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TOMOYO Linux Cross Reference
Linux/security/Kconfig

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  1 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
  2 #
  3 # Security configuration
  4 #
  5 
  6 menu "Security options"
  7 
  8 source "security/keys/Kconfig"
  9 
 10 config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
 11         bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
 12         default n
 13         help
 14           This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
 15           syslog via dmesg(8).
 16 
 17           If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
 18           unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
 19 
 20           If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 21 
 22 choice
 23         prompt "Allow /proc/pid/mem access override"
 24         default PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE
 25         help
 26           Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows users to override memory
 27           permissions for users like ptrace, assuming they have ptrace
 28           capability.
 29 
 30           This allows people to limit that - either never override, or
 31           require actual active ptrace attachment.
 32 
 33           Defaults to the traditional behavior (for now)
 34 
 35 config PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE
 36         bool "Traditional /proc/pid/mem behavior"
 37         help
 38           This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping
 39           permissions if you have ptrace access rights.
 40 
 41 config PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE
 42         bool "Require active ptrace() use for access override"
 43         help
 44           This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping
 45           permissions for active ptracers like gdb.
 46 
 47 config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE
 48         bool "Never"
 49         help
 50           Never override memory mapping permissions
 51 
 52 endchoice
 53 
 54 config SECURITY
 55         bool "Enable different security models"
 56         depends on SYSFS
 57         depends on MULTIUSER
 58         help
 59           This allows you to choose different security modules to be
 60           configured into your kernel.
 61 
 62           If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
 63           model will be used.
 64 
 65           If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 66 
 67 config SECURITYFS
 68         bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
 69         help
 70           This will build the securityfs filesystem.  It is currently used by
 71           various security modules (AppArmor, IMA, SafeSetID, TOMOYO, TPM).
 72 
 73           If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 74 
 75 config SECURITY_NETWORK
 76         bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
 77         depends on SECURITY
 78         help
 79           This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
 80           If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
 81           implement socket and networking access controls.
 82           If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 83 
 84 config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
 85         bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
 86         depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
 87         help
 88           This enables the Infiniband security hooks.
 89           If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
 90           implement Infiniband access controls.
 91           If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 92 
 93 config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 94         bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
 95         depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
 96         help
 97           This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
 98           If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
 99           implement per-packet access controls based on labels
100           derived from IPSec policy.  Non-IPSec communications are
101           designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
102           to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
103           IPSec.
104           If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
105 
106 config SECURITY_PATH
107         bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
108         depends on SECURITY
109         help
110           This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
111           If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
112           implement pathname based access controls.
113           If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
114 
115 config INTEL_TXT
116         bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
117         depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
118         help
119           This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
120           Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
121           Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
122           of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
123           will have no effect.
124 
125           Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
126           initial state as well as data reset protection.  This is used to
127           create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
128           helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
129           correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
130           of the kernel itself.
131 
132           Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
133           confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
134           it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
135           providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
136 
137           See <https://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
138           about Intel(R) TXT.
139           See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
140           See Documentation/arch/x86/intel_txt.rst for a description of how to enable
141           Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
142 
143           If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
144 
145 config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
146         int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
147         depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
148         default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
149         default 65536
150         help
151           This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
152           from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages
153           can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
154 
155           For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
156           a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
157           On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
158           Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
159           this low address space will need the permission specific to the
160           systems running LSM.
161 
162 config HARDENED_USERCOPY
163         bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
164         imply STRICT_DEVMEM
165         help
166           This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
167           copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
168           copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
169           are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
170           separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
171           or are part of the kernel text. This prevents entire classes
172           of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
173 
174 config FORTIFY_SOURCE
175         bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
176         depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
177         # https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/53645
178         depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || !X86_32
179         help
180           Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
181           where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
182 
183 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
184         bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
185         help
186           By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
187           binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
188           interface.  Some of these binaries are statically defined
189           either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
190           option.  However, some of these are dynamically created at
191           runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
192           To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
193           calls through a single executable that can not have its name
194           changed.
195 
196           Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
197           "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
198           passed to it.  If desired, this program can filter and pick
199           and choose what real programs are called.
200 
201           If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
202           disabled, choose this option and then set
203           STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
204 
205 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
206         string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"
207         depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
208         default "/sbin/usermode-helper"
209         help
210           The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper
211           program is wish to be run.  The "real" application's name will
212           be in the first argument passed to this program on the command
213           line.
214 
215           If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
216           specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
217 
218 source "security/selinux/Kconfig"
219 source "security/smack/Kconfig"
220 source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig"
221 source "security/apparmor/Kconfig"
222 source "security/loadpin/Kconfig"
223 source "security/yama/Kconfig"
224 source "security/safesetid/Kconfig"
225 source "security/lockdown/Kconfig"
226 source "security/landlock/Kconfig"
227 
228 source "security/integrity/Kconfig"
229 
230 choice
231         prompt "First legacy 'major LSM' to be initialized"
232         default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
233         default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
234         default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
235         default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
236         default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
237 
238         help
239           This choice is there only for converting CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY
240           in old kernel configs to CONFIG_LSM in new kernel configs. Don't
241           change this choice unless you are creating a fresh kernel config,
242           for this choice will be ignored after CONFIG_LSM has been set.
243 
244           Selects the legacy "major security module" that will be
245           initialized first. Overridden by non-default CONFIG_LSM.
246 
247         config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
248                 bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
249 
250         config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
251                 bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
252 
253         config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
254                 bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
255 
256         config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
257                 bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
258 
259         config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
260                 bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
261 
262 endchoice
263 
264 config LSM
265         string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
266         default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
267         default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
268         default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
269         default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
270         default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf"
271         help
272           A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
273           Any LSMs left off this list, except for those with order
274           LSM_ORDER_FIRST and LSM_ORDER_LAST, which are always enabled
275           if selected in the kernel configuration, will be ignored.
276           This can be controlled at boot with the "lsm=" parameter.
277 
278           If unsure, leave this as the default.
279 
280 source "security/Kconfig.hardening"
281 
282 source "security/ccsecurity/Kconfig"
283 
284 endmenu
285 

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