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TOMOYO Linux Cross Reference
Linux/samples/seccomp/user-trap.c

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  1 #include <signal.h>
  2 #include <stdio.h>
  3 #include <stdlib.h>
  4 #include <unistd.h>
  5 #include <errno.h>
  6 #include <fcntl.h>
  7 #include <string.h>
  8 #include <stddef.h>
  9 #include <sys/sysmacros.h>
 10 #include <sys/types.h>
 11 #include <sys/wait.h>
 12 #include <sys/socket.h>
 13 #include <sys/stat.h>
 14 #include <sys/mman.h>
 15 #include <sys/syscall.h>
 16 #include <sys/user.h>
 17 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
 18 #include <sys/ptrace.h>
 19 #include <sys/mount.h>
 20 #include <linux/limits.h>
 21 #include <linux/filter.h>
 22 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
 23 
 24 #define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
 25 
 26 static int seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void *args)
 27 {
 28         errno = 0;
 29         return syscall(__NR_seccomp, op, flags, args);
 30 }
 31 
 32 static int send_fd(int sock, int fd)
 33 {
 34         struct msghdr msg = {};
 35         struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
 36         int *fd_ptr;
 37         char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))] = {0}, c = 'c';
 38         struct iovec io = {
 39                 .iov_base = &c,
 40                 .iov_len = 1,
 41         };
 42 
 43         msg.msg_iov = &io;
 44         msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
 45         msg.msg_control = buf;
 46         msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(buf);
 47         cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
 48         cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
 49         cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
 50         cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
 51         fd_ptr = (int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
 52         *fd_ptr = fd;
 53         msg.msg_controllen = cmsg->cmsg_len;
 54 
 55         if (sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0) {
 56                 perror("sendmsg");
 57                 return -1;
 58         }
 59 
 60         return 0;
 61 }
 62 
 63 static int recv_fd(int sock)
 64 {
 65         struct msghdr msg = {};
 66         struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
 67         int *fd_ptr;
 68         char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))] = {0}, c = 'c';
 69         struct iovec io = {
 70                 .iov_base = &c,
 71                 .iov_len = 1,
 72         };
 73 
 74         msg.msg_iov = &io;
 75         msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
 76         msg.msg_control = buf;
 77         msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(buf);
 78 
 79         if (recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0) {
 80                 perror("recvmsg");
 81                 return -1;
 82         }
 83 
 84         cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
 85         fd_ptr = (int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
 86 
 87         return *fd_ptr;
 88 }
 89 
 90 static int user_trap_syscall(int nr, unsigned int flags)
 91 {
 92         struct sock_filter filter[] = {
 93                 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
 94                         offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
 95                 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, nr, 0, 1),
 96                 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF),
 97                 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
 98         };
 99 
100         struct sock_fprog prog = {
101                 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
102                 .filter = filter,
103         };
104 
105         return seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flags, &prog);
106 }
107 
108 static int handle_req(struct seccomp_notif *req,
109                       struct seccomp_notif_resp *resp, int listener)
110 {
111         char path[PATH_MAX], source[PATH_MAX], target[PATH_MAX];
112         int ret = -1, mem;
113 
114         resp->id = req->id;
115         resp->error = -EPERM;
116         resp->val = 0;
117 
118         if (req->data.nr != __NR_mount) {
119                 fprintf(stderr, "huh? trapped something besides mount? %d\n", req->data.nr);
120                 return -1;
121         }
122 
123         /* Only allow bind mounts. */
124         if (!(req->data.args[3] & MS_BIND))
125                 return 0;
126 
127         /*
128          * Ok, let's read the task's memory to see where they wanted their
129          * mount to go.
130          */
131         snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%d/mem", req->pid);
132         mem = open(path, O_RDONLY);
133         if (mem < 0) {
134                 perror("open mem");
135                 return -1;
136         }
137 
138         /*
139          * Now we avoid a TOCTOU: we referred to a pid by its pid, but since
140          * the pid that made the syscall may have died, we need to confirm that
141          * the pid is still valid after we open its /proc/pid/mem file. We can
142          * ask the listener fd this as follows.
143          *
144          * Note that this check should occur *after* any task-specific
145          * resources are opened, to make sure that the task has not died and
146          * we're not wrongly reading someone else's state in order to make
147          * decisions.
148          */
149         if (ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID, &req->id) < 0) {
150                 fprintf(stderr, "task died before we could map its memory\n");
151                 goto out;
152         }
153 
154         /*
155          * Phew, we've got the right /proc/pid/mem. Now we can read it. Note
156          * that to avoid another TOCTOU, we should read all of the pointer args
157          * before we decide to allow the syscall.
158          */
159         if (lseek(mem, req->data.args[0], SEEK_SET) < 0) {
160                 perror("seek");
161                 goto out;
162         }
163 
164         ret = read(mem, source, sizeof(source));
165         if (ret < 0) {
166                 perror("read");
167                 goto out;
168         }
169 
170         if (lseek(mem, req->data.args[1], SEEK_SET) < 0) {
171                 perror("seek");
172                 goto out;
173         }
174 
175         ret = read(mem, target, sizeof(target));
176         if (ret < 0) {
177                 perror("read");
178                 goto out;
179         }
180 
181         /*
182          * Our policy is to only allow bind mounts inside /tmp. This isn't very
183          * interesting, because we could do unprivlieged bind mounts with user
184          * namespaces already, but you get the idea.
185          */
186         if (!strncmp(source, "/tmp/", 5) && !strncmp(target, "/tmp/", 5)) {
187                 if (mount(source, target, NULL, req->data.args[3], NULL) < 0) {
188                         ret = -1;
189                         perror("actual mount");
190                         goto out;
191                 }
192                 resp->error = 0;
193         }
194 
195         /* Even if we didn't allow it because of policy, generating the
196          * response was be a success, because we want to tell the worker EPERM.
197          */
198         ret = 0;
199 
200 out:
201         close(mem);
202         return ret;
203 }
204 
205 int main(void)
206 {
207         int sk_pair[2], ret = 1, status, listener;
208         pid_t worker = 0 , tracer = 0;
209 
210         if (socketpair(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0, sk_pair) < 0) {
211                 perror("socketpair");
212                 return 1;
213         }
214 
215         worker = fork();
216         if (worker < 0) {
217                 perror("fork");
218                 goto close_pair;
219         }
220 
221         if (worker == 0) {
222                 listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_mount,
223                                              SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
224                 if (listener < 0) {
225                         perror("seccomp");
226                         exit(1);
227                 }
228 
229                 /*
230                  * Drop privileges. We definitely can't mount as uid 1000.
231                  */
232                 if (setuid(1000) < 0) {
233                         perror("setuid");
234                         exit(1);
235                 }
236 
237                 /*
238                  * Send the listener to the parent; also serves as
239                  * synchronization.
240                  */
241                 if (send_fd(sk_pair[1], listener) < 0)
242                         exit(1);
243                 close(listener);
244 
245                 if (mkdir("/tmp/foo", 0755) < 0) {
246                         perror("mkdir");
247                         exit(1);
248                 }
249 
250                 /*
251                  * Try a bad mount just for grins.
252                  */
253                 if (mount("/dev/sda", "/tmp/foo", NULL, 0, NULL) != -1) {
254                         fprintf(stderr, "huh? mounted /dev/sda?\n");
255                         exit(1);
256                 }
257 
258                 if (errno != EPERM) {
259                         perror("bad error from mount");
260                         exit(1);
261                 }
262 
263                 /*
264                  * Ok, we expect this one to succeed.
265                  */
266                 if (mount("/tmp/foo", "/tmp/foo", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
267                         perror("mount");
268                         exit(1);
269                 }
270 
271                 exit(0);
272         }
273 
274         /*
275          * Get the listener from the child.
276          */
277         listener = recv_fd(sk_pair[0]);
278         if (listener < 0)
279                 goto out_kill;
280 
281         /*
282          * Fork a task to handle the requests. This isn't strictly necessary,
283          * but it makes the particular writing of this sample easier, since we
284          * can just wait ofr the tracee to exit and kill the tracer.
285          */
286         tracer = fork();
287         if (tracer < 0) {
288                 perror("fork");
289                 goto out_kill;
290         }
291 
292         if (tracer == 0) {
293                 struct seccomp_notif *req;
294                 struct seccomp_notif_resp *resp;
295                 struct seccomp_notif_sizes sizes;
296 
297                 if (seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES, 0, &sizes) < 0) {
298                         perror("seccomp(GET_NOTIF_SIZES)");
299                         goto out_close;
300                 }
301 
302                 req = malloc(sizes.seccomp_notif);
303                 if (!req)
304                         goto out_close;
305 
306                 resp = malloc(sizes.seccomp_notif_resp);
307                 if (!resp)
308                         goto out_req;
309                 memset(resp, 0, sizes.seccomp_notif_resp);
310 
311                 while (1) {
312                         memset(req, 0, sizes.seccomp_notif);
313                         if (ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, req)) {
314                                 perror("ioctl recv");
315                                 goto out_resp;
316                         }
317 
318                         if (handle_req(req, resp, listener) < 0)
319                                 goto out_resp;
320 
321                         /*
322                          * ENOENT here means that the task may have gotten a
323                          * signal and restarted the syscall. It's up to the
324                          * handler to decide what to do in this case, but for
325                          * the sample code, we just ignore it. Probably
326                          * something better should happen, like undoing the
327                          * mount, or keeping track of the args to make sure we
328                          * don't do it again.
329                          */
330                         if (ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, resp) < 0 &&
331                             errno != ENOENT) {
332                                 perror("ioctl send");
333                                 goto out_resp;
334                         }
335                 }
336 out_resp:
337                 free(resp);
338 out_req:
339                 free(req);
340 out_close:
341                 close(listener);
342                 exit(1);
343         }
344 
345         close(listener);
346 
347         if (waitpid(worker, &status, 0) != worker) {
348                 perror("waitpid");
349                 goto out_kill;
350         }
351 
352         if (umount2("/tmp/foo", MNT_DETACH) < 0 && errno != EINVAL) {
353                 perror("umount2");
354                 goto out_kill;
355         }
356 
357         if (remove("/tmp/foo") < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
358                 perror("remove");
359                 exit(1);
360         }
361 
362         if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
363                 fprintf(stderr, "worker exited nonzero\n");
364                 goto out_kill;
365         }
366 
367         ret = 0;
368 
369 out_kill:
370         if (tracer > 0)
371                 kill(tracer, SIGKILL);
372         if (worker > 0)
373                 kill(worker, SIGKILL);
374 
375 close_pair:
376         close(sk_pair[0]);
377         close(sk_pair[1]);
378         return ret;
379 }
380 

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