
         msr = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL);
         msr |= FB_CLEAR_DIS;
         native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr);
         /* Cache the MSR value to avoid reading it later */
         vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl = msr;
 }
 
 static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear)
                 return;
 
         vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl &= ~FB_CLEAR_DIS;
         native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl);
 }
 
 static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         /*
          * Disable VERW's behavior of clearing CPU buffers for the guest if the
          * CPU isn't affected by MDS/TAA, and the host hasn't forcefully enabled
          * the mitigation. Disabling the clearing behavior provides a
          * performance boost for guests that aren't aware that manually clearing
          * CPU buffers is unnecessary, at the cost of MSR accesses on VM-Entry
          * and VM-Exit.
          */
         vmx->disable_fb_clear = !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF) &&
                                 (kvm_host.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) &&
                                 !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) &&
                                 !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
 
         /*
          * If guest will not execute VERW, there is no need to set FB_CLEAR_DIS
          * at VMEntry. Skip the MSR read/write when a guest has no use case to
          * execute VERW.
          */
         if ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
            ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
             (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) &&
             (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO) &&
             (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO) &&
             (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO)))
                 vmx->disable_fb_clear = false;
 }
 
 static const struct kernel_param_ops vmentry_l1d_flush_ops = {
         .set = vmentry_l1d_flush_set,
         .get = vmentry_l1d_flush_get,
 };
 module_param_cb(vmentry_l1d_flush, &vmentry_l1d_flush_ops, NULL, 0644);
 
 static u32 vmx_segment_access_rights(struct kvm_segment *var);
 
 void vmx_vmexit(void);
 
 #define vmx_insn_failed(fmt...)         \
 do {                                    \
         WARN_ONCE(1, fmt);              \
         pr_warn_ratelimited(fmt);       \
 } while (0)
 
 noinline void vmread_error(unsigned long field)
 {
         vmx_insn_failed("vmread failed: field=%lx\n", field);
 }
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT
 noinstr void vmread_error_trampoline2(unsigned long field, bool fault)
 {
         if (fault) {
                 kvm_spurious_fault();
         } else {
                 instrumentation_begin();
                 vmread_error(field);
                 instrumentation_end();
         }
 }
 #endif
 
 noinline void vmwrite_error(unsigned long field, unsigned long value)
 {
         vmx_insn_failed("vmwrite failed: field=%lx val=%lx err=%u\n",
                         field, value, vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
 }
 
 noinline void vmclear_error(struct vmcs *vmcs, u64 phys_addr)
 {
         vmx_insn_failed("vmclear failed: %p/%llx err=%u\n",
                         vmcs, phys_addr, vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
 }
 
 noinline void vmptrld_error(struct vmcs *vmcs, u64 phys_addr)
 {
         vmx_insn_failed("vmptrld failed: %p/%llx err=%u\n",
                         vmcs, phys_addr, vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
 }
 
 noinline void invvpid_error(unsigned long ext, u16 vpid, gva_t gva)
 {
         vmx_insn_failed("invvpid failed: ext=0x%lx vpid=%u gva=0x%lx\n",
                         ext, vpid, gva);
 }
 
 noinline void invept_error(unsigned long ext, u64 eptp, gpa_t gpa)
 {
         vmx_insn_failed("invept failed: ext=0x%lx eptp=%llx gpa=0x%llx\n",
                         ext, eptp, gpa);
 }
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea);
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs);
 /*
  * We maintain a per-CPU linked-list of VMCS loaded on that CPU. This is needed
  * when a CPU is brought down, and we need to VMCLEAR all VMCSs loaded on it.
  */
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, loaded_vmcss_on_cpu);
 
 static DECLARE_BITMAP(vmx_vpid_bitmap, VMX_NR_VPIDS);
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(vmx_vpid_lock);
 
 struct vmcs_config vmcs_config __ro_after_init;
 struct vmx_capability vmx_capability __ro_after_init;
 
 #define VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(seg)                                  \
         [VCPU_SREG_##seg] = {                                   \
                 .selector = GUEST_##seg##_SELECTOR,             \
                 .base = GUEST_##seg##_BASE,                     \
                 .limit = GUEST_##seg##_LIMIT,                   \
                 .ar_bytes = GUEST_##seg##_AR_BYTES,             \
         }
 
 static const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field {
         unsigned selector;
         unsigned base;
         unsigned limit;
         unsigned ar_bytes;
 } kvm_vmx_segment_fields[] = {
         VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(CS),
         VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(DS),
         VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(ES),
         VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(FS),
         VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(GS),
         VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(SS),
         VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(TR),
         VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(LDTR),
 };
 
 static inline void vmx_segment_cache_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         vmx->segment_cache.bitmask = 0;
 }
 
 static unsigned long host_idt_base;
 
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
 static bool __read_mostly enlightened_vmcs = true;
 module_param(enlightened_vmcs, bool, 0444);
 
 static int hv_enable_l2_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs;
         hpa_t partition_assist_page = hv_get_partition_assist_page(vcpu);
 
         if (partition_assist_page == INVALID_PAGE)
                 return -ENOMEM;
 
         evmcs = (struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *)to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
 
         evmcs->partition_assist_page = partition_assist_page;
         evmcs->hv_vm_id = (unsigned long)vcpu->kvm;
         evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.nested_flush_hypercall = 1;
 
         return 0;
 }
 
 static __init void hv_init_evmcs(void)
 {
         int cpu;
 
         if (!enlightened_vmcs)
                 return;
 
         /*
          * Enlightened VMCS usage should be recommended and the host needs
          * to support eVMCS v1 or above.
          */
         if (ms_hyperv.hints & HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_RECOMMENDED &&
             (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_VERSION) >=
              KVM_EVMCS_VERSION) {
 
                 /* Check that we have assist pages on all online CPUs */
                 for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
                         if (!hv_get_vp_assist_page(cpu)) {
                                 enlightened_vmcs = false;
                                 break;
                         }
                 }
 
                 if (enlightened_vmcs) {
                         pr_info("Using Hyper-V Enlightened VMCS\n");
                         static_branch_enable(&__kvm_is_using_evmcs);
                 }
 
                 if (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_DIRECT_FLUSH)
                         vt_x86_ops.enable_l2_tlb_flush
                                 = hv_enable_l2_tlb_flush;
         } else {
                 enlightened_vmcs = false;
         }
 }
 
 static void hv_reset_evmcs(void)
 {
         struct hv_vp_assist_page *vp_ap;
 
         if (!kvm_is_using_evmcs())
                 return;
 
         /*
          * KVM should enable eVMCS if and only if all CPUs have a VP assist
          * page, and should reject CPU onlining if eVMCS is enabled the CPU
          * doesn't have a VP assist page allocated.
          */
         vp_ap = hv_get_vp_assist_page(smp_processor_id());
         if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!vp_ap))
                 return;
 
         /*
          * Reset everything to support using non-enlightened VMCS access later
          * (e.g. when we reload the module with enlightened_vmcs=0)
          */
         vp_ap->nested_control.features.directhypercall = 0;
         vp_ap->current_nested_vmcs = 0;
         vp_ap->enlighten_vmentry = 0;
 }
 
 #else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) */
 static void hv_init_evmcs(void) {}
 static void hv_reset_evmcs(void) {}
 #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) */
 
 /*
  * Comment's format: document - errata name - stepping - processor name.
  * Refer from
  * https://www.virtualbox.org/svn/vbox/trunk/src/VBox/VMM/VMMR0/HMR0.cpp
  */
 static u32 vmx_preemption_cpu_tfms[] = {
 /* 323344.pdf - BA86   - D0 - Xeon 7500 Series */
 0x000206E6,
 /* 323056.pdf - AAX65  - C2 - Xeon L3406 */
 /* 322814.pdf - AAT59  - C2 - i7-600, i5-500, i5-400 and i3-300 Mobile */
 /* 322911.pdf - AAU65  - C2 - i5-600, i3-500 Desktop and Pentium G6950 */
 0x00020652,
 /* 322911.pdf - AAU65  - K0 - i5-600, i3-500 Desktop and Pentium G6950 */
 0x00020655,
 /* 322373.pdf - AAO95  - B1 - Xeon 3400 Series */
 /* 322166.pdf - AAN92  - B1 - i7-800 and i5-700 Desktop */
 /*
  * 320767.pdf - AAP86  - B1 -
  * i7-900 Mobile Extreme, i7-800 and i7-700 Mobile
  */
 0x000106E5,
 /* 321333.pdf - AAM126 - C0 - Xeon 3500 */
 0x000106A0,
 /* 321333.pdf - AAM126 - C1 - Xeon 3500 */
 0x000106A1,
 /* 320836.pdf - AAJ124 - C0 - i7-900 Desktop Extreme and i7-900 Desktop */
 0x000106A4,
  /* 321333.pdf - AAM126 - D0 - Xeon 3500 */
  /* 321324.pdf - AAK139 - D0 - Xeon 5500 */
  /* 320836.pdf - AAJ124 - D0 - i7-900 Extreme and i7-900 Desktop */
 0x000106A5,
  /* Xeon E3-1220 V2 */
 0x000306A8,
 };
 
 static inline bool cpu_has_broken_vmx_preemption_timer(void)
 {
         u32 eax = cpuid_eax(0x00000001), i;
 
         /* Clear the reserved bits */
         eax &= ~(0x3U << 14 | 0xfU << 28);
         for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_preemption_cpu_tfms); i++)
                 if (eax == vmx_preemption_cpu_tfms[i])
                         return true;
 
         return false;
 }
 
 static inline bool cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         return flexpriority_enabled && lapic_in_kernel(vcpu);
 }
 
 static int vmx_get_passthrough_msr_slot(u32 msr)
 {
         int i;
 
         switch (msr) {
         case 0x800 ... 0x8ff:
                 /* x2APIC MSRs. These are handled in vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic() */
                 return -ENOENT;
         case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS:
         case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE:
         case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK:
         case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH:
         case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B:
                 /* PT MSRs. These are handled in pt_update_intercept_for_msr() */
         case MSR_LBR_SELECT:
         case MSR_LBR_TOS:
         case MSR_LBR_INFO_0 ... MSR_LBR_INFO_0 + 31:
         case MSR_LBR_NHM_FROM ... MSR_LBR_NHM_FROM + 31:
         case MSR_LBR_NHM_TO ... MSR_LBR_NHM_TO + 31:
         case MSR_LBR_CORE_FROM ... MSR_LBR_CORE_FROM + 8:
         case MSR_LBR_CORE_TO ... MSR_LBR_CORE_TO + 8:
                 /* LBR MSRs. These are handled in vmx_update_intercept_for_lbr_msrs() */
                 return -ENOENT;
         }
 
         for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs); i++) {
                 if (vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[i] == msr)
                         return i;
         }
 
         WARN(1, "Invalid MSR %x, please adapt vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[]", msr);
         return -ENOENT;
 }
 
 struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr)
 {
         int i;
 
         i = kvm_find_user_return_msr(msr);
         if (i >= 0)
                 return &vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i];
         return NULL;
 }
 
 static int vmx_set_guest_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
                                   struct vmx_uret_msr *msr, u64 data)
 {
         unsigned int slot = msr - vmx->guest_uret_msrs;
         int ret = 0;
 
         if (msr->load_into_hardware) {
                 preempt_disable();
                 ret = kvm_set_user_return_msr(slot, data, msr->mask);
                 preempt_enable();
         }
         if (!ret)
                 msr->data = data;
         return ret;
 }
 
 /*
  * Disable VMX and clear CR4.VMXE (even if VMXOFF faults)
  *
  * Note, VMXOFF causes a #UD if the CPU is !post-VMXON, but it's impossible to
  * atomically track post-VMXON state, e.g. this may be called in NMI context.
  * Eat all faults as all other faults on VMXOFF faults are mode related, i.e.
  * faults are guaranteed to be due to the !post-VMXON check unless the CPU is
  * magically in RM, VM86, compat mode, or at CPL>0.
  */
 static int kvm_cpu_vmxoff(void)
 {
         asm goto("1: vmxoff\n\t"
                           _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault])
                           ::: "cc", "memory" : fault);
 
         cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE);
         return 0;
 
 fault:
         cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE);
         return -EIO;
 }
 
 static void vmx_emergency_disable(void)
 {
         int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
         struct loaded_vmcs *v;
 
         kvm_rebooting = true;
 
         /*
          * Note, CR4.VMXE can be _cleared_ in NMI context, but it can only be
          * set in task context.  If this races with VMX is disabled by an NMI,
          * VMCLEAR and VMXOFF may #UD, but KVM will eat those faults due to
          * kvm_rebooting set.
          */
         if (!(__read_cr4() & X86_CR4_VMXE))
                 return;
 
         list_for_each_entry(v, &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu),
                             loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link)
                 vmcs_clear(v->vmcs);
 
         kvm_cpu_vmxoff();
 }
 
 static void __loaded_vmcs_clear(void *arg)
 {
         struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs = arg;
         int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
 
         if (loaded_vmcs->cpu != cpu)
                 return; /* vcpu migration can race with cpu offline */
         if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) == loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
                 per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = NULL;
 
         vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
         if (loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs && loaded_vmcs->launched)
                 vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs);
 
         list_del(&loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link);
 
         /*
          * Ensure all writes to loaded_vmcs, including deleting it from its
          * current percpu list, complete before setting loaded_vmcs->cpu to
          * -1, otherwise a different cpu can see loaded_vmcs->cpu == -1 first
          * and add loaded_vmcs to its percpu list before it's deleted from this
          * cpu's list. Pairs with the smp_rmb() in vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs().
          */
         smp_wmb();
 
         loaded_vmcs->cpu = -1;
         loaded_vmcs->launched = 0;
 }
 
 void loaded_vmcs_clear(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
 {
         int cpu = loaded_vmcs->cpu;
 
         if (cpu != -1)
                 smp_call_function_single(cpu,
                          __loaded_vmcs_clear, loaded_vmcs, 1);
 }
 
 static bool vmx_segment_cache_test_set(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg,
                                        unsigned field)
 {
         bool ret;
         u32 mask = 1 << (seg * SEG_FIELD_NR + field);
 
         if (!kvm_register_is_available(&vmx->vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS)) {
                 kvm_register_mark_available(&vmx->vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS);
                 vmx->segment_cache.bitmask = 0;
         }
         ret = vmx->segment_cache.bitmask & mask;
         vmx->segment_cache.bitmask |= mask;
         return ret;
 }
 
 static u16 vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
 {
         u16 *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].selector;
 
         if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_SEL))
                 *p = vmcs_read16(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].selector);
         return *p;
 }
 
 static ulong vmx_read_guest_seg_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
 {
         ulong *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].base;
 
         if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_BASE))
                 *p = vmcs_readl(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].base);
         return *p;
 }
 
 static u32 vmx_read_guest_seg_limit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
 {
         u32 *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].limit;
 
         if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_LIMIT))
                 *p = vmcs_read32(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].limit);
         return *p;
 }
 
 static u32 vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
 {
         u32 *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].ar;
 
         if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_AR))
                 *p = vmcs_read32(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].ar_bytes);
         return *p;
 }
 
 void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         u32 eb;
 
         eb = (1u << PF_VECTOR) | (1u << UD_VECTOR) | (1u << MC_VECTOR) |
              (1u << DB_VECTOR) | (1u << AC_VECTOR);
         /*
          * #VE isn't used for VMX.  To test against unexpected changes
          * related to #VE for VMX, intercept unexpected #VE and warn on it.
          */
         if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_PROVE_VE))
                 eb |= 1u << VE_VECTOR;
         /*
          * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
          * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
          * We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
          * as VMware does.
          */
         if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
                 eb |= (1u << GP_VECTOR);
         if ((vcpu->guest_debug &
              (KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)) ==
             (KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP))
                 eb |= 1u << BP_VECTOR;
         if (to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active)
                 eb = ~0;
         if (!vmx_need_pf_intercept(vcpu))
                 eb &= ~(1u << PF_VECTOR);
 
         /* When we are running a nested L2 guest and L1 specified for it a
          * certain exception bitmap, we must trap the same exceptions and pass
          * them to L1. When running L2, we will only handle the exceptions
          * specified above if L1 did not want them.
          */
         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
                 eb |= get_vmcs12(vcpu)->exception_bitmap;
         else {
                 int mask = 0, match = 0;
 
                 if (enable_ept && (eb & (1u << PF_VECTOR))) {
                         /*
                          * If EPT is enabled, #PF is currently only intercepted
                          * if MAXPHYADDR is smaller on the guest than on the
                          * host.  In that case we only care about present,
                          * non-reserved faults.  For vmcs02, however, PFEC_MASK
                          * and PFEC_MATCH are set in prepare_vmcs02_rare.
                          */
                         mask = PFERR_PRESENT_MASK | PFERR_RSVD_MASK;
                         match = PFERR_PRESENT_MASK;
                 }
                 vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK, mask);
                 vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, match);
         }
 
         /*
          * Disabling xfd interception indicates that dynamic xfeatures
          * might be used in the guest. Always trap #NM in this case
          * to save guest xfd_err timely.
          */
         if (vcpu->arch.xfd_no_write_intercept)
                 eb |= (1u << NM_VECTOR);
 
         vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb);
 }
 
 /*
  * Check if MSR is intercepted for currently loaded MSR bitmap.
  */
 static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr)
 {
         if (!(exec_controls_get(vmx) & CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS))
                 return true;
 
         return vmx_test_msr_bitmap_write(vmx->loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap, msr);
 }
 
 unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         unsigned int flags = 0;
 
         if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched)
                 flags |= VMX_RUN_VMRESUME;
 
         /*
          * If writes to the SPEC_CTRL MSR aren't intercepted, the guest is free
          * to change it directly without causing a vmexit.  In that case read
          * it after vmexit and store it in vmx->spec_ctrl.
          */
         if (!msr_write_intercepted(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))
                 flags |= VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL;
 
         return flags;
 }
 
 static __always_inline void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
                 unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit)
 {
         vm_entry_controls_clearbit(vmx, entry);
         vm_exit_controls_clearbit(vmx, exit);
 }
 
 int vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(struct vmx_msrs *m, u32 msr)
 {
         unsigned int i;
 
         for (i = 0; i < m->nr; ++i) {
                 if (m->val[i].index == msr)
                         return i;
         }
         return -ENOENT;
 }
 
 static void clear_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr)
 {
         int i;
         struct msr_autoload *m = &vmx->msr_autoload;
 
         switch (msr) {
         case MSR_EFER:
                 if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer()) {
                         clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
                                         VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER,
                                         VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER);
                         return;
                 }
                 break;
         case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL:
                 if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl()) {
                         clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
                                         VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
                                         VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL);
                         return;
                 }
                 break;
         }
         i = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&m->guest, msr);
         if (i < 0)
                 goto skip_guest;
         --m->guest.nr;
         m->guest.val[i] = m->guest.val[m->guest.nr];
         vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->guest.nr);
 
 skip_guest:
         i = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&m->host, msr);
         if (i < 0)
                 return;
 
         --m->host.nr;
         m->host.val[i] = m->host.val[m->host.nr];
         vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->host.nr);
 }
 
 static __always_inline void add_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
                 unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit,
                 unsigned long guest_val_vmcs, unsigned long host_val_vmcs,
                 u64 guest_val, u64 host_val)
 {
         vmcs_write64(guest_val_vmcs, guest_val);
         if (host_val_vmcs != HOST_IA32_EFER)
                 vmcs_write64(host_val_vmcs, host_val);
         vm_entry_controls_setbit(vmx, entry);
         vm_exit_controls_setbit(vmx, exit);
 }
 
 static void add_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr,
                                   u64 guest_val, u64 host_val, bool entry_only)
 {
         int i, j = 0;
         struct msr_autoload *m = &vmx->msr_autoload;
 
         switch (msr) {
         case MSR_EFER:
                 if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer()) {
                         add_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
                                         VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER,
                                         VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER,
                                         GUEST_IA32_EFER,
                                         HOST_IA32_EFER,
                                         guest_val, host_val);
                         return;
                 }
                 break;
         case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL:
                 if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl()) {
                         add_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
                                         VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
                                         VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
                                         GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
                                         HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
                                         guest_val, host_val);
                         return;
                 }
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE:
                 /* PEBS needs a quiescent period after being disabled (to write
                  * a record).  Disabling PEBS through VMX MSR swapping doesn't
                  * provide that period, so a CPU could write host's record into
                  * guest's memory.
                  */
                 wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE, 0);
         }
 
         i = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&m->guest, msr);
         if (!entry_only)
                 j = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&m->host, msr);
 
         if ((i < 0 && m->guest.nr == MAX_NR_LOADSTORE_MSRS) ||
             (j < 0 &&  m->host.nr == MAX_NR_LOADSTORE_MSRS)) {
                 printk_once(KERN_WARNING "Not enough msr switch entries. "
                                 "Can't add msr %x\n", msr);
                 return;
         }
         if (i < 0) {
                 i = m->guest.nr++;
                 vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->guest.nr);
         }
         m->guest.val[i].index = msr;
         m->guest.val[i].value = guest_val;
 
         if (entry_only)
                 return;
 
         if (j < 0) {
                 j = m->host.nr++;
                 vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->host.nr);
         }
         m->host.val[j].index = msr;
         m->host.val[j].value = host_val;
 }
 
 static bool update_transition_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         u64 guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer;
         u64 ignore_bits = 0;
         int i;
 
         /* Shadow paging assumes NX to be available.  */
         if (!enable_ept)
                 guest_efer |= EFER_NX;
 
         /*
          * LMA and LME handled by hardware; SCE meaningless outside long mode.
          */
         ignore_bits |= EFER_SCE;
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
         ignore_bits |= EFER_LMA | EFER_LME;
         /* SCE is meaningful only in long mode on Intel */
         if (guest_efer & EFER_LMA)
                 ignore_bits &= ~(u64)EFER_SCE;
 #endif
 
         /*
          * On EPT, we can't emulate NX, so we must switch EFER atomically.
          * On CPUs that support "load IA32_EFER", always switch EFER
          * atomically, since it's faster than switching it manually.
          */
         if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer() ||
             (enable_ept && ((vmx->vcpu.arch.efer ^ kvm_host.efer) & EFER_NX))) {
                 if (!(guest_efer & EFER_LMA))
                         guest_efer &= ~EFER_LME;
                 if (guest_efer != kvm_host.efer)
                         add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER,
                                               guest_efer, kvm_host.efer, false);
                 else
                         clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER);
                 return false;
         }
 
         i = kvm_find_user_return_msr(MSR_EFER);
         if (i < 0)
                 return false;
 
         clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER);
 
         guest_efer &= ~ignore_bits;
         guest_efer |= kvm_host.efer & ignore_bits;
 
         vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].data = guest_efer;
         vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].mask = ~ignore_bits;
 
         return true;
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 /*
  * On 32-bit kernels, VM exits still load the FS and GS bases from the
  * VMCS rather than the segment table.  KVM uses this helper to figure
  * out the current bases to poke them into the VMCS before entry.
  */
 static unsigned long segment_base(u16 selector)
 {
         struct desc_struct *table;
         unsigned long v;
 
         if (!(selector & ~SEGMENT_RPL_MASK))
                 return 0;
 
         table = get_current_gdt_ro();
 
         if ((selector & SEGMENT_TI_MASK) == SEGMENT_LDT) {
                 u16 ldt_selector = kvm_read_ldt();
 
                 if (!(ldt_selector & ~SEGMENT_RPL_MASK))
                         return 0;
 
                 table = (struct desc_struct *)segment_base(ldt_selector);
         }
         v = get_desc_base(&table[selector >> 3]);
         return v;
 }
 #endif
 
 static inline bool pt_can_write_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         return vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest() &&
                !(vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN);
 }
 
 static inline bool pt_output_base_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 base)
 {
         /* The base must be 128-byte aligned and a legal physical address. */
         return kvm_vcpu_is_legal_aligned_gpa(vcpu, base, 128);
 }
 
 static inline void pt_load_msr(struct pt_ctx *ctx, u32 addr_range)
 {
         u32 i;
 
         wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS, ctx->status);
         wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE, ctx->output_base);
         wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK, ctx->output_mask);
         wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH, ctx->cr3_match);
         for (i = 0; i < addr_range; i++) {
                 wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i * 2, ctx->addr_a[i]);
                 wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B + i * 2, ctx->addr_b[i]);
         }
 }
 
 static inline void pt_save_msr(struct pt_ctx *ctx, u32 addr_range)
 {
         u32 i;
 
         rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS, ctx->status);
         rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE, ctx->output_base);
         rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK, ctx->output_mask);
         rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH, ctx->cr3_match);
         for (i = 0; i < addr_range; i++) {
                 rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i * 2, ctx->addr_a[i]);
                 rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B + i * 2, ctx->addr_b[i]);
         }
 }
 
 static void pt_guest_enter(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         if (vmx_pt_mode_is_system())
                 return;
 
         /*
          * GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL is already set in the VMCS.
          * Save host state before VM entry.
          */
         rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl);
         if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
                 wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
                 pt_save_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.host, vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges);
                 pt_load_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.guest, vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges);
         }
 }
 
 static void pt_guest_exit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         if (vmx_pt_mode_is_system())
                 return;
 
         if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
                 pt_save_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.guest, vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges);
                 pt_load_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.host, vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges);
         }
 
         /*
          * KVM requires VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL to expose PT to the guest,
          * i.e. RTIT_CTL is always cleared on VM-Exit.  Restore it if necessary.
          */
         if (vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl)
                 wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl);
 }
 
 void vmx_set_host_fs_gs(struct vmcs_host_state *host, u16 fs_sel, u16 gs_sel,
                         unsigned long fs_base, unsigned long gs_base)
 {
         if (unlikely(fs_sel != host->fs_sel)) {
                 if (!(fs_sel & 7))
                         vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, fs_sel);
                 else
                         vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, 0);
                 host->fs_sel = fs_sel;
         }
         if (unlikely(gs_sel != host->gs_sel)) {
                 if (!(gs_sel & 7))
                         vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, gs_sel);
                 else
                         vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, 0);
                 host->gs_sel = gs_sel;
         }
         if (unlikely(fs_base != host->fs_base)) {
                 vmcs_writel(HOST_FS_BASE, fs_base);
                 host->fs_base = fs_base;
         }
         if (unlikely(gs_base != host->gs_base)) {
                 vmcs_writel(HOST_GS_BASE, gs_base);
                 host->gs_base = gs_base;
         }
 }
 
 void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         struct vmcs_host_state *host_state;
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
         int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
 #endif
         unsigned long fs_base, gs_base;
         u16 fs_sel, gs_sel;
         int i;
 
         /*
          * Note that guest MSRs to be saved/restored can also be changed
          * when guest state is loaded. This happens when guest transitions
          * to/from long-mode by setting MSR_EFER.LMA.
          */
         if (!vmx->guest_uret_msrs_loaded) {
                 vmx->guest_uret_msrs_loaded = true;
                 for (i = 0; i < kvm_nr_uret_msrs; ++i) {
                         if (!vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].load_into_hardware)
                                 continue;
 
                         kvm_set_user_return_msr(i,
                                                 vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].data,
                                                 vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].mask);
                 }
         }
 
         if (vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync)
                 nested_sync_vmcs12_to_shadow(vcpu);
 
         if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
                 return;
 
         host_state = &vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state;
 
         /*
          * Set host fs and gs selectors.  Unfortunately, 22.2.3 does not
          * allow segment selectors with cpl > 0 or ti == 1.
          */
         host_state->ldt_sel = kvm_read_ldt();
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
         savesegment(ds, host_state->ds_sel);
         savesegment(es, host_state->es_sel);
 
         gs_base = cpu_kernelmode_gs_base(cpu);
         if (likely(is_64bit_mm(current->mm))) {
                 current_save_fsgs();
                 fs_sel = current->thread.fsindex;
                 gs_sel = current->thread.gsindex;
                 fs_base = current->thread.fsbase;
                 vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = current->thread.gsbase;
         } else {
                 savesegment(fs, fs_sel);
                 savesegment(gs, gs_sel);
                 fs_base = read_msr(MSR_FS_BASE);
                 vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = read_msr(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE);
         }
 
         wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
 #else
         savesegment(fs, fs_sel);
         savesegment(gs, gs_sel);
         fs_base = segment_base(fs_sel);
         gs_base = segment_base(gs_sel);
 #endif
 
         vmx_set_host_fs_gs(host_state, fs_sel, gs_sel, fs_base, gs_base);
         vmx->guest_state_loaded = true;
 }
 
 static void vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         struct vmcs_host_state *host_state;
 
         if (!vmx->guest_state_loaded)
                 return;
 
         host_state = &vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state;
 
         ++vmx->vcpu.stat.host_state_reload;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
         rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
 #endif
         if (host_state->ldt_sel || (host_state->gs_sel & 7)) {
                 kvm_load_ldt(host_state->ldt_sel);
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
                 load_gs_index(host_state->gs_sel);
 #else
                 loadsegment(gs, host_state->gs_sel);
 #endif
         }
         if (host_state->fs_sel & 7)
                 loadsegment(fs, host_state->fs_sel);
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
         if (unlikely(host_state->ds_sel | host_state->es_sel)) {
                 loadsegment(ds, host_state->ds_sel);
                 loadsegment(es, host_state->es_sel);
         }
 #endif
         invalidate_tss_limit();
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
         wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base);
 #endif
         load_fixmap_gdt(raw_smp_processor_id());
         vmx->guest_state_loaded = false;
         vmx->guest_uret_msrs_loaded = false;
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 static u64 vmx_read_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         preempt_disable();
         if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
                 rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
         preempt_enable();
         return vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base;
 }
 
 static void vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
 {
         preempt_disable();
         if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
                 wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, data);
         preempt_enable();
         vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base = data;
 }
 #endif
 
 static void grow_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         unsigned int old = vmx->ple_window;
 
         vmx->ple_window = __grow_ple_window(old, ple_window,
                                             ple_window_grow,
                                             ple_window_max);
 
         if (vmx->ple_window != old) {
                 vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
                 trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
                                             vmx->ple_window, old);
         }
 }
 
 static void shrink_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         unsigned int old = vmx->ple_window;
 
         vmx->ple_window = __shrink_ple_window(old, ple_window,
                                               ple_window_shrink,
                                               ple_window);
 
         if (vmx->ple_window != old) {
                 vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
                 trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
                                             vmx->ple_window, old);
         }
 }
 
 void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu,
                         struct loaded_vmcs *buddy)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         bool already_loaded = vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu == cpu;
         struct vmcs *prev;
 
         if (!already_loaded) {
                 loaded_vmcs_clear(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
                 local_irq_disable();
 
                 /*
                  * Ensure loaded_vmcs->cpu is read before adding loaded_vmcs to
                  * this cpu's percpu list, otherwise it may not yet be deleted
                  * from its previous cpu's percpu list.  Pairs with the
                  * smb_wmb() in __loaded_vmcs_clear().
                  */
                 smp_rmb();
 
                 list_add(&vmx->loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link,
                          &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
                 local_irq_enable();
         }
 
         prev = per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu);
         if (prev != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) {
                 per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
                 vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
 
                 /*
                  * No indirect branch prediction barrier needed when switching
                  * the active VMCS within a vCPU, unless IBRS is advertised to
                  * the vCPU.  To minimize the number of IBPBs executed, KVM
                  * performs IBPB on nested VM-Exit (a single nested transition
                  * may switch the active VMCS multiple times).
                  */
                 if (!buddy || WARN_ON_ONCE(buddy->vmcs != prev))
                         indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
         }
 
         if (!already_loaded) {
                 void *gdt = get_current_gdt_ro();
 
                 /*
                  * Flush all EPTP/VPID contexts, the new pCPU may have stale
                  * TLB entries from its previous association with the vCPU.
                  */
                 kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu);
 
                 /*
                  * Linux uses per-cpu TSS and GDT, so set these when switching
                  * processors.  See 22.2.4.
                  */
                 vmcs_writel(HOST_TR_BASE,
                             (unsigned long)&get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->tss.x86_tss);
                 vmcs_writel(HOST_GDTR_BASE, (unsigned long)gdt);   /* 22.2.4 */
 
                 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) {
                         /* 22.2.3 */
                         vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP,
                                     (unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(cpu) + 1));
                 }
 
                 vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu = cpu;
         }
 }
 
 /*
  * Switches to specified vcpu, until a matching vcpu_put(), but assumes
  * vcpu mutex is already taken.
  */
 void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         if (vcpu->scheduled_out && !kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                 shrink_ple_window(vcpu);
 
         vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(vcpu, cpu, NULL);
 
         vmx_vcpu_pi_load(vcpu, cpu);
 
         vmx->host_debugctlmsr = get_debugctlmsr();
 }
 
 void vmx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         vmx_vcpu_pi_put(vcpu);
 
         vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(to_vmx(vcpu));
 }
 
 bool vmx_emulation_required(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         return emulate_invalid_guest_state && !vmx_guest_state_valid(vcpu);
 }
 
 unsigned long vmx_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         unsigned long rflags, save_rflags;
 
         if (!kvm_register_is_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS)) {
                 kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS);
                 rflags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);
                 if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
                         rflags &= RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
                         save_rflags = vmx->rmode.save_rflags;
                         rflags |= save_rflags & ~RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
                 }
                 vmx->rflags = rflags;
         }
         return vmx->rflags;
 }
 
 void vmx_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         unsigned long old_rflags;
 
         /*
          * Unlike CR0 and CR4, RFLAGS handling requires checking if the vCPU
          * is an unrestricted guest in order to mark L2 as needing emulation
          * if L1 runs L2 as a restricted guest.
          */
         if (is_unrestricted_guest(vcpu)) {
                 kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS);
                 vmx->rflags = rflags;
                 vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, rflags);
                 return;
         }
 
         old_rflags = vmx_get_rflags(vcpu);
         vmx->rflags = rflags;
         if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
                 vmx->rmode.save_rflags = rflags;
                 rflags |= X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_VM;
         }
         vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, rflags);
 
         if ((old_rflags ^ vmx->rflags) & X86_EFLAGS_VM)
                 vmx->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
 }
 
 bool vmx_get_if_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         return vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_IF;
 }
 
 u32 vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         u32 interruptibility = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO);
         int ret = 0;
 
         if (interruptibility & GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI)
                 ret |= KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI;
         if (interruptibility & GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS)
                 ret |= KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS;
 
         return ret;
 }
 
 void vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask)
 {
         u32 interruptibility_old = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO);
         u32 interruptibility = interruptibility_old;
 
         interruptibility &= ~(GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS);
 
         if (mask & KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS)
                 interruptibility |= GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS;
         else if (mask & KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI)
                 interruptibility |= GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI;
 
         if ((interruptibility != interruptibility_old))
                 vmcs_write32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, interruptibility);
 }
 
 static int vmx_rtit_ctl_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         unsigned long value;
 
         /*
          * Any MSR write that attempts to change bits marked reserved will
          * case a #GP fault.
          */
         if (data & vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask)
                 return 1;
 
         /*
          * Any attempt to modify IA32_RTIT_CTL while TraceEn is set will
          * result in a #GP unless the same write also clears TraceEn.
          */
         if ((vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) &&
                 ((vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl ^ data) & ~RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN))
                 return 1;
 
         /*
          * WRMSR to IA32_RTIT_CTL that sets TraceEn but clears this bit
          * and FabricEn would cause #GP, if
          * CPUID.(EAX=14H, ECX=0):ECX.SNGLRGNOUT[bit 2] = 0
          */
         if ((data & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) && !(data & RTIT_CTL_TOPA) &&
                 !(data & RTIT_CTL_FABRIC_EN) &&
                 !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
                                         PT_CAP_single_range_output))
                 return 1;
 
         /*
          * MTCFreq, CycThresh and PSBFreq encodings check, any MSR write that
          * utilize encodings marked reserved will cause a #GP fault.
          */
         value = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_mtc_periods);
         if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_mtc) &&
                         !test_bit((data & RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE) >>
                         RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE_OFFSET, &value))
                 return 1;
         value = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
                                                 PT_CAP_cycle_thresholds);
         if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_cyc) &&
                         !test_bit((data & RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH) >>
                         RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH_OFFSET, &value))
                 return 1;
         value = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_periods);
         if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_cyc) &&
                         !test_bit((data & RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ) >>
                         RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ_OFFSET, &value))
                 return 1;
 
         /*
          * If ADDRx_CFG is reserved or the encodings is >2 will
          * cause a #GP fault.
          */
         value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR0) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR0_OFFSET;
         if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges < 1)) || (value > 2))
                 return 1;
         value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR1) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR1_OFFSET;
         if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges < 2)) || (value > 2))
                 return 1;
         value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR2) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR2_OFFSET;
         if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges < 3)) || (value > 2))
                 return 1;
         value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR3) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR3_OFFSET;
         if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges < 4)) || (value > 2))
                 return 1;
 
         return 0;
 }
 
 int vmx_check_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
                                   void *insn, int insn_len)
 {
         /*
          * Emulation of instructions in SGX enclaves is impossible as RIP does
          * not point at the failing instruction, and even if it did, the code
          * stream is inaccessible.  Inject #UD instead of exiting to userspace
          * so that guest userspace can't DoS the guest simply by triggering
          * emulation (enclaves are CPL3 only).
          */
         if (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.enclave_mode) {
                 kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
                 return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
         }
         return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
 }
 
 static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason;
         unsigned long rip, orig_rip;
         u32 instr_len;
 
         /*
          * Using VMCS.VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN on EPT misconfig depends on
          * undefined behavior: Intel's SDM doesn't mandate the VMCS field be
          * set when EPT misconfig occurs.  In practice, real hardware updates
          * VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN on EPT misconfig, but other hypervisors
          * (namely Hyper-V) don't set it due to it being undefined behavior,
          * i.e. we end up advancing IP with some random value.
          */
         if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) ||
             exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {
                 instr_len = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
 
                 /*
                  * Emulating an enclave's instructions isn't supported as KVM
                  * cannot access the enclave's memory or its true RIP, e.g. the
                  * vmcs.GUEST_RIP points at the exit point of the enclave, not
                  * the RIP that actually triggered the VM-Exit.  But, because
                  * most instructions that cause VM-Exit will #UD in an enclave,
                  * most instruction-based VM-Exits simply do not occur.
                  *
                  * There are a few exceptions, notably the debug instructions
                  * INT1ICEBRK and INT3, as they are allowed in debug enclaves
                  * and generate #DB/#BP as expected, which KVM might intercept.
                  * But again, the CPU does the dirty work and saves an instr
                  * length of zero so VMMs don't shoot themselves in the foot.
                  * WARN if KVM tries to skip a non-zero length instruction on
                  * a VM-Exit from an enclave.
                  */
                 if (!instr_len)
                         goto rip_updated;
 
                 WARN_ONCE(exit_reason.enclave_mode,
                           "skipping instruction after SGX enclave VM-Exit");
 
                 orig_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
                 rip = orig_rip + instr_len;
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
                 /*
                  * We need to mask out the high 32 bits of RIP if not in 64-bit
                  * mode, but just finding out that we are in 64-bit mode is
                  * quite expensive.  Only do it if there was a carry.
                  */
                 if (unlikely(((rip ^ orig_rip) >> 31) == 3) && !is_64_bit_mode(vcpu))
                         rip = (u32)rip;
 #endif
                 kvm_rip_write(vcpu, rip);
         } else {
                 if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP))
                         return 0;
         }
 
 rip_updated:
         /* skipping an emulated instruction also counts */
         vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
 
         return 1;
 }
 
 /*
  * Recognizes a pending MTF VM-exit and records the nested state for later
  * delivery.
  */
 void vmx_update_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
                 return;
 
         /*
          * Per the SDM, MTF takes priority over debug-trap exceptions besides
          * TSS T-bit traps and ICEBP (INT1).  KVM doesn't emulate T-bit traps
          * or ICEBP (in the emulator proper), and skipping of ICEBP after an
          * intercepted #DB deliberately avoids single-step #DB and MTF updates
          * as ICEBP is higher priority than both.  As instruction emulation is
          * completed at this point (i.e. KVM is at the instruction boundary),
          * any #DB exception pending delivery must be a debug-trap of lower
          * priority than MTF.  Record the pending MTF state to be delivered in
          * vmx_check_nested_events().
          */
         if (nested_cpu_has_mtf(vmcs12) &&
             (!vcpu->arch.exception.pending ||
              vcpu->arch.exception.vector == DB_VECTOR) &&
             (!vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending ||
              vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.vector == DB_VECTOR)) {
                 vmx->nested.mtf_pending = true;
                 kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
         } else {
                 vmx->nested.mtf_pending = false;
         }
 }
 
 int vmx_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         vmx_update_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
         return skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
 }
 
 static void vmx_clear_hlt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         /*
          * Ensure that we clear the HLT state in the VMCS.  We don't need to
          * explicitly skip the instruction because if the HLT state is set,
          * then the instruction is already executing and RIP has already been
          * advanced.
          */
         if (kvm_hlt_in_guest(vcpu->kvm) &&
                         vmcs_read32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE) == GUEST_ACTIVITY_HLT)
                 vmcs_write32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE, GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE);
 }
 
 void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct kvm_queued_exception *ex = &vcpu->arch.exception;
         u32 intr_info = ex->vector | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu, ex);
 
         if (ex->has_error_code) {
                 /*
                  * Despite the error code being architecturally defined as 32
                  * bits, and the VMCS field being 32 bits, Intel CPUs and thus
                  * VMX don't actually supporting setting bits 31:16.  Hardware
                  * will (should) never provide a bogus error code, but AMD CPUs
                  * do generate error codes with bits 31:16 set, and so KVM's
                  * ABI lets userspace shove in arbitrary 32-bit values.  Drop
                  * the upper bits to avoid VM-Fail, losing information that
                  * doesn't really exist is preferable to killing the VM.
                  */
                 vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE, (u16)ex->error_code);
                 intr_info |= INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
         }
 
         if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
                 int inc_eip = 0;
                 if (kvm_exception_is_soft(ex->vector))
                         inc_eip = vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len;
                 kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, ex->vector, inc_eip);
                 return;
         }
 
         WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->emulation_required);
 
         if (kvm_exception_is_soft(ex->vector)) {
                 vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
                              vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len);
                 intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION;
         } else
                 intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION;
 
         vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, intr_info);
 
         vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
 }
 
 static void vmx_setup_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned int msr,
                                bool load_into_hardware)
 {
         struct vmx_uret_msr *uret_msr;
 
         uret_msr = vmx_find_uret_msr(vmx, msr);
         if (!uret_msr)
                 return;
 
         uret_msr->load_into_hardware = load_into_hardware;
 }
 
 /*
  * Configuring user return MSRs to automatically save, load, and restore MSRs
  * that need to be shoved into hardware when running the guest.  Note, omitting
  * an MSR here does _NOT_ mean it's not emulated, only that it will not be
  * loaded into hardware when running the guest.
  */
 static void vmx_setup_uret_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
         bool load_syscall_msrs;
 
         /*
          * The SYSCALL MSRs are only needed on long mode guests, and only
          * when EFER.SCE is set.
          */
         load_syscall_msrs = is_long_mode(&vmx->vcpu) &&
                             (vmx->vcpu.arch.efer & EFER_SCE);
 
         vmx_setup_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_STAR, load_syscall_msrs);
         vmx_setup_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_LSTAR, load_syscall_msrs);
         vmx_setup_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, load_syscall_msrs);
 #endif
         vmx_setup_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER, update_transition_efer(vmx));
 
         vmx_setup_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_TSC_AUX,
                            guest_cpuid_has(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) ||
                            guest_cpuid_has(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID));
 
         /*
          * hle=0, rtm=0, tsx_ctrl=1 can be found with some combinations of new
          * kernel and old userspace.  If those guests run on a tsx=off host, do
          * allow guests to use TSX_CTRL, but don't change the value in hardware
          * so that TSX remains always disabled.
          */
         vmx_setup_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM));
 
         /*
          * The set of MSRs to load may have changed, reload MSRs before the
          * next VM-Enter.
          */
         vmx->guest_uret_msrs_loaded = false;
 }
 
 u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
 
         if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING))
                 return vmcs12->tsc_offset;
 
         return 0;
 }
 
 u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
 
         if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING) &&
             nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING))
                 return vmcs12->tsc_multiplier;
 
         return kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio;
 }
 
 void vmx_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, vcpu->arch.tsc_offset);
 }
 
 void vmx_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         vmcs_write64(TSC_MULTIPLIER, vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio);
 }
 
 /*
  * Userspace is allowed to set any supported IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL regardless of
  * guest CPUID.  Note, KVM allows userspace to set "VMX in SMX" to maintain
  * backwards compatibility even though KVM doesn't support emulating SMX.  And
  * because userspace set "VMX in SMX", the guest must also be allowed to set it,
  * e.g. if the MSR is left unlocked and the guest does a RMW operation.
  */
 #define KVM_SUPPORTED_FEATURE_CONTROL  (FEAT_CTL_LOCKED                  | \
                                         FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX  | \
                                         FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX | \
                                         FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED          | \
                                         FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED             | \
                                         FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED)
 
 static inline bool is_vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
                                                     struct msr_data *msr)
 {
         uint64_t valid_bits;
 
         /*
          * Ensure KVM_SUPPORTED_FEATURE_CONTROL is updated when new bits are
          * exposed to the guest.
          */
         WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &
                      ~KVM_SUPPORTED_FEATURE_CONTROL);
 
         if (!msr->host_initiated &&
             (vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED))
                 return false;
 
         if (msr->host_initiated)
                 valid_bits = KVM_SUPPORTED_FEATURE_CONTROL;
         else
                 valid_bits = vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits;
 
         return !(msr->data & ~valid_bits);
 }
 
 int vmx_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
 {
         switch (msr->index) {
         case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR:
                 if (!nested)
                         return 1;
                 return vmx_get_vmx_msr(&vmcs_config.nested, msr->index, &msr->data);
         default:
                 return KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID;
         }
 }
 
 /*
  * Reads an msr value (of 'msr_info->index') into 'msr_info->data'.
  * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
  * Assumes vcpu_load() was already called.
  */
 int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         struct vmx_uret_msr *msr;
         u32 index;
 
         switch (msr_info->index) {
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
         case MSR_FS_BASE:
                 msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_FS_BASE);
                 break;
         case MSR_GS_BASE:
                 msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GS_BASE);
                 break;
         case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
                 msr_info->data = vmx_read_guest_kernel_gs_base(vmx);
                 break;
 #endif
         case MSR_EFER:
                 return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
         case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL:
                 if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
                     !(vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
                         return 1;
                 goto find_uret_msr;
         case MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL:
                 if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !vmx_has_waitpkg(vmx))
                         return 1;
 
                 msr_info->data = vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control;
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
                 if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
                     !guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(vcpu))
                         return 1;
 
                 msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl;
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
                 msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
                 msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP);
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
                 msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP);
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
                 if (!kvm_mpx_supported() ||
                     (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
                      !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX)))
                         return 1;
                 msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS);
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
                 if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
                     !(vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control &
                       FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED))
                         return 1;
                 msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.mcg_ext_ctl;
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL:
                 msr_info->data = vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control;
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 ... MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3:
                 if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
                     !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC))
                         return 1;
                 msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash
                         [msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0];
                 break;
         case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR:
                 if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
                         return 1;
                 if (vmx_get_vmx_msr(&vmx->nested.msrs, msr_info->index,
                                     &msr_info->data))
                         return 1;
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV
                 /*
                  * Enlightened VMCS v1 doesn't have certain VMCS fields but
                  * instead of just ignoring the features, different Hyper-V
                  * versions are either trying to use them and fail or do some
                  * sanity checking and refuse to boot. Filter all unsupported
                  * features out.
                  */
                 if (!msr_info->host_initiated && guest_cpuid_has_evmcs(vcpu))
                         nested_evmcs_filter_control_msr(vcpu, msr_info->index,
                                                         &msr_info->data);
 #endif
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL:
                 if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest())
                         return 1;
                 msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl;
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS:
                 if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest())
                         return 1;
                 msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.status;
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH:
                 if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest() ||
                         !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
                                                 PT_CAP_cr3_filtering))
                         return 1;
                 msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.cr3_match;
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE:
                 if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest() ||
                         (!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
                                         PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
                          !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
                                         PT_CAP_single_range_output)))
                         return 1;
                 msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_base;
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK:
                 if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest() ||
                         (!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
                                         PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
                          !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
                                         PT_CAP_single_range_output)))
                         return 1;
                 msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask;
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B:
                 index = msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A;
                 if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest() ||
                     (index >= 2 * vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges))
                         return 1;
                 if (index % 2)
                         msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_b[index / 2];
                 else
                         msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2];
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
                 msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL);
                 break;
         default:
         find_uret_msr:
                 msr = vmx_find_uret_msr(vmx, msr_info->index);
                 if (msr) {
                         msr_info->data = msr->data;
                         break;
                 }
                 return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
         }
 
         return 0;
 }
 
 static u64 nested_vmx_truncate_sysenter_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                                                     u64 data)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
         if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM))
                 return (u32)data;
 #endif
         return (unsigned long)data;
 }
 
 static u64 vmx_get_supported_debugctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool host_initiated)
 {
         u64 debugctl = 0;
 
         if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT) &&
             (host_initiated || guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT)))
                 debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BUS_LOCK_DETECT;
 
         if ((kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT) &&
             (host_initiated || intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(vcpu)))
                 debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR | DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_LBRS_ON_PMI;
 
         return debugctl;
 }
 
 /*
  * Writes msr value into the appropriate "register".
  * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
  * Assumes vcpu_load() was already called.
  */
 int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         struct vmx_uret_msr *msr;
         int ret = 0;
         u32 msr_index = msr_info->index;
         u64 data = msr_info->data;
         u32 index;
 
         switch (msr_index) {
         case MSR_EFER:
                 ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
                 break;
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
         case MSR_FS_BASE:
                 vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
                 vmcs_writel(GUEST_FS_BASE, data);
                 break;
         case MSR_GS_BASE:
                 vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
                 vmcs_writel(GUEST_GS_BASE, data);
                 break;
         case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
                 vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(vmx, data);
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_XFD:
                 ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
                 /*
                  * Always intercepting WRMSR could incur non-negligible
                  * overhead given xfd might be changed frequently in
                  * guest context switch. Disable write interception
                  * upon the first write with a non-zero value (indicating
                  * potential usage on dynamic xfeatures). Also update
                  * exception bitmap to trap #NM for proper virtualization
                  * of guest xfd_err.
                  */
                 if (!ret && data) {
                         vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_XFD,
                                                       MSR_TYPE_RW);
                         vcpu->arch.xfd_no_write_intercept = true;
                         vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
                 }
                 break;
 #endif
         case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
                 if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
                         get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_sysenter_cs = data;
                 vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, data);
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
                 if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
                         data = nested_vmx_truncate_sysenter_addr(vcpu, data);
                         get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_sysenter_eip = data;
                 }
                 vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, data);
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
                 if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
                         data = nested_vmx_truncate_sysenter_addr(vcpu, data);
                         get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_sysenter_esp = data;
                 }
                 vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, data);
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR: {
                 u64 invalid;
 
                 invalid = data & ~vmx_get_supported_debugctl(vcpu, msr_info->host_initiated);
                 if (invalid & (DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF|DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR)) {
                         kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(vcpu, msr_index, data);
                         data &= ~(DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF|DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR);
                         invalid &= ~(DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF|DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR);
                 }
 
                 if (invalid)
                         return 1;
 
                 if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && get_vmcs12(vcpu)->vm_exit_controls &
                                                 VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS)
                         get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_ia32_debugctl = data;
 
                 vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, data);
                 if (intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(vcpu) && !to_vmx(vcpu)->lbr_desc.event &&
                     (data & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR))
                         intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event(vcpu);
                 return 0;
         }
         case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
                 if (!kvm_mpx_supported() ||
                     (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
                      !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX)))
                         return 1;
                 if (is_noncanonical_address(data & PAGE_MASK, vcpu) ||
                     (data & MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS_RSVD))
                         return 1;
 
                 if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
                     ((vmx->nested.msrs.entry_ctls_high & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS) ||
                      (vmx->nested.msrs.exit_ctls_high & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS)))
                         get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_bndcfgs = data;
 
                 vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, data);
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL:
                 if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !vmx_has_waitpkg(vmx))
                         return 1;
 
                 /* The reserved bit 1 and non-32 bit [63:32] should be zero */
                 if (data & (BIT_ULL(1) | GENMASK_ULL(63, 32)))
                         return 1;
 
                 vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control = data;
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
                 if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
                     !guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(vcpu))
                         return 1;
 
                 if (kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(data))
                         return 1;
 
                 vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
                 if (!data)
                         break;
 
                 /*
                  * For non-nested:
                  * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
                  * it through.
                  *
                  * For nested:
                  * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
                  * nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the
                  * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten
                  * in the merging. We update the vmcs01 here for L1 as well
                  * since it will end up touching the MSR anyway now.
                  */
                 vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu,
                                               MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
                                               MSR_TYPE_RW);
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL:
                 if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
                     !(vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
                         return 1;
                 if (data & ~(TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE | TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR))
                         return 1;
                 goto find_uret_msr;
         case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
                 ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
                 if (ret)
                         break;
 
                 if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
                     get_vmcs12(vcpu)->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_PAT)
                         get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_ia32_pat = data;
 
                 if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT)
                         vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, data);
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
                 if ((!msr_info->host_initiated &&
                      !(to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control &
                        FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED)) ||
                     (data & ~MCG_EXT_CTL_LMCE_EN))
                         return 1;
                 vcpu->arch.mcg_ext_ctl = data;
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL:
                 if (!is_vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(vmx, msr_info))
                         return 1;
 
                 vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control = data;
                 if (msr_info->host_initiated && data == 0)
                         vmx_leave_nested(vcpu);
 
                 /* SGX may be enabled/disabled by guest's firmware */
                 vmx_write_encls_bitmap(vcpu, NULL);
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 ... MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3:
                 /*
                  * On real hardware, the LE hash MSRs are writable before
                  * the firmware sets bit 0 in MSR 0x7a ("activating" SGX),
                  * at which point SGX related bits in IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL
                  * become writable.
                  *
                  * KVM does not emulate SGX activation for simplicity, so
                  * allow writes to the LE hash MSRs if IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL
                  * is unlocked.  This is technically not architectural
                  * behavior, but it's close enough.
                  */
                 if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
                     (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) ||
                     ((vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED) &&
                     !(vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED))))
                         return 1;
                 vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash
                         [msr_index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0] = data;
                 break;
         case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR:
                 if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
                         return 1; /* they are read-only */
                 if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
                         return 1;
                 return vmx_set_vmx_msr(vcpu, msr_index, data);
         case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL:
                 if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest() ||
                         vmx_rtit_ctl_check(vcpu, data) ||
                         vmx->nested.vmxon)
                         return 1;
                 vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL, data);
                 vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl = data;
                 pt_update_intercept_for_msr(vcpu);
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS:
                 if (!pt_can_write_msr(vmx))
                         return 1;
                 if (data & MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS_MASK)
                         return 1;
                 vmx->pt_desc.guest.status = data;
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH:
                 if (!pt_can_write_msr(vmx))
                         return 1;
                 if (!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
                                            PT_CAP_cr3_filtering))
                         return 1;
                 vmx->pt_desc.guest.cr3_match = data;
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE:
                 if (!pt_can_write_msr(vmx))
                         return 1;
                 if (!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
                                            PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
                     !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
                                            PT_CAP_single_range_output))
                         return 1;
                 if (!pt_output_base_valid(vcpu, data))
                         return 1;
                 vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_base = data;
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK:
                 if (!pt_can_write_msr(vmx))
                         return 1;
                 if (!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
                                            PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
                     !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
                                            PT_CAP_single_range_output))
                         return 1;
                 vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask = data;
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B:
                 if (!pt_can_write_msr(vmx))
                         return 1;
                 index = msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A;
                 if (index >= 2 * vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges)
                         return 1;
                 if (is_noncanonical_address(data, vcpu))
                         return 1;
                 if (index % 2)
                         vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_b[index / 2] = data;
                 else
                         vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2] = data;
                 break;
         case MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES:
                 if (data && !vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu)->version)
                         return 1;
                 if (data & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT) {
                         if ((data & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT) !=
                             (kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT))
                                 return 1;
                         if (!cpuid_model_is_consistent(vcpu))
                                 return 1;
                 }
                 if (data & PERF_CAP_PEBS_FORMAT) {
                         if ((data & PERF_CAP_PEBS_MASK) !=
                             (kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap & PERF_CAP_PEBS_MASK))
                                 return 1;
                         if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_DS))
                                 return 1;
                         if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_DTES64))
                                 return 1;
                         if (!cpuid_model_is_consistent(vcpu))
                                 return 1;
                 }
                 ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
                 break;
 
         default:
         find_uret_msr:
                 msr = vmx_find_uret_msr(vmx, msr_index);
                 if (msr)
                         ret = vmx_set_guest_uret_msr(vmx, msr, data);
                 else
                         ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
         }
 
         /* FB_CLEAR may have changed, also update the FB_CLEAR_DIS behavior */
         if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)
                 vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(vcpu, vmx);
 
         return ret;
 }
 
 void vmx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg)
 {
         unsigned long guest_owned_bits;
 
         kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, reg);
 
         switch (reg) {
         case VCPU_REGS_RSP:
                 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP] = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RSP);
                 break;
         case VCPU_REGS_RIP:
                 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP] = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RIP);
                 break;
         case VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR:
                 if (enable_ept)
                         ept_save_pdptrs(vcpu);
                 break;
         case VCPU_EXREG_CR0:
                 guest_owned_bits = vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits;
 
                 vcpu->arch.cr0 &= ~guest_owned_bits;
                 vcpu->arch.cr0 |= vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR0) & guest_owned_bits;
                 break;
         case VCPU_EXREG_CR3:
                 /*
                  * When intercepting CR3 loads, e.g. for shadowing paging, KVM's
                  * CR3 is loaded into hardware, not the guest's CR3.
                  */
                 if (!(exec_controls_get(to_vmx(vcpu)) & CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING))
                         vcpu->arch.cr3 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR3);
                 break;
         case VCPU_EXREG_CR4:
                 guest_owned_bits = vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits;
 
                 vcpu->arch.cr4 &= ~guest_owned_bits;
                 vcpu->arch.cr4 |= vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) & guest_owned_bits;
                 break;
         default:
                 KVM_BUG_ON(1, vcpu->kvm);
                 break;
         }
 }
 
 /*
  * There is no X86_FEATURE for SGX yet, but anyway we need to query CPUID
  * directly instead of going through cpu_has(), to ensure KVM is trapping
  * ENCLS whenever it's supported in hardware.  It does not matter whether
  * the host OS supports or has enabled SGX.
  */
 static bool cpu_has_sgx(void)
 {
         return cpuid_eax(0) >= 0x12 && (cpuid_eax(0x12) & BIT(0));
 }
 
 /*
  * Some cpus support VM_{ENTRY,EXIT}_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL but they
  * can't be used due to errata where VM Exit may incorrectly clear
  * IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL[34:32]. Work around the errata by using the
  * MSR load mechanism to switch IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL.
  */
 static bool cpu_has_perf_global_ctrl_bug(void)
 {
         switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vfm) {
         case INTEL_NEHALEM_EP:  /* AAK155 */
         case INTEL_NEHALEM:     /* AAP115 */
         case INTEL_WESTMERE:    /* AAT100 */
         case INTEL_WESTMERE_EP: /* BC86,AAY89,BD102 */
         case INTEL_NEHALEM_EX:  /* BA97 */
                 return true;
         default:
                 break;
         }
 
         return false;
 }
 
 static int adjust_vmx_controls(u32 ctl_min, u32 ctl_opt, u32 msr, u32 *result)
 {
         u32 vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high;
         u32 ctl = ctl_min | ctl_opt;
 
         rdmsr(msr, vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high);
 
         ctl &= vmx_msr_high; /* bit == 0 in high word ==> must be zero */
         ctl |= vmx_msr_low;  /* bit == 1 in low word  ==> must be one  */
 
         /* Ensure minimum (required) set of control bits are supported. */
         if (ctl_min & ~ctl)
                 return -EIO;
 
         *result = ctl;
         return 0;
 }
 
 static u64 adjust_vmx_controls64(u64 ctl_opt, u32 msr)
 {
         u64 allowed;
 
         rdmsrl(msr, allowed);
 
         return  ctl_opt & allowed;
 }
 
 static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
                              struct vmx_capability *vmx_cap)
 {
         u32 vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high;
         u32 _pin_based_exec_control = 0;
         u32 _cpu_based_exec_control = 0;
         u32 _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control = 0;
         u64 _cpu_based_3rd_exec_control = 0;
         u32 _vmexit_control = 0;
         u32 _vmentry_control = 0;
         u64 misc_msr;
         int i;
 
         /*
          * LOAD/SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS are absent because both are mandatory.
          * SAVE_IA32_PAT and SAVE_IA32_EFER are absent because KVM always
          * intercepts writes to PAT and EFER, i.e. never enables those controls.
          */
         struct {
                 u32 entry_control;
                 u32 exit_control;
         } const vmcs_entry_exit_pairs[] = {
                 { VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,  VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL },
                 { VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT,               VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT },
                 { VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER,              VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER },
                 { VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS,                VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS },
                 { VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL,          VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL },
         };
 
         memset(vmcs_conf, 0, sizeof(*vmcs_conf));
 
         if (adjust_vmx_controls(KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
                                 KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
                                 MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS,
                                 &_cpu_based_exec_control))
                 return -EIO;
         if (_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS) {
                 if (adjust_vmx_controls(KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
                                         KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
                                         MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2,
                                         &_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control))
                         return -EIO;
         }
         if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_PROVE_VE))
                 _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE;
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
         if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &
                                 SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES))
                 _cpu_based_exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
 #endif
 
         if (!(_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW))
                 _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~(
                                 SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
                                 SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
                                 SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
 
         rdmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP,
                 &vmx_cap->ept, &vmx_cap->vpid);
 
         if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT) &&
             vmx_cap->ept) {
                 pr_warn_once("EPT CAP should not exist if not support "
                                 "1-setting enable EPT VM-execution control\n");
 
                 if (error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config)
                         return -EIO;
 
                 vmx_cap->ept = 0;
                 _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE;
         }
         if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID) &&
             vmx_cap->vpid) {
                 pr_warn_once("VPID CAP should not exist if not support "
                                 "1-setting enable VPID VM-execution control\n");
 
                 if (error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config)
                         return -EIO;
 
                 vmx_cap->vpid = 0;
         }
 
         if (!cpu_has_sgx())
                 _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING;
 
         if (_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS)
                 _cpu_based_3rd_exec_control =
                         adjust_vmx_controls64(KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
                                               MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS3);
 
         if (adjust_vmx_controls(KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS,
                                 KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS,
                                 MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS,
                                 &_vmexit_control))
                 return -EIO;
 
         if (adjust_vmx_controls(KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
                                 KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
                                 MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS,
                                 &_pin_based_exec_control))
                 return -EIO;
 
         if (cpu_has_broken_vmx_preemption_timer())
                 _pin_based_exec_control &= ~PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
         if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &
                 SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY))
                 _pin_based_exec_control &= ~PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
 
         if (adjust_vmx_controls(KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS,
                                 KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS,
                                 MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS,
                                 &_vmentry_control))
                 return -EIO;
 
         for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_entry_exit_pairs); i++) {
                 u32 n_ctrl = vmcs_entry_exit_pairs[i].entry_control;
                 u32 x_ctrl = vmcs_entry_exit_pairs[i].exit_control;
 
                 if (!(_vmentry_control & n_ctrl) == !(_vmexit_control & x_ctrl))
                         continue;
 
                 pr_warn_once("Inconsistent VM-Entry/VM-Exit pair, entry = %x, exit = %x\n",
                              _vmentry_control & n_ctrl, _vmexit_control & x_ctrl);
 
                 if (error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config)
                         return -EIO;
 
                 _vmentry_control &= ~n_ctrl;
                 _vmexit_control &= ~x_ctrl;
         }
 
         rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC, vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high);
 
         /* IA-32 SDM Vol 3B: VMCS size is never greater than 4kB. */
         if ((vmx_msr_high & 0x1fff) > PAGE_SIZE)
                 return -EIO;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
         /* IA-32 SDM Vol 3B: 64-bit CPUs always have VMX_BASIC_MSR[48]==0. */
         if (vmx_msr_high & (1u<<16))
                 return -EIO;
 #endif
 
         /* Require Write-Back (WB) memory type for VMCS accesses. */
         if (((vmx_msr_high >> 18) & 15) != 6)
                 return -EIO;
 
         rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC, misc_msr);
 
         vmcs_conf->size = vmx_msr_high & 0x1fff;
         vmcs_conf->basic_cap = vmx_msr_high & ~0x1fff;
 
         vmcs_conf->revision_id = vmx_msr_low;
 
         vmcs_conf->pin_based_exec_ctrl = _pin_based_exec_control;
         vmcs_conf->cpu_based_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_exec_control;
         vmcs_conf->cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control;
         vmcs_conf->cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_3rd_exec_control;
         vmcs_conf->vmexit_ctrl         = _vmexit_control;
         vmcs_conf->vmentry_ctrl        = _vmentry_control;
         vmcs_conf->misc = misc_msr;
 
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
         if (enlightened_vmcs)
                 evmcs_sanitize_exec_ctrls(vmcs_conf);
 #endif
 
         return 0;
 }
 
 static bool __kvm_is_vmx_supported(void)
 {
         int cpu = smp_processor_id();
 
         if (!(cpuid_ecx(1) & feature_bit(VMX))) {
                 pr_err("VMX not supported by CPU %d\n", cpu);
                 return false;
         }
 
         if (!this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL) ||
             !this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VMX)) {
                 pr_err("VMX not enabled (by BIOS) in MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL on CPU %d\n", cpu);
                 return false;
         }
 
         return true;
 }
 
 static bool kvm_is_vmx_supported(void)
 {
         bool supported;
 
         migrate_disable();
         supported = __kvm_is_vmx_supported();
         migrate_enable();
 
         return supported;
 }
 
 int vmx_check_processor_compat(void)
 {
         int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
         struct vmcs_config vmcs_conf;
         struct vmx_capability vmx_cap;
 
         if (!__kvm_is_vmx_supported())
                 return -EIO;
 
         if (setup_vmcs_config(&vmcs_conf, &vmx_cap) < 0) {
                 pr_err("Failed to setup VMCS config on CPU %d\n", cpu);
                 return -EIO;
         }
         if (nested)
                 nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(&vmcs_conf, vmx_cap.ept);
         if (memcmp(&vmcs_config, &vmcs_conf, sizeof(struct vmcs_config))) {
                 pr_err("Inconsistent VMCS config on CPU %d\n", cpu);
                 return -EIO;
         }
         return 0;
 }
 
 static int kvm_cpu_vmxon(u64 vmxon_pointer)
 {
         u64 msr;
 
         cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE);
 
         asm goto("1: vmxon %[vmxon_pointer]\n\t"
                           _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault])
                           : : [vmxon_pointer] "m"(vmxon_pointer)
                           : : fault);
         return 0;
 
 fault:
         WARN_ONCE(1, "VMXON faulted, MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL (0x3a) = 0x%llx\n",
                   rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, &msr) ? 0xdeadbeef : msr);
         cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE);
 
         return -EFAULT;
 }
 
 int vmx_hardware_enable(void)
 {
         int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
         u64 phys_addr = __pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu));
         int r;
 
         if (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_VMXE)
                 return -EBUSY;
 
         /*
          * This can happen if we hot-added a CPU but failed to allocate
          * VP assist page for it.
          */
         if (kvm_is_using_evmcs() && !hv_get_vp_assist_page(cpu))
                 return -EFAULT;
 
         intel_pt_handle_vmx(1);
 
         r = kvm_cpu_vmxon(phys_addr);
         if (r) {
                 intel_pt_handle_vmx(0);
                 return r;
         }
 
         return 0;
 }
 
 static void vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss(void)
 {
         int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
         struct loaded_vmcs *v, *n;
 
         list_for_each_entry_safe(v, n, &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu),
                                  loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link)
                 __loaded_vmcs_clear(v);
 }
 
 void vmx_hardware_disable(void)
 {
         vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss();
 
         if (kvm_cpu_vmxoff())
                 kvm_spurious_fault();
 
         hv_reset_evmcs();
 
         intel_pt_handle_vmx(0);
 }
 
 struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs_cpu(bool shadow, int cpu, gfp_t flags)
 {
         int node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
         struct page *pages;
         struct vmcs *vmcs;
 
         pages = __alloc_pages_node(node, flags, 0);
         if (!pages)
                 return NULL;
         vmcs = page_address(pages);
         memset(vmcs, 0, vmcs_config.size);
 
         /* KVM supports Enlightened VMCS v1 only */
         if (kvm_is_using_evmcs())
                 vmcs->hdr.revision_id = KVM_EVMCS_VERSION;
         else
                 vmcs->hdr.revision_id = vmcs_config.revision_id;
 
         if (shadow)
                 vmcs->hdr.shadow_vmcs = 1;
         return vmcs;
 }
 
 void free_vmcs(struct vmcs *vmcs)
 {
         free_page((unsigned long)vmcs);
 }
 
 /*
  * Free a VMCS, but before that VMCLEAR it on the CPU where it was last loaded
  */
 void free_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
 {
         if (!loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
                 return;
         loaded_vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs);
         free_vmcs(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
         loaded_vmcs->vmcs = NULL;
         if (loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap)
                 free_page((unsigned long)loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap);
         WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs != NULL);
 }
 
 int alloc_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
 {
         loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs(false);
         if (!loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
                 return -ENOMEM;
 
         vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
 
         loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = NULL;
         loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = false;
         loaded_vmcs->cpu = -1;
         loaded_vmcs->launched = 0;
 
         if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) {
                 loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap = (unsigned long *)
                                 __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
                 if (!loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap)
                         goto out_vmcs;
                 memset(loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE);
         }
 
         memset(&loaded_vmcs->host_state, 0, sizeof(struct vmcs_host_state));
         memset(&loaded_vmcs->controls_shadow, 0,
                 sizeof(struct vmcs_controls_shadow));
 
         return 0;
 
 out_vmcs:
         free_loaded_vmcs(loaded_vmcs);
         return -ENOMEM;
 }
 
 static void free_kvm_area(void)
 {
         int cpu;
 
         for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
                 free_vmcs(per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu));
                 per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu) = NULL;
         }
 }
 
 static __init int alloc_kvm_area(void)
 {
         int cpu;
 
         for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
                 struct vmcs *vmcs;
 
                 vmcs = alloc_vmcs_cpu(false, cpu, GFP_KERNEL);
                 if (!vmcs) {
                         free_kvm_area();
                         return -ENOMEM;
                 }
 
                 /*
                  * When eVMCS is enabled, alloc_vmcs_cpu() sets
                  * vmcs->revision_id to KVM_EVMCS_VERSION instead of
                  * revision_id reported by MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC.
                  *
                  * However, even though not explicitly documented by
                  * TLFS, VMXArea passed as VMXON argument should
                  * still be marked with revision_id reported by
                  * physical CPU.
                  */
                 if (kvm_is_using_evmcs())
                         vmcs->hdr.revision_id = vmcs_config.revision_id;
 
                 per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu) = vmcs;
         }
         return 0;
 }
 
 static void fix_pmode_seg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg,
                 struct kvm_segment *save)
 {
         if (!emulate_invalid_guest_state) {
                 /*
                  * CS and SS RPL should be equal during guest entry according
                  * to VMX spec, but in reality it is not always so. Since vcpu
                  * is in the middle of the transition from real mode to
                  * protected mode it is safe to assume that RPL 0 is a good
                  * default value.
                  */
                 if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS || seg == VCPU_SREG_SS)
                         save->selector &= ~SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
                 save->dpl = save->selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
                 save->s = 1;
         }
         __vmx_set_segment(vcpu, save, seg);
 }
 
 static void enter_pmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         unsigned long flags;
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         /*
          * Update real mode segment cache. It may be not up-to-date if segment
          * register was written while vcpu was in a guest mode.
          */
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES], VCPU_SREG_ES);
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS], VCPU_SREG_DS);
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS], VCPU_SREG_FS);
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS], VCPU_SREG_GS);
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS], VCPU_SREG_SS);
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS], VCPU_SREG_CS);
 
         vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0;
 
         __vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_TR], VCPU_SREG_TR);
 
         flags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);
         flags &= RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
         flags |= vmx->rmode.save_rflags & ~RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
         vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, flags);
 
         vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, (vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) & ~X86_CR4_VME) |
                         (vmcs_readl(CR4_READ_SHADOW) & X86_CR4_VME));
 
         vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
 
         fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_CS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS]);
         fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_SS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS]);
         fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_ES, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES]);
         fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_DS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS]);
         fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_FS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS]);
         fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_GS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS]);
 }
 
 static void fix_rmode_seg(int seg, struct kvm_segment *save)
 {
         const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field *sf = &kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg];
         struct kvm_segment var = *save;
 
         var.dpl = 0x3;
         if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS)
                 var.type = 0x3;
 
         if (!emulate_invalid_guest_state) {
                 var.selector = var.base >> 4;
                 var.base = var.base & 0xffff0;
                 var.limit = 0xffff;
                 var.g = 0;
                 var.db = 0;
                 var.present = 1;
                 var.s = 1;
                 var.l = 0;
                 var.unusable = 0;
                 var.type = 0x3;
                 var.avl = 0;
                 if (save->base & 0xf)
                         pr_warn_once("segment base is not paragraph aligned "
                                      "when entering protected mode (seg=%d)", seg);
         }
 
         vmcs_write16(sf->selector, var.selector);
         vmcs_writel(sf->base, var.base);
         vmcs_write32(sf->limit, var.limit);
         vmcs_write32(sf->ar_bytes, vmx_segment_access_rights(&var));
 }
 
 static void enter_rmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         unsigned long flags;
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(vcpu->kvm);
 
         /*
          * KVM should never use VM86 to virtualize Real Mode when L2 is active,
          * as using VM86 is unnecessary if unrestricted guest is enabled, and
          * if unrestricted guest is disabled, VM-Enter (from L1) with CR0.PG=0
          * should VM-Fail and KVM should reject userspace attempts to stuff
          * CR0.PG=0 when L2 is active.
          */
         WARN_ON_ONCE(is_guest_mode(vcpu));
 
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_TR], VCPU_SREG_TR);
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES], VCPU_SREG_ES);
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS], VCPU_SREG_DS);
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS], VCPU_SREG_FS);
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS], VCPU_SREG_GS);
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS], VCPU_SREG_SS);
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS], VCPU_SREG_CS);
 
         vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 1;
 
         vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
 
         vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, kvm_vmx->tss_addr);
         vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_LIMIT, RMODE_TSS_SIZE - 1);
         vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, 0x008b);
 
         flags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);
         vmx->rmode.save_rflags = flags;
 
         flags |= X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_VM;
 
         vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, flags);
         vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) | X86_CR4_VME);
         vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
 
         fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_SS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS]);
         fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_CS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS]);
         fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_ES, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES]);
         fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_DS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS]);
         fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_GS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS]);
         fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_FS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS]);
 }
 
 int vmx_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         /* Nothing to do if hardware doesn't support EFER. */
         if (!vmx_find_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER))
                 return 0;
 
         vcpu->arch.efer = efer;
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
         if (efer & EFER_LMA)
                 vm_entry_controls_setbit(vmx, VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
         else
                 vm_entry_controls_clearbit(vmx, VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
 #else
         if (KVM_BUG_ON(efer & EFER_LMA, vcpu->kvm))
                 return 1;
 #endif
 
         vmx_setup_uret_msrs(vmx);
         return 0;
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 
 static void enter_lmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         u32 guest_tr_ar;
 
         vmx_segment_cache_clear(to_vmx(vcpu));
 
         guest_tr_ar = vmcs_read32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES);
         if ((guest_tr_ar & VMX_AR_TYPE_MASK) != VMX_AR_TYPE_BUSY_64_TSS) {
                 pr_debug_ratelimited("%s: tss fixup for long mode. \n",
                                      __func__);
                 vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES,
                              (guest_tr_ar & ~VMX_AR_TYPE_MASK)
                              | VMX_AR_TYPE_BUSY_64_TSS);
         }
         vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer | EFER_LMA);
 }
 
 static void exit_lmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer & ~EFER_LMA);
 }
 
 #endif
 
 void vmx_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         /*
          * INVEPT must be issued when EPT is enabled, irrespective of VPID, as
          * the CPU is not required to invalidate guest-physical mappings on
          * VM-Entry, even if VPID is disabled.  Guest-physical mappings are
          * associated with the root EPT structure and not any particular VPID
          * (INVVPID also isn't required to invalidate guest-physical mappings).
          */
         if (enable_ept) {
                 ept_sync_global();
         } else if (enable_vpid) {
                 if (cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_global()) {
                         vpid_sync_vcpu_global();
                 } else {
                         vpid_sync_vcpu_single(vmx->vpid);
                         vpid_sync_vcpu_single(vmx->nested.vpid02);
                 }
         }
 }
 
 static inline int vmx_get_current_vpid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
                 return nested_get_vpid02(vcpu);
         return to_vmx(vcpu)->vpid;
 }
 
 void vmx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
         u64 root_hpa = mmu->root.hpa;
 
         /* No flush required if the current context is invalid. */
         if (!VALID_PAGE(root_hpa))
                 return;
 
         if (enable_ept)
                 ept_sync_context(construct_eptp(vcpu, root_hpa,
                                                 mmu->root_role.level));
         else
                 vpid_sync_context(vmx_get_current_vpid(vcpu));
 }
 
 void vmx_flush_tlb_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr)
 {
         /*
          * vpid_sync_vcpu_addr() is a nop if vpid==0, see the comment in
          * vmx_flush_tlb_guest() for an explanation of why this is ok.
          */
         vpid_sync_vcpu_addr(vmx_get_current_vpid(vcpu), addr);
 }
 
 void vmx_flush_tlb_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         /*
          * vpid_sync_context() is a nop if vpid==0, e.g. if enable_vpid==0 or a
          * vpid couldn't be allocated for this vCPU.  VM-Enter and VM-Exit are
          * required to flush GVA->{G,H}PA mappings from the TLB if vpid is
          * disabled (VM-Enter with vpid enabled and vpid==0 is disallowed),
          * i.e. no explicit INVVPID is necessary.
          */
         vpid_sync_context(vmx_get_current_vpid(vcpu));
 }
 
 void vmx_ept_load_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
 
         if (!kvm_register_is_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR))
                 return;
 
         if (is_pae_paging(vcpu)) {
                 vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR0, mmu->pdptrs[0]);
                 vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR1, mmu->pdptrs[1]);
                 vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR2, mmu->pdptrs[2]);
                 vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR3, mmu->pdptrs[3]);
         }
 }
 
 void ept_save_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
 
         if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_pae_paging(vcpu)))
                 return;
 
         mmu->pdptrs[0] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR0);
         mmu->pdptrs[1] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR1);
         mmu->pdptrs[2] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR2);
         mmu->pdptrs[3] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR3);
 
         kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR);
 }
 
 #define CR3_EXITING_BITS (CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING | \
                           CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING)
 
 bool vmx_is_valid_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
 {
         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
                 return nested_guest_cr0_valid(vcpu, cr0);
 
         if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon)
                 return nested_host_cr0_valid(vcpu, cr0);
 
         return true;
 }
 
 void vmx_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         unsigned long hw_cr0, old_cr0_pg;
         u32 tmp;
 
         old_cr0_pg = kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, X86_CR0_PG);
 
         hw_cr0 = (cr0 & ~KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_OFF);
         if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
                 hw_cr0 |= KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
         else {
                 hw_cr0 |= KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON;
                 if (!enable_ept)
                         hw_cr0 |= X86_CR0_WP;
 
                 if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PE))
                         enter_pmode(vcpu);
 
                 if (!vmx->rmode.vm86_active && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PE))
                         enter_rmode(vcpu);
         }
 
         vmcs_writel(CR0_READ_SHADOW, cr0);
         vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR0, hw_cr0);
         vcpu->arch.cr0 = cr0;
         kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR0);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
         if (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME) {
                 if (!old_cr0_pg && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PG))
                         enter_lmode(vcpu);
                 else if (old_cr0_pg && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG))
                         exit_lmode(vcpu);
         }
 #endif
 
         if (enable_ept && !enable_unrestricted_guest) {
                 /*
                  * Ensure KVM has an up-to-date snapshot of the guest's CR3.  If
                  * the below code _enables_ CR3 exiting, vmx_cache_reg() will
                  * (correctly) stop reading vmcs.GUEST_CR3 because it thinks
                  * KVM's CR3 is installed.
                  */
                 if (!kvm_register_is_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3))
                         vmx_cache_reg(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3);
 
                 /*
                  * When running with EPT but not unrestricted guest, KVM must
                  * intercept CR3 accesses when paging is _disabled_.  This is
                  * necessary because restricted guests can't actually run with
                  * paging disabled, and so KVM stuffs its own CR3 in order to
                  * run the guest when identity mapped page tables.
                  *
                  * Do _NOT_ check the old CR0.PG, e.g. to optimize away the
                  * update, it may be stale with respect to CR3 interception,
                  * e.g. after nested VM-Enter.
                  *
                  * Lastly, honor L1's desires, i.e. intercept CR3 loads and/or
                  * stores to forward them to L1, even if KVM does not need to
                  * intercept them to preserve its identity mapped page tables.
                  */
                 if (!(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {
                         exec_controls_setbit(vmx, CR3_EXITING_BITS);
                 } else if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
                         exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, CR3_EXITING_BITS);
                 } else {
                         tmp = exec_controls_get(vmx);
                         tmp &= ~CR3_EXITING_BITS;
                         tmp |= get_vmcs12(vcpu)->cpu_based_vm_exec_control & CR3_EXITING_BITS;
                         exec_controls_set(vmx, tmp);
                 }
 
                 /* Note, vmx_set_cr4() consumes the new vcpu->arch.cr0. */
                 if ((old_cr0_pg ^ cr0) & X86_CR0_PG)
                         vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu));
 
                 /*
                  * When !CR0_PG -> CR0_PG, vcpu->arch.cr3 becomes active, but
                  * GUEST_CR3 is still vmx->ept_identity_map_addr if EPT + !URG.
                  */
                 if (!(old_cr0_pg & X86_CR0_PG) && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PG))
                         kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3);
         }
 
         /* depends on vcpu->arch.cr0 to be set to a new value */
         vmx->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
 }
 
 static int vmx_get_max_ept_level(void)
 {
         if (cpu_has_vmx_ept_5levels())
                 return 5;
         return 4;
 }
 
 u64 construct_eptp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level)
 {
         u64 eptp = VMX_EPTP_MT_WB;
 
         eptp |= (root_level == 5) ? VMX_EPTP_PWL_5 : VMX_EPTP_PWL_4;
 
         if (enable_ept_ad_bits &&
             (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) || nested_ept_ad_enabled(vcpu)))
                 eptp |= VMX_EPTP_AD_ENABLE_BIT;
         eptp |= root_hpa;
 
         return eptp;
 }
 
 void vmx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level)
 {
         struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
         bool update_guest_cr3 = true;
         unsigned long guest_cr3;
         u64 eptp;
 
         if (enable_ept) {
                 eptp = construct_eptp(vcpu, root_hpa, root_level);
                 vmcs_write64(EPT_POINTER, eptp);
 
                 hv_track_root_tdp(vcpu, root_hpa);
 
                 if (!enable_unrestricted_guest && !is_paging(vcpu))
                         guest_cr3 = to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_identity_map_addr;
                 else if (kvm_register_is_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3))
                         guest_cr3 = vcpu->arch.cr3;
                 else /* vmcs.GUEST_CR3 is already up-to-date. */
                         update_guest_cr3 = false;
                 vmx_ept_load_pdptrs(vcpu);
         } else {
                 guest_cr3 = root_hpa | kvm_get_active_pcid(vcpu) |
                             kvm_get_active_cr3_lam_bits(vcpu);
         }
 
         if (update_guest_cr3)
                 vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR3, guest_cr3);
 }
 
 bool vmx_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
 {
         /*
          * We operate under the default treatment of SMM, so VMX cannot be
          * enabled under SMM.  Note, whether or not VMXE is allowed at all,
          * i.e. is a reserved bit, is handled by common x86 code.
          */
         if ((cr4 & X86_CR4_VMXE) && is_smm(vcpu))
                 return false;
 
         if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon && !nested_cr4_valid(vcpu, cr4))
                 return false;
 
         return true;
 }
 
 void vmx_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
 {
         unsigned long old_cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         unsigned long hw_cr4;
 
         /*
          * Pass through host's Machine Check Enable value to hw_cr4, which
          * is in force while we are in guest mode.  Do not let guests control
          * this bit, even if host CR4.MCE == 0.
          */
         hw_cr4 = (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_MCE) | (cr4 & ~X86_CR4_MCE);
         if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
                 hw_cr4 |= KVM_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
         else if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active)
                 hw_cr4 |= KVM_RMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON;
         else
                 hw_cr4 |= KVM_PMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON;
 
         if (vmx_umip_emulated()) {
                 if (cr4 & X86_CR4_UMIP) {
                         secondary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
                         hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_UMIP;
                 } else if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) ||
                         !nested_cpu_has2(get_vmcs12(vcpu), SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC)) {
                         secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
                 }
         }
 
         vcpu->arch.cr4 = cr4;
         kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR4);
 
         if (!enable_unrestricted_guest) {
                 if (enable_ept) {
                         if (!is_paging(vcpu)) {
                                 hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_PAE;
                                 hw_cr4 |= X86_CR4_PSE;
                         } else if (!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)) {
                                 hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_PAE;
                         }
                 }
 
                 /*
                  * SMEP/SMAP/PKU is disabled if CPU is in non-paging mode in
                  * hardware.  To emulate this behavior, SMEP/SMAP/PKU needs
                  * to be manually disabled when guest switches to non-paging
                  * mode.
                  *
                  * If !enable_unrestricted_guest, the CPU is always running
                  * with CR0.PG=1 and CR4 needs to be modified.
                  * If enable_unrestricted_guest, the CPU automatically
                  * disables SMEP/SMAP/PKU when the guest sets CR0.PG=0.
                  */
                 if (!is_paging(vcpu))
                         hw_cr4 &= ~(X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE);
         }
 
         vmcs_writel(CR4_READ_SHADOW, cr4);
         vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, hw_cr4);
 
         if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & (X86_CR4_OSXSAVE | X86_CR4_PKE))
                 kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
 }
 
 void vmx_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         u32 ar;
 
         if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && seg != VCPU_SREG_LDTR) {
                 *var = vmx->rmode.segs[seg];
                 if (seg == VCPU_SREG_TR
                     || var->selector == vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(vmx, seg))
                         return;
                 var->base = vmx_read_guest_seg_base(vmx, seg);
                 var->selector = vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(vmx, seg);
                 return;
         }
         var->base = vmx_read_guest_seg_base(vmx, seg);
         var->limit = vmx_read_guest_seg_limit(vmx, seg);
         var->selector = vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(vmx, seg);
         ar = vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(vmx, seg);
         var->unusable = (ar >> 16) & 1;
         var->type = ar & 15;
         var->s = (ar >> 4) & 1;
         var->dpl = (ar >> 5) & 3;
         /*
          * Some userspaces do not preserve unusable property. Since usable
          * segment has to be present according to VMX spec we can use present
          * property to amend userspace bug by making unusable segment always
          * nonpresent. vmx_segment_access_rights() already marks nonpresent
          * segment as unusable.
          */
         var->present = !var->unusable;
         var->avl = (ar >> 12) & 1;
         var->l = (ar >> 13) & 1;
         var->db = (ar >> 14) & 1;
         var->g = (ar >> 15) & 1;
 }
 
 u64 vmx_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
 {
         struct kvm_segment s;
 
         if (to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active) {
                 vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &s, seg);
                 return s.base;
         }
         return vmx_read_guest_seg_base(to_vmx(vcpu), seg);
 }
 
 int vmx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         if (unlikely(vmx->rmode.vm86_active))
                 return 0;
         else {
                 int ar = vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(vmx, VCPU_SREG_SS);
                 return VMX_AR_DPL(ar);
         }
 }
 
 static u32 vmx_segment_access_rights(struct kvm_segment *var)
 {
         u32 ar;
 
         ar = var->type & 15;
         ar |= (var->s & 1) << 4;
         ar |= (var->dpl & 3) << 5;
         ar |= (var->present & 1) << 7;
         ar |= (var->avl & 1) << 12;
         ar |= (var->l & 1) << 13;
         ar |= (var->db & 1) << 14;
         ar |= (var->g & 1) << 15;
         ar |= (var->unusable || !var->present) << 16;
 
         return ar;
 }
 
 void __vmx_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field *sf = &kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg];
 
         vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
 
         if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && seg != VCPU_SREG_LDTR) {
                 vmx->rmode.segs[seg] = *var;
                 if (seg == VCPU_SREG_TR)
                         vmcs_write16(sf->selector, var->selector);
                 else if (var->s)
                         fix_rmode_seg(seg, &vmx->rmode.segs[seg]);
                 return;
         }
 
         vmcs_writel(sf->base, var->base);
         vmcs_write32(sf->limit, var->limit);
         vmcs_write16(sf->selector, var->selector);
 
         /*
          *   Fix the "Accessed" bit in AR field of segment registers for older
          * qemu binaries.
          *   IA32 arch specifies that at the time of processor reset the
          * "Accessed" bit in the AR field of segment registers is 1. And qemu
          * is setting it to 0 in the userland code. This causes invalid guest
          * state vmexit when "unrestricted guest" mode is turned on.
          *    Fix for this setup issue in cpu_reset is being pushed in the qemu
          * tree. Newer qemu binaries with that qemu fix would not need this
          * kvm hack.
          */
         if (is_unrestricted_guest(vcpu) && (seg != VCPU_SREG_LDTR))
                 var->type |= 0x1; /* Accessed */
 
         vmcs_write32(sf->ar_bytes, vmx_segment_access_rights(var));
 }
 
 void vmx_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
 {
         __vmx_set_segment(vcpu, var, seg);
 
         to_vmx(vcpu)->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
 }
 
 void vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l)
 {
         u32 ar = vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(to_vmx(vcpu), VCPU_SREG_CS);
 
         *db = (ar >> 14) & 1;
         *l = (ar >> 13) & 1;
 }
 
 void vmx_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
 {
         dt->size = vmcs_read32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
         dt->address = vmcs_readl(GUEST_IDTR_BASE);
 }
 
 void vmx_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
 {
         vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, dt->size);
         vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, dt->address);
 }
 
 void vmx_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
 {
         dt->size = vmcs_read32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT);
         dt->address = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GDTR_BASE);
 }
 
 void vmx_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
 {
         vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, dt->size);
         vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, dt->address);
 }
 
 static bool rmode_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
 {
         struct kvm_segment var;
         u32 ar;
 
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &var, seg);
         var.dpl = 0x3;
         if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS)
                 var.type = 0x3;
         ar = vmx_segment_access_rights(&var);
 
         if (var.base != (var.selector << 4))
                 return false;
         if (var.limit != 0xffff)
                 return false;
         if (ar != 0xf3)
                 return false;
 
         return true;
 }
 
 static bool code_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct kvm_segment cs;
         unsigned int cs_rpl;
 
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
         cs_rpl = cs.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
 
         if (cs.unusable)
                 return false;
         if (~cs.type & (VMX_AR_TYPE_CODE_MASK|VMX_AR_TYPE_ACCESSES_MASK))
                 return false;
         if (!cs.s)
                 return false;
         if (cs.type & VMX_AR_TYPE_WRITEABLE_MASK) {
                 if (cs.dpl > cs_rpl)
                         return false;
         } else {
                 if (cs.dpl != cs_rpl)
                         return false;
         }
         if (!cs.present)
                 return false;
 
         /* TODO: Add Reserved field check, this'll require a new member in the kvm_segment_field structure */
         return true;
 }
 
 static bool stack_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct kvm_segment ss;
         unsigned int ss_rpl;
 
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
         ss_rpl = ss.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
 
         if (ss.unusable)
                 return true;
         if (ss.type != 3 && ss.type != 7)
                 return false;
         if (!ss.s)
                 return false;
         if (ss.dpl != ss_rpl) /* DPL != RPL */
                 return false;
         if (!ss.present)
                 return false;
 
         return true;
 }
 
 static bool data_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
 {
         struct kvm_segment var;
         unsigned int rpl;
 
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &var, seg);
         rpl = var.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
 
         if (var.unusable)
                 return true;
         if (!var.s)
                 return false;
         if (!var.present)
                 return false;
         if (~var.type & (VMX_AR_TYPE_CODE_MASK|VMX_AR_TYPE_WRITEABLE_MASK)) {
                 if (var.dpl < rpl) /* DPL < RPL */
                         return false;
         }
 
         /* TODO: Add other members to kvm_segment_field to allow checking for other access
          * rights flags
          */
         return true;
 }
 
 static bool tr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct kvm_segment tr;
 
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &tr, VCPU_SREG_TR);
 
         if (tr.unusable)
                 return false;
         if (tr.selector & SEGMENT_TI_MASK)      /* TI = 1 */
                 return false;
         if (tr.type != 3 && tr.type != 11) /* TODO: Check if guest is in IA32e mode */
                 return false;
         if (!tr.present)
                 return false;
 
         return true;
 }
 
 static bool ldtr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct kvm_segment ldtr;
 
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &ldtr, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
 
         if (ldtr.unusable)
                 return true;
         if (ldtr.selector & SEGMENT_TI_MASK)    /* TI = 1 */
                 return false;
         if (ldtr.type != 2)
                 return false;
         if (!ldtr.present)
                 return false;
 
         return true;
 }
 
 static bool cs_ss_rpl_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct kvm_segment cs, ss;
 
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
         vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
 
         return ((cs.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK) ==
                  (ss.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK));
 }
 
 /*
  * Check if guest state is valid. Returns true if valid, false if
  * not.
  * We assume that registers are always usable
  */
 bool __vmx_guest_state_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         /* real mode guest state checks */
         if (!is_protmode(vcpu) || (vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_VM)) {
                 if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_CS))
                         return false;
                 if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_SS))
                         return false;
                 if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_DS))
                         return false;
                 if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_ES))
                         return false;
                 if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_FS))
                         return false;
                 if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_GS))
                         return false;
         } else {
         /* protected mode guest state checks */
                 if (!cs_ss_rpl_check(vcpu))
                         return false;
                 if (!code_segment_valid(vcpu))
                         return false;
                 if (!stack_segment_valid(vcpu))
                         return false;
                 if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_DS))
                         return false;
                 if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_ES))
                         return false;
                 if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_FS))
                         return false;
                 if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_GS))
                         return false;
                 if (!tr_valid(vcpu))
                         return false;
                 if (!ldtr_valid(vcpu))
                         return false;
         }
         /* TODO:
          * - Add checks on RIP
          * - Add checks on RFLAGS
          */
 
         return true;
 }
 
 static int init_rmode_tss(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *ua)
 {
         const void *zero_page = (const void *) __va(page_to_phys(ZERO_PAGE(0)));
         u16 data;
         int i;
 
         for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
                 if (__copy_to_user(ua + PAGE_SIZE * i, zero_page, PAGE_SIZE))
                         return -EFAULT;
         }
 
         data = TSS_BASE_SIZE + TSS_REDIRECTION_SIZE;
         if (__copy_to_user(ua + TSS_IOPB_BASE_OFFSET, &data, sizeof(u16)))
                 return -EFAULT;
 
         data = ~0;
         if (__copy_to_user(ua + RMODE_TSS_SIZE - 1, &data, sizeof(u8)))
                 return -EFAULT;
 
         return 0;
 }
 
 static int init_rmode_identity_map(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
         struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(kvm);
         int i, r = 0;
         void __user *uaddr;
         u32 tmp;
 
         /* Protect kvm_vmx->ept_identity_pagetable_done. */
         mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
 
         if (likely(kvm_vmx->ept_identity_pagetable_done))
                 goto out;
 
         if (!kvm_vmx->ept_identity_map_addr)
                 kvm_vmx->ept_identity_map_addr = VMX_EPT_IDENTITY_PAGETABLE_ADDR;
 
         uaddr = __x86_set_memory_region(kvm,
                                         IDENTITY_PAGETABLE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT,
                                         kvm_vmx->ept_identity_map_addr,
                                         PAGE_SIZE);
         if (IS_ERR(uaddr)) {
                 r = PTR_ERR(uaddr);
                 goto out;
         }
 
         /* Set up identity-mapping pagetable for EPT in real mode */
         for (i = 0; i < (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(tmp)); i++) {
                 tmp = (i << 22) + (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER |
                         _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PSE);
                 if (__copy_to_user(uaddr + i * sizeof(tmp), &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) {
                         r = -EFAULT;
                         goto out;
                 }
         }
         kvm_vmx->ept_identity_pagetable_done = true;
 
 out:
         mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
         return r;
 }
 
 static void seg_setup(int seg)
 {
         const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field *sf = &kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg];
         unsigned int ar;
 
         vmcs_write16(sf->selector, 0);
         vmcs_writel(sf->base, 0);
         vmcs_write32(sf->limit, 0xffff);
         ar = 0x93;
         if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS)
                 ar |= 0x08; /* code segment */
 
         vmcs_write32(sf->ar_bytes, ar);
 }
 
 int allocate_vpid(void)
 {
         int vpid;
 
         if (!enable_vpid)
                 return 0;
         spin_lock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
         vpid = find_first_zero_bit(vmx_vpid_bitmap, VMX_NR_VPIDS);
         if (vpid < VMX_NR_VPIDS)
                 __set_bit(vpid, vmx_vpid_bitmap);
         else
                 vpid = 0;
         spin_unlock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
         return vpid;
 }
 
 void free_vpid(int vpid)
 {
         if (!enable_vpid || vpid == 0)
                 return;
         spin_lock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
         __clear_bit(vpid, vmx_vpid_bitmap);
         spin_unlock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
 }
 
 static void vmx_msr_bitmap_l01_changed(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         /*
          * When KVM is a nested hypervisor on top of Hyper-V and uses
          * 'Enlightened MSR Bitmap' feature L0 needs to know that MSR
          * bitmap has changed.
          */
         if (kvm_is_using_evmcs()) {
                 struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs = (void *)vmx->vmcs01.vmcs;
 
                 if (evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.msr_bitmap)
                         evmcs->hv_clean_fields &=
                                 ~HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_MSR_BITMAP;
         }
 
         vmx->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc = true;
 }
 
 void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int type)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
         int idx;
 
         if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
                 return;
 
         vmx_msr_bitmap_l01_changed(vmx);
 
         /*
          * Mark the desired intercept state in shadow bitmap, this is needed
          * for resync when the MSR filters change.
          */
         idx = vmx_get_passthrough_msr_slot(msr);
         if (idx >= 0) {
                 if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
                         clear_bit(idx, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
                 if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
                         clear_bit(idx, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
         }
 
         if ((type & MSR_TYPE_R) &&
             !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ)) {
                 vmx_set_msr_bitmap_read(msr_bitmap, msr);
                 type &= ~MSR_TYPE_R;
         }
 
         if ((type & MSR_TYPE_W) &&
             !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE)) {
                 vmx_set_msr_bitmap_write(msr_bitmap, msr);
                 type &= ~MSR_TYPE_W;
         }
 
         if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
                 vmx_clear_msr_bitmap_read(msr_bitmap, msr);
 
         if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
                 vmx_clear_msr_bitmap_write(msr_bitmap, msr);
 }
 
 void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int type)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
         int idx;
 
         if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
                 return;
 
         vmx_msr_bitmap_l01_changed(vmx);
 
         /*
          * Mark the desired intercept state in shadow bitmap, this is needed
          * for resync when the MSR filter changes.
          */
         idx = vmx_get_passthrough_msr_slot(msr);
         if (idx >= 0) {
                 if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
                         set_bit(idx, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
                 if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
                         set_bit(idx, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
         }
 
         if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
                 vmx_set_msr_bitmap_read(msr_bitmap, msr);
 
         if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
                 vmx_set_msr_bitmap_write(msr_bitmap, msr);
 }
 
 static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         /*
          * x2APIC indices for 64-bit accesses into the RDMSR and WRMSR halves
          * of the MSR bitmap.  KVM emulates APIC registers up through 0x3f0,
          * i.e. MSR 0x83f, and so only needs to dynamically manipulate 64 bits.
          */
         const int read_idx = APIC_BASE_MSR / BITS_PER_LONG_LONG;
         const int write_idx = read_idx + (0x800 / sizeof(u64));
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         u64 *msr_bitmap = (u64 *)vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
         u8 mode;
 
         if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap() || WARN_ON_ONCE(!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)))
                 return;
 
         if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls() &&
             (secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx) &
              SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE)) {
                 mode = MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC;
                 if (enable_apicv && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
                         mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV;
         } else {
                 mode = 0;
         }
 
         if (mode == vmx->x2apic_msr_bitmap_mode)
                 return;
 
         vmx->x2apic_msr_bitmap_mode = mode;
 
         /*
          * Reset the bitmap for MSRs 0x800 - 0x83f.  Leave AMD's uber-extended
          * registers (0x840 and above) intercepted, KVM doesn't support them.
          * Intercept all writes by default and poke holes as needed.  Pass
          * through reads for all valid registers by default in x2APIC+APICv
          * mode, only the current timer count needs on-demand emulation by KVM.
          */
         if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV)
                 msr_bitmap[read_idx] = ~kvm_lapic_readable_reg_mask(vcpu->arch.apic);
         else
                 msr_bitmap[read_idx] = ~0ull;
         msr_bitmap[write_idx] = ~0ull;
 
         /*
          * TPR reads and writes can be virtualized even if virtual interrupt
          * delivery is not in use.
          */
         vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI), MSR_TYPE_RW,
                                   !(mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC));
 
         if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) {
                 vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), MSR_TYPE_RW);
                 vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI), MSR_TYPE_W);
                 vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SELF_IPI), MSR_TYPE_W);
                 if (enable_ipiv)
                         vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ICR), MSR_TYPE_RW);
         }
 }
 
 void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         bool flag = !(vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN);
         u32 i;
 
         vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
         vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
         vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
         vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
         for (i = 0; i < vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges; i++) {
                 vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i * 2, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
                 vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B + i * 2, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
         }
 }
 
 void vmx_msr_filter_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         u32 i;
 
         if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
                 return;
 
         /*
          * Redo intercept permissions for MSRs that KVM is passing through to
          * the guest.  Disabling interception will check the new MSR filter and
          * ensure that KVM enables interception if usersepace wants to filter
          * the MSR.  MSRs that KVM is already intercepting don't need to be
          * refreshed since KVM is going to intercept them regardless of what
          * userspace wants.
          */
         for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs); i++) {
                 u32 msr = vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[i];
 
                 if (!test_bit(i, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.read))
                         vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, msr, MSR_TYPE_R);
 
                 if (!test_bit(i, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.write))
                         vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, msr, MSR_TYPE_W);
         }
 
         /* PT MSRs can be passed through iff PT is exposed to the guest. */
         if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest())
                 pt_update_intercept_for_msr(vcpu);
 }
 
 static inline void kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                                                      int pi_vec)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
         if (vcpu->mode == IN_GUEST_MODE) {
                 /*
                  * The vector of the virtual has already been set in the PIR.
                  * Send a notification event to deliver the virtual interrupt
                  * unless the vCPU is the currently running vCPU, i.e. the
                  * event is being sent from a fastpath VM-Exit handler, in
                  * which case the PIR will be synced to the vIRR before
                  * re-entering the guest.
                  *
                  * When the target is not the running vCPU, the following
                  * possibilities emerge:
                  *
                  * Case 1: vCPU stays in non-root mode. Sending a notification
                  * event posts the interrupt to the vCPU.
                  *
                  * Case 2: vCPU exits to root mode and is still runnable. The
                  * PIR will be synced to the vIRR before re-entering the guest.
                  * Sending a notification event is ok as the host IRQ handler
                  * will ignore the spurious event.
                  *
                  * Case 3: vCPU exits to root mode and is blocked. vcpu_block()
                  * has already synced PIR to vIRR and never blocks the vCPU if
                  * the vIRR is not empty. Therefore, a blocked vCPU here does
                  * not wait for any requested interrupts in PIR, and sending a
                  * notification event also results in a benign, spurious event.
                  */
 
                 if (vcpu != kvm_get_running_vcpu())
                         __apic_send_IPI_mask(get_cpu_mask(vcpu->cpu), pi_vec);
                 return;
         }
 #endif
         /*
          * The vCPU isn't in the guest; wake the vCPU in case it is blocking,
          * otherwise do nothing as KVM will grab the highest priority pending
          * IRQ via ->sync_pir_to_irr() in vcpu_enter_guest().
          */
         kvm_vcpu_wake_up(vcpu);
 }
 
 static int vmx_deliver_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                                                 int vector)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
             vector == vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv) {
                 /*
                  * If a posted intr is not recognized by hardware,
                  * we will accomplish it in the next vmentry.
                  */
                 vmx->nested.pi_pending = true;
                 kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
 
                 /*
                  * This pairs with the smp_mb_*() after setting vcpu->mode in
                  * vcpu_enter_guest() to guarantee the vCPU sees the event
                  * request if triggering a posted interrupt "fails" because
                  * vcpu->mode != IN_GUEST_MODE.  The extra barrier is needed as
                  * the smb_wmb() in kvm_make_request() only ensures everything
                  * done before making the request is visible when the request
                  * is visible, it doesn't ensure ordering between the store to
                  * vcpu->requests and the load from vcpu->mode.
                  */
                 smp_mb__after_atomic();
 
                 /* the PIR and ON have been set by L1. */
                 kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(vcpu, POSTED_INTR_NESTED_VECTOR);
                 return 0;
         }
         return -1;
 }
 /*
  * Send interrupt to vcpu via posted interrupt way.
  * 1. If target vcpu is running(non-root mode), send posted interrupt
  * notification to vcpu and hardware will sync PIR to vIRR atomically.
  * 2. If target vcpu isn't running(root mode), kick it to pick up the
  * interrupt from PIR in next vmentry.
  */
 static int vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         int r;
 
         r = vmx_deliver_nested_posted_interrupt(vcpu, vector);
         if (!r)
                 return 0;
 
         /* Note, this is called iff the local APIC is in-kernel. */
         if (!vcpu->arch.apic->apicv_active)
                 return -1;
 
         if (pi_test_and_set_pir(vector, &vmx->pi_desc))
                 return 0;
 
         /* If a previous notification has sent the IPI, nothing to do.  */
         if (pi_test_and_set_on(&vmx->pi_desc))
                 return 0;
 
         /*
          * The implied barrier in pi_test_and_set_on() pairs with the smp_mb_*()
          * after setting vcpu->mode in vcpu_enter_guest(), thus the vCPU is
          * guaranteed to see PID.ON=1 and sync the PIR to IRR if triggering a
          * posted interrupt "fails" because vcpu->mode != IN_GUEST_MODE.
          */
         kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(vcpu, POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
         return 0;
 }
 
 void vmx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
                            int trig_mode, int vector)
 {
         struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = apic->vcpu;
 
         if (vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(vcpu, vector)) {
                 kvm_lapic_set_irr(vector, apic);
                 kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
                 kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
         } else {
                 trace_kvm_apicv_accept_irq(vcpu->vcpu_id, delivery_mode,
                                            trig_mode, vector);
         }
 }
 
 /*
  * Set up the vmcs's constant host-state fields, i.e., host-state fields that
  * will not change in the lifetime of the guest.
  * Note that host-state that does change is set elsewhere. E.g., host-state
  * that is set differently for each CPU is set in vmx_vcpu_load(), not here.
  */
 void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         u32 low32, high32;
         unsigned long tmpl;
         unsigned long cr0, cr3, cr4;
 
         cr0 = read_cr0();
         WARN_ON(cr0 & X86_CR0_TS);
         vmcs_writel(HOST_CR0, cr0);  /* 22.2.3 */
 
         /*
          * Save the most likely value for this task's CR3 in the VMCS.
          * We can't use __get_current_cr3_fast() because we're not atomic.
          */
         cr3 = __read_cr3();
         vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, cr3);             /* 22.2.3  FIXME: shadow tables */
         vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3 = cr3;
 
         /* Save the most likely value for this task's CR4 in the VMCS. */
         cr4 = cr4_read_shadow();
         vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, cr4);                     /* 22.2.3, 22.2.5 */
         vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4;
 
         vmcs_write16(HOST_CS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_CS);  /* 22.2.4 */
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
         /*
          * Load null selectors, so we can avoid reloading them in
          * vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(), in case userspace uses
          * the null selectors too (the expected case).
          */
         vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, 0);
         vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, 0);
 #else
         vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS);  /* 22.2.4 */
         vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS);  /* 22.2.4 */
 #endif
         vmcs_write16(HOST_SS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS);  /* 22.2.4 */
         vmcs_write16(HOST_TR_SELECTOR, GDT_ENTRY_TSS*8);  /* 22.2.4 */
 
         vmcs_writel(HOST_IDTR_BASE, host_idt_base);   /* 22.2.4 */
 
         vmcs_writel(HOST_RIP, (unsigned long)vmx_vmexit); /* 22.2.5 */
 
         rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, low32, high32);
         vmcs_write32(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, low32);
 
         /*
          * SYSENTER is used for 32-bit system calls on either 32-bit or
          * 64-bit kernels.  It is always zero If neither is allowed, otherwise
          * vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs loads it with the per-CPU entry stack (and may
          * have already done so!).
          */
         if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
                 vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 0);
 
         rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl);
         vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl);   /* 22.2.3 */
 
         if (vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
                 rdmsr(MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, low32, high32);
                 vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_PAT, low32 | ((u64) high32 << 32));
         }
 
         if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer())
                 vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_EFER, kvm_host.efer);
 }
 
 void set_cr4_guest_host_mask(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &vmx->vcpu;
 
         vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = KVM_POSSIBLE_CR4_GUEST_BITS &
                                           ~vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_rsvd_bits;
         if (!enable_ept) {
                 vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits &= ~X86_CR4_TLBFLUSH_BITS;
                 vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits &= ~X86_CR4_PDPTR_BITS;
         }
         if (is_guest_mode(&vmx->vcpu))
                 vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits &=
                         ~get_vmcs12(vcpu)->cr4_guest_host_mask;
         vmcs_writel(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits);
 }
 
 static u32 vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         u32 pin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_config.pin_based_exec_ctrl;
 
         if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu))
                 pin_based_exec_ctrl &= ~PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
 
         if (!enable_vnmi)
                 pin_based_exec_ctrl &= ~PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS;
 
         if (!enable_preemption_timer)
                 pin_based_exec_ctrl &= ~PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
 
         return pin_based_exec_ctrl;
 }
 
 static u32 vmx_vmentry_ctrl(void)
 {
         u32 vmentry_ctrl = vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl;
 
         if (vmx_pt_mode_is_system())
                 vmentry_ctrl &= ~(VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP |
                                   VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL);
         /*
          * IA32e mode, and loading of EFER and PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL are toggled dynamically.
          */
         vmentry_ctrl &= ~(VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL |
                           VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER |
                           VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
 
         if (cpu_has_perf_global_ctrl_bug())
                 vmentry_ctrl &= ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
 
         return vmentry_ctrl;
 }
 
 static u32 vmx_vmexit_ctrl(void)
 {
         u32 vmexit_ctrl = vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl;
 
         /*
          * Not used by KVM and never set in vmcs01 or vmcs02, but emulated for
          * nested virtualization and thus allowed to be set in vmcs12.
          */
         vmexit_ctrl &= ~(VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_PAT | VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_EFER |
                          VM_EXIT_SAVE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER);
 
         if (vmx_pt_mode_is_system())
                 vmexit_ctrl &= ~(VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP |
                                  VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL);
 
         if (cpu_has_perf_global_ctrl_bug())
                 vmexit_ctrl &= ~VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
 
         /* Loading of EFER and PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL are toggled dynamically */
         return vmexit_ctrl &
                 ~(VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL | VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER);
 }
 
 void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
                 vmx->nested.update_vmcs01_apicv_status = true;
                 return;
         }
 
         pin_controls_set(vmx, vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(vmx));
 
         if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) {
                 secondary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx,
                                                SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
                                                SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
                 if (enable_ipiv)
                         tertiary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx, TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT);
         } else {
                 secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx,
                                                  SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
                                                  SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
                 if (enable_ipiv)
                         tertiary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT);
         }
 
         vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(vcpu);
 }
 
 static u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         u32 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_exec_ctrl;
 
         /*
          * Not used by KVM, but fully supported for nesting, i.e. are allowed in
          * vmcs12 and propagated to vmcs02 when set in vmcs12.
          */
         exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING |
                           CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS |
                           CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG |
                           CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING);
 
         /* INTR_WINDOW_EXITING and NMI_WINDOW_EXITING are toggled dynamically */
         exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING |
                           CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING);
 
         if (vmx->vcpu.arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)
                 exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING;
 
         if (!cpu_need_tpr_shadow(&vmx->vcpu))
                 exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
         if (exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)
                 exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING |
                                   CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING);
         else
                 exec_control |= CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING |
                                 CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING;
 #endif
         /* No need to intercept CR3 access or INVPLG when using EPT. */
         if (enable_ept)
                 exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
                                   CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING |
                                   CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING);
         if (kvm_mwait_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
                 exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING |
                                 CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING);
         if (kvm_hlt_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
                 exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING;
         return exec_control;
 }
 
 static u64 vmx_tertiary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         u64 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl;
 
         /*
          * IPI virtualization relies on APICv. Disable IPI virtualization if
          * APICv is inhibited.
          */
         if (!enable_ipiv || !kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu))
                 exec_control &= ~TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT;
 
         return exec_control;
 }
 
 /*
  * Adjust a single secondary execution control bit to intercept/allow an
  * instruction in the guest.  This is usually done based on whether or not a
  * feature has been exposed to the guest in order to correctly emulate faults.
  */
 static inline void
 vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 *exec_control,
                                   u32 control, bool enabled, bool exiting)
 {
         /*
          * If the control is for an opt-in feature, clear the control if the
          * feature is not exposed to the guest, i.e. not enabled.  If the
          * control is opt-out, i.e. an exiting control, clear the control if
          * the feature _is_ exposed to the guest, i.e. exiting/interception is
          * disabled for the associated instruction.  Note, the caller is
          * responsible presetting exec_control to set all supported bits.
          */
         if (enabled == exiting)
                 *exec_control &= ~control;
 
         /*
          * Update the nested MSR settings so that a nested VMM can/can't set
          * controls for features that are/aren't exposed to the guest.
          */
         if (nested) {
                 /*
                  * All features that can be added or removed to VMX MSRs must
                  * be supported in the first place for nested virtualization.
                  */
                 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(vmcs_config.nested.secondary_ctls_high & control)))
                         enabled = false;
 
                 if (enabled)
                         vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |= control;
                 else
                         vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &= ~control;
         }
 }
 
 /*
  * Wrapper macro for the common case of adjusting a secondary execution control
  * based on a single guest CPUID bit, with a dedicated feature bit.  This also
  * verifies that the control is actually supported by KVM and hardware.
  */
 #define vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, name, feat_name, ctrl_name, exiting)     \
 ({                                                                                              \
         struct kvm_vcpu *__vcpu = &(vmx)->vcpu;                                                 \
         bool __enabled;                                                                         \
                                                                                                 \
         if (cpu_has_vmx_##name()) {                                                             \
                 if (kvm_is_governed_feature(X86_FEATURE_##feat_name))                           \
                         __enabled = guest_can_use(__vcpu, X86_FEATURE_##feat_name);             \
                 else                                                                            \
                         __enabled = guest_cpuid_has(__vcpu, X86_FEATURE_##feat_name);           \
                 vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, SECONDARY_EXEC_##ctrl_name,\
                                                   __enabled, exiting);                          \
         }                                                                                       \
 })
 
 /* More macro magic for ENABLE_/opt-in versus _EXITING/opt-out controls. */
 #define vmx_adjust_sec_exec_feature(vmx, exec_control, lname, uname) \
         vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, lname, uname, ENABLE_##uname, false)
 
 #define vmx_adjust_sec_exec_exiting(vmx, exec_control, lname, uname) \
         vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, lname, uname, uname##_EXITING, true)
 
 static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &vmx->vcpu;
 
         u32 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl;
 
         if (vmx_pt_mode_is_system())
                 exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_USE_GPA | SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_CONCEAL_VMX);
         if (!cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(vcpu))
                 exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
         if (vmx->vpid == 0)
                 exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID;
         if (!enable_ept) {
                 exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT;
                 exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE;
                 enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
         }
         if (!enable_unrestricted_guest)
                 exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
         if (kvm_pause_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
                 exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING;
         if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
                 exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
                                   SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
         exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE;
 
         /*
          * KVM doesn't support VMFUNC for L1, but the control is set in KVM's
          * base configuration as KVM emulates VMFUNC[EPTP_SWITCHING] for L2.
          */
         exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC;
 
         /* SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC is enabled/disabled on writes to CR4.UMIP,
          * in vmx_set_cr4.  */
         exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC;
 
         /* SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS is enabled when L1 executes VMPTRLD
            (handle_vmptrld).
            We can NOT enable shadow_vmcs here because we don't have yet
            a current VMCS12
         */
         exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS;
 
         /*
          * PML is enabled/disabled when dirty logging of memsmlots changes, but
          * it needs to be set here when dirty logging is already active, e.g.
          * if this vCPU was created after dirty logging was enabled.
          */
         if (!enable_pml || !atomic_read(&vcpu->kvm->nr_memslots_dirty_logging))
                 exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
 
         vmx_adjust_sec_exec_feature(vmx, &exec_control, xsaves, XSAVES);
 
         /*
          * RDPID is also gated by ENABLE_RDTSCP, turn on the control if either
          * feature is exposed to the guest.  This creates a virtualization hole
          * if both are supported in hardware but only one is exposed to the
          * guest, but letting the guest execute RDTSCP or RDPID when either one
          * is advertised is preferable to emulating the advertised instruction
          * in KVM on #UD, and obviously better than incorrectly injecting #UD.
          */
         if (cpu_has_vmx_rdtscp()) {
                 bool rdpid_or_rdtscp_enabled =
                         guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) ||
                         guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID);
 
                 vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(vmx, &exec_control,
                                                   SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP,
                                                   rdpid_or_rdtscp_enabled, false);
         }
 
         vmx_adjust_sec_exec_feature(vmx, &exec_control, invpcid, INVPCID);
 
         vmx_adjust_sec_exec_exiting(vmx, &exec_control, rdrand, RDRAND);
         vmx_adjust_sec_exec_exiting(vmx, &exec_control, rdseed, RDSEED);
 
         vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, &exec_control, waitpkg, WAITPKG,
                                     ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE, false);
 
         if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.bus_lock_detection_enabled)
                 exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION;
 
         if (!kvm_notify_vmexit_enabled(vcpu->kvm))
                 exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_NOTIFY_VM_EXITING;
 
         return exec_control;
 }
 
 static inline int vmx_get_pid_table_order(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
         return get_order(kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids * sizeof(*to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->pid_table));
 }
 
 static int vmx_alloc_ipiv_pid_table(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
         struct page *pages;
         struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(kvm);
 
         if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm) || !enable_ipiv)
                 return 0;
 
         if (kvm_vmx->pid_table)
                 return 0;
 
         pages = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO,
                             vmx_get_pid_table_order(kvm));
         if (!pages)
                 return -ENOMEM;
 
         kvm_vmx->pid_table = (void *)page_address(pages);
         return 0;
 }
 
 int vmx_vcpu_precreate(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
         return vmx_alloc_ipiv_pid_table(kvm);
 }
 
 #define VMX_XSS_EXIT_BITMAP 0
 
 static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         struct kvm *kvm = vmx->vcpu.kvm;
         struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(kvm);
 
         if (nested)
                 nested_vmx_set_vmcs_shadowing_bitmap();
 
         if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
                 vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap));
 
         vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, INVALID_GPA); /* 22.3.1.5 */
 
         /* Control */
         pin_controls_set(vmx, vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(vmx));
 
         exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_exec_control(vmx));
 
         if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
                 secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx));
                 if (vmx->ve_info)
                         vmcs_write64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS,
                                      __pa(vmx->ve_info));
         }
 
         if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls())
                 tertiary_exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_tertiary_exec_control(vmx));
 
         if (enable_apicv && lapic_in_kernel(&vmx->vcpu)) {
                 vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, 0);
                 vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, 0);
                 vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2, 0);
                 vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, 0);
 
                 vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, 0);
 
                 vmcs_write16(POSTED_INTR_NV, POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
                 vmcs_write64(POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR, __pa((&vmx->pi_desc)));
         }
 
         if (vmx_can_use_ipiv(&vmx->vcpu)) {
                 vmcs_write64(PID_POINTER_TABLE, __pa(kvm_vmx->pid_table));
                 vmcs_write16(LAST_PID_POINTER_INDEX, kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids - 1);
         }
 
         if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(kvm)) {
                 vmcs_write32(PLE_GAP, ple_gap);
                 vmx->ple_window = ple_window;
                 vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
         }
 
         if (kvm_notify_vmexit_enabled(kvm))
                 vmcs_write32(NOTIFY_WINDOW, kvm->arch.notify_window);
 
         vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK, 0);
         vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, 0);
         vmcs_write32(CR3_TARGET_COUNT, 0);           /* 22.2.1 */
 
         vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, 0);            /* 22.2.4 */
         vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, 0);            /* 22.2.4 */
         vmx_set_constant_host_state(vmx);
         vmcs_writel(HOST_FS_BASE, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
         vmcs_writel(HOST_GS_BASE, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
 
         if (cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc())
                 vmcs_write64(VM_FUNCTION_CONTROL, 0);
 
         vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, 0);
         vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
         vmcs_write64(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.host.val));
         vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
         vmcs_write64(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.guest.val));
 
         if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT)
                 vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmx->vcpu.arch.pat);
 
         vm_exit_controls_set(vmx, vmx_vmexit_ctrl());
 
         /* 22.2.1, 20.8.1 */
         vm_entry_controls_set(vmx, vmx_vmentry_ctrl());
 
         vmx->vcpu.arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = vmx_l1_guest_owned_cr0_bits();
         vmcs_writel(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~vmx->vcpu.arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits);
 
         set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx);
 
         if (vmx->vpid != 0)
                 vmcs_write16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID, vmx->vpid);
 
         if (cpu_has_vmx_xsaves())
                 vmcs_write64(XSS_EXIT_BITMAP, VMX_XSS_EXIT_BITMAP);
 
         if (enable_pml) {
                 vmcs_write64(PML_ADDRESS, page_to_phys(vmx->pml_pg));
                 vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
         }
 
         vmx_write_encls_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu, NULL);
 
         if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest()) {
                 memset(&vmx->pt_desc, 0, sizeof(vmx->pt_desc));
                 /* Bit[6~0] are forced to 1, writes are ignored. */
                 vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask = 0x7F;
                 vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
         }
 
         vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, 0);
         vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, 0);
         vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, 0);
         vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, 0);
 
         if (cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow()) {
                 vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR, 0);
                 if (cpu_need_tpr_shadow(&vmx->vcpu))
                         vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR,
                                      __pa(vmx->vcpu.arch.apic->regs));
                 vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, 0);
         }
 
         vmx_setup_uret_msrs(vmx);
 }
 
 static void __vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         init_vmcs(vmx);
 
         if (nested)
                 memcpy(&vmx->nested.msrs, &vmcs_config.nested, sizeof(vmx->nested.msrs));
 
         vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(vcpu);
 
         vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = -1;
         vmx->nested.vmxon_ptr = INVALID_GPA;
         vmx->nested.current_vmptr = INVALID_GPA;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV
         vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr = EVMPTR_INVALID;
 #endif
 
         vcpu->arch.microcode_version = 0x100000000ULL;
         vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits = FEAT_CTL_LOCKED;
 
         /*
          * Enforce invariant: pi_desc.nv is always either POSTED_INTR_VECTOR
          * or POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR.
          */
         vmx->pi_desc.nv = POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
         __pi_set_sn(&vmx->pi_desc);
 }
 
 void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         if (!init_event)
                 __vmx_vcpu_reset(vcpu);
 
         vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0;
         vmx->spec_ctrl = 0;
 
         vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control = 0;
 
         vmx->hv_deadline_tsc = -1;
         kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, 0);
 
         vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
         kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS);
 
         seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_CS);
         vmcs_write16(GUEST_CS_SELECTOR, 0xf000);
         vmcs_writel(GUEST_CS_BASE, 0xffff0000ul);
 
         seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_DS);
         seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_ES);
         seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_FS);
         seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_GS);
         seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_SS);
 
         vmcs_write16(GUEST_TR_SELECTOR, 0);
         vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, 0);
         vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
         vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, 0x008b);
 
         vmcs_write16(GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR, 0);
         vmcs_writel(GUEST_LDTR_BASE, 0);
         vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
         vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_AR_BYTES, 0x00082);
 
         vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, 0);
         vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
 
         vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, 0);
         vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
 
         vmcs_write32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE, GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE);
         vmcs_write32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, 0);
         vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS, 0);
         if (kvm_mpx_supported())
                 vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, 0);
 
         vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, 0);  /* 22.2.1 */
 
         kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD, vcpu);
 
         vpid_sync_context(vmx->vpid);
 
         vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(vcpu, vmx);
 }
 
 void vmx_enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         exec_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING);
 }
 
 void vmx_enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         if (!enable_vnmi ||
             vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI) {
                 vmx_enable_irq_window(vcpu);
                 return;
         }
 
         exec_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING);
 }
 
 void vmx_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         uint32_t intr;
         int irq = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr;
 
         trace_kvm_inj_virq(irq, vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft, reinjected);
 
         ++vcpu->stat.irq_injections;
         if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
                 int inc_eip = 0;
                 if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft)
                         inc_eip = vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len;
                 kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, irq, inc_eip);
                 return;
         }
         intr = irq | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
         if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft) {
                 intr |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR;
                 vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
                              vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len);
         } else
                 intr |= INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR;
         vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, intr);
 
         vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
 }
 
 void vmx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         if (!enable_vnmi) {
                 /*
                  * Tracking the NMI-blocked state in software is built upon
                  * finding the next open IRQ window. This, in turn, depends on
                  * well-behaving guests: They have to keep IRQs disabled at
                  * least as long as the NMI handler runs. Otherwise we may
                  * cause NMI nesting, maybe breaking the guest. But as this is
                  * highly unlikely, we can live with the residual risk.
                  */
                 vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = 1;
                 vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time = 0;
         }
 
         ++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
         vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = false;
 
         if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
                 kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, NMI_VECTOR, 0);
                 return;
         }
 
         vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD,
                         INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | NMI_VECTOR);
 
         vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
 }
 
 bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         bool masked;
 
         if (!enable_vnmi)
                 return vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked;
         if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked)
                 return false;
         masked = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI;
         vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = !masked;
         return masked;
 }
 
 void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         if (!enable_vnmi) {
                 if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked != masked) {
                         vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = masked;
                         vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time = 0;
                 }
         } else {
                 vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = !masked;
                 if (masked)
                         vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
                                       GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
                 else
                         vmcs_clear_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
                                         GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
         }
 }
 
 bool vmx_nmi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_nmi(vcpu))
                 return false;
 
         if (!enable_vnmi && to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked)
                 return true;
 
         return (vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
                 (GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS | GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI |
                  GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI));
 }
 
 int vmx_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
 {
         if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
                 return -EBUSY;
 
         /* An NMI must not be injected into L2 if it's supposed to VM-Exit.  */
         if (for_injection && is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_nmi(vcpu))
                 return -EBUSY;
 
         return !vmx_nmi_blocked(vcpu);
 }
 
 bool __vmx_interrupt_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         return !(vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_IF) ||
                (vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
                 (GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS));
 }
 
 bool vmx_interrupt_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_intr(vcpu))
                 return false;
 
         return __vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu);
 }
 
 int vmx_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
 {
         if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
                 return -EBUSY;
 
         /*
          * An IRQ must not be injected into L2 if it's supposed to VM-Exit,
          * e.g. if the IRQ arrived asynchronously after checking nested events.
          */
         if (for_injection && is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_intr(vcpu))
                 return -EBUSY;
 
         return !vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu);
 }
 
 int vmx_set_tss_addr(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int addr)
 {
         void __user *ret;
 
         if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
                 return 0;
 
         mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
         ret = __x86_set_memory_region(kvm, TSS_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT, addr,
                                       PAGE_SIZE * 3);
         mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
 
         if (IS_ERR(ret))
                 return PTR_ERR(ret);
 
         to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->tss_addr = addr;
 
         return init_rmode_tss(kvm, ret);
 }
 
 int vmx_set_identity_map_addr(struct kvm *kvm, u64 ident_addr)
 {
         to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_identity_map_addr = ident_addr;
         return 0;
 }
 
 static bool rmode_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vec)
 {
         switch (vec) {
         case BP_VECTOR:
                 /*
                  * Update instruction length as we may reinject the exception
                  * from user space while in guest debugging mode.
                  */
                 to_vmx(vcpu)->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len =
                         vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
                 if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)
                         return false;
                 fallthrough;
         case DB_VECTOR:
                 return !(vcpu->guest_debug &
                         (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP));
         case DE_VECTOR:
         case OF_VECTOR:
         case BR_VECTOR:
         case UD_VECTOR:
         case DF_VECTOR:
         case SS_VECTOR:
         case GP_VECTOR:
         case MF_VECTOR:
                 return true;
         }
         return false;
 }
 
 static int handle_rmode_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                                   int vec, u32 err_code)
 {
         /*
          * Instruction with address size override prefix opcode 0x67
          * Cause the #SS fault with 0 error code in VM86 mode.
          */
         if (((vec == GP_VECTOR) || (vec == SS_VECTOR)) && err_code == 0) {
                 if (kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0)) {
                         if (vcpu->arch.halt_request) {
                                 vcpu->arch.halt_request = 0;
                                 return kvm_emulate_halt_noskip(vcpu);
                         }
                         return 1;
                 }
                 return 0;
         }
 
         /*
          * Forward all other exceptions that are valid in real mode.
          * FIXME: Breaks guest debugging in real mode, needs to be fixed with
          *        the required debugging infrastructure rework.
          */
         kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, vec);
         return 1;
 }
 
 static int handle_machine_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         /* handled by vmx_vcpu_run() */
         return 1;
 }
 
 /*
  * If the host has split lock detection disabled, then #AC is
  * unconditionally injected into the guest, which is the pre split lock
  * detection behaviour.
  *
  * If the host has split lock detection enabled then #AC is
  * only injected into the guest when:
  *  - Guest CPL == 3 (user mode)
  *  - Guest has #AC detection enabled in CR0
  *  - Guest EFLAGS has AC bit set
  */
 bool vmx_guest_inject_ac(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT))
                 return true;
 
         return vmx_get_cpl(vcpu) == 3 && kvm_is_cr0_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR0_AM) &&
                (kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_AC);
 }
 
 static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
         u32 intr_info, ex_no, error_code;
         unsigned long cr2, dr6;
         u32 vect_info;
 
         vect_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
         intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
 
         /*
          * Machine checks are handled by handle_exception_irqoff(), or by
          * vmx_vcpu_run() if a #MC occurs on VM-Entry.  NMIs are handled by
          * vmx_vcpu_enter_exit().
          */
         if (is_machine_check(intr_info) || is_nmi(intr_info))
                 return 1;
 
         /*
          * Queue the exception here instead of in handle_nm_fault_irqoff().
          * This ensures the nested_vmx check is not skipped so vmexit can
          * be reflected to L1 (when it intercepts #NM) before reaching this
          * point.
          */
         if (is_nm_fault(intr_info)) {
                 kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, NM_VECTOR);
                 return 1;
         }
 
         if (is_invalid_opcode(intr_info))
                 return handle_ud(vcpu);
 
         if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_ve_fault(intr_info))) {
                 struct vmx_ve_information *ve_info = vmx->ve_info;
 
                 WARN_ONCE(ve_info->exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION,
                           "Unexpected #VE on VM-Exit reason 0x%x", ve_info->exit_reason);
                 dump_vmcs(vcpu);
                 kvm_mmu_print_sptes(vcpu, ve_info->guest_physical_address, "#VE");
                 return 1;
         }
 
         error_code = 0;
         if (intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)
                 error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
 
         if (!vmx->rmode.vm86_active && is_gp_fault(intr_info)) {
                 WARN_ON_ONCE(!enable_vmware_backdoor);
 
                 /*
                  * VMware backdoor emulation on #GP interception only handles
                  * IN{S}, OUT{S}, and RDPMC, none of which generate a non-zero
                  * error code on #GP.
                  */
                 if (error_code) {
                         kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
                         return 1;
                 }
                 return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP);
         }
 
         /*
          * The #PF with PFEC.RSVD = 1 indicates the guest is accessing
          * MMIO, it is better to report an internal error.
          * See the comments in vmx_handle_exit.
          */
         if ((vect_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
             !(is_page_fault(intr_info) && !(error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK))) {
                 vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
                 vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_SIMUL_EX;
                 vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 4;
                 vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vect_info;
                 vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = intr_info;
                 vcpu->run->internal.data[2] = error_code;
                 vcpu->run->internal.data[3] = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
                 return 0;
         }
 
         if (is_page_fault(intr_info)) {
                 cr2 = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
                 if (enable_ept && !vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_flags) {
                         /*
                          * EPT will cause page fault only if we need to
                          * detect illegal GPAs.
                          */
                         WARN_ON_ONCE(!allow_smaller_maxphyaddr);
                         kvm_fixup_and_inject_pf_error(vcpu, cr2, error_code);
                         return 1;
                 } else
                         return kvm_handle_page_fault(vcpu, error_code, cr2, NULL, 0);
         }
 
         ex_no = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
 
         if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no))
                 return handle_rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no, error_code);
 
         switch (ex_no) {
         case DB_VECTOR:
                 dr6 = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
                 if (!(vcpu->guest_debug &
                       (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))) {
                         /*
                          * If the #DB was due to ICEBP, a.k.a. INT1, skip the
                          * instruction.  ICEBP generates a trap-like #DB, but
                          * despite its interception control being tied to #DB,
                          * is an instruction intercept, i.e. the VM-Exit occurs
                          * on the ICEBP itself.  Use the inner "skip" helper to
                          * avoid single-step #DB and MTF updates, as ICEBP is
                          * higher priority.  Note, skipping ICEBP still clears
                          * STI and MOVSS blocking.
                          *
                          * For all other #DBs, set vmcs.PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS
                          * if single-step is enabled in RFLAGS and STI or MOVSS
                          * blocking is active, as the CPU doesn't set the bit
                          * on VM-Exit due to #DB interception.  VM-Entry has a
                          * consistency check that a single-step #DB is pending
                          * in this scenario as the previous instruction cannot
                          * have toggled RFLAGS.TF 0=>1 (because STI and POP/MOV
                          * don't modify RFLAGS), therefore the one instruction
                          * delay when activating single-step breakpoints must
                          * have already expired.  Note, the CPU sets/clears BS
                          * as appropriate for all other VM-Exits types.
                          */
                         if (is_icebp(intr_info))
                                 WARN_ON(!skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu));
                         else if ((vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_TF) &&
                                  (vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
                                   (GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS)))
                                 vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS,
                                             vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS) | DR6_BS);
 
                         kvm_queue_exception_p(vcpu, DB_VECTOR, dr6);
                         return 1;
                 }
                 kvm_run->debug.arch.dr6 = dr6 | DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;
                 kvm_run->debug.arch.dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
                 fallthrough;
         case BP_VECTOR:
                 /*
                  * Update instruction length as we may reinject #BP from
                  * user space while in guest debugging mode. Reading it for
                  * #DB as well causes no harm, it is not used in that case.
                  */
                 vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len =
                         vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
                 kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
                 kvm_run->debug.arch.pc = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
                 kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = ex_no;
                 break;
         case AC_VECTOR:
                 if (vmx_guest_inject_ac(vcpu)) {
                         kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, AC_VECTOR, error_code);
                         return 1;
                 }
 
                 /*
                  * Handle split lock. Depending on detection mode this will
                  * either warn and disable split lock detection for this
                  * task or force SIGBUS on it.
                  */
                 if (handle_guest_split_lock(kvm_rip_read(vcpu)))
                         return 1;
                 fallthrough;
         default:
                 kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_EXCEPTION;
                 kvm_run->ex.exception = ex_no;
                 kvm_run->ex.error_code = error_code;
                 break;
         }
         return 0;
 }
 
 static __always_inline int handle_external_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         ++vcpu->stat.irq_exits;
         return 1;
 }
 
 static int handle_triple_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN;
         vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
         return 0;
 }
 
 static int handle_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         unsigned long exit_qualification;
         int size, in, string;
         unsigned port;
 
         exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
         string = (exit_qualification & 16) != 0;
 
         ++vcpu->stat.io_exits;
 
         if (string)
                 return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
 
         port = exit_qualification >> 16;
         size = (exit_qualification & 7) + 1;
         in = (exit_qualification & 8) != 0;
 
         return kvm_fast_pio(vcpu, size, port, in);
 }
 
 void vmx_patch_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned char *hypercall)
 {
         /*
          * Patch in the VMCALL instruction:
          */
         hypercall[0] = 0x0f;
         hypercall[1] = 0x01;
         hypercall[2] = 0xc1;
 }
 
 /* called to set cr0 as appropriate for a mov-to-cr0 exit. */
 static int handle_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
 {
         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
                 struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
                 unsigned long orig_val = val;
 
                 /*
                  * We get here when L2 changed cr0 in a way that did not change
                  * any of L1's shadowed bits (see nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr),
                  * but did change L0 shadowed bits. So we first calculate the
                  * effective cr0 value that L1 would like to write into the
                  * hardware. It consists of the L2-owned bits from the new
                  * value combined with the L1-owned bits from L1's guest_cr0.
                  */
                 val = (val & ~vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask) |
                         (vmcs12->guest_cr0 & vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask);
 
                 if (kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, val))
                         return 1;
                 vmcs_writel(CR0_READ_SHADOW, orig_val);
                 return 0;
         } else {
                 return kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, val);
         }
 }
 
 static int handle_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
 {
         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
                 struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
                 unsigned long orig_val = val;
 
                 /* analogously to handle_set_cr0 */
                 val = (val & ~vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask) |
                         (vmcs12->guest_cr4 & vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask);
                 if (kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, val))
                         return 1;
                 vmcs_writel(CR4_READ_SHADOW, orig_val);
                 return 0;
         } else
                 return kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, val);
 }
 
 static int handle_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         /*
          * UMIP emulation relies on intercepting writes to CR4.UMIP, i.e. this
          * and other code needs to be updated if UMIP can be guest owned.
          */
         BUILD_BUG_ON(KVM_POSSIBLE_CR4_GUEST_BITS & X86_CR4_UMIP);
 
         WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_UMIP));
         return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
 }
 
 static int handle_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         unsigned long exit_qualification, val;
         int cr;
         int reg;
         int err;
         int ret;
 
         exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
         cr = exit_qualification & 15;
         reg = (exit_qualification >> 8) & 15;
         switch ((exit_qualification >> 4) & 3) {
         case 0: /* mov to cr */
                 val = kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg);
                 trace_kvm_cr_write(cr, val);
                 switch (cr) {
                 case 0:
                         err = handle_set_cr0(vcpu, val);
                         return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
                 case 3:
                         WARN_ON_ONCE(enable_unrestricted_guest);
 
                         err = kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, val);
                         return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
                 case 4:
                         err = handle_set_cr4(vcpu, val);
                         return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
                 case 8: {
                                 u8 cr8_prev = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
                                 u8 cr8 = (u8)val;
                                 err = kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, cr8);
                                 ret = kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
                                 if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
                                         return ret;
                                 if (cr8_prev <= cr8)
                                         return ret;
                                 /*
                                  * TODO: we might be squashing a
                                  * KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP-triggered
                                  * KVM_EXIT_DEBUG here.
                                  */
                                 vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SET_TPR;
                                 return 0;
                         }
                 }
                 break;
         case 2: /* clts */
                 KVM_BUG(1, vcpu->kvm, "Guest always owns CR0.TS");
                 return -EIO;
         case 1: /*mov from cr*/
                 switch (cr) {
                 case 3:
                         WARN_ON_ONCE(enable_unrestricted_guest);
 
                         val = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
                         kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
                         trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
                         return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
                 case 8:
                         val = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
                         kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
                         trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
                         return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
                 }
                 break;
         case 3: /* lmsw */
                 val = (exit_qualification >> LMSW_SOURCE_DATA_SHIFT) & 0x0f;
                 trace_kvm_cr_write(0, (kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, ~0xful) | val));
                 kvm_lmsw(vcpu, val);
 
                 return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
         default:
                 break;
         }
         vcpu->run->exit_reason = 0;
         vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unhandled control register: op %d cr %d\n",
                (int)(exit_qualification >> 4) & 3, cr);
         return 0;
 }
 
 static int handle_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         unsigned long exit_qualification;
         int dr, dr7, reg;
         int err = 1;
 
         exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
         dr = exit_qualification & DEBUG_REG_ACCESS_NUM;
 
         /* First, if DR does not exist, trigger UD */
         if (!kvm_require_dr(vcpu, dr))
                 return 1;
 
         if (vmx_get_cpl(vcpu) > 0)
                 goto out;
 
         dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
         if (dr7 & DR7_GD) {
                 /*
                  * As the vm-exit takes precedence over the debug trap, we
                  * need to emulate the latter, either for the host or the
                  * guest debugging itself.
                  */
                 if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP) {
                         vcpu->run->debug.arch.dr6 = DR6_BD | DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;
                         vcpu->run->debug.arch.dr7 = dr7;
                         vcpu->run->debug.arch.pc = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
                         vcpu->run->debug.arch.exception = DB_VECTOR;
                         vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
                         return 0;
                 } else {
                         kvm_queue_exception_p(vcpu, DB_VECTOR, DR6_BD);
                         return 1;
                 }
         }
 
         if (vcpu->guest_debug == 0) {
                 exec_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING);
 
                 /*
                  * No more DR vmexits; force a reload of the debug registers
                  * and reenter on this instruction.  The next vmexit will
                  * retrieve the full state of the debug registers.
                  */
                 vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs |= KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT;
                 return 1;
         }
 
         reg = DEBUG_REG_ACCESS_REG(exit_qualification);
         if (exit_qualification & TYPE_MOV_FROM_DR) {
                 kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, kvm_get_dr(vcpu, dr));
                 err = 0;
         } else {
                 err = kvm_set_dr(vcpu, dr, kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg));
         }
 
 out:
         return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
 }
 
 void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[0], 0);
         get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[1], 1);
         get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[2], 2);
         get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[3], 3);
         get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6);
         vcpu->arch.dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
 
         vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs &= ~KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT;
         exec_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING);
 
         /*
          * exc_debug expects dr6 to be cleared after it runs, avoid that it sees
          * a stale dr6 from the guest.
          */
         set_debugreg(DR6_RESERVED, 6);
 }
 
 void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
 {
         vmcs_writel(GUEST_DR7, val);
 }
 
 static int handle_tpr_below_threshold(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         kvm_apic_update_ppr(vcpu);
         return 1;
 }
 
 static int handle_interrupt_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         exec_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING);
 
         kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
 
         ++vcpu->stat.irq_window_exits;
         return 1;
 }
 
 static int handle_invlpg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         unsigned long exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
 
         kvm_mmu_invlpg(vcpu, exit_qualification);
         return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
 }
 
 static int handle_apic_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         if (likely(fasteoi)) {
                 unsigned long exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
                 int access_type, offset;
 
                 access_type = exit_qualification & APIC_ACCESS_TYPE;
                 offset = exit_qualification & APIC_ACCESS_OFFSET;
                 /*
                  * Sane guest uses MOV to write EOI, with written value
                  * not cared. So make a short-circuit here by avoiding
                  * heavy instruction emulation.
                  */
                 if ((access_type == TYPE_LINEAR_APIC_INST_WRITE) &&
                     (offset == APIC_EOI)) {
                         kvm_lapic_set_eoi(vcpu);
                         return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
                 }
         }
         return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
 }
 
 static int handle_apic_eoi_induced(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         unsigned long exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
         int vector = exit_qualification & 0xff;
 
         /* EOI-induced VM exit is trap-like and thus no need to adjust IP */
         kvm_apic_set_eoi_accelerated(vcpu, vector);
         return 1;
 }
 
 static int handle_apic_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         unsigned long exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
 
         /*
          * APIC-write VM-Exit is trap-like, KVM doesn't need to advance RIP and
          * hardware has done any necessary aliasing, offset adjustments, etc...
          * for the access.  I.e. the correct value has already been  written to
          * the vAPIC page for the correct 16-byte chunk.  KVM needs only to
          * retrieve the register value and emulate the access.
          */
         u32 offset = exit_qualification & 0xff0;
 
         kvm_apic_write_nodecode(vcpu, offset);
         return 1;
 }
 
 static int handle_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         unsigned long exit_qualification;
         bool has_error_code = false;
         u32 error_code = 0;
         u16 tss_selector;
         int reason, type, idt_v, idt_index;
 
         idt_v = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK);
         idt_index = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK);
         type = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK);
 
         exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
 
         reason = (u32)exit_qualification >> 30;
         if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_GATE && idt_v) {
                 switch (type) {
                 case INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR:
                         vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
                         vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, true);
                         break;
                 case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR:
                 case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
                         kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
                         break;
                 case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION:
                         if (vmx->idt_vectoring_info &
                             VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK) {
                                 has_error_code = true;
                                 error_code =
                                         vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE);
                         }
                         fallthrough;
                 case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:
                         kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
                         break;
                 default:
                         break;
                 }
         }
         tss_selector = exit_qualification;
 
         if (!idt_v || (type != INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION &&
                        type != INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR &&
                        type != INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR))
                 WARN_ON(!skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu));
 
         /*
          * TODO: What about debug traps on tss switch?
          *       Are we supposed to inject them and update dr6?
          */
         return kvm_task_switch(vcpu, tss_selector,
                                type == INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR ? idt_index : -1,
                                reason, has_error_code, error_code);
 }
 
 static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         unsigned long exit_qualification;
         gpa_t gpa;
         u64 error_code;
 
         exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
 
         /*
          * EPT violation happened while executing iret from NMI,
          * "blocked by NMI" bit has to be set before next VM entry.
          * There are errata that may cause this bit to not be set:
          * AAK134, BY25.
          */
         if (!(to_vmx(vcpu)->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
                         enable_vnmi &&
                         (exit_qualification & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI))
                 vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
 
         gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
         trace_kvm_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, exit_qualification);
 
         /* Is it a read fault? */
         error_code = (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ)
                      ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
         /* Is it a write fault? */
         error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE)
                       ? PFERR_WRITE_MASK : 0;
         /* Is it a fetch fault? */
         error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR)
                       ? PFERR_FETCH_MASK : 0;
         /* ept page table entry is present? */
         error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASK)
                       ? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
 
         error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED) != 0 ?
                PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK : PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
 
         /*
          * Check that the GPA doesn't exceed physical memory limits, as that is
          * a guest page fault.  We have to emulate the instruction here, because
          * if the illegal address is that of a paging structure, then
          * EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE bit is set.  Alternatively, if supported we
          * would also use advanced VM-exit information for EPT violations to
          * reconstruct the page fault error code.
          */
         if (unlikely(allow_smaller_maxphyaddr && !kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(vcpu, gpa)))
                 return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
 
         return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, error_code, NULL, 0);
 }
 
 static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         gpa_t gpa;
 
         if (vmx_check_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_PF, NULL, 0))
                 return 1;
 
         /*
          * A nested guest cannot optimize MMIO vmexits, because we have an
          * nGPA here instead of the required GPA.
          */
         gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
         if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
             !kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_FAST_MMIO_BUS, gpa, 0, NULL)) {
                 trace_kvm_fast_mmio(gpa);
                 return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
         }
 
         return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, PFERR_RSVD_MASK, NULL, 0);
 }
 
 static int handle_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         if (KVM_BUG_ON(!enable_vnmi, vcpu->kvm))
                 return -EIO;
 
         exec_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING);
         ++vcpu->stat.nmi_window_exits;
         kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
 
         return 1;
 }
 
 static bool vmx_emulation_required_with_pending_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         return vmx->emulation_required && !vmx->rmode.vm86_active &&
                (kvm_is_exception_pending(vcpu) || vcpu->arch.exception.injected);
 }
 
 static int handle_invalid_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         bool intr_window_requested;
         unsigned count = 130;
 
         intr_window_requested = exec_controls_get(vmx) &
                                 CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING;
 
         while (vmx->emulation_required && count-- != 0) {
                 if (intr_window_requested && !vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu))
                         return handle_interrupt_window(&vmx->vcpu);
 
                 if (kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu))
                         return 1;
 
                 if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0))
                         return 0;
 
                 if (vmx_emulation_required_with_pending_exception(vcpu)) {
                         kvm_prepare_emulation_failure_exit(vcpu);
                         return 0;
                 }
 
                 if (vcpu->arch.halt_request) {
                         vcpu->arch.halt_request = 0;
                         return kvm_emulate_halt_noskip(vcpu);
                 }
 
                 /*
                  * Note, return 1 and not 0, vcpu_run() will invoke
                  * xfer_to_guest_mode() which will create a proper return
                  * code.
                  */
                 if (__xfer_to_guest_mode_work_pending())
                         return 1;
         }
 
         return 1;
 }
 
 int vmx_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         if (vmx_emulation_required_with_pending_exception(vcpu)) {
                 kvm_prepare_emulation_failure_exit(vcpu);
                 return 0;
         }
 
         return 1;
 }
 
 /*
  * Indicate a busy-waiting vcpu in spinlock. We do not enable the PAUSE
  * exiting, so only get here on cpu with PAUSE-Loop-Exiting.
  */
 static int handle_pause(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                 grow_ple_window(vcpu);
 
         /*
          * Intel sdm vol3 ch-25.1.3 says: The "PAUSE-loop exiting"
          * VM-execution control is ignored if CPL > 0. OTOH, KVM
          * never set PAUSE_EXITING and just set PLE if supported,
          * so the vcpu must be CPL=0 if it gets a PAUSE exit.
          */
         kvm_vcpu_on_spin(vcpu, true);
         return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
 }
 
 static int handle_monitor_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         return 1;
 }
 
 static int handle_invpcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         u32 vmx_instruction_info;
         unsigned long type;
         gva_t gva;
         struct {
                 u64 pcid;
                 u64 gla;
         } operand;
         int gpr_index;
 
         if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID)) {
                 kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
                 return 1;
         }
 
         vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
         gpr_index = vmx_get_instr_info_reg2(vmx_instruction_info);
         type = kvm_register_read(vcpu, gpr_index);
 
         /* According to the Intel instruction reference, the memory operand
          * is read even if it isn't needed (e.g., for type==all)
          */
         if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu),
                                 vmx_instruction_info, false,
                                 sizeof(operand), &gva))
                 return 1;
 
         return kvm_handle_invpcid(vcpu, type, gva);
 }
 
 static int handle_pml_full(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         unsigned long exit_qualification;
 
         trace_kvm_pml_full(vcpu->vcpu_id);
 
         exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
 
         /*
          * PML buffer FULL happened while executing iret from NMI,
          * "blocked by NMI" bit has to be set before next VM entry.
          */
         if (!(to_vmx(vcpu)->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
                         enable_vnmi &&
                         (exit_qualification & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI))
                 vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
                                 GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
 
         /*
          * PML buffer already flushed at beginning of VMEXIT. Nothing to do
          * here.., and there's no userspace involvement needed for PML.
          */
         return 1;
 }
 
 static fastpath_t handle_fastpath_preemption_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                                                    bool force_immediate_exit)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         /*
          * In the *extremely* unlikely scenario that this is a spurious VM-Exit
          * due to the timer expiring while it was "soft" disabled, just eat the
          * exit and re-enter the guest.
          */
         if (unlikely(vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled))
                 return EXIT_FASTPATH_REENTER_GUEST;
 
         /*
          * If the timer expired because KVM used it to force an immediate exit,
          * then mission accomplished.
          */
         if (force_immediate_exit)
                 return EXIT_FASTPATH_EXIT_HANDLED;
 
         /*
          * If L2 is active, go down the slow path as emulating the guest timer
          * expiration likely requires synthesizing a nested VM-Exit.
          */
         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
                 return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
 
         kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer(vcpu);
         return EXIT_FASTPATH_REENTER_GUEST;
 }
 
 static int handle_preemption_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         /*
          * This non-fastpath handler is reached if and only if the preemption
          * timer was being used to emulate a guest timer while L2 is active.
          * All other scenarios are supposed to be handled in the fastpath.
          */
         WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_guest_mode(vcpu));
         kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer(vcpu);
         return 1;
 }
 
 /*
  * When nested=0, all VMX instruction VM Exits filter here.  The handlers
  * are overwritten by nested_vmx_setup() when nested=1.
  */
 static int handle_vmx_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
         return 1;
 }
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
 static int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         /*
          * SGX virtualization is disabled.  There is no software enable bit for
          * SGX, so KVM intercepts all ENCLS leafs and injects a #UD to prevent
          * the guest from executing ENCLS (when SGX is supported by hardware).
          */
         kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
         return 1;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM */
 
 static int handle_bus_lock_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         /*
          * Hardware may or may not set the BUS_LOCK_DETECTED flag on BUS_LOCK
          * VM-Exits. Unconditionally set the flag here and leave the handling to
          * vmx_handle_exit().
          */
         to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.bus_lock_detected = true;
         return 1;
 }
 
 static int handle_notify(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         unsigned long exit_qual = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
         bool context_invalid = exit_qual & NOTIFY_VM_CONTEXT_INVALID;
 
         ++vcpu->stat.notify_window_exits;
 
         /*
          * Notify VM exit happened while executing iret from NMI,
          * "blocked by NMI" bit has to be set before next VM entry.
          */
         if (enable_vnmi && (exit_qual & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI))
                 vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
                               GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
 
         if (vcpu->kvm->arch.notify_vmexit_flags & KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_USER ||
             context_invalid) {
                 vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_NOTIFY;
                 vcpu->run->notify.flags = context_invalid ?
                                           KVM_NOTIFY_CONTEXT_INVALID : 0;
                 return 0;
         }
 
         return 1;
 }
 
 /*
  * The exit handlers return 1 if the exit was handled fully and guest execution
  * may resume.  Otherwise they set the kvm_run parameter to indicate what needs
  * to be done to userspace and return 0.
  */
 static int (*kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
         [EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI]           = handle_exception_nmi,
         [EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT]      = handle_external_interrupt,
         [EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT]            = handle_triple_fault,
         [EXIT_REASON_NMI_WINDOW]              = handle_nmi_window,
         [EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION]          = handle_io,
         [EXIT_REASON_CR_ACCESS]               = handle_cr,
         [EXIT_REASON_DR_ACCESS]               = handle_dr,
         [EXIT_REASON_CPUID]                   = kvm_emulate_cpuid,
         [EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ]                = kvm_emulate_rdmsr,
         [EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE]               = kvm_emulate_wrmsr,
         [EXIT_REASON_INTERRUPT_WINDOW]        = handle_interrupt_window,
         [EXIT_REASON_HLT]                     = kvm_emulate_halt,
         [EXIT_REASON_INVD]                    = kvm_emulate_invd,
         [EXIT_REASON_INVLPG]                  = handle_invlpg,
         [EXIT_REASON_RDPMC]                   = kvm_emulate_rdpmc,
         [EXIT_REASON_VMCALL]                  = kvm_emulate_hypercall,
         [EXIT_REASON_VMCLEAR]                 = handle_vmx_instruction,
         [EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH]                = handle_vmx_instruction,
         [EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD]                 = handle_vmx_instruction,
         [EXIT_REASON_VMPTRST]                 = handle_vmx_instruction,
         [EXIT_REASON_VMREAD]                  = handle_vmx_instruction,
         [EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME]                = handle_vmx_instruction,
         [EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE]                 = handle_vmx_instruction,
         [EXIT_REASON_VMOFF]                   = handle_vmx_instruction,
         [EXIT_REASON_VMON]                    = handle_vmx_instruction,
         [EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD]     = handle_tpr_below_threshold,
         [EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS]             = handle_apic_access,
         [EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE]              = handle_apic_write,
         [EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED]             = handle_apic_eoi_induced,
         [EXIT_REASON_WBINVD]                  = kvm_emulate_wbinvd,
         [EXIT_REASON_XSETBV]                  = kvm_emulate_xsetbv,
         [EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH]             = handle_task_switch,
         [EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY]      = handle_machine_check,
         [EXIT_REASON_GDTR_IDTR]               = handle_desc,
         [EXIT_REASON_LDTR_TR]                 = handle_desc,
         [EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION]           = handle_ept_violation,
         [EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG]           = handle_ept_misconfig,
         [EXIT_REASON_PAUSE_INSTRUCTION]       = handle_pause,
         [EXIT_REASON_MWAIT_INSTRUCTION]       = kvm_emulate_mwait,
         [EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG]       = handle_monitor_trap,
         [EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_INSTRUCTION]     = kvm_emulate_monitor,
         [EXIT_REASON_INVEPT]                  = handle_vmx_instruction,
         [EXIT_REASON_INVVPID]                 = handle_vmx_instruction,
         [EXIT_REASON_RDRAND]                  = kvm_handle_invalid_op,
         [EXIT_REASON_RDSEED]                  = kvm_handle_invalid_op,
         [EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL]                = handle_pml_full,
         [EXIT_REASON_INVPCID]                 = handle_invpcid,
         [EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC]                  = handle_vmx_instruction,
         [EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER]        = handle_preemption_timer,
         [EXIT_REASON_ENCLS]                   = handle_encls,
         [EXIT_REASON_BUS_LOCK]                = handle_bus_lock_vmexit,
         [EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY]                  = handle_notify,
 };
 
 static const int kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers =
         ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_vmx_exit_handlers);
 
 void vmx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
                        u64 *info1, u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         *reason = vmx->exit_reason.full;
         *info1 = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
         if (!(vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry)) {
                 *info2 = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
                 *intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
                 if (is_exception_with_error_code(*intr_info))
                         *error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
                 else
                         *error_code = 0;
         } else {
                 *info2 = 0;
                 *intr_info = 0;
                 *error_code = 0;
         }
 }
 
 static void vmx_destroy_pml_buffer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         if (vmx->pml_pg) {
                 __free_page(vmx->pml_pg);
                 vmx->pml_pg = NULL;
         }
 }
 
 static void vmx_flush_pml_buffer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         u64 *pml_buf;
         u16 pml_idx;
 
         pml_idx = vmcs_read16(GUEST_PML_INDEX);
 
         /* Do nothing if PML buffer is empty */
         if (pml_idx == (PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1))
                 return;
 
         /* PML index always points to next available PML buffer entity */
         if (pml_idx >= PML_ENTITY_NUM)
                 pml_idx = 0;
         else
                 pml_idx++;
 
         pml_buf = page_address(vmx->pml_pg);
         for (; pml_idx < PML_ENTITY_NUM; pml_idx++) {
                 u64 gpa;
 
                 gpa = pml_buf[pml_idx];
                 WARN_ON(gpa & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
                 kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
         }
 
         /* reset PML index */
         vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
 }
 
 static void vmx_dump_sel(char *name, uint32_t sel)
 {
         pr_err("%s sel=0x%04x, attr=0x%05x, limit=0x%08x, base=0x%016lx\n",
                name, vmcs_read16(sel),
                vmcs_read32(sel + GUEST_ES_AR_BYTES - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR),
                vmcs_read32(sel + GUEST_ES_LIMIT - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR),
                vmcs_readl(sel + GUEST_ES_BASE - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR));
 }
 
 static void vmx_dump_dtsel(char *name, uint32_t limit)
 {
         pr_err("%s                           limit=0x%08x, base=0x%016lx\n",
                name, vmcs_read32(limit),
                vmcs_readl(limit + GUEST_GDTR_BASE - GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT));
 }
 
 static void vmx_dump_msrs(char *name, struct vmx_msrs *m)
 {
         unsigned int i;
         struct vmx_msr_entry *e;
 
         pr_err("MSR %s:\n", name);
         for (i = 0, e = m->val; i < m->nr; ++i, ++e)
                 pr_err("  %2d: msr=0x%08x value=0x%016llx\n", i, e->index, e->value);
 }
 
 void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         u32 vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl;
         u32 cpu_based_exec_ctrl, pin_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control;
         u64 tertiary_exec_control;
         unsigned long cr4;
         int efer_slot;
 
         if (!dump_invalid_vmcs) {
                 pr_warn_ratelimited("set kvm_intel.dump_invalid_vmcs=1 to dump internal KVM state.\n");
                 return;
         }
 
         vmentry_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS);
         vmexit_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS);
         cpu_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
         pin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
         cr4 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4);
 
         if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls())
                 secondary_exec_control = vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
         else
                 secondary_exec_control = 0;
 
         if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls())
                 tertiary_exec_control = vmcs_read64(TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
         else
                 tertiary_exec_control = 0;
 
         pr_err("VMCS %p, last attempted VM-entry on CPU %d\n",
                vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs, vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu);
         pr_err("*** Guest State ***\n");
         pr_err("CR0: actual=0x%016lx, shadow=0x%016lx, gh_mask=%016lx\n",
                vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR0), vmcs_readl(CR0_READ_SHADOW),
                vmcs_readl(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK));
         pr_err("CR4: actual=0x%016lx, shadow=0x%016lx, gh_mask=%016lx\n",
                cr4, vmcs_readl(CR4_READ_SHADOW), vmcs_readl(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK));
         pr_err("CR3 = 0x%016lx\n", vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR3));
         if (cpu_has_vmx_ept()) {
                 pr_err("PDPTR0 = 0x%016llx  PDPTR1 = 0x%016llx\n",
                        vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR0), vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR1));
                 pr_err("PDPTR2 = 0x%016llx  PDPTR3 = 0x%016llx\n",
                        vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR2), vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR3));
         }
         pr_err("RSP = 0x%016lx  RIP = 0x%016lx\n",
                vmcs_readl(GUEST_RSP), vmcs_readl(GUEST_RIP));
         pr_err("RFLAGS=0x%08lx         DR7 = 0x%016lx\n",
                vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS), vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7));
         pr_err("Sysenter RSP=%016lx CS:RIP=%04x:%016lx\n",
                vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP),
                vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS), vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP));
         vmx_dump_sel("CS:  ", GUEST_CS_SELECTOR);
         vmx_dump_sel("DS:  ", GUEST_DS_SELECTOR);
         vmx_dump_sel("SS:  ", GUEST_SS_SELECTOR);
         vmx_dump_sel("ES:  ", GUEST_ES_SELECTOR);
         vmx_dump_sel("FS:  ", GUEST_FS_SELECTOR);
         vmx_dump_sel("GS:  ", GUEST_GS_SELECTOR);
         vmx_dump_dtsel("GDTR:", GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT);
         vmx_dump_sel("LDTR:", GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR);
         vmx_dump_dtsel("IDTR:", GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
         vmx_dump_sel("TR:  ", GUEST_TR_SELECTOR);
         efer_slot = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&vmx->msr_autoload.guest, MSR_EFER);
         if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
                 pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_EFER));
         else if (efer_slot >= 0)
                 pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx (autoload)\n",
                        vmx->msr_autoload.guest.val[efer_slot].value);
         else if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE)
                 pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx (effective)\n",
                        vcpu->arch.efer | (EFER_LMA | EFER_LME));
         else
                 pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx (effective)\n",
                        vcpu->arch.efer & ~(EFER_LMA | EFER_LME));
         if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT)
                 pr_err("PAT = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_PAT));
         pr_err("DebugCtl = 0x%016llx  DebugExceptions = 0x%016lx\n",
                vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL),
                vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS));
         if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl() &&
             vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL)
                 pr_err("PerfGlobCtl = 0x%016llx\n",
                        vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL));
         if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS)
                 pr_err("BndCfgS = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS));
         pr_err("Interruptibility = %08x  ActivityState = %08x\n",
                vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO),
                vmcs_read32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE));
         if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY)
                 pr_err("InterruptStatus = %04x\n",
                        vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS));
         if (vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT) > 0)
                 vmx_dump_msrs("guest autoload", &vmx->msr_autoload.guest);
         if (vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT) > 0)
                 vmx_dump_msrs("guest autostore", &vmx->msr_autostore.guest);
 
         pr_err("*** Host State ***\n");
         pr_err("RIP = 0x%016lx  RSP = 0x%016lx\n",
                vmcs_readl(HOST_RIP), vmcs_readl(HOST_RSP));
         pr_err("CS=%04x SS=%04x DS=%04x ES=%04x FS=%04x GS=%04x TR=%04x\n",
                vmcs_read16(HOST_CS_SELECTOR), vmcs_read16(HOST_SS_SELECTOR),
                vmcs_read16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR), vmcs_read16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR),
                vmcs_read16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR), vmcs_read16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR),
                vmcs_read16(HOST_TR_SELECTOR));
         pr_err("FSBase=%016lx GSBase=%016lx TRBase=%016lx\n",
                vmcs_readl(HOST_FS_BASE), vmcs_readl(HOST_GS_BASE),
                vmcs_readl(HOST_TR_BASE));
         pr_err("GDTBase=%016lx IDTBase=%016lx\n",
                vmcs_readl(HOST_GDTR_BASE), vmcs_readl(HOST_IDTR_BASE));
         pr_err("CR0=%016lx CR3=%016lx CR4=%016lx\n",
                vmcs_readl(HOST_CR0), vmcs_readl(HOST_CR3),
                vmcs_readl(HOST_CR4));
         pr_err("Sysenter RSP=%016lx CS:RIP=%04x:%016lx\n",
                vmcs_readl(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP),
                vmcs_read32(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_CS),
                vmcs_readl(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP));
         if (vmexit_ctl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
                 pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_EFER));
         if (vmexit_ctl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT)
                 pr_err("PAT = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_PAT));
         if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl() &&
             vmexit_ctl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL)
                 pr_err("PerfGlobCtl = 0x%016llx\n",
                        vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL));
         if (vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT) > 0)
                 vmx_dump_msrs("host autoload", &vmx->msr_autoload.host);
 
         pr_err("*** Control State ***\n");
         pr_err("CPUBased=0x%08x SecondaryExec=0x%08x TertiaryExec=0x%016llx\n",
                cpu_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control, tertiary_exec_control);
         pr_err("PinBased=0x%08x EntryControls=%08x ExitControls=%08x\n",
                pin_based_exec_ctrl, vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl);
         pr_err("ExceptionBitmap=%08x PFECmask=%08x PFECmatch=%08x\n",
                vmcs_read32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP),
                vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK),
                vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH));
         pr_err("VMEntry: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
                vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD),
                vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE),
                vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
         pr_err("VMExit: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
                vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO),
                vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE),
                vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
         pr_err("        reason=%08x qualification=%016lx\n",
                vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON), vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION));
         pr_err("IDTVectoring: info=%08x errcode=%08x\n",
                vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD),
                vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE));
         pr_err("TSC Offset = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(TSC_OFFSET));
         if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING)
                 pr_err("TSC Multiplier = 0x%016llx\n",
                        vmcs_read64(TSC_MULTIPLIER));
         if (cpu_based_exec_ctrl & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) {
                 if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY) {
                         u16 status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
                         pr_err("SVI|RVI = %02x|%02x ", status >> 8, status & 0xff);
                 }
                 pr_cont("TPR Threshold = 0x%02x\n", vmcs_read32(TPR_THRESHOLD));
                 if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)
                         pr_err("APIC-access addr = 0x%016llx ", vmcs_read64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR));
                 pr_cont("virt-APIC addr = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR));
         }
         if (pin_based_exec_ctrl & PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR)
                 pr_err("PostedIntrVec = 0x%02x\n", vmcs_read16(POSTED_INTR_NV));
         if ((secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT))
                 pr_err("EPT pointer = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(EPT_POINTER));
         if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING)
                 pr_err("PLE Gap=%08x Window=%08x\n",
                        vmcs_read32(PLE_GAP), vmcs_read32(PLE_WINDOW));
         if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID)
                 pr_err("Virtual processor ID = 0x%04x\n",
                        vmcs_read16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID));
         if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE) {
                 struct vmx_ve_information *ve_info = vmx->ve_info;
                 u64 ve_info_pa = vmcs_read64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS);
 
                 /*
                  * If KVM is dumping the VMCS, then something has gone wrong
                  * already.  Derefencing an address from the VMCS, which could
                  * very well be corrupted, is a terrible idea.  The virtual
                  * address is known so use it.
                  */
                 pr_err("VE info address = 0x%016llx%s\n", ve_info_pa,
                        ve_info_pa == __pa(ve_info) ? "" : "(corrupted!)");
                 pr_err("ve_info: 0x%08x 0x%08x 0x%016llx 0x%016llx 0x%016llx 0x%04x\n",
                        ve_info->exit_reason, ve_info->delivery,
                        ve_info->exit_qualification,
                        ve_info->guest_linear_address,
                        ve_info->guest_physical_address, ve_info->eptp_index);
         }
 }
 
 /*
  * The guest has exited.  See if we can fix it or if we need userspace
  * assistance.
  */
 static int __vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
         u32 vectoring_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
         u16 exit_handler_index;
 
         /*
          * Flush logged GPAs PML buffer, this will make dirty_bitmap more
          * updated. Another good is, in kvm_vm_ioctl_get_dirty_log, before
          * querying dirty_bitmap, we only need to kick all vcpus out of guest
          * mode as if vcpus is in root mode, the PML buffer must has been
          * flushed already.  Note, PML is never enabled in hardware while
          * running L2.
          */
         if (enable_pml && !is_guest_mode(vcpu))
                 vmx_flush_pml_buffer(vcpu);
 
         /*
          * KVM should never reach this point with a pending nested VM-Enter.
          * More specifically, short-circuiting VM-Entry to emulate L2 due to
          * invalid guest state should never happen as that means KVM knowingly
          * allowed a nested VM-Enter with an invalid vmcs12.  More below.
          */
         if (KVM_BUG_ON(vmx->nested.nested_run_pending, vcpu->kvm))
                 return -EIO;
 
         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
                 /*
                  * PML is never enabled when running L2, bail immediately if a
                  * PML full exit occurs as something is horribly wrong.
                  */
                 if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL)
                         goto unexpected_vmexit;
 
                 /*
                  * The host physical addresses of some pages of guest memory
                  * are loaded into the vmcs02 (e.g. vmcs12's Virtual APIC
                  * Page). The CPU may write to these pages via their host
                  * physical address while L2 is running, bypassing any
                  * address-translation-based dirty tracking (e.g. EPT write
                  * protection).
                  *
                  * Mark them dirty on every exit from L2 to prevent them from
                  * getting out of sync with dirty tracking.
                  */
                 nested_mark_vmcs12_pages_dirty(vcpu);
 
                 /*
                  * Synthesize a triple fault if L2 state is invalid.  In normal
                  * operation, nested VM-Enter rejects any attempt to enter L2
                  * with invalid state.  However, those checks are skipped if
                  * state is being stuffed via RSM or KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE.  If
                  * L2 state is invalid, it means either L1 modified SMRAM state
                  * or userspace provided bad state.  Synthesize TRIPLE_FAULT as
                  * doing so is architecturally allowed in the RSM case, and is
                  * the least awful solution for the userspace case without
                  * risking false positives.
                  */
                 if (vmx->emulation_required) {
                         nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT, 0, 0);
                         return 1;
                 }
 
                 if (nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(vcpu))
                         return 1;
         }
 
         /* If guest state is invalid, start emulating.  L2 is handled above. */
         if (vmx->emulation_required)
                 return handle_invalid_guest_state(vcpu);
 
         if (exit_reason.failed_vmentry) {
                 dump_vmcs(vcpu);
                 vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
                 vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
                         = exit_reason.full;
                 vcpu->run->fail_entry.cpu = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
                 return 0;
         }
 
         if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
                 dump_vmcs(vcpu);
                 vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
                 vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
                         = vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR);
                 vcpu->run->fail_entry.cpu = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
                 return 0;
         }
 
         /*
          * Note:
          * Do not try to fix EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG if it caused by
          * delivery event since it indicates guest is accessing MMIO.
          * The vm-exit can be triggered again after return to guest that
          * will cause infinite loop.
          */
         if ((vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
             (exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI &&
              exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION &&
              exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL &&
              exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS &&
              exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH &&
              exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY)) {
                 int ndata = 3;
 
                 vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
                 vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_DELIVERY_EV;
                 vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vectoring_info;
                 vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = exit_reason.full;
                 vcpu->run->internal.data[2] = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
                 if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {
                         vcpu->run->internal.data[ndata++] =
                                 vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
                 }
                 vcpu->run->internal.data[ndata++] = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
                 vcpu->run->internal.ndata = ndata;
                 return 0;
         }
 
         if (unlikely(!enable_vnmi &&
                      vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked)) {
                 if (!vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu)) {
                         vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
                 } else if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time > 1000000000LL &&
                            vcpu->arch.nmi_pending) {
                         /*
                          * This CPU don't support us in finding the end of an
                          * NMI-blocked window if the guest runs with IRQs
                          * disabled. So we pull the trigger after 1 s of
                          * futile waiting, but inform the user about this.
                          */
                         printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Breaking out of NMI-blocked "
                                "state on VCPU %d after 1 s timeout\n",
                                __func__, vcpu->vcpu_id);
                         vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
                 }
         }
 
         if (exit_fastpath != EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE)
                 return 1;
 
         if (exit_reason.basic >= kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers)
                 goto unexpected_vmexit;
 #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
         if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE)
                 return kvm_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
         else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER)
                 return handle_preemption_timer(vcpu);
         else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_INTERRUPT_WINDOW)
                 return handle_interrupt_window(vcpu);
         else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
                 return handle_external_interrupt(vcpu);
         else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_HLT)
                 return kvm_emulate_halt(vcpu);
         else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG)
                 return handle_ept_misconfig(vcpu);
 #endif
 
         exit_handler_index = array_index_nospec((u16)exit_reason.basic,
                                                 kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers);
         if (!kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_handler_index])
                 goto unexpected_vmexit;
 
         return kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_handler_index](vcpu);
 
 unexpected_vmexit:
         vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmx: unexpected exit reason 0x%x\n",
                     exit_reason.full);
         dump_vmcs(vcpu);
         vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
         vcpu->run->internal.suberror =
                         KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXIT_REASON;
         vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 2;
         vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = exit_reason.full;
         vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
         return 0;
 }
 
 int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
 {
         int ret = __vmx_handle_exit(vcpu, exit_fastpath);
 
         /*
          * Exit to user space when bus lock detected to inform that there is
          * a bus lock in guest.
          */
         if (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.bus_lock_detected) {
                 if (ret > 0)
                         vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_X86_BUS_LOCK;
 
                 vcpu->run->flags |= KVM_RUN_X86_BUS_LOCK;
                 return 0;
         }
         return ret;
 }
 
 /*
  * Software based L1D cache flush which is used when microcode providing
  * the cache control MSR is not loaded.
  *
  * The L1D cache is 32 KiB on Nehalem and later microarchitectures, but to
  * flush it is required to read in 64 KiB because the replacement algorithm
  * is not exactly LRU. This could be sized at runtime via topology
  * information but as all relevant affected CPUs have 32KiB L1D cache size
  * there is no point in doing so.
  */
 static noinstr void vmx_l1d_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         int size = PAGE_SIZE << L1D_CACHE_ORDER;
 
         /*
          * This code is only executed when the flush mode is 'cond' or
          * 'always'
          */
         if (static_branch_likely(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond)) {
                 bool flush_l1d;
 
                 /*
                  * Clear the per-vcpu flush bit, it gets set again if the vCPU
                  * is reloaded, i.e. if the vCPU is scheduled out or if KVM
                  * exits to userspace, or if KVM reaches one of the unsafe
                  * VMEXIT handlers, e.g. if KVM calls into the emulator.
                  */
                 flush_l1d = vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d;
                 vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = false;
 
                 /*
                  * Clear the per-cpu flush bit, it gets set again from
                  * the interrupt handlers.
                  */
                 flush_l1d |= kvm_get_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();
                 kvm_clear_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();
 
                 if (!flush_l1d)
                         return;
         }
 
         vcpu->stat.l1d_flush++;
 
         if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) {
                 native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, L1D_FLUSH);
                 return;
         }
 
         asm volatile(
                 /* First ensure the pages are in the TLB */
                 "xorl   %%eax, %%eax\n"
                 ".Lpopulate_tlb:\n\t"
                 "movzbl (%[flush_pages], %%" _ASM_AX "), %%ecx\n\t"
                 "addl   $4096, %%eax\n\t"
                 "cmpl   %%eax, %[size]\n\t"
                 "jne    .Lpopulate_tlb\n\t"
                 "xorl   %%eax, %%eax\n\t"
                 "cpuid\n\t"
                 /* Now fill the cache */
                 "xorl   %%eax, %%eax\n"
                 ".Lfill_cache:\n"
                 "movzbl (%[flush_pages], %%" _ASM_AX "), %%ecx\n\t"
                 "addl   $64, %%eax\n\t"
                 "cmpl   %%eax, %[size]\n\t"
                 "jne    .Lfill_cache\n\t"
                 "lfence\n"
                 :: [flush_pages] "r" (vmx_l1d_flush_pages),
                     [size] "r" (size)
                 : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx");
 }
 
 void vmx_update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
 {
         struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
         int tpr_threshold;
 
         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
                 nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW))
                 return;
 
         tpr_threshold = (irr == -1 || tpr < irr) ? 0 : irr;
         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
                 to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.l1_tpr_threshold = tpr_threshold;
         else
                 vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, tpr_threshold);
 }
 
 void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         u32 sec_exec_control;
 
         if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
                 return;
 
         if (!flexpriority_enabled &&
             !cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode())
                 return;
 
         /* Postpone execution until vmcs01 is the current VMCS. */
         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
                 vmx->nested.change_vmcs01_virtual_apic_mode = true;
                 return;
         }
 
         sec_exec_control = secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx);
         sec_exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
                               SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE);
 
         switch (kvm_get_apic_mode(vcpu)) {
         case LAPIC_MODE_INVALID:
                 WARN_ONCE(true, "Invalid local APIC state");
                 break;
         case LAPIC_MODE_DISABLED:
                 break;
         case LAPIC_MODE_XAPIC:
                 if (flexpriority_enabled) {
                         sec_exec_control |=
                                 SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
                         kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD, vcpu);
 
                         /*
                          * Flush the TLB, reloading the APIC access page will
                          * only do so if its physical address has changed, but
                          * the guest may have inserted a non-APIC mapping into
                          * the TLB while the APIC access page was disabled.
                          */
                         kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, vcpu);
                 }
                 break;
         case LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC:
                 if (cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode())
                         sec_exec_control |=
                                 SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE;
                 break;
         }
         secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, sec_exec_control);
 
         vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(vcpu);
 }
 
 void vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         const gfn_t gfn = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE >> PAGE_SHIFT;
         struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
         struct kvm_memslots *slots = kvm_memslots(kvm);
         struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
         unsigned long mmu_seq;
         kvm_pfn_t pfn;
 
         /* Defer reload until vmcs01 is the current VMCS. */
         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
                 to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.reload_vmcs01_apic_access_page = true;
                 return;
         }
 
         if (!(secondary_exec_controls_get(to_vmx(vcpu)) &
             SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES))
                 return;
 
         /*
          * Explicitly grab the memslot using KVM's internal slot ID to ensure
          * KVM doesn't unintentionally grab a userspace memslot.  It _should_
          * be impossible for userspace to create a memslot for the APIC when
          * APICv is enabled, but paranoia won't hurt in this case.
          */
         slot = id_to_memslot(slots, APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT);
         if (!slot || slot->flags & KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID)
                 return;
 
         /*
          * Ensure that the mmu_notifier sequence count is read before KVM
          * retrieves the pfn from the primary MMU.  Note, the memslot is
          * protected by SRCU, not the mmu_notifier.  Pairs with the smp_wmb()
          * in kvm_mmu_invalidate_end().
          */
         mmu_seq = kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq;
         smp_rmb();
 
         /*
          * No need to retry if the memslot does not exist or is invalid.  KVM
          * controls the APIC-access page memslot, and only deletes the memslot
          * if APICv is permanently inhibited, i.e. the memslot won't reappear.
          */
         pfn = gfn_to_pfn_memslot(slot, gfn);
         if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn))
                 return;
 
         read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
         if (mmu_invalidate_retry_gfn(kvm, mmu_seq, gfn)) {
                 kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD, vcpu);
                 read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
                 goto out;
         }
 
         vmcs_write64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR, pfn_to_hpa(pfn));
         read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
 
         /*
          * No need for a manual TLB flush at this point, KVM has already done a
          * flush if there were SPTEs pointing at the previous page.
          */
 out:
         /*
          * Do not pin apic access page in memory, the MMU notifier
          * will call us again if it is migrated or swapped out.
          */
         kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
 }
 
 void vmx_hwapic_isr_update(int max_isr)
 {
         u16 status;
         u8 old;
 
         if (max_isr == -1)
                 max_isr = 0;
 
         status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
         old = status >> 8;
         if (max_isr != old) {
                 status &= 0xff;
                 status |= max_isr << 8;
                 vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
         }
 }
 
 static void vmx_set_rvi(int vector)
 {
         u16 status;
         u8 old;
 
         if (vector == -1)
                 vector = 0;
 
         status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
         old = (u8)status & 0xff;
         if ((u8)vector != old) {
                 status &= ~0xff;
                 status |= (u8)vector;
                 vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
         }
 }
 
 void vmx_hwapic_irr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_irr)
 {
         /*
          * When running L2, updating RVI is only relevant when
          * vmcs12 virtual-interrupt-delivery enabled.
          * However, it can be enabled only when L1 also
          * intercepts external-interrupts and in that case
          * we should not update vmcs02 RVI but instead intercept
          * interrupt. Therefore, do nothing when running L2.
          */
         if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
                 vmx_set_rvi(max_irr);
 }
 
 int vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         int max_irr;
         bool got_posted_interrupt;
 
         if (KVM_BUG_ON(!enable_apicv, vcpu->kvm))
                 return -EIO;
 
         if (pi_test_on(&vmx->pi_desc)) {
                 pi_clear_on(&vmx->pi_desc);
                 /*
                  * IOMMU can write to PID.ON, so the barrier matters even on UP.
                  * But on x86 this is just a compiler barrier anyway.
                  */
                 smp_mb__after_atomic();
                 got_posted_interrupt =
                         kvm_apic_update_irr(vcpu, vmx->pi_desc.pir, &max_irr);
         } else {
                 max_irr = kvm_lapic_find_highest_irr(vcpu);
                 got_posted_interrupt = false;
         }
 
         /*
          * Newly recognized interrupts are injected via either virtual interrupt
          * delivery (RVI) or KVM_REQ_EVENT.  Virtual interrupt delivery is
          * disabled in two cases:
          *
          * 1) If L2 is running and the vCPU has a new pending interrupt.  If L1
          * wants to exit on interrupts, KVM_REQ_EVENT is needed to synthesize a
          * VM-Exit to L1.  If L1 doesn't want to exit, the interrupt is injected
          * into L2, but KVM doesn't use virtual interrupt delivery to inject
          * interrupts into L2, and so KVM_REQ_EVENT is again needed.
          *
          * 2) If APICv is disabled for this vCPU, assigned devices may still
          * attempt to post interrupts.  The posted interrupt vector will cause
          * a VM-Exit and the subsequent entry will call sync_pir_to_irr.
          */
         if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
                 vmx_set_rvi(max_irr);
         else if (got_posted_interrupt)
                 kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
 
         return max_irr;
 }
 
 void vmx_load_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap)
 {
         if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
                 return;
 
         vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, eoi_exit_bitmap[0]);
         vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, eoi_exit_bitmap[1]);
         vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2, eoi_exit_bitmap[2]);
         vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, eoi_exit_bitmap[3]);
 }
 
 void vmx_apicv_pre_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         pi_clear_on(&vmx->pi_desc);
         memset(vmx->pi_desc.pir, 0, sizeof(vmx->pi_desc.pir));
 }
 
 void vmx_do_interrupt_irqoff(unsigned long entry);
 void vmx_do_nmi_irqoff(void);
 
 static void handle_nm_fault_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         /*
          * Save xfd_err to guest_fpu before interrupt is enabled, so the
          * MSR value is not clobbered by the host activity before the guest
          * has chance to consume it.
          *
          * Do not blindly read xfd_err here, since this exception might
          * be caused by L1 interception on a platform which doesn't
          * support xfd at all.
          *
          * Do it conditionally upon guest_fpu::xfd. xfd_err matters
          * only when xfd contains a non-zero value.
          *
          * Queuing exception is done in vmx_handle_exit. See comment there.
          */
         if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd)
                 rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err);
 }
 
 static void handle_exception_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 intr_info)
 {
         /* if exit due to PF check for async PF */
         if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
                 vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_flags = kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags();
         /* if exit due to NM, handle before interrupts are enabled */
         else if (is_nm_fault(intr_info))
                 handle_nm_fault_irqoff(vcpu);
         /* Handle machine checks before interrupts are enabled */
         else if (is_machine_check(intr_info))
                 kvm_machine_check();
 }
 
 static void handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                                              u32 intr_info)
 {
         unsigned int vector = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
 
         if (KVM_BUG(!is_external_intr(intr_info), vcpu->kvm,
             "unexpected VM-Exit interrupt info: 0x%x", intr_info))
                 return;
 
         kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, KVM_HANDLING_IRQ);
         if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED))
                 fred_entry_from_kvm(EVENT_TYPE_EXTINT, vector);
         else
                 vmx_do_interrupt_irqoff(gate_offset((gate_desc *)host_idt_base + vector));
         kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
 
         vcpu->arch.at_instruction_boundary = true;
 }
 
 void vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         if (vmx->emulation_required)
                 return;
 
         if (vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
                 handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(vcpu, vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu));
         else if (vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)
                 handle_exception_irqoff(vcpu, vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu));
 }
 
 /*
  * The kvm parameter can be NULL (module initialization, or invocation before
  * VM creation). Be sure to check the kvm parameter before using it.
  */
 bool vmx_has_emulated_msr(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index)
 {
         switch (index) {
         case MSR_IA32_SMBASE:
                 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SMM))
                         return false;
                 /*
                  * We cannot do SMM unless we can run the guest in big
                  * real mode.
                  */
                 return enable_unrestricted_guest || emulate_invalid_guest_state;
         case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR:
                 return nested;
         case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
         case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
                 /* This is AMD only.  */
                 return false;
         default:
                 return true;
         }
 }
 
 static void vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         u32 exit_intr_info;
         bool unblock_nmi;
         u8 vector;
         bool idtv_info_valid;
 
         idtv_info_valid = vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK;
 
         if (enable_vnmi) {
                 if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked)
                         return;
 
                 exit_intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(&vmx->vcpu);
                 unblock_nmi = (exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI) != 0;
                 vector = exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
                 /*
                  * SDM 3: 27.7.1.2 (September 2008)
                  * Re-set bit "block by NMI" before VM entry if vmexit caused by
                  * a guest IRET fault.
                  * SDM 3: 23.2.2 (September 2008)
                  * Bit 12 is undefined in any of the following cases:
                  *  If the VM exit sets the valid bit in the IDT-vectoring
                  *   information field.
                  *  If the VM exit is due to a double fault.
                  */
                 if ((exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) && unblock_nmi &&
                     vector != DF_VECTOR && !idtv_info_valid)
                         vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
                                       GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
                 else
                         vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked =
                                 !(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO)
                                   & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
         } else if (unlikely(vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked))
                 vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time +=
                         ktime_to_ns(ktime_sub(ktime_get(),
                                               vmx->loaded_vmcs->entry_time));
 }
 
 static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                                       u32 idt_vectoring_info,
                                       int instr_len_field,
                                       int error_code_field)
 {
         u8 vector;
         int type;
         bool idtv_info_valid;
 
         idtv_info_valid = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK;
 
         vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
         kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
         kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
 
         if (!idtv_info_valid)
                 return;
 
         kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
 
         vector = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
         type = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK;
 
         switch (type) {
         case INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR:
                 vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = true;
                 /*
                  * SDM 3: 27.7.1.2 (September 2008)
                  * Clear bit "block by NMI" before VM entry if a NMI
                  * delivery faulted.
                  */
                 vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, false);
                 break;
         case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:
                 vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);
                 fallthrough;
         case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION:
                 if (idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK) {
                         u32 err = vmcs_read32(error_code_field);
                         kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, err);
                 } else
                         kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector);
                 break;
         case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
                 vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);
                 fallthrough;
         case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR:
                 kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, vector, type == INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR);
                 break;
         default:
                 break;
         }
 }
 
 static void vmx_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         __vmx_complete_interrupts(&vmx->vcpu, vmx->idt_vectoring_info,
                                   VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
                                   IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE);
 }
 
 void vmx_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         __vmx_complete_interrupts(vcpu,
                                   vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD),
                                   VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
                                   VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE);
 
         vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, 0);
 }
 
 static void atomic_switch_perf_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
         int i, nr_msrs;
         struct perf_guest_switch_msr *msrs;
         struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(&vmx->vcpu);
 
         pmu->host_cross_mapped_mask = 0;
         if (pmu->pebs_enable & pmu->global_ctrl)
                 intel_pmu_cross_mapped_check(pmu);
 
         /* Note, nr_msrs may be garbage if perf_guest_get_msrs() returns NULL. */
         msrs = perf_guest_get_msrs(&nr_msrs, (void *)pmu);
         if (!msrs)
                 return;
 
         for (i = 0; i < nr_msrs; i++)
                 if (msrs[i].host == msrs[i].guest)
                         clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, msrs[i].msr);
                 else
                         add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, msrs[i].msr, msrs[i].guest,
                                         msrs[i].host, false);
 }
 
 static void vmx_update_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool force_immediate_exit)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         u64 tscl;
         u32 delta_tsc;
 
         if (force_immediate_exit) {
                 vmcs_write32(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, 0);
                 vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = false;
         } else if (vmx->hv_deadline_tsc != -1) {
                 tscl = rdtsc();
                 if (vmx->hv_deadline_tsc > tscl)
                         /* set_hv_timer ensures the delta fits in 32-bits */
                         delta_tsc = (u32)((vmx->hv_deadline_tsc - tscl) >>
                                 cpu_preemption_timer_multi);
                 else
                         delta_tsc = 0;
 
                 vmcs_write32(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, delta_tsc);
                 vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = false;
         } else if (!vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled) {
                 vmcs_write32(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, -1);
                 vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = true;
         }
 }
 
 void noinstr vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp)
 {
         if (unlikely(host_rsp != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.rsp)) {
                 vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.rsp = host_rsp;
                 vmcs_writel(HOST_RSP, host_rsp);
         }
 }
 
 void noinstr vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
                                         unsigned int flags)
 {
         u64 hostval = this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
 
         if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
                 return;
 
         if (flags & VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL)
                 vmx->spec_ctrl = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
 
         /*
          * If the guest/host SPEC_CTRL values differ, restore the host value.
          *
          * For legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit always needs to be written after
          * transitioning from a less privileged predictor mode, regardless of
          * whether the guest/host values differ.
          */
         if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS) ||
             vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval)
                 native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, hostval);
 
         barrier_nospec();
 }
 
 static fastpath_t vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                                              bool force_immediate_exit)
 {
         /*
          * If L2 is active, some VMX preemption timer exits can be handled in
          * the fastpath even, all other exits must use the slow path.
          */
         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
             to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER)
                 return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
 
         switch (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.basic) {
         case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
                 return handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(vcpu);
         case EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER:
                 return handle_fastpath_preemption_timer(vcpu, force_immediate_exit);
         default:
                 return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
         }
 }
 
 static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                                         unsigned int flags)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         guest_state_enter_irqoff();
 
         /*
          * L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS, but VERW
          * mitigation for MDS is done late in VMentry and is still
          * executed in spite of L1D Flush. This is because an extra VERW
          * should not matter much after the big hammer L1D Flush.
          */
         if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
                 vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
         else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mmio_stale_data_clear) &&
                  kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
                 mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
 
         vmx_disable_fb_clear(vmx);
 
         if (vcpu->arch.cr2 != native_read_cr2())
                 native_write_cr2(vcpu->arch.cr2);
 
         vmx->fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs,
                                    flags);
 
         vcpu->arch.cr2 = native_read_cr2();
         vcpu->arch.regs_avail &= ~VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET;
 
         vmx->idt_vectoring_info = 0;
 
         vmx_enable_fb_clear(vmx);
 
         if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
                 vmx->exit_reason.full = 0xdead;
                 goto out;
         }
 
         vmx->exit_reason.full = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON);
         if (likely(!vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry))
                 vmx->idt_vectoring_info = vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD);
 
         if ((u16)vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI &&
             is_nmi(vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu))) {
                 kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, KVM_HANDLING_NMI);
                 if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED))
                         fred_entry_from_kvm(EVENT_TYPE_NMI, NMI_VECTOR);
                 else
                         vmx_do_nmi_irqoff();
                 kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
         }
 
 out:
         guest_state_exit_irqoff();
 }
 
 fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool force_immediate_exit)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         unsigned long cr3, cr4;
 
         /* Record the guest's net vcpu time for enforced NMI injections. */
         if (unlikely(!enable_vnmi &&
                      vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked))
                 vmx->loaded_vmcs->entry_time = ktime_get();
 
         /*
          * Don't enter VMX if guest state is invalid, let the exit handler
          * start emulation until we arrive back to a valid state.  Synthesize a
          * consistency check VM-Exit due to invalid guest state and bail.
          */
         if (unlikely(vmx->emulation_required)) {
                 vmx->fail = 0;
 
                 vmx->exit_reason.full = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE;
                 vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry = 1;
                 kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_1);
                 vmx->exit_qualification = ENTRY_FAIL_DEFAULT;
                 kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_2);
                 vmx->exit_intr_info = 0;
                 return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
         }
 
         trace_kvm_entry(vcpu, force_immediate_exit);
 
         if (vmx->ple_window_dirty) {
                 vmx->ple_window_dirty = false;
                 vmcs_write32(PLE_WINDOW, vmx->ple_window);
         }
 
         /*
          * We did this in prepare_switch_to_guest, because it needs to
          * be within srcu_read_lock.
          */
         WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync);
 
         if (kvm_register_is_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSP))
                 vmcs_writel(GUEST_RSP, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP]);
         if (kvm_register_is_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RIP))
                 vmcs_writel(GUEST_RIP, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP]);
         vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = 0;
 
         /*
          * Refresh vmcs.HOST_CR3 if necessary.  This must be done immediately
          * prior to VM-Enter, as the kernel may load a new ASID (PCID) any time
          * it switches back to the current->mm, which can occur in KVM context
          * when switching to a temporary mm to patch kernel code, e.g. if KVM
          * toggles a static key while handling a VM-Exit.
          */
         cr3 = __get_current_cr3_fast();
         if (unlikely(cr3 != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3)) {
                 vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, cr3);
                 vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3 = cr3;
         }
 
         cr4 = cr4_read_shadow();
         if (unlikely(cr4 != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4)) {
                 vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, cr4);
                 vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4;
         }
 
         /* When KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT, dr6 is accessible in guest. */
         if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT))
                 set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6);
 
         /* When single-stepping over STI and MOV SS, we must clear the
          * corresponding interruptibility bits in the guest state. Otherwise
          * vmentry fails as it then expects bit 14 (BS) in pending debug
          * exceptions being set, but that's not correct for the guest debugging
          * case. */
         if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)
                 vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
 
         kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
 
         pt_guest_enter(vmx);
 
         atomic_switch_perf_msrs(vmx);
         if (intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(vcpu))
                 vmx_passthrough_lbr_msrs(vcpu);
 
         if (enable_preemption_timer)
                 vmx_update_hv_timer(vcpu, force_immediate_exit);
         else if (force_immediate_exit)
                 smp_send_reschedule(vcpu->cpu);
 
         kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
 
         /* The actual VMENTER/EXIT is in the .noinstr.text section. */
         vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx));
 
         /* All fields are clean at this point */
         if (kvm_is_using_evmcs()) {
                 current_evmcs->hv_clean_fields |=
                         HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_ALL;
 
                 current_evmcs->hv_vp_id = kvm_hv_get_vpindex(vcpu);
         }
 
         /* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed */
         if (vmx->host_debugctlmsr)
                 update_debugctlmsr(vmx->host_debugctlmsr);
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
         /*
          * The sysexit path does not restore ds/es, so we must set them to
          * a reasonable value ourselves.
          *
          * We can't defer this to vmx_prepare_switch_to_host() since that
          * function may be executed in interrupt context, which saves and
          * restore segments around it, nullifying its effect.
          */
         loadsegment(ds, __USER_DS);
         loadsegment(es, __USER_DS);
 #endif
 
         pt_guest_exit(vmx);
 
         kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
 
         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
                 /*
                  * Track VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME that have made past guest state
                  * checking.
                  */
                 if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending &&
                     !vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry)
                         ++vcpu->stat.nested_run;
 
                 vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
         }
 
         if (unlikely(vmx->fail))
                 return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
 
         if (unlikely((u16)vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY))
                 kvm_machine_check();
 
         trace_kvm_exit(vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
 
         if (unlikely(vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry))
                 return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
 
         vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched = 1;
 
         vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(vmx);
         vmx_complete_interrupts(vmx);
 
         return vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(vcpu, force_immediate_exit);
 }
 
 void vmx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         if (enable_pml)
                 vmx_destroy_pml_buffer(vmx);
         free_vpid(vmx->vpid);
         nested_vmx_free_vcpu(vcpu);
         free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
         free_page((unsigned long)vmx->ve_info);
 }
 
 int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vmx_uret_msr *tsx_ctrl;
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx;
         int i, err;
 
         BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu) != 0);
         vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vmx->pi_wakeup_list);
 
         err = -ENOMEM;
 
         vmx->vpid = allocate_vpid();
 
         /*
          * If PML is turned on, failure on enabling PML just results in failure
          * of creating the vcpu, therefore we can simplify PML logic (by
          * avoiding dealing with cases, such as enabling PML partially on vcpus
          * for the guest), etc.
          */
         if (enable_pml) {
                 vmx->pml_pg = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
                 if (!vmx->pml_pg)
                         goto free_vpid;
         }
 
         for (i = 0; i < kvm_nr_uret_msrs; ++i)
                 vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].mask = -1ull;
         if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
                 /*
                  * TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR is handled in the CPUID interception.
                  * Keep the host value unchanged to avoid changing CPUID bits
                  * under the host kernel's feet.
                  */
                 tsx_ctrl = vmx_find_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL);
                 if (tsx_ctrl)
                         tsx_ctrl->mask = ~(u64)TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
         }
 
         err = alloc_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->vmcs01);
         if (err < 0)
                 goto free_pml;
 
         /*
          * Use Hyper-V 'Enlightened MSR Bitmap' feature when KVM runs as a
          * nested (L1) hypervisor and Hyper-V in L0 supports it. Enable the
          * feature only for vmcs01, KVM currently isn't equipped to realize any
          * performance benefits from enabling it for vmcs02.
          */
         if (kvm_is_using_evmcs() &&
             (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_MSR_BITMAP)) {
                 struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs = (void *)vmx->vmcs01.vmcs;
 
                 evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.msr_bitmap = 1;
         }
 
         /* The MSR bitmap starts with all ones */
         bitmap_fill(vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.read, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
         bitmap_fill(vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.write, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
 
         vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_TYPE_R);
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
         vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
         vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
         vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
 #endif
         vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_TYPE_RW);
         vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
         vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
         if (kvm_cstate_in_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
                 vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_C1_RES, MSR_TYPE_R);
                 vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_C3_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
                 vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_C6_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
                 vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_C7_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
         }
 
         vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01;
 
         if (cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(vcpu)) {
                 err = kvm_alloc_apic_access_page(vcpu->kvm);
                 if (err)
                         goto free_vmcs;
         }
 
         if (enable_ept && !enable_unrestricted_guest) {
                 err = init_rmode_identity_map(vcpu->kvm);
                 if (err)
                         goto free_vmcs;
         }
 
         err = -ENOMEM;
         if (vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl & SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE) {
                 struct page *page;
 
                 BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*vmx->ve_info) > PAGE_SIZE);
 
                 /* ve_info must be page aligned. */
                 page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
                 if (!page)
                         goto free_vmcs;
 
                 vmx->ve_info = page_to_virt(page);
         }
 
         if (vmx_can_use_ipiv(vcpu))
                 WRITE_ONCE(to_kvm_vmx(vcpu->kvm)->pid_table[vcpu->vcpu_id],
                            __pa(&vmx->pi_desc) | PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID);
 
         return 0;
 
 free_vmcs:
         free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
 free_pml:
         vmx_destroy_pml_buffer(vmx);
 free_vpid:
         free_vpid(vmx->vpid);
         return err;
 }
 
 #define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
 #define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
 
 int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
         if (!ple_gap)
                 kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true;
 
         if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_L1TF) && enable_ept) {
                 switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
                 case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
                 case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
                         /* 'I explicitly don't care' is set */
                         break;
                 case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
                 case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
                 case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
                         /*
                          * Warn upon starting the first VM in a potentially
                          * insecure environment.
                          */
                         if (sched_smt_active())
                                 pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_SMT);
                         if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
                                 pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_L1D);
                         break;
                 case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
                         /* Flush is enforced */
                         break;
                 }
         }
         return 0;
 }
 
 u8 vmx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
 {
         /*
          * Force UC for host MMIO regions, as allowing the guest to access MMIO
          * with cacheable accesses will result in Machine Checks.
          */
         if (is_mmio)
                 return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
 
         /*
          * Force WB and ignore guest PAT if the VM does NOT have a non-coherent
          * device attached.  Letting the guest control memory types on Intel
          * CPUs may result in unexpected behavior, and so KVM's ABI is to trust
          * the guest to behave only as a last resort.
          */
         if (!kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm))
                 return (MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT) | VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
 
         return (MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT);
 }
 
 static void vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 new_ctl)
 {
         /*
          * These bits in the secondary execution controls field
          * are dynamic, the others are mostly based on the hypervisor
          * architecture and the guest's CPUID.  Do not touch the
          * dynamic bits.
          */
         u32 mask =
                 SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS |
                 SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
                 SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
                 SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC;
 
         u32 cur_ctl = secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx);
 
         secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, (new_ctl & ~mask) | (cur_ctl & mask));
 }
 
 /*
  * Generate MSR_IA32_VMX_CR{0,4}_FIXED1 according to CPUID. Only set bits
  * (indicating "allowed-1") if they are supported in the guest's CPUID.
  */
 static void nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
 
         vmx->nested.msrs.cr0_fixed1 = 0xffffffff;
         vmx->nested.msrs.cr4_fixed1 = X86_CR4_PCE;
 
 #define cr4_fixed1_update(_cr4_mask, _reg, _cpuid_mask) do {            \
         if (entry && (entry->_reg & (_cpuid_mask)))                     \
                 vmx->nested.msrs.cr4_fixed1 |= (_cr4_mask);     \
 } while (0)
 
         entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x1);
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_VME,        edx, feature_bit(VME));
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PVI,        edx, feature_bit(VME));
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_TSD,        edx, feature_bit(TSC));
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_DE,         edx, feature_bit(DE));
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PSE,        edx, feature_bit(PSE));
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PAE,        edx, feature_bit(PAE));
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_MCE,        edx, feature_bit(MCE));
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PGE,        edx, feature_bit(PGE));
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_OSFXSR,     edx, feature_bit(FXSR));
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT, edx, feature_bit(XMM));
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_VMXE,       ecx, feature_bit(VMX));
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_SMXE,       ecx, feature_bit(SMX));
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PCIDE,      ecx, feature_bit(PCID));
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE,    ecx, feature_bit(XSAVE));
 
         entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, 0x7, 0);
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE,   ebx, feature_bit(FSGSBASE));
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_SMEP,       ebx, feature_bit(SMEP));
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_SMAP,       ebx, feature_bit(SMAP));
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PKE,        ecx, feature_bit(PKU));
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_UMIP,       ecx, feature_bit(UMIP));
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_LA57,       ecx, feature_bit(LA57));
 
         entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, 0x7, 1);
         cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_LAM_SUP,    eax, feature_bit(LAM));
 
 #undef cr4_fixed1_update
 }
 
 static void update_intel_pt_cfg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best = NULL;
         int i;
 
         for (i = 0; i < PT_CPUID_LEAVES; i++) {
                 best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, 0x14, i);
                 if (!best)
                         return;
                 vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_EAX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->eax;
                 vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_EBX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->ebx;
                 vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_ECX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->ecx;
                 vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_EDX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->edx;
         }
 
         /* Get the number of configurable Address Ranges for filtering */
         vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
                                                 PT_CAP_num_address_ranges);
 
         /* Initialize and clear the no dependency bits */
         vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask = ~(RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN | RTIT_CTL_OS |
                         RTIT_CTL_USR | RTIT_CTL_TSC_EN | RTIT_CTL_DISRETC |
                         RTIT_CTL_BRANCH_EN);
 
         /*
          * If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[0]=1 CR3Filter can be set otherwise
          * will inject an #GP
          */
         if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_cr3_filtering))
                 vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_CR3EN;
 
         /*
          * If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[1]=1 CYCEn, CycThresh and
          * PSBFreq can be set
          */
         if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_cyc))
                 vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(RTIT_CTL_CYCLEACC |
                                 RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH | RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ);
 
         /*
          * If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[3]=1 MTCEn and MTCFreq can be set
          */
         if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_mtc))
                 vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(RTIT_CTL_MTC_EN |
                                               RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE);
 
         /* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[4]=1 FUPonPTW and PTWEn can be set */
         if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_ptwrite))
                 vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(RTIT_CTL_FUP_ON_PTW |
                                                         RTIT_CTL_PTW_EN);
 
         /* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[5]=1 PwrEvEn can be set */
         if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_power_event_trace))
                 vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_PWR_EVT_EN;
 
         /* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):ECX[0]=1 ToPA can be set */
         if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_topa_output))
                 vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_TOPA;
 
         /* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):ECX[3]=1 FabricEn can be set */
         if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_output_subsys))
                 vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_FABRIC_EN;
 
         /* unmask address range configure area */
         for (i = 0; i < vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges; i++)
                 vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(0xfULL << (32 + i * 4));
 }
 
 void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         /*
          * XSAVES is effectively enabled if and only if XSAVE is also exposed
          * to the guest.  XSAVES depends on CR4.OSXSAVE, and CR4.OSXSAVE can be
          * set if and only if XSAVE is supported.
          */
         if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
             guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
                 kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
 
         kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
         kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM);
 
         vmx_setup_uret_msrs(vmx);
 
         if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls())
                 vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(vmx,
                                                 vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx));
 
         if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
                 vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
                         FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX |
                         FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
         else
                 vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &=
                         ~(FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX |
                           FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX);
 
         if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
                 nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(vcpu);
 
         if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) &&
                         guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT))
                 update_intel_pt_cfg(vcpu);
 
         if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
                 struct vmx_uret_msr *msr;
                 msr = vmx_find_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL);
                 if (msr) {
                         bool enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RTM);
                         vmx_set_guest_uret_msr(vmx, msr, enabled ? 0 : TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE);
                 }
         }
 
         if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XFD))
                 vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, MSR_TYPE_R,
                                           !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XFD));
 
         if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
                 vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, MSR_TYPE_W,
                                           !guest_has_pred_cmd_msr(vcpu));
 
         if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D))
                 vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, MSR_TYPE_W,
                                           !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D));
 
         set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx);
 
         vmx_write_encls_bitmap(vcpu, NULL);
         if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX))
                 vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED;
         else
                 vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &= ~FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED;
 
         if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC))
                 vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
                         FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED;
         else
                 vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &=
                         ~FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED;
 
         /* Refresh #PF interception to account for MAXPHYADDR changes. */
         vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
 }
 
 static __init u64 vmx_get_perf_capabilities(void)
 {
         u64 perf_cap = PMU_CAP_FW_WRITES;
         u64 host_perf_cap = 0;
 
         if (!enable_pmu)
                 return 0;
 
         if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PDCM))
                 rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES, host_perf_cap);
 
         if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR)) {
                 x86_perf_get_lbr(&vmx_lbr_caps);
 
                 /*
                  * KVM requires LBR callstack support, as the overhead due to
                  * context switching LBRs without said support is too high.
                  * See intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event() for more info.
                  */
                 if (!vmx_lbr_caps.has_callstack)
                         memset(&vmx_lbr_caps, 0, sizeof(vmx_lbr_caps));
                 else if (vmx_lbr_caps.nr)
                         perf_cap |= host_perf_cap & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT;
         }
 
         if (vmx_pebs_supported()) {
                 perf_cap |= host_perf_cap & PERF_CAP_PEBS_MASK;
 
                 /*
                  * Disallow adaptive PEBS as it is functionally broken, can be
                  * used by the guest to read *host* LBRs, and can be used to
                  * bypass userspace event filters.  To correctly and safely
                  * support adaptive PEBS, KVM needs to:
                  *
                  * 1. Account for the ADAPTIVE flag when (re)programming fixed
                  *    counters.
                  *
                  * 2. Gain support from perf (or take direct control of counter
                  *    programming) to support events without adaptive PEBS
                  *    enabled for the hardware counter.
                  *
                  * 3. Ensure LBR MSRs cannot hold host data on VM-Entry with
                  *    adaptive PEBS enabled and MSR_PEBS_DATA_CFG.LBRS=1.
                  *
                  * 4. Document which PMU events are effectively exposed to the
                  *    guest via adaptive PEBS, and make adaptive PEBS mutually
                  *    exclusive with KVM_SET_PMU_EVENT_FILTER if necessary.
                  */
                 perf_cap &= ~PERF_CAP_PEBS_BASELINE;
         }
 
         return perf_cap;
 }
 
 static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void)
 {
         kvm_set_cpu_caps();
 
         /* CPUID 0x1 */
         if (nested)
                 kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VMX);
 
         /* CPUID 0x7 */
         if (kvm_mpx_supported())
                 kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_MPX);
         if (!cpu_has_vmx_invpcid())
                 kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID);
         if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest())
                 kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT);
         if (vmx_pebs_supported()) {
                 kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_DS);
                 kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_DTES64);
         }
 
         if (!enable_pmu)
                 kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_PDCM);
         kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap = vmx_get_perf_capabilities();
 
         if (!enable_sgx) {
                 kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX);
                 kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC);
                 kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX1);
                 kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX2);
         }
 
         if (vmx_umip_emulated())
                 kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_UMIP);
 
         /* CPUID 0xD.1 */
         kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
         if (!cpu_has_vmx_xsaves())
                 kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
 
         /* CPUID 0x80000001 and 0x7 (RDPID) */
         if (!cpu_has_vmx_rdtscp()) {
                 kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP);
                 kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_RDPID);
         }
 
         if (cpu_has_vmx_waitpkg())
                 kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG);
 }
 
 static int vmx_check_intercept_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                                   struct x86_instruction_info *info)
 {
         struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
         unsigned short port;
         bool intercept;
         int size;
 
         if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_in ||
             info->intercept == x86_intercept_ins) {
                 port = info->src_val;
                 size = info->dst_bytes;
         } else {
                 port = info->dst_val;
                 size = info->src_bytes;
         }
 
         /*
          * If the 'use IO bitmaps' VM-execution control is 0, IO instruction
          * VM-exits depend on the 'unconditional IO exiting' VM-execution
          * control.
          *
          * Otherwise, IO instruction VM-exits are controlled by the IO bitmaps.
          */
         if (!nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS))
                 intercept = nested_cpu_has(vmcs12,
                                            CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING);
         else
                 intercept = nested_vmx_check_io_bitmaps(vcpu, port, size);
 
         /* FIXME: produce nested vmexit and return X86EMUL_INTERCEPTED.  */
         return intercept ? X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE : X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
 }
 
 int vmx_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                         struct x86_instruction_info *info,
                         enum x86_intercept_stage stage,
                         struct x86_exception *exception)
 {
         struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
 
         switch (info->intercept) {
         /*
          * RDPID causes #UD if disabled through secondary execution controls.
          * Because it is marked as EmulateOnUD, we need to intercept it here.
          * Note, RDPID is hidden behind ENABLE_RDTSCP.
          */
         case x86_intercept_rdpid:
                 if (!nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP)) {
                         exception->vector = UD_VECTOR;
                         exception->error_code_valid = false;
                         return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
                 }
                 break;
 
         case x86_intercept_in:
         case x86_intercept_ins:
         case x86_intercept_out:
         case x86_intercept_outs:
                 return vmx_check_intercept_io(vcpu, info);
 
         case x86_intercept_lgdt:
         case x86_intercept_lidt:
         case x86_intercept_lldt:
         case x86_intercept_ltr:
         case x86_intercept_sgdt:
         case x86_intercept_sidt:
         case x86_intercept_sldt:
         case x86_intercept_str:
                 if (!nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC))
                         return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
 
                 /* FIXME: produce nested vmexit and return X86EMUL_INTERCEPTED.  */
                 break;
 
         case x86_intercept_pause:
                 /*
                  * PAUSE is a single-byte NOP with a REPE prefix, i.e. collides
                  * with vanilla NOPs in the emulator.  Apply the interception
                  * check only to actual PAUSE instructions.  Don't check
                  * PAUSE-loop-exiting, software can't expect a given PAUSE to
                  * exit, i.e. KVM is within its rights to allow L2 to execute
                  * the PAUSE.
                  */
                 if ((info->rep_prefix != REPE_PREFIX) ||
                     !nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING))
                         return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
 
                 break;
 
         /* TODO: check more intercepts... */
         default:
                 break;
         }
 
         return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 /* (a << shift) / divisor, return 1 if overflow otherwise 0 */
 static inline int u64_shl_div_u64(u64 a, unsigned int shift,
                                   u64 divisor, u64 *result)
 {
         u64 low = a << shift, high = a >> (64 - shift);
 
         /* To avoid the overflow on divq */
         if (high >= divisor)
                 return 1;
 
         /* Low hold the result, high hold rem which is discarded */
         asm("divq %2\n\t" : "=a" (low), "=d" (high) :
             "rm" (divisor), "" (low), "1" (high));
         *result = low;
 
         return 0;
 }
 
 int vmx_set_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_deadline_tsc,
                      bool *expired)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx;
         u64 tscl, guest_tscl, delta_tsc, lapic_timer_advance_cycles;
         struct kvm_timer *ktimer = &vcpu->arch.apic->lapic_timer;
 
         vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         tscl = rdtsc();
         guest_tscl = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, tscl);
         delta_tsc = max(guest_deadline_tsc, guest_tscl) - guest_tscl;
         lapic_timer_advance_cycles = nsec_to_cycles(vcpu,
                                                     ktimer->timer_advance_ns);
 
         if (delta_tsc > lapic_timer_advance_cycles)
                 delta_tsc -= lapic_timer_advance_cycles;
         else
                 delta_tsc = 0;
 
         /* Convert to host delta tsc if tsc scaling is enabled */
         if (vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio != kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio &&
             delta_tsc && u64_shl_div_u64(delta_tsc,
                                 kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits,
                                 vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio, &delta_tsc))
                 return -ERANGE;
 
         /*
          * If the delta tsc can't fit in the 32 bit after the multi shift,
          * we can't use the preemption timer.
          * It's possible that it fits on later vmentries, but checking
          * on every vmentry is costly so we just use an hrtimer.
          */
         if (delta_tsc >> (cpu_preemption_timer_multi + 32))
                 return -ERANGE;
 
         vmx->hv_deadline_tsc = tscl + delta_tsc;
         *expired = !delta_tsc;
         return 0;
 }
 
 void vmx_cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         to_vmx(vcpu)->hv_deadline_tsc = -1;
 }
 #endif
 
 void vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!enable_pml))
                 return;
 
         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
                 vmx->nested.update_vmcs01_cpu_dirty_logging = true;
                 return;
         }
 
         /*
          * Note, nr_memslots_dirty_logging can be changed concurrent with this
          * code, but in that case another update request will be made and so
          * the guest will never run with a stale PML value.
          */
         if (atomic_read(&vcpu->kvm->nr_memslots_dirty_logging))
                 secondary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML);
         else
                 secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML);
 }
 
 void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         if (vcpu->arch.mcg_cap & MCG_LMCE_P)
                 to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
                         FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED;
         else
                 to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &=
                         ~FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED;
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
 int vmx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
 {
         /* we need a nested vmexit to enter SMM, postpone if run is pending */
         if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
                 return -EBUSY;
         return !is_smm(vcpu);
 }
 
 int vmx_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, union kvm_smram *smram)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
         /*
          * TODO: Implement custom flows for forcing the vCPU out/in of L2 on
          * SMI and RSM.  Using the common VM-Exit + VM-Enter routines is wrong
          * SMI and RSM only modify state that is saved and restored via SMRAM.
          * E.g. most MSRs are left untouched, but many are modified by VM-Exit
          * and VM-Enter, and thus L2's values may be corrupted on SMI+RSM.
          */
         vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode = is_guest_mode(vcpu);
         if (vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode)
                 nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, -1, 0, 0);
 
         vmx->nested.smm.vmxon = vmx->nested.vmxon;
         vmx->nested.vmxon = false;
         vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
         return 0;
 }
 
 int vmx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const union kvm_smram *smram)
 {
         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
         int ret;
 
         if (vmx->nested.smm.vmxon) {
                 vmx->nested.vmxon = true;
                 vmx->nested.smm.vmxon = false;
         }
 
         if (vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode) {
                 ret = nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(vcpu, false);
                 if (ret)
                         return ret;
 
                 vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 1;
                 vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode = false;
         }
         return 0;
 }
 
 void vmx_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         /* RSM will cause a vmexit anyway.  */
 }
 #endif
 
 bool vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         return to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon && !is_guest_mode(vcpu);
 }
 
 void vmx_migrate_timers(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
                 struct hrtimer *timer = &to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.preemption_timer;
 
                 if (hrtimer_try_to_cancel(timer) == 1)
                         hrtimer_start_expires(timer, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS_PINNED);
         }
 }
 
 void vmx_hardware_unsetup(void)
 {
         kvm_set_posted_intr_wakeup_handler(NULL);
 
         if (nested)
                 nested_vmx_hardware_unsetup();
 
         free_kvm_area();
 }
 
 void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
         struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(kvm);
 
         free_pages((unsigned long)kvm_vmx->pid_table, vmx_get_pid_table_order(kvm));
 }
 
 /*
  * Note, the SDM states that the linear address is masked *after* the modified
  * canonicality check, whereas KVM masks (untags) the address and then performs
  * a "normal" canonicality check.  Functionally, the two methods are identical,
  * and when the masking occurs relative to the canonicality check isn't visible
  * to software, i.e. KVM's behavior doesn't violate the SDM.
  */
 gva_t vmx_get_untagged_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, unsigned int flags)
 {
         int lam_bit;
         unsigned long cr3_bits;
 
         if (flags & (X86EMUL_F_FETCH | X86EMUL_F_IMPLICIT | X86EMUL_F_INVLPG))
                 return gva;
 
         if (!is_64_bit_mode(vcpu))
                 return gva;
 
         /*
          * Bit 63 determines if the address should be treated as user address
          * or a supervisor address.
          */
         if (!(gva & BIT_ULL(63))) {
                 cr3_bits = kvm_get_active_cr3_lam_bits(vcpu);
                 if (!(cr3_bits & (X86_CR3_LAM_U57 | X86_CR3_LAM_U48)))
                         return gva;
 
                 /* LAM_U48 is ignored if LAM_U57 is set. */
                 lam_bit = cr3_bits & X86_CR3_LAM_U57 ? 56 : 47;
         } else {
                 if (!kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_LAM_SUP))
                         return gva;
 
                 lam_bit = kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_LA57) ? 56 : 47;
         }
 
         /*
          * Untag the address by sign-extending the lam_bit, but NOT to bit 63.
          * Bit 63 is retained from the raw virtual address so that untagging
          * doesn't change a user access to a supervisor access, and vice versa.
          */
         return (sign_extend64(gva, lam_bit) & ~BIT_ULL(63)) | (gva & BIT_ULL(63));
 }
 
 static unsigned int vmx_handle_intel_pt_intr(void)
 {
         struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = kvm_get_running_vcpu();
 
         /* '' on failure so that the !PT case can use a RET0 static call. */
         if (!vcpu || !kvm_handling_nmi_from_guest(vcpu))
                 return 0;
 
         kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_PMI, vcpu);
         __set_bit(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL_TRACE_TOPA_PMI_BIT,
                   (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.pmu.global_status);
         return 1;
 }
 
 static __init void vmx_setup_user_return_msrs(void)
 {
 
         /*
          * Though SYSCALL is only supported in 64-bit mode on Intel CPUs, kvm
          * will emulate SYSCALL in legacy mode if the vendor string in guest
          * CPUID.0:{EBX,ECX,EDX} is "AuthenticAMD" or "AMDisbetter!" To
          * support this emulation, MSR_STAR is included in the list for i386,
          * but is never loaded into hardware.  MSR_CSTAR is also never loaded
          * into hardware and is here purely for emulation purposes.
          */
         const u32 vmx_uret_msrs_list[] = {
         #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
                 MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, MSR_LSTAR, MSR_CSTAR,
         #endif
                 MSR_EFER, MSR_TSC_AUX, MSR_STAR,
                 MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL,
         };
         int i;
 
         BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_uret_msrs_list) != MAX_NR_USER_RETURN_MSRS);
 
         for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_uret_msrs_list); ++i)
                 kvm_add_user_return_msr(vmx_uret_msrs_list[i]);
 }
 
 static void __init vmx_setup_me_spte_mask(void)
 {
         u64 me_mask = 0;
 
         /*
          * On pre-MKTME system, boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits equals to
          * kvm_host.maxphyaddr.  On MKTME and/or TDX capable systems,
          * boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits holds the actual physical address
          * w/o the KeyID bits, and kvm_host.maxphyaddr equals to
          * MAXPHYADDR reported by CPUID.  Those bits between are KeyID bits.
          */
         if (boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits != kvm_host.maxphyaddr)
                 me_mask = rsvd_bits(boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits,
                                     kvm_host.maxphyaddr - 1);
 
         /*
          * Unlike SME, host kernel doesn't support setting up any
          * MKTME KeyID on Intel platforms.  No memory encryption
          * bits should be included into the SPTE.
          */
         kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask(0, me_mask);
 }
 
 __init int vmx_hardware_setup(void)
 {
         unsigned long host_bndcfgs;
         struct desc_ptr dt;
         int r;
 
         store_idt(&dt);
         host_idt_base = dt.address;
 
         vmx_setup_user_return_msrs();
 
         if (setup_vmcs_config(&vmcs_config, &vmx_capability) < 0)
                 return -EIO;
 
         if (cpu_has_perf_global_ctrl_bug())
                 pr_warn_once("VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL "
                              "does not work properly. Using workaround\n");
 
         if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX))
                 kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_NX);
 
         if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MPX)) {
                 rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, host_bndcfgs);
                 WARN_ONCE(host_bndcfgs, "BNDCFGS in host will be lost");
         }
 
         if (!cpu_has_vmx_mpx())
                 kvm_caps.supported_xcr0 &= ~(XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS |
                                              XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR);
 
         if (!cpu_has_vmx_vpid() || !cpu_has_vmx_invvpid() ||
             !(cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_single() || cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_global()))
                 enable_vpid = 0;
 
         if (!cpu_has_vmx_ept() ||
             !cpu_has_vmx_ept_4levels() ||
             !cpu_has_vmx_ept_mt_wb() ||
             !cpu_has_vmx_invept_global())
                 enable_ept = 0;
 
         /* NX support is required for shadow paging. */
         if (!enable_ept && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX)) {
                 pr_err_ratelimited("NX (Execute Disable) not supported\n");
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
         }
 
         if (!cpu_has_vmx_ept_ad_bits() || !enable_ept)
                 enable_ept_ad_bits = 0;
 
         if (!cpu_has_vmx_unrestricted_guest() || !enable_ept)
                 enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
 
         if (!cpu_has_vmx_flexpriority())
                 flexpriority_enabled = 0;
 
         if (!cpu_has_virtual_nmis())
                 enable_vnmi = 0;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
         if (!cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit())
                 enable_sgx = false;
 #endif
 
         /*
          * set_apic_access_page_addr() is used to reload apic access
          * page upon invalidation.  No need to do anything if not
          * using the APIC_ACCESS_ADDR VMCS field.
          */
         if (!flexpriority_enabled)
                 vt_x86_ops.set_apic_access_page_addr = NULL;
 
         if (!cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow())
                 vt_x86_ops.update_cr8_intercept = NULL;
 
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
         if (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_GUEST_MAPPING_FLUSH
             && enable_ept) {
                 vt_x86_ops.flush_remote_tlbs = hv_flush_remote_tlbs;
                 vt_x86_ops.flush_remote_tlbs_range = hv_flush_remote_tlbs_range;
         }
 #endif
 
         if (!cpu_has_vmx_ple()) {
                 ple_gap = 0;
                 ple_window = 0;
                 ple_window_grow = 0;
                 ple_window_max = 0;
                 ple_window_shrink = 0;
         }
 
         if (!cpu_has_vmx_apicv())
                 enable_apicv = 0;
         if (!enable_apicv)
                 vt_x86_ops.sync_pir_to_irr = NULL;
 
         if (!enable_apicv || !cpu_has_vmx_ipiv())
                 enable_ipiv = false;
 
         if (cpu_has_vmx_tsc_scaling())
                 kvm_caps.has_tsc_control = true;
 
         kvm_caps.max_tsc_scaling_ratio = KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX;
         kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits = 48;
         kvm_caps.has_bus_lock_exit = cpu_has_vmx_bus_lock_detection();
         kvm_caps.has_notify_vmexit = cpu_has_notify_vmexit();
 
         set_bit(0, vmx_vpid_bitmap); /* 0 is reserved for host */
 
         if (enable_ept)
                 kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(enable_ept_ad_bits,
                                       cpu_has_vmx_ept_execute_only());
 
         /*
          * Setup shadow_me_value/shadow_me_mask to include MKTME KeyID
          * bits to shadow_zero_check.
          */
         vmx_setup_me_spte_mask();
 
         kvm_configure_mmu(enable_ept, 0, vmx_get_max_ept_level(),
                           ept_caps_to_lpage_level(vmx_capability.ept));
 
         /*
          * Only enable PML when hardware supports PML feature, and both EPT
          * and EPT A/D bit features are enabled -- PML depends on them to work.
          */
         if (!enable_ept || !enable_ept_ad_bits || !cpu_has_vmx_pml())
                 enable_pml = 0;
 
         if (!enable_pml)
                 vt_x86_ops.cpu_dirty_log_size = 0;
 
         if (!cpu_has_vmx_preemption_timer())
                 enable_preemption_timer = false;
 
         if (enable_preemption_timer) {
                 u64 use_timer_freq = 5000ULL * 1000 * 1000;
 
                 cpu_preemption_timer_multi =
                         vmcs_config.misc & VMX_MISC_PREEMPTION_TIMER_RATE_MASK;
 
                 if (tsc_khz)
                         use_timer_freq = (u64)tsc_khz * 1000;
                 use_timer_freq >>= cpu_preemption_timer_multi;
 
                 /*
                  * KVM "disables" the preemption timer by setting it to its max
                  * value.  Don't use the timer if it might cause spurious exits
                  * at a rate faster than 0.1 Hz (of uninterrupted guest time).
                  */
                 if (use_timer_freq > 0xffffffffu / 10)
                         enable_preemption_timer = false;
         }
 
         if (!enable_preemption_timer) {
                 vt_x86_ops.set_hv_timer = NULL;
                 vt_x86_ops.cancel_hv_timer = NULL;
         }
 
         kvm_caps.supported_mce_cap |= MCG_LMCE_P;
         kvm_caps.supported_mce_cap |= MCG_CMCI_P;
 
         if (pt_mode != PT_MODE_SYSTEM && pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST)
                 return -EINVAL;
         if (!enable_ept || !enable_pmu || !cpu_has_vmx_intel_pt())
                 pt_mode = PT_MODE_SYSTEM;
         if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST)
                 vt_init_ops.handle_intel_pt_intr = vmx_handle_intel_pt_intr;
         else
                 vt_init_ops.handle_intel_pt_intr = NULL;
 
         setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash();
 
         if (nested) {
                 nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(&vmcs_config, vmx_capability.ept);
 
                 r = nested_vmx_hardware_setup(kvm_vmx_exit_handlers);
                 if (r)
                         return r;
         }
 
         vmx_set_cpu_caps();
 
         r = alloc_kvm_area();
         if (r && nested)
                 nested_vmx_hardware_unsetup();
 
         kvm_set_posted_intr_wakeup_handler(pi_wakeup_handler);
 
         return r;
 }
 
 static void vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush(void)
 {
         if (vmx_l1d_flush_pages) {
                 free_pages((unsigned long)vmx_l1d_flush_pages, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
                 vmx_l1d_flush_pages = NULL;
         }
         /* Restore state so sysfs ignores VMX */
         l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
 }
 
 static void __vmx_exit(void)
 {
         allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = false;
 
         cpu_emergency_unregister_virt_callback(vmx_emergency_disable);
 
         vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush();
 }
 
 static void vmx_exit(void)
 {
         kvm_exit();
         __vmx_exit();
         kvm_x86_vendor_exit();
 
 }
 module_exit(vmx_exit);
 
 static int __init vmx_init(void)
 {
         int r, cpu;
 
         if (!kvm_is_vmx_supported())
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
         /*
          * Note, hv_init_evmcs() touches only VMX knobs, i.e. there's nothing
          * to unwind if a later step fails.
          */
         hv_init_evmcs();
 
         r = kvm_x86_vendor_init(&vt_init_ops);
         if (r)
                 return r;
 
         /*
          * Must be called after common x86 init so enable_ept is properly set
          * up. Hand the parameter mitigation value in which was stored in
          * the pre module init parser. If no parameter was given, it will
          * contain 'auto' which will be turned into the default 'cond'
          * mitigation mode.
          */
         r = vmx_setup_l1d_flush(vmentry_l1d_flush_param);
         if (r)
                 goto err_l1d_flush;
 
         for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
                 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
 
                 pi_init_cpu(cpu);
         }
 
         cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback(vmx_emergency_disable);
 
         vmx_check_vmcs12_offsets();
 
         /*
          * Shadow paging doesn't have a (further) performance penalty
          * from GUEST_MAXPHYADDR < HOST_MAXPHYADDR so enable it
          * by default
          */
         if (!enable_ept)
                 allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = true;
 
         /*
          * Common KVM initialization _must_ come last, after this, /dev/kvm is
          * exposed to userspace!
          */
         r = kvm_init(sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx), __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx),
                      THIS_MODULE);
         if (r)
                 goto err_kvm_init;
 
         return 0;
 
 err_kvm_init:
         __vmx_exit();
 err_l1d_flush:
         kvm_x86_vendor_exit();
         return r;
 }
 module_init(vmx_init);