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Linux/security/apparmor/net.c

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  1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
  2 /*
  3  * AppArmor security module
  4  *
  5  * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
  6  *
  7  * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
  8  * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
  9  */
 10 
 11 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 12 #include "include/audit.h"
 13 #include "include/cred.h"
 14 #include "include/label.h"
 15 #include "include/net.h"
 16 #include "include/policy.h"
 17 #include "include/secid.h"
 18 
 19 #include "net_names.h"
 20 
 21 
 22 struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
 23         AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",   AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
 24         { }
 25 };
 26 
 27 static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
 28         "unknown",
 29         "send",
 30         "receive",
 31         "unknown",
 32 
 33         "create",
 34         "shutdown",
 35         "connect",
 36         "unknown",
 37 
 38         "setattr",
 39         "getattr",
 40         "setcred",
 41         "getcred",
 42 
 43         "chmod",
 44         "chown",
 45         "chgrp",
 46         "lock",
 47 
 48         "mmap",
 49         "mprot",
 50         "unknown",
 51         "unknown",
 52 
 53         "accept",
 54         "bind",
 55         "listen",
 56         "unknown",
 57 
 58         "setopt",
 59         "getopt",
 60         "unknown",
 61         "unknown",
 62 
 63         "unknown",
 64         "unknown",
 65         "unknown",
 66         "unknown",
 67 };
 68 
 69 
 70 /* audit callback for net specific fields */
 71 void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 72 {
 73         struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
 74         struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);
 75 
 76         if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family])
 77                 audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"%s\"",
 78                                  address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
 79         else
 80                 audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"unknown(%d)\"",
 81                                  sa->u.net->family);
 82         if (sock_type_names[ad->net.type])
 83                 audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"%s\"",
 84                                  sock_type_names[ad->net.type]);
 85         else
 86                 audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"unknown(%d)\"",
 87                                  ad->net.type);
 88         audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", ad->net.protocol);
 89 
 90         if (ad->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
 91                 audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
 92                 aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->request, NULL, 0,
 93                                    net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
 94 
 95                 if (ad->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
 96                         audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
 97                         aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->denied, NULL, 0,
 98                                            net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
 99                 }
100         }
101         if (ad->peer) {
102                 audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
103                 aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer,
104                                 FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
105         }
106 }
107 
108 /* Generic af perm */
109 int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
110                        struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, u32 request, u16 family,
111                        int type)
112 {
113         struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
114                                                     typeof(*rules), list);
115         struct aa_perms perms = { };
116         aa_state_t state;
117         __be16 buffer[2];
118 
119         AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX);
120         AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX);
121 
122         if (profile_unconfined(profile))
123                 return 0;
124         state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_NET);
125         if (!state)
126                 return 0;
127 
128         buffer[0] = cpu_to_be16(family);
129         buffer[1] = cpu_to_be16((u16) type);
130         state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
131                                  4);
132         perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
133         aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
134 
135         return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_net_cb);
136 }
137 
138 int aa_af_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
139                const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, int type, int protocol)
140 {
141         struct aa_profile *profile;
142         DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);
143 
144         return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
145                         aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &ad, request, family,
146                                            type));
147 }
148 
149 static int aa_label_sk_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
150                             struct aa_label *label,
151                             const char *op, u32 request,
152                             struct sock *sk)
153 {
154         struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
155         int error = 0;
156 
157         AA_BUG(!label);
158         AA_BUG(!sk);
159 
160         if (ctx->label != kernel_t && !unconfined(label)) {
161                 struct aa_profile *profile;
162                 DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, sk);
163 
164                 ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
165                 error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
166                             aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &ad, request, sk));
167         }
168 
169         return error;
170 }
171 
172 int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
173 {
174         struct aa_label *label;
175         int error;
176 
177         AA_BUG(!sk);
178         AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
179 
180         /* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */
181         label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
182         error = aa_label_sk_perm(current_cred(), label, op, request, sk);
183         end_current_label_crit_section(label);
184 
185         return error;
186 }
187 
188 
189 int aa_sock_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
190                       const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
191 {
192         AA_BUG(!label);
193         AA_BUG(!sock);
194         AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
195 
196         return aa_label_sk_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, sock->sk);
197 }
198 
199 #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
200 static int apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark *secmark)
201 {
202         struct aa_label *label;
203 
204         if (secmark->label[0] == '*') {
205                 secmark->secid = AA_SECID_WILDCARD;
206                 return 0;
207         }
208 
209         label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label,
210                                     secmark->label, strlen(secmark->label),
211                                     GFP_ATOMIC, false, false);
212 
213         if (IS_ERR(label))
214                 return PTR_ERR(label);
215 
216         secmark->secid = label->secid;
217 
218         return 0;
219 }
220 
221 static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid,
222                            struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
223 {
224         int i, ret;
225         struct aa_perms perms = { };
226         struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
227                                                     typeof(*rules), list);
228 
229         if (rules->secmark_count == 0)
230                 return 0;
231 
232         for (i = 0; i < rules->secmark_count; i++) {
233                 if (!rules->secmark[i].secid) {
234                         ret = apparmor_secmark_init(&rules->secmark[i]);
235                         if (ret)
236                                 return ret;
237                 }
238 
239                 if (rules->secmark[i].secid == secid ||
240                     rules->secmark[i].secid == AA_SECID_WILDCARD) {
241                         if (rules->secmark[i].deny)
242                                 perms.deny = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
243                         else
244                                 perms.allow = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
245 
246                         if (rules->secmark[i].audit)
247                                 perms.audit = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
248                 }
249         }
250 
251         aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
252 
253         return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_net_cb);
254 }
255 
256 int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
257                            u32 secid, const struct sock *sk)
258 {
259         struct aa_profile *profile;
260         DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, sk);
261 
262         return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
263                                     aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid,
264                                                     &ad));
265 }
266 #endif
267 

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