TOMOYO Linux Cross Reference
Linux/security/security.c

   // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
   /*
    * Security plug functions
    *
    * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com>
    * Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
    * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com>
    * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
    * Copyright (C) 2023 Microsoft Corporation <paul@paul-moore.com>
   */
  
  #define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt
  
  #include <linux/bpf.h>
  #include <linux/capability.h>
  #include <linux/dcache.h>
  #include <linux/export.h>
  #include <linux/init.h>
  #include <linux/kernel.h>
  #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
  #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
  #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
  #include <linux/mman.h>
  #include <linux/mount.h>
  #include <linux/personality.h>
  #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
  #include <linux/string.h>
  #include <linux/xattr.h>
  #include <linux/msg.h>
  #include <linux/overflow.h>
  #include <net/flow.h>
  
  /* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */
  #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info)
  
  /*
   * How many LSMs are built into the kernel as determined at
   * build time. Used to determine fixed array sizes.
   * The capability module is accounted for by CONFIG_SECURITY
   */
  #define LSM_CONFIG_COUNT ( \
          (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY) ? 1 : 0) + \
          (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
          (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
          (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) ? 1 : 0) + \
          (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \
          (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) ? 1 : 0) + \
          (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) ? 1 : 0) + \
          (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) ? 1 : 0) + \
          (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
          (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
          (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \
          (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0) + \
          (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM) ? 1 : 0))
  
  /*
   * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
   * security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows
   * all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing
   * purposes.
   */
  const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX + 1] = {
          [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
          [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
          [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
          [LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access",
          [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
          [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation",
          [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",
          [LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access",
          [LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access",
          [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables",
          [LOCKDOWN_DEVICE_TREE] = "modifying device tree contents",
          [LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage",
          [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO",
          [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters",
          [LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio",
          [LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access",
          [LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access",
          [LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM",
          [LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM",
          [LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION] = "RTAS error injection",
          [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
          [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
          [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
          [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
          [LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM",
          [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
          [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
          [LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",
          [LOCKDOWN_XFRM_SECRET] = "xfrm SA secret",
          [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
  };
  
  struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __ro_after_init;
  static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain);
  
  static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
  static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
 
 char *lsm_names;
 static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __ro_after_init;
 
 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
 static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
 static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm;
 
 static __initconst const char *const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM;
 
 /* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */
 static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms;
 static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive;
 
 static __initdata bool debug;
 #define init_debug(...)                                         \
         do {                                                    \
                 if (debug)                                      \
                         pr_info(__VA_ARGS__);                   \
         } while (0)
 
 static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm)
 {
         if (!lsm->enabled)
                 return false;
 
         return *lsm->enabled;
 }
 
 /* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */
 static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1;
 static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0;
 static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled)
 {
         /*
          * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use
          * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state.
          */
         if (!lsm->enabled) {
                 if (enabled)
                         lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
                 else
                         lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
         } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) {
                 if (!enabled)
                         lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
         } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) {
                 if (enabled)
                         lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
         } else {
                 *lsm->enabled = enabled;
         }
 }
 
 /* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */
 static bool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
 {
         struct lsm_info **check;
 
         for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++)
                 if (*check == lsm)
                         return true;
 
         return false;
 }
 
 /* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */
 static int last_lsm __initdata;
 static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from)
 {
         /* Ignore duplicate selections. */
         if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
                 return;
 
         if (WARN(last_lsm == LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM slots!?\n", from))
                 return;
 
         /* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */
         if (!lsm->enabled)
                 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
         ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm;
 
         init_debug("%s ordered: %s (%s)\n", from, lsm->name,
                    is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled");
 }
 
 /* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */
 static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm)
 {
         /* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */
         if (!is_enabled(lsm))
                 return false;
 
         /* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */
         if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) {
                 init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name);
                 return false;
         }
 
         return true;
 }
 
 static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs)
 {
         int offset;
 
         if (*need <= 0)
                 return;
 
         offset = ALIGN(*lbs, sizeof(void *));
         *lbs = offset + *need;
         *need = offset;
 }
 
 static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
 {
         if (!needed)
                 return;
 
         lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
         lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
         /*
          * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to
          * what the modules might need.
          */
         if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0)
                 blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
         lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
         lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
         lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
         lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
         lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
         lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_xattr_count,
                           &blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count);
 }
 
 /* Prepare LSM for initialization. */
 static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
 {
         int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm);
 
         /* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */
         set_enabled(lsm, enabled);
 
         /* If enabled, do pre-initialization work. */
         if (enabled) {
                 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) {
                         exclusive = lsm;
                         init_debug("exclusive chosen:   %s\n", lsm->name);
                 }
 
                 lsm_set_blob_sizes(lsm->blobs);
         }
 }
 
 /* Initialize a given LSM, if it is enabled. */
 static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
 {
         if (is_enabled(lsm)) {
                 int ret;
 
                 init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name);
                 ret = lsm->init();
                 WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret);
         }
 }
 
 /*
  * Current index to use while initializing the lsm id list.
  */
 u32 lsm_active_cnt __ro_after_init;
 const struct lsm_id *lsm_idlist[LSM_CONFIG_COUNT];
 
 /* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */
 static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
 {
         struct lsm_info *lsm;
         char *sep, *name, *next;
 
         /* LSM_ORDER_FIRST is always first. */
         for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
                 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST)
                         append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "  first");
         }
 
         /* Process "security=", if given. */
         if (chosen_major_lsm) {
                 struct lsm_info *major;
 
                 /*
                  * To match the original "security=" behavior, this
                  * explicitly does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major
                  * if the selected one was separately disabled: disable
                  * all non-matching Legacy Major LSMs.
                  */
                 for (major = __start_lsm_info; major < __end_lsm_info;
                      major++) {
                         if ((major->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) &&
                             strcmp(major->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0) {
                                 set_enabled(major, false);
                                 init_debug("security=%s disabled: %s (only one legacy major LSM)\n",
                                            chosen_major_lsm, major->name);
                         }
                 }
         }
 
         sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL);
         next = sep;
         /* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */
         while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) {
                 bool found = false;
 
                 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
                         if (strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
                                 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE)
                                         append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
                                 found = true;
                         }
                 }
 
                 if (!found)
                         init_debug("%s ignored: %s (not built into kernel)\n",
                                    origin, name);
         }
 
         /* Process "security=", if given. */
         if (chosen_major_lsm) {
                 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
                         if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
                                 continue;
                         if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) == 0)
                                 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "security=");
                 }
         }
 
         /* LSM_ORDER_LAST is always last. */
         for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
                 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_LAST)
                         append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "   last");
         }
 
         /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */
         for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
                 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
                         continue;
                 set_enabled(lsm, false);
                 init_debug("%s skipped: %s (not in requested order)\n",
                            origin, lsm->name);
         }
 
         kfree(sep);
 }
 
 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred);
 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task);
 
 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result);
 
 static void __init report_lsm_order(void)
 {
         struct lsm_info **lsm, *early;
         int first = 0;
 
         pr_info("initializing lsm=");
 
         /* Report each enabled LSM name, comma separated. */
         for (early = __start_early_lsm_info;
              early < __end_early_lsm_info; early++)
                 if (is_enabled(early))
                         pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", early->name);
         for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
                 if (is_enabled(*lsm))
                         pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", (*lsm)->name);
 
         pr_cont("\n");
 }
 
 static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
 {
         struct lsm_info **lsm;
 
         ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms),
                                GFP_KERNEL);
 
         if (chosen_lsm_order) {
                 if (chosen_major_lsm) {
                         pr_warn("security=%s is ignored because it is superseded by lsm=%s\n",
                                 chosen_major_lsm, chosen_lsm_order);
                         chosen_major_lsm = NULL;
                 }
                 ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline");
         } else
                 ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin");
 
         for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
                 prepare_lsm(*lsm);
 
         report_lsm_order();
 
         init_debug("cred blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
         init_debug("file blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
         init_debug("inode blob size      = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
         init_debug("ipc blob size        = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
         init_debug("msg_msg blob size    = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
         init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
         init_debug("task blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
         init_debug("xattr slots          = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count);
 
         /*
          * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
          */
         if (blob_sizes.lbs_file)
                 lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache",
                                                    blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0,
                                                    SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
         if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode)
                 lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache",
                                                     blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0,
                                                     SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 
         lsm_early_cred((struct cred *) current->cred);
         lsm_early_task(current);
         for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
                 initialize_lsm(*lsm);
 
         kfree(ordered_lsms);
 }
 
 int __init early_security_init(void)
 {
         struct lsm_info *lsm;
 
 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
         INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&security_hook_heads.NAME);
 #include "linux/lsm_hook_defs.h"
 #undef LSM_HOOK
 
         for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) {
                 if (!lsm->enabled)
                         lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
                 prepare_lsm(lsm);
                 initialize_lsm(lsm);
         }
 
         return 0;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_init - initializes the security framework
  *
  * This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence.
  */
 int __init security_init(void)
 {
         struct lsm_info *lsm;
 
         init_debug("legacy security=%s\n", chosen_major_lsm ? : " *unspecified*");
         init_debug("  CONFIG_LSM=%s\n", builtin_lsm_order);
         init_debug("boot arg lsm=%s\n", chosen_lsm_order ? : " *unspecified*");
 
         /*
          * Append the names of the early LSM modules now that kmalloc() is
          * available
          */
         for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) {
                 init_debug("  early started: %s (%s)\n", lsm->name,
                            is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled");
                 if (lsm->enabled)
                         lsm_append(lsm->name, &lsm_names);
         }
 
         /* Load LSMs in specified order. */
         ordered_lsm_init();
 
         return 0;
 }
 
 /* Save user chosen LSM */
 static int __init choose_major_lsm(char *str)
 {
         chosen_major_lsm = str;
         return 1;
 }
 __setup("security=", choose_major_lsm);
 
 /* Explicitly choose LSM initialization order. */
 static int __init choose_lsm_order(char *str)
 {
         chosen_lsm_order = str;
         return 1;
 }
 __setup("lsm=", choose_lsm_order);
 
 /* Enable LSM order debugging. */
 static int __init enable_debug(char *str)
 {
         debug = true;
         return 1;
 }
 __setup("lsm.debug", enable_debug);
 
 static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm)
 {
         const char *last;
 
         if (WARN_ON(!list || !lsm))
                 return false;
         last = strrchr(list, ',');
         if (last)
                 /* Pass the comma, strcmp() will check for '\0' */
                 last++;
         else
                 last = list;
         return !strcmp(last, lsm);
 }
 
 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
 {
         char *cp;
 
         if (*result == NULL) {
                 *result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL);
                 if (*result == NULL)
                         return -ENOMEM;
         } else {
                 /* Check if it is the last registered name */
                 if (match_last_lsm(*result, new))
                         return 0;
                 cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new);
                 if (cp == NULL)
                         return -ENOMEM;
                 kfree(*result);
                 *result = cp;
         }
         return 0;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
  * @hooks: the hooks to add
  * @count: the number of hooks to add
  * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module
  *
  * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
  */
 void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
                                const struct lsm_id *lsmid)
 {
         int i;
 
         /*
          * A security module may call security_add_hooks() more
          * than once during initialization, and LSM initialization
          * is serialized. Landlock is one such case.
          * Look at the previous entry, if there is one, for duplication.
          */
         if (lsm_active_cnt == 0 || lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt - 1] != lsmid) {
                 if (lsm_active_cnt >= LSM_CONFIG_COUNT)
                         panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
                 lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt++] = lsmid;
         }
 
         for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
                 hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
                 hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
         }
 
         /*
          * Don't try to append during early_security_init(), we'll come back
          * and fix this up afterwards.
          */
         if (slab_is_available()) {
                 if (lsm_append(lsmid->name, &lsm_names) < 0)
                         panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
         }
 }
 
 int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
 {
         return blocking_notifier_call_chain(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
                                             event, data);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_blocking_lsm_notifier);
 
 int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
 {
         return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
                                                 nb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_blocking_lsm_notifier);
 
 int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
 {
         return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
                                                   nb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier);
 
 /**
  * lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob
  * @cred: the cred that needs a blob
  * @gfp: allocation type
  *
  * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules
  *
  * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
  */
 static int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 {
         if (blob_sizes.lbs_cred == 0) {
                 cred->security = NULL;
                 return 0;
         }
 
         cred->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp);
         if (cred->security == NULL)
                 return -ENOMEM;
         return 0;
 }
 
 /**
  * lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob
  * @cred: the cred that needs a blob
  *
  * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules
  */
 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred)
 {
         int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL);
 
         if (rc)
                 panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__);
 }
 
 /**
  * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob
  * @file: the file that needs a blob
  *
  * Allocate the file blob for all the modules
  *
  * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
  */
 static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file)
 {
         if (!lsm_file_cache) {
                 file->f_security = NULL;
                 return 0;
         }
 
         file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
         if (file->f_security == NULL)
                 return -ENOMEM;
         return 0;
 }
 
 /**
  * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob
  * @inode: the inode that needs a blob
  *
  * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules
  *
  * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
  */
 int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
 {
         if (!lsm_inode_cache) {
                 inode->i_security = NULL;
                 return 0;
         }
 
         inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
         if (inode->i_security == NULL)
                 return -ENOMEM;
         return 0;
 }
 
 /**
  * lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob
  * @task: the task that needs a blob
  *
  * Allocate the task blob for all the modules
  *
  * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
  */
 static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
 {
         if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
                 task->security = NULL;
                 return 0;
         }
 
         task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
         if (task->security == NULL)
                 return -ENOMEM;
         return 0;
 }
 
 /**
  * lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob
  * @kip: the ipc that needs a blob
  *
  * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules
  *
  * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
  */
 static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip)
 {
         if (blob_sizes.lbs_ipc == 0) {
                 kip->security = NULL;
                 return 0;
         }
 
         kip->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL);
         if (kip->security == NULL)
                 return -ENOMEM;
         return 0;
 }
 
 /**
  * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob
  * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob
  *
  * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules
  *
  * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
  */
 static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)
 {
         if (blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg == 0) {
                 mp->security = NULL;
                 return 0;
         }
 
         mp->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg, GFP_KERNEL);
         if (mp->security == NULL)
                 return -ENOMEM;
         return 0;
 }
 
 /**
  * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob
  * @task: the task that needs a blob
  *
  * Allocate the task blob for all the modules
  */
 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
 {
         int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
 
         if (rc)
                 panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
 }
 
 /**
  * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob
  * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
  *
  * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules
  *
  * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
  */
 static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
 {
         if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) {
                 sb->s_security = NULL;
                 return 0;
         }
 
         sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL);
         if (sb->s_security == NULL)
                 return -ENOMEM;
         return 0;
 }
 
 /**
  * lsm_fill_user_ctx - Fill a user space lsm_ctx structure
  * @uctx: a userspace LSM context to be filled
  * @uctx_len: available uctx size (input), used uctx size (output)
  * @val: the new LSM context value
  * @val_len: the size of the new LSM context value
  * @id: LSM id
  * @flags: LSM defined flags
  *
  * Fill all of the fields in a userspace lsm_ctx structure.  If @uctx is NULL
  * simply calculate the required size to output via @utc_len and return
  * success.
  *
  * Returns 0 on success, -E2BIG if userspace buffer is not large enough,
  * -EFAULT on a copyout error, -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
  */
 int lsm_fill_user_ctx(struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx, u32 *uctx_len,
                       void *val, size_t val_len,
                       u64 id, u64 flags)
 {
         struct lsm_ctx *nctx = NULL;
         size_t nctx_len;
         int rc = 0;
 
         nctx_len = ALIGN(struct_size(nctx, ctx, val_len), sizeof(void *));
         if (nctx_len > *uctx_len) {
                 rc = -E2BIG;
                 goto out;
         }
 
         /* no buffer - return success/0 and set @uctx_len to the req size */
         if (!uctx)
                 goto out;
 
         nctx = kzalloc(nctx_len, GFP_KERNEL);
         if (nctx == NULL) {
                 rc = -ENOMEM;
                 goto out;
         }
         nctx->id = id;
         nctx->flags = flags;
         nctx->len = nctx_len;
         nctx->ctx_len = val_len;
         memcpy(nctx->ctx, val, val_len);
 
         if (copy_to_user(uctx, nctx, nctx_len))
                 rc = -EFAULT;
 
 out:
         kfree(nctx);
         *uctx_len = nctx_len;
         return rc;
 }
 
 /*
  * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and
  * can be accessed with:
  *
  *      LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>)
  *
  * The macros below define static constants for the default value of each
  * LSM hook.
  */
 #define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default)
 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME)
 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \
         static const int __maybe_unused LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT);
 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
         DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME)
 
 #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
 #undef LSM_HOOK
 
 /*
  * Hook list operation macros.
  *
  * call_void_hook:
  *      This is a hook that does not return a value.
  *
  * call_int_hook:
  *      This is a hook that returns a value.
  */
 
 #define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...)                               \
         do {                                                    \
                 struct security_hook_list *P;                   \
                                                                 \
                 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \
                         P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__);              \
         } while (0)
 
 #define call_int_hook(FUNC, ...) ({                             \
         int RC = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(FUNC);                         \
         do {                                                    \
                 struct security_hook_list *P;                   \
                                                                 \
                 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
                         RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__);         \
                         if (RC != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(FUNC))        \
                                 break;                          \
                 }                                               \
         } while (0);                                            \
         RC;                                                     \
 })
 
 /* Security operations */
 
 /**
  * security_binder_set_context_mgr() - Check if becoming binder ctx mgr is ok
  * @mgr: task credentials of current binder process
  *
  * Check whether @mgr is allowed to be the binder context manager.
  *
  * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
 {
         return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, mgr);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_binder_transaction() - Check if a binder transaction is allowed
  * @from: sending process
  * @to: receiving process
  *
  * Check whether @from is allowed to invoke a binder transaction call to @to.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
                                 const struct cred *to)
 {
         return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, from, to);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_binder_transfer_binder() - Check if a binder transfer is allowed
  * @from: sending process
  * @to: receiving process
  *
  * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer a binder reference to @to.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
                                     const struct cred *to)
 {
         return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, from, to);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_binder_transfer_file() - Check if a binder file xfer is allowed
  * @from: sending process
  * @to: receiving process
  * @file: file being transferred
  *
  * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer @file to @to.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
                                   const struct cred *to, const struct file *file)
 {
         return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, from, to, file);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_ptrace_access_check() - Check if tracing is allowed
  * @child: target process
  * @mode: PTRACE_MODE flags
  *
  * Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the @child
  * process.  Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check
  * during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of tracing check
  * during an execve in the bprm_set_creds hook of binprm_security_ops if the
  * process is being traced and its security attributes would be changed by the
  * execve.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
         return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, child, mode);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_ptrace_traceme() - Check if tracing is allowed
  * @parent: tracing process
  *
  * Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the
  * current process before allowing the current process to present itself to the
  * @parent process for tracing.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
         return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, parent);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_capget() - Get the capability sets for a process
  * @target: target process
  * @effective: effective capability set
  * @inheritable: inheritable capability set
  * @permitted: permitted capability set
  *
  * Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the
  * @target process.  The hook may also perform permission checking to determine
  * if the current process is allowed to see the capability sets of the @target
  * process.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained.
  */
 int security_capget(const struct task_struct *target,
                     kernel_cap_t *effective,
                     kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
                     kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
         return call_int_hook(capget, target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_capset() - Set the capability sets for a process
  * @new: new credentials for the target process
  * @old: current credentials of the target process
  * @effective: effective capability set
  * @inheritable: inheritable capability set
  * @permitted: permitted capability set
  *
  * Set the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the
  * current process.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 and update @new if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
                     const kernel_cap_t *effective,
                     const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
                     const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
         return call_int_hook(capset, new, old, effective, inheritable,
                              permitted);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_capable() - Check if a process has the necessary capability
  * @cred: credentials to examine
  * @ns: user namespace
  * @cap: capability requested
  * @opts: capability check options
  *
  * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated
  * credentials.  @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
  * @opts contains options for the capable check <include/linux/security.h>.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if the capability is granted.
  */
 int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
                      struct user_namespace *ns,
                      int cap,
                      unsigned int opts)
 {
         return call_int_hook(capable, cred, ns, cap, opts);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_quotactl() - Check if a quotactl() syscall is allowed for this fs
  * @cmds: commands
  * @type: type
  * @id: id
  * @sb: filesystem
  *
  * Check whether the quotactl syscall is allowed for this @sb.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, const struct super_block *sb)
 {
         return call_int_hook(quotactl, cmds, type, id, sb);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_quota_on() - Check if QUOTAON is allowed for a dentry
  * @dentry: dentry
  *
  * Check whether QUOTAON is allowed for @dentry.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
         return call_int_hook(quota_on, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_syslog() - Check if accessing the kernel message ring is allowed
  * @type: SYSLOG_ACTION_* type
  *
  * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing
  * logging to the console.  See the syslog(2) manual page for an explanation of
  * the @type values.
  *
  * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_syslog(int type)
 {
         return call_int_hook(syslog, type);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_settime64() - Check if changing the system time is allowed
  * @ts: new time
  * @tz: timezone
  *
  * Check permission to change the system time, struct timespec64 is defined in
  * <include/linux/time64.h> and timezone is defined in <include/linux/time.h>.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
 {
         return call_int_hook(settime, ts, tz);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_vm_enough_memory_mm() - Check if allocating a new mem map is allowed
  * @mm: mm struct
  * @pages: number of pages
  *
  * Check permissions for allocating a new virtual mapping.  If all LSMs return
  * a positive value, __vm_enough_memory() will be called with cap_sys_admin
  * set. If at least one LSM returns 0 or negative, __vm_enough_memory() will be
  * called with cap_sys_admin cleared.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted by the LSM infrastructure to the
  *         caller.
  */
 int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 {
         struct security_hook_list *hp;
         int cap_sys_admin = 1;
         int rc;
 
         /*
          * The module will respond with a positive value if
          * it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be
          * made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules
          * agree that it should be set it will. If any module
          * thinks it should not be set it won't.
          */
         hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) {
                 rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
                 if (rc <= 0) {
                         cap_sys_admin = 0;
                         break;
                 }
         }
         return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_bprm_creds_for_exec() - Prepare the credentials for exec()
  * @bprm: binary program information
  *
  * If the setup in prepare_exec_creds did not setup @bprm->cred->security
  * properly for executing @bprm->file, update the LSM's portion of
  * @bprm->cred->security to be what commit_creds needs to install for the new
  * program.  This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for
  * transitions between security domains).  The hook must set @bprm->secureexec
  * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode.  @bprm
  * contains the linux_binprm structure.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
  */
 int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
         return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, bprm);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_bprm_creds_from_file() - Update linux_binprm creds based on file
  * @bprm: binary program information
  * @file: associated file
  *
  * If @file is setpcap, suid, sgid or otherwise marked to change privilege upon
  * exec, update @bprm->cred to reflect that change. This is called after
  * finding the binary that will be executed without an interpreter.  This
  * ensures that the credentials will not be derived from a script that the
  * binary will need to reopen, which when reopend may end up being a completely
  * different file.  This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for
  * transitions between security domains).  The hook must set @bprm->secureexec
  * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode.  The
  * hook must add to @bprm->per_clear any personality flags that should be
  * cleared from current->personality.  @bprm contains the linux_binprm
  * structure.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
  */
 int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file)
 {
         return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, bprm, file);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_bprm_check() - Mediate binary handler search
  * @bprm: binary program information
  *
  * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will begin.
  * It allows a check against the @bprm->cred->security value which was set in
  * the preceding creds_for_exec call.  The argv list and envp list are reliably
  * available in @bprm.  This hook may be called multiple times during a single
  * execve.  @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
  */
 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
         return call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, bprm);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_bprm_committing_creds() - Install creds for a process during exec()
  * @bprm: binary program information
  *
  * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being
  * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials pointed to
  * by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by the
  * bprm_creds_for_exec hook.  @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure.  This
  * hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such as closing
  * open file descriptors to which access will no longer be granted when the
  * attributes are changed.  This is called immediately before commit_creds().
  */
 void security_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
         call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_bprm_committed_creds() - Tidy up after cred install during exec()
  * @bprm: binary program information
  *
  * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a process
  * being transformed by an execve operation.  The new credentials have, by this
  * point, been set to @current->cred.  @bprm points to the linux_binprm
  * structure.  This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the
  * process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal state.  This is called
  * immediately after commit_creds().
  */
 void security_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
         call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_fs_context_submount() - Initialise fc->security
  * @fc: new filesystem context
  * @reference: dentry reference for submount/remount
  *
  * Fill out the ->security field for a new fs_context.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success or negative error code on failure.
  */
 int security_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *reference)
 {
         return call_int_hook(fs_context_submount, fc, reference);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_fs_context_dup() - Duplicate a fs_context LSM blob
  * @fc: destination filesystem context
  * @src_fc: source filesystem context
  *
  * Allocate and attach a security structure to sc->security.  This pointer is
  * initialised to NULL by the caller.  @fc indicates the new filesystem context.
  * @src_fc indicates the original filesystem context.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on failure.
  */
 int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc)
 {
         return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, fc, src_fc);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_fs_context_parse_param() - Configure a filesystem context
  * @fc: filesystem context
  * @param: filesystem parameter
  *
  * Userspace provided a parameter to configure a superblock.  The LSM can
  * consume the parameter or return it to the caller for use elsewhere.
  *
  * Return: If the parameter is used by the LSM it should return 0, if it is
  *         returned to the caller -ENOPARAM is returned, otherwise a negative
  *         error code is returned.
  */
 int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
                                     struct fs_parameter *param)
 {
         struct security_hook_list *hp;
         int trc;
         int rc = -ENOPARAM;
 
         hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.fs_context_parse_param,
                              list) {
                 trc = hp->hook.fs_context_parse_param(fc, param);
                 if (trc == 0)
                         rc = 0;
                 else if (trc != -ENOPARAM)
                         return trc;
         }
         return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_sb_alloc() - Allocate a super_block LSM blob
  * @sb: filesystem superblock
  *
  * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field.  The
  * s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is allocated.
  * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful.
  */
 int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
 {
         int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb);
 
         if (unlikely(rc))
                 return rc;
         rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, sb);
         if (unlikely(rc))
                 security_sb_free(sb);
         return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_sb_delete() - Release super_block LSM associated objects
  * @sb: filesystem superblock
  *
  * Release objects tied to a superblock (e.g. inodes).  @sb contains the
  * super_block structure being released.
  */
 void security_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb)
 {
         call_void_hook(sb_delete, sb);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_sb_free() - Free a super_block LSM blob
  * @sb: filesystem superblock
  *
  * Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field.  @sb contains the super_block
  * structure to be modified.
  */
 void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb)
 {
         call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb);
         kfree(sb->s_security);
         sb->s_security = NULL;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_free_mnt_opts() - Free memory associated with mount options
  * @mnt_opts: LSM processed mount options
  *
  * Free memory associated with @mnt_ops.
  */
 void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts)
 {
         if (!*mnt_opts)
                 return;
         call_void_hook(sb_free_mnt_opts, *mnt_opts);
         *mnt_opts = NULL;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts);
 
 /**
  * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts() - Consume LSM mount options
  * @options: mount options
  * @mnt_opts: LSM processed mount options
  *
  * Eat (scan @options) and save them in @mnt_opts.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure.
  */
 int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
 {
         return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, options, mnt_opts);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts);
 
 /**
  * security_sb_mnt_opts_compat() - Check if new mount options are allowed
  * @sb: filesystem superblock
  * @mnt_opts: new mount options
  *
  * Determine if the new mount options in @mnt_opts are allowed given the
  * existing mounted filesystem at @sb.  @sb superblock being compared.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if options are compatible.
  */
 int security_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb,
                                 void *mnt_opts)
 {
         return call_int_hook(sb_mnt_opts_compat, sb, mnt_opts);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat);
 
 /**
  * security_sb_remount() - Verify no incompatible mount changes during remount
  * @sb: filesystem superblock
  * @mnt_opts: (re)mount options
  *
  * Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes are
  * being made to those options.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb,
                         void *mnt_opts)
 {
         return call_int_hook(sb_remount, sb, mnt_opts);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount);
 
 /**
  * security_sb_kern_mount() - Check if a kernel mount is allowed
  * @sb: filesystem superblock
  *
  * Mount this @sb if allowed by permissions.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_sb_kern_mount(const struct super_block *sb)
 {
         return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, sb);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_sb_show_options() - Output the mount options for a superblock
  * @m: output file
  * @sb: filesystem superblock
  *
  * Show (print on @m) mount options for this @sb.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure.
  */
 int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
 {
         return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, m, sb);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_sb_statfs() - Check if accessing fs stats is allowed
  * @dentry: superblock handle
  *
  * Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt
  * mountpoint.  @dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
         return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_sb_mount() - Check permission for mounting a filesystem
  * @dev_name: filesystem backing device
  * @path: mount point
  * @type: filesystem type
  * @flags: mount flags
  * @data: filesystem specific data
  *
  * Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on the
  * mount point named by @nd.  For an ordinary mount, @dev_name identifies a
  * device if the file system type requires a device.  For a remount
  * (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant.  For a loopback/bind mount
  * (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the pathname of the object being
  * mounted.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
                       const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
 {
         return call_int_hook(sb_mount, dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_sb_umount() - Check permission for unmounting a filesystem
  * @mnt: mounted filesystem
  * @flags: unmount flags
  *
  * Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 {
         return call_int_hook(sb_umount, mnt, flags);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_sb_pivotroot() - Check permissions for pivoting the rootfs
  * @old_path: new location for current rootfs
  * @new_path: location of the new rootfs
  *
  * Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
                           const struct path *new_path)
 {
         return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, old_path, new_path);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() - Set the mount options for a filesystem
  * @sb: filesystem superblock
  * @mnt_opts: binary mount options
  * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in)
  * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out)
  *
  * Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
                              void *mnt_opts,
                              unsigned long kern_flags,
                              unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 {
         struct security_hook_list *hp;
         int rc = mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : LSM_RET_DEFAULT(sb_set_mnt_opts);
 
         hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.sb_set_mnt_opts,
                              list) {
                 rc = hp->hook.sb_set_mnt_opts(sb, mnt_opts, kern_flags,
                                               set_kern_flags);
                 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(sb_set_mnt_opts))
                         break;
         }
         return rc;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts);
 
 /**
  * security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() - Duplicate superblock mount options
  * @oldsb: source superblock
  * @newsb: destination superblock
  * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in)
  * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out)
  *
  * Copy all security options from a given superblock to another.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
                                struct super_block *newsb,
                                unsigned long kern_flags,
                                unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 {
         return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, oldsb, newsb,
                              kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
 
 /**
  * security_move_mount() - Check permissions for moving a mount
  * @from_path: source mount point
  * @to_path: destination mount point
  *
  * Check permission before a mount is moved.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
                         const struct path *to_path)
 {
         return call_int_hook(move_mount, from_path, to_path);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_path_notify() - Check if setting a watch is allowed
  * @path: file path
  * @mask: event mask
  * @obj_type: file path type
  *
  * Check permissions before setting a watch on events as defined by @mask, on
  * an object at @path, whose type is defined by @obj_type.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
                          unsigned int obj_type)
 {
         return call_int_hook(path_notify, path, mask, obj_type);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_alloc() - Allocate an inode LSM blob
  * @inode: the inode
  *
  * Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security.  The
  * i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is
  * allocated.
  *
  * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful.
  */
 int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
 {
         int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode);
 
         if (unlikely(rc))
                 return rc;
         rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, inode);
         if (unlikely(rc))
                 security_inode_free(inode);
         return rc;
 }
 
 static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
 {
         /*
          * The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob
          */
         kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_free() - Free an inode's LSM blob
  * @inode: the inode
  *
  * Deallocate the inode security structure and set @inode->i_security to NULL.
  */
 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 {
         call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
         /*
          * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
          * a call to security_inode_permission() can be made
          * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
          * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
          * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
          * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
          * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
          */
         if (inode->i_security)
                 call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security,
                          inode_free_by_rcu);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_dentry_init_security() - Perform dentry initialization
  * @dentry: the dentry to initialize
  * @mode: mode used to determine resource type
  * @name: name of the last path component
  * @xattr_name: name of the security/LSM xattr
  * @ctx: pointer to the resulting LSM context
  * @ctxlen: length of @ctx
  *
  * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available since NFSv4
  * has no label backed by an EA anyway.  It is important to note that
  * @xattr_name does not need to be free'd by the caller, it is a static string.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure.
  */
 int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
                                   const struct qstr *name,
                                   const char **xattr_name, void **ctx,
                                   u32 *ctxlen)
 {
         return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, dentry, mode, name,
                              xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
 
 /**
  * security_dentry_create_files_as() - Perform dentry initialization
  * @dentry: the dentry to initialize
  * @mode: mode used to determine resource type
  * @name: name of the last path component
  * @old: creds to use for LSM context calculations
  * @new: creds to modify
  *
  * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available and set
  * that context in passed in creds so that new files are created using that
  * context. Context is calculated using the passed in creds and not the creds
  * of the caller.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
                                     struct qstr *name,
                                     const struct cred *old, struct cred *new)
 {
         return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, dentry, mode,
                              name, old, new);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as);
 
 /**
  * security_inode_init_security() - Initialize an inode's LSM context
  * @inode: the inode
  * @dir: parent directory
  * @qstr: last component of the pathname
  * @initxattrs: callback function to write xattrs
  * @fs_data: filesystem specific data
  *
  * Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly
  * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode.  This
  * hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation transaction and
  * provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike the post_create/mkdir/...
  * hooks called by the VFS.
  *
  * The hook function is expected to populate the xattrs array, by calling
  * lsm_get_xattr_slot() to retrieve the slots reserved by the security module
  * with the lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure.  For each
  * slot, the hook function should set ->name to the attribute name suffix
  * (e.g. selinux), to allocate ->value (will be freed by the caller) and set it
  * to the attribute value, to set ->value_len to the length of the value.  If
  * the security module does not use security attributes or does not wish to put
  * a security attribute on this particular inode, then it should return
  * -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if the LSM successfully initialized all of the inode
  *         security attributes that are required, negative values otherwise.
  */
 int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
                                  const struct qstr *qstr,
                                  const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
 {
         struct security_hook_list *hp;
         struct xattr *new_xattrs = NULL;
         int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP, xattr_count = 0;
 
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
                 return 0;
 
         if (!blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count)
                 return 0;
 
         if (initxattrs) {
                 /* Allocate +1 as terminator. */
                 new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count + 1,
                                      sizeof(*new_xattrs), GFP_NOFS);
                 if (!new_xattrs)
                         return -ENOMEM;
         }
 
         hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security,
                              list) {
                 ret = hp->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs,
                                                   &xattr_count);
                 if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
                         goto out;
                 /*
                  * As documented in lsm_hooks.h, -EOPNOTSUPP in this context
                  * means that the LSM is not willing to provide an xattr, not
                  * that it wants to signal an error. Thus, continue to invoke
                  * the remaining LSMs.
                  */
         }
 
         /* If initxattrs() is NULL, xattr_count is zero, skip the call. */
         if (!xattr_count)
                 goto out;
 
         ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
 out:
         for (; xattr_count > 0; xattr_count--)
                 kfree(new_xattrs[xattr_count - 1].value);
         kfree(new_xattrs);
         return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
 
 /**
  * security_inode_init_security_anon() - Initialize an anonymous inode
  * @inode: the inode
  * @name: the anonymous inode class
  * @context_inode: an optional related inode
  *
  * Set up the incore security field for the new anonymous inode and return
  * whether the inode creation is permitted by the security module or not.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EACCES if the security module denies the
  * creation of this inode, or another -errno upon other errors.
  */
 int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
                                       const struct qstr *name,
                                       const struct inode *context_inode)
 {
         return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, inode, name,
                              context_inode);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
 /**
  * security_path_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed
  * @dir: parent directory
  * @dentry: new file
  * @mode: new file mode
  * @dev: device number
  *
  * Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called even
  * if mknod operation is being done for a regular file.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
                         umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(path_mknod, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
 
 /**
  * security_path_post_mknod() - Update inode security after reg file creation
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount
  * @dentry: new file
  *
  * Update inode security field after a regular file has been created.
  */
 void security_path_post_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
                 return;
         call_void_hook(path_post_mknod, idmap, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_path_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed
  * @dir: parent directory
  * @dentry: new directory
  * @mode: new directory mode
  *
  * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
                         umode_t mode)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, dir, dentry, mode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir);
 
 /**
  * security_path_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed
  * @dir: parent directory
  * @dentry: directory to remove
  *
  * Check the permission to remove a directory.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, dir, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_path_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed
  * @dir: parent directory
  * @dentry: file
  *
  * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(path_unlink, dir, dentry);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink);
 
 /**
  * security_path_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed
  * @dir: parent directory
  * @dentry: symbolic link
  * @old_name: file pathname
  *
  * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
                           const char *old_name)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(path_symlink, dir, dentry, old_name);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_path_link - Check if creating a hard link is allowed
  * @old_dentry: existing file
  * @new_dir: new parent directory
  * @new_dentry: new link
  *
  * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
                        struct dentry *new_dentry)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(path_link, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_path_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed
  * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file
  * @old_dentry: the old file
  * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file
  * @new_dentry: the new file
  * @flags: flags
  *
  * Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
                          const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
                          unsigned int flags)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) ||
                      (d_is_positive(new_dentry) &&
                       IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)))))
                 return 0;
 
         return call_int_hook(path_rename, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
                              new_dentry, flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename);
 
 /**
  * security_path_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed
  * @path: file
  *
  * Check permission before truncating the file indicated by path.  Note that
  * truncation permissions may also be checked based on already opened files,
  * using the security_file_truncate() hook.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(path_truncate, path);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_path_chmod() - Check if changing the file's mode is allowed
  * @path: file
  * @mode: new mode
  *
  * Check for permission to change a mode of the file @path. The new mode is
  * specified in @mode which is a bitmask of constants from
  * <include/uapi/linux/stat.h>.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(path_chmod, path, mode);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_path_chown() - Check if changing the file's owner/group is allowed
  * @path: file
  * @uid: file owner
  * @gid: file group
  *
  * Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(path_chown, path, uid, gid);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_path_chroot() - Check if changing the root directory is allowed
  * @path: directory
  *
  * Check for permission to change root directory.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path)
 {
         return call_int_hook(path_chroot, path);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
 
 /**
  * security_inode_create() - Check if creating a file is allowed
  * @dir: the parent directory
  * @dentry: the file being created
  * @mode: requested file mode
  *
  * Check permission to create a regular file.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
                           umode_t mode)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(inode_create, dir, dentry, mode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create);
 
 /**
  * security_inode_post_create_tmpfile() - Update inode security of new tmpfile
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount
  * @inode: inode of the new tmpfile
  *
  * Update inode security data after a tmpfile has been created.
  */
 void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
                                         struct inode *inode)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
                 return;
         call_void_hook(inode_post_create_tmpfile, idmap, inode);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed
  * @old_dentry: existing file
  * @dir: new parent directory
  * @new_dentry: new link
  *
  * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
                         struct dentry *new_dentry)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(inode_link, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed
  * @dir: parent directory
  * @dentry: file
  *
  * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, dir, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed
  * @dir: parent directory
  * @dentry: symbolic link
  * @old_name: existing filename
  *
  * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
                            const char *old_name)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, dir, dentry, old_name);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_mkdir() - Check if creation a new director is allowed
  * @dir: parent directory
  * @dentry: new directory
  * @mode: new directory mode
  *
  * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory
  * associated with inode structure @dir.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, dir, dentry, mode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir);
 
 /**
  * security_inode_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed
  * @dir: parent directory
  * @dentry: directory to be removed
  *
  * Check the permission to remove a directory.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, dir, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed
  * @dir: parent directory
  * @dentry: new file
  * @mode: new file mode
  * @dev: device number
  *
  * Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo file
  * created via the mknod system call).  Note that if mknod operation is being
  * done for a regular file, then the create hook will be called and not this
  * hook.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
                          umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed
  * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file
  * @old_dentry: the old file
  * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file
  * @new_dentry: the new file
  * @flags: flags
  *
  * Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
                           struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
                           unsigned int flags)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) ||
                      (d_is_positive(new_dentry) &&
                       IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)))))
                 return 0;
 
         if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
                 int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, new_dir, new_dentry,
                                         old_dir, old_dentry);
                 if (err)
                         return err;
         }
 
         return call_int_hook(inode_rename, old_dir, old_dentry,
                              new_dir, new_dentry);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_readlink() - Check if reading a symbolic link is allowed
  * @dentry: link
  *
  * Check the permission to read the symbolic link.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_follow_link() - Check if following a symbolic link is allowed
  * @dentry: link dentry
  * @inode: link inode
  * @rcu: true if in RCU-walk mode
  *
  * Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname.  If
  * @rcu is true, @inode is not stable.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
                                bool rcu)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, dentry, inode, rcu);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_permission() - Check if accessing an inode is allowed
  * @inode: inode
  * @mask: access mask
  *
  * Check permission before accessing an inode.  This hook is called by the
  * existing Linux permission function, so a security module can use it to
  * provide additional checking for existing Linux permission checks.  Notice
  * that this hook is called when a file is opened (as well as many other
  * operations), whereas the file_security_ops permission hook is called when
  * the actual read/write operations are performed.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(inode_permission, inode, mask);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_setattr() - Check if setting file attributes is allowed
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount
  * @dentry: file
  * @attr: new attributes
  *
  * Check permission before setting file attributes.  Note that the kernel call
  * to notify_change is performed from several locations, whenever file
  * attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod operations,
  * transferring disk quotas, etc).
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
                            struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(inode_setattr, idmap, dentry, attr);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
 
 /**
  * security_inode_post_setattr() - Update the inode after a setattr operation
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount
  * @dentry: file
  * @ia_valid: file attributes set
  *
  * Update inode security field after successful setting file attributes.
  */
 void security_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
                                  int ia_valid)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
                 return;
         call_void_hook(inode_post_setattr, idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_getattr() - Check if getting file attributes is allowed
  * @path: file
  *
  * Check permission before obtaining file attributes.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, path);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_setxattr() - Check if setting file xattrs is allowed
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount
  * @dentry: file
  * @name: xattr name
  * @value: xattr value
  * @size: size of xattr value
  * @flags: flags
  *
  * This hook performs the desired permission checks before setting the extended
  * attributes (xattrs) on @dentry.  It is important to note that we have some
  * additional logic before the main LSM implementation calls to detect if we
  * need to perform an additional capability check at the LSM layer.
  *
  * Normally we enforce a capability check prior to executing the various LSM
  * hook implementations, but if a LSM wants to avoid this capability check,
  * it can register a 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hook and return a value of 1 for
  * xattrs that it wants to avoid the capability check, leaving the LSM fully
  * responsible for enforcing the access control for the specific xattr.  If all
  * of the enabled LSMs refrain from registering a 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hook,
  * or return a 0 (the default return value), the capability check is still
  * performed.  If no 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hooks are registered the capability
  * check is performed.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
                             struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
                             const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
         int rc;
 
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
                 return 0;
 
         /* enforce the capability checks at the lsm layer, if needed */
         if (!call_int_hook(inode_xattr_skipcap, name)) {
                 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
                 if (rc)
                         return rc;
         }
 
         return call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, idmap, dentry, name, value, size,
                              flags);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_set_acl() - Check if setting posix acls is allowed
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount
  * @dentry: file
  * @acl_name: acl name
  * @kacl: acl struct
  *
  * Check permission before setting posix acls, the posix acls in @kacl are
  * identified by @acl_name.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
                            struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
                            struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_post_set_acl() - Update inode security from posix acls set
  * @dentry: file
  * @acl_name: acl name
  * @kacl: acl struct
  *
  * Update inode security data after successfully setting posix acls on @dentry.
  * The posix acls in @kacl are identified by @acl_name.
  */
 void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
                                  struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
                 return;
         call_void_hook(inode_post_set_acl, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount
  * @dentry: file
  * @acl_name: acl name
  *
  * Check permission before getting osix acls, the posix acls are identified by
  * @acl_name.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
                            struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_remove_acl() - Check if removing a posix acl is allowed
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount
  * @dentry: file
  * @acl_name: acl name
  *
  * Check permission before removing posix acls, the posix acls are identified
  * by @acl_name.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
                               struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_post_remove_acl() - Update inode security after rm posix acls
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount
  * @dentry: file
  * @acl_name: acl name
  *
  * Update inode security data after successfully removing posix acls on
  * @dentry in @idmap. The posix acls are identified by @acl_name.
  */
 void security_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
                                     struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
                 return;
         call_void_hook(inode_post_remove_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_post_setxattr() - Update the inode after a setxattr operation
  * @dentry: file
  * @name: xattr name
  * @value: xattr value
  * @size: xattr value size
  * @flags: flags
  *
  * Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation.
  */
 void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
                                   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
                 return;
         call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_getxattr() - Check if xattr access is allowed
  * @dentry: file
  * @name: xattr name
  *
  * Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes identified by
  * @name for @dentry.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, dentry, name);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_listxattr() - Check if listing xattrs is allowed
  * @dentry: file
  *
  * Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute names for
  * @dentry.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_removexattr() - Check if removing an xattr is allowed
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount
  * @dentry: file
  * @name: xattr name
  *
  * This hook performs the desired permission checks before setting the extended
  * attributes (xattrs) on @dentry.  It is important to note that we have some
  * additional logic before the main LSM implementation calls to detect if we
  * need to perform an additional capability check at the LSM layer.
  *
  * Normally we enforce a capability check prior to executing the various LSM
  * hook implementations, but if a LSM wants to avoid this capability check,
  * it can register a 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hook and return a value of 1 for
  * xattrs that it wants to avoid the capability check, leaving the LSM fully
  * responsible for enforcing the access control for the specific xattr.  If all
  * of the enabled LSMs refrain from registering a 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hook,
  * or return a 0 (the default return value), the capability check is still
  * performed.  If no 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hooks are registered the capability
  * check is performed.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
                                struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
         int rc;
 
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
                 return 0;
 
         /* enforce the capability checks at the lsm layer, if needed */
         if (!call_int_hook(inode_xattr_skipcap, name)) {
                 rc = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
                 if (rc)
                         return rc;
         }
 
         return call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, idmap, dentry, name);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_post_removexattr() - Update the inode after a removexattr op
  * @dentry: file
  * @name: xattr name
  *
  * Update the inode after a successful removexattr operation.
  */
 void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
                 return;
         call_void_hook(inode_post_removexattr, dentry, name);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required
  * @dentry: associated dentry
  *
  * Called when an inode has been changed to determine if
  * security_inode_killpriv() should be called.
  *
  * Return: Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation, return 0 if
  *         security_inode_killpriv() does not need to be called, return >0 if
  *         security_inode_killpriv() does need to be called.
  */
 int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
         return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_killpriv() - The setuid bit is removed, update LSM state
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount
  * @dentry: associated dentry
  *
  * The @dentry's setuid bit is being removed.  Remove similar security labels.
  * Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held.
  *
  * Return: Return 0 on success.  If error is returned, then the operation
  *         causing setuid bit removal is failed.
  */
 int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
                             struct dentry *dentry)
 {
         return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, idmap, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_getsecurity() - Get the xattr security label of an inode
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount
  * @inode: inode
  * @name: xattr name
  * @buffer: security label buffer
  * @alloc: allocation flag
  *
  * Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the security
  * label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer.  Note that @name is the
  * remainder of the attribute name after the security prefix has been removed.
  * @alloc is used to specify if the call should return a value via the buffer
  * or just the value length.
  *
  * Return: Returns size of buffer on success.
  */
 int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
                                struct inode *inode, const char *name,
                                void **buffer, bool alloc)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
                 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity);
 
         return call_int_hook(inode_getsecurity, idmap, inode, name, buffer,
                              alloc);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_setsecurity() - Set the xattr security label of an inode
  * @inode: inode
  * @name: xattr name
  * @value: security label
  * @size: length of security label
  * @flags: flags
  *
  * Set the security label associated with @name for @inode from the extended
  * attribute value @value.  @size indicates the size of the @value in bytes.
  * @flags may be XATTR_CREATE, XATTR_REPLACE, or 0. Note that @name is the
  * remainder of the attribute name after the security. prefix has been removed.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success.
  */
 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
                                const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
                 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity);
 
         return call_int_hook(inode_setsecurity, inode, name, value, size,
                              flags);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_listsecurity() - List the xattr security label names
  * @inode: inode
  * @buffer: buffer
  * @buffer_size: size of buffer
  *
  * Copy the extended attribute names for the security labels associated with
  * @inode into @buffer.  The maximum size of @buffer is specified by
  * @buffer_size.  @buffer may be NULL to request the size of the buffer
  * required.
  *
  * Return: Returns number of bytes used/required on success.
  */
 int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode,
                                 char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
 {
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
                 return 0;
         return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, inode, buffer, buffer_size);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
 
 /**
  * security_inode_getsecid() - Get an inode's secid
  * @inode: inode
  * @secid: secid to return
  *
  * Get the secid associated with the node.  In case of failure, @secid will be
  * set to zero.
  */
 void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 {
         call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inode_copy_up() - Create new creds for an overlayfs copy-up op
  * @src: union dentry of copy-up file
  * @new: newly created creds
  *
  * A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of overlay
  * filesystem. Security module can prepare a set of new creds and modify as
  * need be and return new creds. Caller will switch to new creds temporarily to
  * create new file and release newly allocated creds.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on error.
  */
 int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
 {
         return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, src, new);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up);
 
 /**
  * security_inode_copy_up_xattr() - Filter xattrs in an overlayfs copy-up op
  * @src: union dentry of copy-up file
  * @name: xattr name
  *
  * Filter the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is copied up from a
  * lower layer to the union/overlay layer.   The caller is responsible for
  * reading and writing the xattrs, this hook is merely a filter.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 to accept the xattr, 1 to discard the xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP
  *         if the security module does not know about attribute, or a negative
  *         error code to abort the copy up.
  */
 int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, const char *name)
 {
         int rc;
 
         /*
          * The implementation can return 0 (accept the xattr), 1 (discard the
          * xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or
          * any other error code in case of an error.
          */
         rc = call_int_hook(inode_copy_up_xattr, src, name);
         if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr))
                 return rc;
 
         return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
 
 /**
  * security_kernfs_init_security() - Init LSM context for a kernfs node
  * @kn_dir: parent kernfs node
  * @kn: the kernfs node to initialize
  *
  * Initialize the security context of a newly created kernfs node based on its
  * own and its parent's attributes.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
                                   struct kernfs_node *kn)
 {
         return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, kn_dir, kn);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_file_permission() - Check file permissions
  * @file: file
  * @mask: requested permissions
  *
  * Check file permissions before accessing an open file.  This hook is called
  * by various operations that read or write files.  A security module can use
  * this hook to perform additional checking on these operations, e.g. to
  * revalidate permissions on use to support privilege bracketing or policy
  * changes.  Notice that this hook is used when the actual read/write
  * operations are performed, whereas the inode_security_ops hook is called when
  * a file is opened (as well as many other operations).  Although this hook can
  * be used to revalidate permissions for various system call operations that
  * read or write files, it does not address the revalidation of permissions for
  * memory-mapped files.  Security modules must handle this separately if they
  * need such revalidation.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
         return call_int_hook(file_permission, file, mask);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_file_alloc() - Allocate and init a file's LSM blob
  * @file: the file
  *
  * Allocate and attach a security structure to the file->f_security field.  The
  * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created.
  *
  * Return: Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
  */
 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
 {
         int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file);
 
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
         rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, file);
         if (unlikely(rc))
                 security_file_free(file);
         return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_file_release() - Perform actions before releasing the file ref
  * @file: the file
  *
  * Perform actions before releasing the last reference to a file.
  */
 void security_file_release(struct file *file)
 {
         call_void_hook(file_release, file);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_file_free() - Free a file's LSM blob
  * @file: the file
  *
  * Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security.
  */
 void security_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
         void *blob;
 
         call_void_hook(file_free_security, file);
 
         blob = file->f_security;
         if (blob) {
                 file->f_security = NULL;
                 kmem_cache_free(lsm_file_cache, blob);
         }
 }
 
 /**
  * security_file_ioctl() - Check if an ioctl is allowed
  * @file: associated file
  * @cmd: ioctl cmd
  * @arg: ioctl arguments
  *
  * Check permission for an ioctl operation on @file.  Note that @arg sometimes
  * represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer
  * value.  When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used
  * by the security module.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
         return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, file, cmd, arg);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl);
 
 /**
  * security_file_ioctl_compat() - Check if an ioctl is allowed in compat mode
  * @file: associated file
  * @cmd: ioctl cmd
  * @arg: ioctl arguments
  *
  * Compat version of security_file_ioctl() that correctly handles 32-bit
  * processes running on 64-bit kernels.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
                                unsigned long arg)
 {
         return call_int_hook(file_ioctl_compat, file, cmd, arg);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl_compat);
 
 static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 {
         /*
          * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect
          * it to imply PROT_EXEC?  If not, nothing to talk about...
          */
         if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ)
                 return prot;
         if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
                 return prot;
         /*
          * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it.
          */
         if (!file)
                 return prot | PROT_EXEC;
         /*
          * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need
          * NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case
          */
         if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) {
 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
                 if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) {
                         unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file);
                         if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC))
                                 return prot;
                 }
 #endif
                 return prot | PROT_EXEC;
         }
         /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */
         return prot;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_mmap_file() - Check if mmap'ing a file is allowed
  * @file: file
  * @prot: protection applied by the kernel
  * @flags: flags
  *
  * Check permissions for a mmap operation.  The @file may be NULL, e.g. if
  * mapping anonymous memory.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
                        unsigned long flags)
 {
         return call_int_hook(mmap_file, file, prot, mmap_prot(file, prot),
                              flags);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_mmap_addr() - Check if mmap'ing an address is allowed
  * @addr: address
  *
  * Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
         return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, addr);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_file_mprotect() - Check if changing memory protections is allowed
  * @vma: memory region
  * @reqprot: application requested protection
  * @prot: protection applied by the kernel
  *
  * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
                            unsigned long prot)
 {
         return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, vma, reqprot, prot);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_file_lock() - Check if a file lock is allowed
  * @file: file
  * @cmd: lock operation (e.g. F_RDLCK, F_WRLCK)
  *
  * Check permission before performing file locking operations.  Note the hook
  * mediates both flock and fcntl style locks.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
         return call_int_hook(file_lock, file, cmd);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_file_fcntl() - Check if fcntl() op is allowed
  * @file: file
  * @cmd: fcntl command
  * @arg: command argument
  *
  * Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd from
  * being performed on the file @file.  Note that @arg sometimes represents a
  * user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer value.  When
  * @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used by the
  * security module.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
         return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, file, cmd, arg);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_file_set_fowner() - Set the file owner info in the LSM blob
  * @file: the file
  *
  * Save owner security information (typically from current->security) in
  * file->f_security for later use by the send_sigiotask hook.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success.
  */
 void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
 {
         call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_file_send_sigiotask() - Check if sending SIGIO/SIGURG is allowed
  * @tsk: target task
  * @fown: signal sender
  * @sig: signal to be sent, SIGIO is sent if 0
  *
  * Check permission for the file owner @fown to send SIGIO or SIGURG to the
  * process @tsk.  Note that this hook is sometimes called from interrupt.  Note
  * that the fown_struct, @fown, is never outside the context of a struct file,
  * so the file structure (and associated security information) can always be
  * obtained: container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner).
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
                                  struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
 {
         return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, tsk, fown, sig);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_file_receive() - Check if receiving a file via IPC is allowed
  * @file: file being received
  *
  * This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process to
  * receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
 {
         return call_int_hook(file_receive, file);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_file_open() - Save open() time state for late use by the LSM
  * @file:
  *
  * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon file_permission,
  * and recheck access if anything has changed since inode_permission.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_file_open(struct file *file)
 {
         int ret;
 
         ret = call_int_hook(file_open, file);
         if (ret)
                 return ret;
 
         return fsnotify_open_perm(file);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_file_post_open() - Evaluate a file after it has been opened
  * @file: the file
  * @mask: access mask
  *
  * Evaluate an opened file and the access mask requested with open(). The hook
  * is useful for LSMs that require the file content to be available in order to
  * make decisions.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
         return call_int_hook(file_post_open, file, mask);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_post_open);
 
 /**
  * security_file_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed
  * @file: file
  *
  * Check permission before truncating a file, i.e. using ftruncate.  Note that
  * truncation permission may also be checked based on the path, using the
  * @path_truncate hook.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_file_truncate(struct file *file)
 {
         return call_int_hook(file_truncate, file);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_task_alloc() - Allocate a task's LSM blob
  * @task: the task
  * @clone_flags: flags indicating what is being shared
  *
  * Handle allocation of task-related resources.
  *
  * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure.
  */
 int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
 {
         int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
 
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
         rc = ccs_alloc_task_security(task);
         if (likely(!rc))
                 rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, task, clone_flags);
         if (unlikely(rc))
                 security_task_free(task);
         return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_task_free() - Free a task's LSM blob and related resources
  * @task: task
  *
  * Handle release of task-related resources.  Note that this can be called from
  * interrupt context.
  */
 void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
 {
         call_void_hook(task_free, task);
         ccs_free_task_security(task);
 
         kfree(task->security);
         task->security = NULL;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_cred_alloc_blank() - Allocate the min memory to allow cred_transfer
  * @cred: credentials
  * @gfp: gfp flags
  *
  * Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that
  * cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure.
  */
 int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 {
         int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp);
 
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
         rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, cred, gfp);
         if (unlikely(rc))
                 security_cred_free(cred);
         return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_cred_free() - Free the cred's LSM blob and associated resources
  * @cred: credentials
  *
  * Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials.
  */
 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
         /*
          * There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that
          * may result in a call here with ->security being NULL.
          */
         if (unlikely(cred->security == NULL))
                 return;
 
         call_void_hook(cred_free, cred);
 
         kfree(cred->security);
         cred->security = NULL;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_prepare_creds() - Prepare a new set of credentials
  * @new: new credentials
  * @old: original credentials
  * @gfp: gfp flags
  *
  * Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure.
  */
 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
 {
         int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp);
 
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
         rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, new, old, gfp);
         if (unlikely(rc))
                 security_cred_free(new);
         return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_transfer_creds() - Transfer creds
  * @new: target credentials
  * @old: original credentials
  *
  * Transfer data from original creds to new creds.
  */
 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
         call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_cred_getsecid() - Get the secid from a set of credentials
  * @c: credentials
  * @secid: secid value
  *
  * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c.  In case of
  * failure, @secid will be set to zero.
  */
 void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
 {
         *secid = 0;
         call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
 
 /**
  * security_kernel_act_as() - Set the kernel credentials to act as secid
  * @new: credentials
  * @secid: secid
  *
  * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
  * The current task must be the one that nominated @secid.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if successful.
  */
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 {
         return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, new, secid);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_kernel_create_files_as() - Set file creation context using an inode
  * @new: target credentials
  * @inode: reference inode
  *
  * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same as the
  * objective context of the specified inode.  The current task must be the one
  * that nominated @inode.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if successful.
  */
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 {
         return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, new, inode);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_kernel_module_request() - Check if loading a module is allowed
  * @kmod_name: module name
  *
  * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for
  * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if successful.
  */
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
         return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, kmod_name);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_kernel_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace
  * @file: file
  * @id: file identifier
  * @contents: trust if security_kernel_post_read_file() will be called
  *
  * Read a file specified by userspace.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
                               bool contents)
 {
         return call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, file, id, contents);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
 
 /**
  * security_kernel_post_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace
  * @file: file
  * @buf: file contents
  * @size: size of file contents
  * @id: file identifier
  *
  * Read a file specified by userspace.  This must be paired with a prior call
  * to security_kernel_read_file() call that indicated this hook would also be
  * called, see security_kernel_read_file() for more information.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
                                    enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
         return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, file, buf, size, id);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
 
 /**
  * security_kernel_load_data() - Load data provided by userspace
  * @id: data identifier
  * @contents: true if security_kernel_post_load_data() will be called
  *
  * Load data provided by userspace.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
         return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, id, contents);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data);
 
 /**
  * security_kernel_post_load_data() - Load userspace data from a non-file source
  * @buf: data
  * @size: size of data
  * @id: data identifier
  * @description: text description of data, specific to the id value
  *
  * Load data provided by a non-file source (usually userspace buffer).  This
  * must be paired with a prior security_kernel_load_data() call that indicated
  * this hook would also be called, see security_kernel_load_data() for more
  * information.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
                                    enum kernel_load_data_id id,
                                    char *description)
 {
         return call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, buf, size, id, description);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);
 
 /**
  * security_task_fix_setuid() - Update LSM with new user id attributes
  * @new: updated credentials
  * @old: credentials being replaced
  * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag values
  *
  * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user identity
  * attributes of the current process.  The @flags parameter indicates which of
  * the set*uid system calls invoked this hook.  If @new is the set of
  * credentials that will be installed.  Modifications should be made to this
  * rather than to @current->cred.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success.
  */
 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
                              int flags)
 {
         return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, new, old, flags);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_task_fix_setgid() - Update LSM with new group id attributes
  * @new: updated credentials
  * @old: credentials being replaced
  * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag value
  *
  * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the group identity
  * attributes of the current process.  The @flags parameter indicates which of
  * the set*gid system calls invoked this hook.  @new is the set of credentials
  * that will be installed.  Modifications should be made to this rather than to
  * @current->cred.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success.
  */
 int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
                              int flags)
 {
         return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, new, old, flags);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_task_fix_setgroups() - Update LSM with new supplementary groups
  * @new: updated credentials
  * @old: credentials being replaced
  *
  * Update the module's state after setting the supplementary group identity
  * attributes of the current process.  @new is the set of credentials that will
  * be installed.  Modifications should be made to this rather than to
  * @current->cred.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success.
  */
 int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
         return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgroups, new, old);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_task_setpgid() - Check if setting the pgid is allowed
  * @p: task being modified
  * @pgid: new pgid
  *
  * Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the process
  * @p to @pgid.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
         return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, p, pgid);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_task_getpgid() - Check if getting the pgid is allowed
  * @p: task
  *
  * Check permission before getting the process group identifier of the process
  * @p.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
 {
         return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, p);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_task_getsid() - Check if getting the session id is allowed
  * @p: task
  *
  * Check permission before getting the session identifier of the process @p.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 {
         return call_int_hook(task_getsid, p);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_current_getsecid_subj() - Get the current task's subjective secid
  * @secid: secid value
  *
  * Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the current task and return
  * it in @secid.  In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
  */
 void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
 {
         *secid = 0;
         call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj);
 
 /**
  * security_task_getsecid_obj() - Get a task's objective secid
  * @p: target task
  * @secid: secid value
  *
  * Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p and
  * return it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
  */
 void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
 {
         *secid = 0;
         call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
 
 /**
  * security_task_setnice() - Check if setting a task's nice value is allowed
  * @p: target task
  * @nice: nice value
  *
  * Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
         return call_int_hook(task_setnice, p, nice);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_task_setioprio() - Check if setting a task's ioprio is allowed
  * @p: target task
  * @ioprio: ioprio value
  *
  * Check permission before setting the ioprio value of @p to @ioprio.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 {
         return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, p, ioprio);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_task_getioprio() - Check if getting a task's ioprio is allowed
  * @p: task
  *
  * Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
 {
         return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, p);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_task_prlimit() - Check if get/setting resources limits is allowed
  * @cred: current task credentials
  * @tcred: target task credentials
  * @flags: LSM_PRLIMIT_* flag bits indicating a get/set/both
  *
  * Check permission before getting and/or setting the resource limits of
  * another task.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
                           unsigned int flags)
 {
         return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, cred, tcred, flags);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_task_setrlimit() - Check if setting a new rlimit value is allowed
  * @p: target task's group leader
  * @resource: resource whose limit is being set
  * @new_rlim: new resource limit
  *
  * Check permission before setting the resource limits of process @p for
  * @resource to @new_rlim.  The old resource limit values can be examined by
  * dereferencing (p->signal->rlim + resource).
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
                             struct rlimit *new_rlim)
 {
         return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, p, resource, new_rlim);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_task_setscheduler() - Check if setting sched policy/param is allowed
  * @p: target task
  *
  * Check permission before setting scheduling policy and/or parameters of
  * process @p.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
         return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, p);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_task_getscheduler() - Check if getting scheduling info is allowed
  * @p: target task
  *
  * Check permission before obtaining scheduling information for process @p.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
         return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, p);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_task_movememory() - Check if moving memory is allowed
  * @p: task
  *
  * Check permission before moving memory owned by process @p.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
 {
         return call_int_hook(task_movememory, p);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_task_kill() - Check if sending a signal is allowed
  * @p: target process
  * @info: signal information
  * @sig: signal value
  * @cred: credentials of the signal sender, NULL if @current
  *
  * Check permission before sending signal @sig to @p.  @info can be NULL, the
  * constant 1, or a pointer to a kernel_siginfo structure.  If @info is 1 or
  * SI_FROMKERNEL(info) is true, then the signal should be viewed as coming from
  * the kernel and should typically be permitted.  SIGIO signals are handled
  * separately by the send_sigiotask hook in file_security_ops.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
                        int sig, const struct cred *cred)
 {
         return call_int_hook(task_kill, p, info, sig, cred);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_task_prctl() - Check if a prctl op is allowed
  * @option: operation
  * @arg2: argument
  * @arg3: argument
  * @arg4: argument
  * @arg5: argument
  *
  * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the
  * current process.
  *
  * Return: Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value
  *         to cause prctl() to return immediately with that value.
  */
 int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
                         unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
 {
         int thisrc;
         int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl);
         struct security_hook_list *hp;
 
         hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) {
                 thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
                 if (thisrc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl)) {
                         rc = thisrc;
                         if (thisrc != 0)
                                 break;
                 }
         }
         return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_task_to_inode() - Set the security attributes of a task's inode
  * @p: task
  * @inode: inode
  *
  * Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's
  * security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes.
  */
 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
 {
         call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_create_user_ns() - Check if creating a new userns is allowed
  * @cred: prepared creds
  *
  * Check permission prior to creating a new user namespace.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if successful, otherwise < 0 error code.
  */
 int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred)
 {
         return call_int_hook(userns_create, cred);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_ipc_permission() - Check if sysv ipc access is allowed
  * @ipcp: ipc permission structure
  * @flag: requested permissions
  *
  * Check permissions for access to IPC.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 {
         return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, ipcp, flag);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_ipc_getsecid() - Get the sysv ipc object's secid
  * @ipcp: ipc permission structure
  * @secid: secid pointer
  *
  * Get the secid associated with the ipc object.  In case of failure, @secid
  * will be set to zero.
  */
 void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
 {
         *secid = 0;
         call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_msg_msg_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc message LSM blob
  * @msg: message structure
  *
  * Allocate and attach a security structure to the msg->security field.  The
  * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created.
  *
  * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
  */
 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
         int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg);
 
         if (unlikely(rc))
                 return rc;
         rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, msg);
         if (unlikely(rc))
                 security_msg_msg_free(msg);
         return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_msg_msg_free() - Free a sysv ipc message LSM blob
  * @msg: message structure
  *
  * Deallocate the security structure for this message.
  */
 void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
         call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg);
         kfree(msg->security);
         msg->security = NULL;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_msg_queue_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob
  * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure
  *
  * Allocate and attach a security structure to @msg. The security field is
  * initialized to NULL when the structure is first created.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
  */
 int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
 {
         int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq);
 
         if (unlikely(rc))
                 return rc;
         rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, msq);
         if (unlikely(rc))
                 security_msg_queue_free(msq);
         return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_msg_queue_free() - Free a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob
  * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure
  *
  * Deallocate security field @perm->security for the message queue.
  */
 void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
 {
         call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq);
         kfree(msq->security);
         msq->security = NULL;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_msg_queue_associate() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed
  * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure
  * @msqflg: operation flags
  *
  * Check permission when a message queue is requested through the msgget system
  * call. This hook is only called when returning the message queue identifier
  * for an existing message queue, not when a new message queue is created.
  *
  * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
 {
         return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, msq, msqflg);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_msg_queue_msgctl() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed
  * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure
  * @cmd: operation
  *
  * Check permission when a message control operation specified by @cmd is to be
  * performed on the message queue with permissions.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
 {
         return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, msq, cmd);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_msg_queue_msgsnd() - Check if sending a sysv ipc message is allowed
  * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure
  * @msg: message
  * @msqflg: operation flags
  *
  * Check permission before a message, @msg, is enqueued on the message queue
  * with permissions specified in @msq.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq,
                               struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
 {
         return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, msq, msg, msqflg);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_msg_queue_msgrcv() - Check if receiving a sysv ipc msg is allowed
  * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure
  * @msg: message
  * @target: target task
  * @type: type of message requested
  * @mode: operation flags
  *
  * Check permission before a message, @msg, is removed from the message queue.
  * The @target task structure contains a pointer to the process that will be
  * receiving the message (not equal to the current process when inline receives
  * are being performed).
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
                               struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
 {
         return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, msq, msg, target, type, mode);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_shm_alloc() - Allocate a sysv shm LSM blob
  * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure
  *
  * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @shp security field.  The
  * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
  */
 int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
 {
         int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp);
 
         if (unlikely(rc))
                 return rc;
         rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, shp);
         if (unlikely(rc))
                 security_shm_free(shp);
         return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_shm_free() - Free a sysv shm LSM blob
  * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure
  *
  * Deallocate the security structure @perm->security for the memory segment.
  */
 void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
 {
         call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp);
         kfree(shp->security);
         shp->security = NULL;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_shm_associate() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed
  * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure
  * @shmflg: operation flags
  *
  * Check permission when a shared memory region is requested through the shmget
  * system call. This hook is only called when returning the shared memory
  * region identifier for an existing region, not when a new shared memory
  * region is created.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
 {
         return call_int_hook(shm_associate, shp, shmflg);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_shm_shmctl() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed
  * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure
  * @cmd: operation
  *
  * Check permission when a shared memory control operation specified by @cmd is
  * to be performed on the shared memory region with permissions in @shp.
  *
  * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
 {
         return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, shp, cmd);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_shm_shmat() - Check if a sysv shm attach operation is allowed
  * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure
  * @shmaddr: address of memory region to attach
  * @shmflg: operation flags
  *
  * Check permissions prior to allowing the shmat system call to attach the
  * shared memory segment with permissions @shp to the data segment of the
  * calling process. The attaching address is specified by @shmaddr.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
                        char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
 {
         return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_sem_alloc() - Allocate a sysv semaphore LSM blob
  * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure
  *
  * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @sma security field. The
  * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
  */
 int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
 {
         int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma);
 
         if (unlikely(rc))
                 return rc;
         rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, sma);
         if (unlikely(rc))
                 security_sem_free(sma);
         return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_sem_free() - Free a sysv semaphore LSM blob
  * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure
  *
  * Deallocate security structure @sma->security for the semaphore.
  */
 void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
 {
         call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma);
         kfree(sma->security);
         sma->security = NULL;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_sem_associate() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed
  * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure
  * @semflg: operation flags
  *
  * Check permission when a semaphore is requested through the semget system
  * call. This hook is only called when returning the semaphore identifier for
  * an existing semaphore, not when a new one must be created.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
 {
         return call_int_hook(sem_associate, sma, semflg);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_sem_semctl() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed
  * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure
  * @cmd: operation
  *
  * Check permission when a semaphore operation specified by @cmd is to be
  * performed on the semaphore.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
 {
         return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, sma, cmd);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_sem_semop() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed
  * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure
  * @sops: operations to perform
  * @nsops: number of operations
  * @alter: flag indicating changes will be made
  *
  * Check permissions before performing operations on members of the semaphore
  * set. If the @alter flag is nonzero, the semaphore set may be modified.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
                        unsigned nsops, int alter)
 {
         return call_int_hook(sem_semop, sma, sops, nsops, alter);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_d_instantiate() - Populate an inode's LSM state based on a dentry
  * @dentry: dentry
  * @inode: inode
  *
  * Fill in @inode security information for a @dentry if allowed.
  */
 void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
 {
         if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
                 return;
         call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate);
 
 /*
  * Please keep this in sync with it's counterpart in security/lsm_syscalls.c
  */
 
 /**
  * security_getselfattr - Read an LSM attribute of the current process.
  * @attr: which attribute to return
  * @uctx: the user-space destination for the information, or NULL
  * @size: pointer to the size of space available to receive the data
  * @flags: special handling options. LSM_FLAG_SINGLE indicates that only
  * attributes associated with the LSM identified in the passed @ctx be
  * reported.
  *
  * A NULL value for @uctx can be used to get both the number of attributes
  * and the size of the data.
  *
  * Returns the number of attributes found on success, negative value
  * on error. @size is reset to the total size of the data.
  * If @size is insufficient to contain the data -E2BIG is returned.
  */
 int security_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx,
                          u32 __user *size, u32 flags)
 {
         struct security_hook_list *hp;
         struct lsm_ctx lctx = { .id = LSM_ID_UNDEF, };
         u8 __user *base = (u8 __user *)uctx;
         u32 entrysize;
         u32 total = 0;
         u32 left;
         bool toobig = false;
         bool single = false;
         int count = 0;
         int rc;
 
         if (attr == LSM_ATTR_UNDEF)
                 return -EINVAL;
         if (size == NULL)
                 return -EINVAL;
         if (get_user(left, size))
                 return -EFAULT;
 
         if (flags) {
                 /*
                  * Only flag supported is LSM_FLAG_SINGLE
                  */
                 if (flags != LSM_FLAG_SINGLE || !uctx)
                         return -EINVAL;
                 if (copy_from_user(&lctx, uctx, sizeof(lctx)))
                         return -EFAULT;
                 /*
                  * If the LSM ID isn't specified it is an error.
                  */
                 if (lctx.id == LSM_ID_UNDEF)
                         return -EINVAL;
                 single = true;
         }
 
         /*
          * In the usual case gather all the data from the LSMs.
          * In the single case only get the data from the LSM specified.
          */
         hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getselfattr, list) {
                 if (single && lctx.id != hp->lsmid->id)
                         continue;
                 entrysize = left;
                 if (base)
                         uctx = (struct lsm_ctx __user *)(base + total);
                 rc = hp->hook.getselfattr(attr, uctx, &entrysize, flags);
                 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
                         rc = 0;
                         continue;
                 }
                 if (rc == -E2BIG) {
                         rc = 0;
                         left = 0;
                         toobig = true;
                 } else if (rc < 0)
                         return rc;
                 else
                         left -= entrysize;
 
                 total += entrysize;
                 count += rc;
                 if (single)
                         break;
         }
         if (put_user(total, size))
                 return -EFAULT;
         if (toobig)
                 return -E2BIG;
         if (count == 0)
                 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getselfattr);
         return count;
 }
 
 /*
  * Please keep this in sync with it's counterpart in security/lsm_syscalls.c
  */
 
 /**
  * security_setselfattr - Set an LSM attribute on the current process.
  * @attr: which attribute to set
  * @uctx: the user-space source for the information
  * @size: the size of the data
  * @flags: reserved for future use, must be 0
  *
  * Set an LSM attribute for the current process. The LSM, attribute
  * and new value are included in @uctx.
  *
  * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL if the input is inconsistent, -EFAULT
  * if the user buffer is inaccessible, E2BIG if size is too big, or an
  * LSM specific failure.
  */
 int security_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx,
                          u32 size, u32 flags)
 {
         struct security_hook_list *hp;
         struct lsm_ctx *lctx;
         int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setselfattr);
         u64 required_len;
 
         if (flags)
                 return -EINVAL;
         if (size < sizeof(*lctx))
                 return -EINVAL;
         if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
                 return -E2BIG;
 
         lctx = memdup_user(uctx, size);
         if (IS_ERR(lctx))
                 return PTR_ERR(lctx);
 
         if (size < lctx->len ||
             check_add_overflow(sizeof(*lctx), lctx->ctx_len, &required_len) ||
             lctx->len < required_len) {
                 rc = -EINVAL;
                 goto free_out;
         }
 
         hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setselfattr, list)
                 if ((hp->lsmid->id) == lctx->id) {
                         rc = hp->hook.setselfattr(attr, lctx, size, flags);
                         break;
                 }
 
 free_out:
         kfree(lctx);
         return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_getprocattr() - Read an attribute for a task
  * @p: the task
  * @lsmid: LSM identification
  * @name: attribute name
  * @value: attribute value
  *
  * Read attribute @name for task @p and store it into @value if allowed.
  *
  * Return: Returns the length of @value on success, a negative value otherwise.
  */
 int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, int lsmid, const char *name,
                          char **value)
 {
         struct security_hook_list *hp;
 
         hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
                 if (lsmid != 0 && lsmid != hp->lsmid->id)
                         continue;
                 return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
         }
         return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_setprocattr() - Set an attribute for a task
  * @lsmid: LSM identification
  * @name: attribute name
  * @value: attribute value
  * @size: attribute value size
  *
  * Write (set) the current task's attribute @name to @value, size @size if
  * allowed.
  *
  * Return: Returns bytes written on success, a negative value otherwise.
  */
 int security_setprocattr(int lsmid, const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 {
         struct security_hook_list *hp;
 
         hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
                 if (lsmid != 0 && lsmid != hp->lsmid->id)
                         continue;
                 return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
         }
         return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_netlink_send() - Save info and check if netlink sending is allowed
  * @sk: sending socket
  * @skb: netlink message
  *
  * Save security information for a netlink message so that permission checking
  * can be performed when the message is processed.  The security information
  * can be saved using the eff_cap field of the netlink_skb_parms structure.
  * Also may be used to provide fine grained control over message transmission.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if the information was successfully saved and message is
  *         allowed to be transmitted.
  */
 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
         return call_int_hook(netlink_send, sk, skb);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_ismaclabel() - Check if the named attribute is a MAC label
  * @name: full extended attribute name
  *
  * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name represents a MAC label.
  *
  * Return: Returns 1 if name is a MAC attribute otherwise returns 0.
  */
 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
 {
         return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, name);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
 
 /**
  * security_secid_to_secctx() - Convert a secid to a secctx
  * @secid: secid
  * @secdata: secctx
  * @seclen: secctx length
  *
  * Convert secid to security context.  If @secdata is NULL the length of the
  * result will be returned in @seclen, but no @secdata will be returned.  This
  * does mean that the length could change between calls to check the length and
  * the next call which actually allocates and returns the @secdata.
  *
  * Return: Return 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
         return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, secid, secdata, seclen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
 
 /**
  * security_secctx_to_secid() - Convert a secctx to a secid
  * @secdata: secctx
  * @seclen: length of secctx
  * @secid: secid
  *
  * Convert security context to secid.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 {
         *secid = 0;
         return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, secdata, seclen, secid);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
 
 /**
  * security_release_secctx() - Free a secctx buffer
  * @secdata: secctx
  * @seclen: length of secctx
  *
  * Release the security context.
  */
 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
         call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
 
 /**
  * security_inode_invalidate_secctx() - Invalidate an inode's security label
  * @inode: inode
  *
  * Notify the security module that it must revalidate the security context of
  * an inode.
  */
 void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
 {
         call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx);
 
 /**
  * security_inode_notifysecctx() - Notify the LSM of an inode's security label
  * @inode: inode
  * @ctx: secctx
  * @ctxlen: length of secctx
  *
  * Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should
  * be.  Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module
  * for this inode.  Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize
  * the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server
  * for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client.
  * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 {
         return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
 
 /**
  * security_inode_setsecctx() - Change the security label of an inode
  * @dentry: inode
  * @ctx: secctx
  * @ctxlen: length of secctx
  *
  * Change the security context of an inode.  Updates the incore security
  * context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed
  * (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the
  * context.  Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security
  * context in its incore inode and on the backing filesystem to a value
  * provided by the client on a SETATTR operation.  Must be called with
  * inode->i_mutex locked.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 {
         return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
 
 /**
  * security_inode_getsecctx() - Get the security label of an inode
  * @inode: inode
  * @ctx: secctx
  * @ctxlen: length of secctx
  *
  * On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security
  * context for the given @inode.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
 {
         return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
 /**
  * security_post_notification() - Check if a watch notification can be posted
  * @w_cred: credentials of the task that set the watch
  * @cred: credentials of the task which triggered the watch
  * @n: the notification
  *
  * Check to see if a watch notification can be posted to a particular queue.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
                                const struct cred *cred,
                                struct watch_notification *n)
 {
         return call_int_hook(post_notification, w_cred, cred, n);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
 /**
  * security_watch_key() - Check if a task is allowed to watch for key events
  * @key: the key to watch
  *
  * Check to see if a process is allowed to watch for event notifications from
  * a key or keyring.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_watch_key(struct key *key)
 {
         return call_int_hook(watch_key, key);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 /**
  * security_unix_stream_connect() - Check if a AF_UNIX stream is allowed
  * @sock: originating sock
  * @other: peer sock
  * @newsk: new sock
  *
  * Check permissions before establishing a Unix domain stream connection
  * between @sock and @other.
  *
  * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because
  * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix
  * domain sockets.  Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name
  * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod
  * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to
  * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated.  Sufficient
  * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible
  * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target
  * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
                                  struct sock *newsk)
 {
         return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, sock, other, newsk);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect);
 
 /**
  * security_unix_may_send() - Check if AF_UNIX socket can send datagrams
  * @sock: originating sock
  * @other: peer sock
  *
  * Check permissions before connecting or sending datagrams from @sock to
  * @other.
  *
  * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because
  * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix
  * domain sockets.  Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name
  * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod
  * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to
  * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated.  Sufficient
  * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible
  * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target
  * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,  struct socket *other)
 {
         return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, sock, other);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send);
 
 /**
  * security_socket_create() - Check if creating a new socket is allowed
  * @family: protocol family
  * @type: communications type
  * @protocol: requested protocol
  * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested
  *
  * Check permissions prior to creating a new socket.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
 {
         return call_int_hook(socket_create, family, type, protocol, kern);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_socket_post_create() - Initialize a newly created socket
  * @sock: socket
  * @family: protocol family
  * @type: communications type
  * @protocol: requested protocol
  * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested
  *
  * This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security
  * structure. Note that the security field was not added directly to the socket
  * structure, but rather, the socket security information is stored in the
  * associated inode.  Typically, the inode alloc_security hook will allocate
  * and attach security information to SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security.  This hook
  * may be used to update the SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security field with additional
  * information that wasn't available when the inode was allocated.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
                                 int type, int protocol, int kern)
 {
         return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, sock, family, type,
                              protocol, kern);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_socket_socketpair() - Check if creating a socketpair is allowed
  * @socka: first socket
  * @sockb: second socket
  *
  * Check permissions before creating a fresh pair of sockets.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted and the connection was
  *         established.
  */
 int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb)
 {
         return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, socka, sockb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair);
 
 /**
  * security_socket_bind() - Check if a socket bind operation is allowed
  * @sock: socket
  * @address: requested bind address
  * @addrlen: length of address
  *
  * Check permission before socket protocol layer bind operation is performed
  * and the socket @sock is bound to the address specified in the @address
  * parameter.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
                          struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
         return call_int_hook(socket_bind, sock, address, addrlen);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_socket_connect() - Check if a socket connect operation is allowed
  * @sock: socket
  * @address: address of remote connection point
  * @addrlen: length of address
  *
  * Check permission before socket protocol layer connect operation attempts to
  * connect socket @sock to a remote address, @address.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
                             struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
         return call_int_hook(socket_connect, sock, address, addrlen);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_socket_listen() - Check if a socket is allowed to listen
  * @sock: socket
  * @backlog: connection queue size
  *
  * Check permission before socket protocol layer listen operation.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
 {
         return call_int_hook(socket_listen, sock, backlog);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_socket_accept() - Check if a socket is allowed to accept connections
  * @sock: listening socket
  * @newsock: newly creation connection socket
  *
  * Check permission before accepting a new connection.  Note that the new
  * socket, @newsock, has been created and some information copied to it, but
  * the accept operation has not actually been performed.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
 {
         return call_int_hook(socket_accept, sock, newsock);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_socket_sendmsg() - Check if sending a message is allowed
  * @sock: sending socket
  * @msg: message to send
  * @size: size of message
  *
  * Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 {
         return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, sock, msg, size);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_socket_recvmsg() - Check if receiving a message is allowed
  * @sock: receiving socket
  * @msg: message to receive
  * @size: size of message
  * @flags: operational flags
  *
  * Check permission before receiving a message from a socket.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
                             int size, int flags)
 {
         return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, sock, msg, size, flags);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_socket_getsockname() - Check if reading the socket addr is allowed
  * @sock: socket
  *
  * Check permission before reading the local address (name) of the socket
  * object.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
 {
         return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, sock);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_socket_getpeername() - Check if reading the peer's addr is allowed
  * @sock: socket
  *
  * Check permission before the remote address (name) of a socket object.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
 {
         return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, sock);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_socket_getsockopt() - Check if reading a socket option is allowed
  * @sock: socket
  * @level: option's protocol level
  * @optname: option name
  *
  * Check permissions before retrieving the options associated with socket
  * @sock.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
 {
         return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, sock, level, optname);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_socket_setsockopt() - Check if setting a socket option is allowed
  * @sock: socket
  * @level: option's protocol level
  * @optname: option name
  *
  * Check permissions before setting the options associated with socket @sock.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
 {
         return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, sock, level, optname);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_socket_shutdown() - Checks if shutting down the socket is allowed
  * @sock: socket
  * @how: flag indicating how sends and receives are handled
  *
  * Checks permission before all or part of a connection on the socket @sock is
  * shut down.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
 {
         return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, sock, how);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_sock_rcv_skb() - Check if an incoming network packet is allowed
  * @sk: destination sock
  * @skb: incoming packet
  *
  * Check permissions on incoming network packets.  This hook is distinct from
  * Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the incoming
  * sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk.  Must not
  * sleep inside this hook because some callers hold spinlocks.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
         return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, sk, skb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
 
 /**
  * security_socket_getpeersec_stream() - Get the remote peer label
  * @sock: socket
  * @optval: destination buffer
  * @optlen: size of peer label copied into the buffer
  * @len: maximum size of the destination buffer
  *
  * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state
  * for unix or connected tcp sockets to userspace via getsockopt SO_GETPEERSEC.
  * For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the socket is associated with an
  * ipsec SA.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return
  *         values.
  */
 int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval,
                                       sockptr_t optlen, unsigned int len)
 {
         return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, sock, optval, optlen,
                              len);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() - Get the remote peer label
  * @sock: socket
  * @skb: datagram packet
  * @secid: remote peer label secid
  *
  * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state
  * for udp sockets on a per-packet basis to userspace via getsockopt
  * SO_GETPEERSEC. The application must first have indicated the IP_PASSSEC
  * option via getsockopt. It can then retrieve the security state returned by
  * this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY ancillary message type.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
                                      struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
 {
         return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, sock, skb, secid);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
 
 /**
  * security_sk_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a sock's LSM blob
  * @sk: sock
  * @family: protocol family
  * @priority: gfp flags
  *
  * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field, which
  * is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 {
         return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, sk, family, priority);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_sk_free() - Free the sock's LSM blob
  * @sk: sock
  *
  * Deallocate security structure.
  */
 void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
 {
         call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_sk_clone() - Clone a sock's LSM state
  * @sk: original sock
  * @newsk: target sock
  *
  * Clone/copy security structure.
  */
 void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
 {
         call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone);
 
 /**
  * security_sk_classify_flow() - Set a flow's secid based on socket
  * @sk: original socket
  * @flic: target flow
  *
  * Set the target flow's secid to socket's secid.
  */
 void security_sk_classify_flow(const struct sock *sk, struct flowi_common *flic)
 {
         call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &flic->flowic_secid);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow);
 
 /**
  * security_req_classify_flow() - Set a flow's secid based on request_sock
  * @req: request_sock
  * @flic: target flow
  *
  * Sets @flic's secid to @req's secid.
  */
 void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
                                 struct flowi_common *flic)
 {
         call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, flic);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow);
 
 /**
  * security_sock_graft() - Reconcile LSM state when grafting a sock on a socket
  * @sk: sock being grafted
  * @parent: target parent socket
  *
  * Sets @parent's inode secid to @sk's secid and update @sk with any necessary
  * LSM state from @parent.
  */
 void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 {
         call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft);
 
 /**
  * security_inet_conn_request() - Set request_sock state using incoming connect
  * @sk: parent listening sock
  * @skb: incoming connection
  * @req: new request_sock
  *
  * Initialize the @req LSM state based on @sk and the incoming connect in @skb.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk,
                                struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req)
 {
         return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, sk, skb, req);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request);
 
 /**
  * security_inet_csk_clone() - Set new sock LSM state based on request_sock
  * @newsk: new sock
  * @req: connection request_sock
  *
  * Set that LSM state of @sock using the LSM state from @req.
  */
 void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
                              const struct request_sock *req)
 {
         call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_inet_conn_established() - Update sock's LSM state with connection
  * @sk: sock
  * @skb: connection packet
  *
  * Update @sock's LSM state to represent a new connection from @skb.
  */
 void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
                                     struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
         call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);
 
 /**
  * security_secmark_relabel_packet() - Check if setting a secmark is allowed
  * @secid: new secmark value
  *
  * Check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to @secid.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
 {
         return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, secid);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
 
 /**
  * security_secmark_refcount_inc() - Increment the secmark labeling rule count
  *
  * Tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded.
  */
 void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
 {
         call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc);
 
 /**
  * security_secmark_refcount_dec() - Decrement the secmark labeling rule count
  *
  * Tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded.
  */
 void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
 {
         call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec);
 
 /**
  * security_tun_dev_alloc_security() - Allocate a LSM blob for a TUN device
  * @security: pointer to the LSM blob
  *
  * This hook allows a module to allocate a security structure for a TUN device,
  * returning the pointer in @security.
  *
  * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure.
  */
 int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
 {
         return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, security);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security);
 
 /**
  * security_tun_dev_free_security() - Free a TUN device LSM blob
  * @security: LSM blob
  *
  * This hook allows a module to free the security structure for a TUN device.
  */
 void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
 {
         call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security);
 
 /**
  * security_tun_dev_create() - Check if creating a TUN device is allowed
  *
  * Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_tun_dev_create(void)
 {
         return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
 
 /**
  * security_tun_dev_attach_queue() - Check if attaching a TUN queue is allowed
  * @security: TUN device LSM blob
  *
  * Check permissions prior to attaching to a TUN device queue.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
 {
         return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, security);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue);
 
 /**
  * security_tun_dev_attach() - Update TUN device LSM state on attach
  * @sk: associated sock
  * @security: TUN device LSM blob
  *
  * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated
  * with the TUN device's sock structure.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
 {
         return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, sk, security);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
 
 /**
  * security_tun_dev_open() - Update TUN device LSM state on open
  * @security: TUN device LSM blob
  *
  * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated
  * with the TUN device's security structure.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_tun_dev_open(void *security)
 {
         return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, security);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open);
 
 /**
  * security_sctp_assoc_request() - Update the LSM on a SCTP association req
  * @asoc: SCTP association
  * @skb: packet requesting the association
  *
  * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association INIT packet to the LSM.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
                                 struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
         return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, asoc, skb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request);
 
 /**
  * security_sctp_bind_connect() - Validate a list of addrs for a SCTP option
  * @sk: socket
  * @optname: SCTP option to validate
  * @address: list of IP addresses to validate
  * @addrlen: length of the address list
  *
  * Validiate permissions required for each address associated with sock @sk.
  * Depending on @optname, the addresses will be treated as either a connect or
  * bind service. The @addrlen is calculated on each IPv4 and IPv6 address using
  * sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) or sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6).
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
                                struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
         return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, sk, optname, address, addrlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect);
 
 /**
  * security_sctp_sk_clone() - Clone a SCTP sock's LSM state
  * @asoc: SCTP association
  * @sk: original sock
  * @newsk: target sock
  *
  * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) (i.e. a TCP style
  * socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace calls
  * sctp_peeloff(3).
  */
 void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
                             struct sock *newsk)
 {
         call_void_hook(sctp_sk_clone, asoc, sk, newsk);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone);
 
 /**
  * security_sctp_assoc_established() - Update LSM state when assoc established
  * @asoc: SCTP association
  * @skb: packet establishing the association
  *
  * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association COOKIE_ACK packet to the
  * security module.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
                                     struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
         return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_established, asoc, skb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established);
 
 /**
  * security_mptcp_add_subflow() - Inherit the LSM label from the MPTCP socket
  * @sk: the owning MPTCP socket
  * @ssk: the new subflow
  *
  * Update the labeling for the given MPTCP subflow, to match the one of the
  * owning MPTCP socket. This hook has to be called after the socket creation and
  * initialization via the security_socket_create() and
  * security_socket_post_create() LSM hooks.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on failure.
  */
 int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
 {
         return call_int_hook(mptcp_add_subflow, sk, ssk);
 }
 
 #endif  /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
 /**
  * security_ib_pkey_access() - Check if access to an IB pkey is allowed
  * @sec: LSM blob
  * @subnet_prefix: subnet prefix of the port
  * @pkey: IB pkey
  *
  * Check permission to access a pkey when modifying a QP.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey)
 {
         return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access);
 
 /**
  * security_ib_endport_manage_subnet() - Check if SMPs traffic is allowed
  * @sec: LSM blob
  * @dev_name: IB device name
  * @port_num: port number
  *
  * Check permissions to send and receive SMPs on a end port.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec,
                                       const char *dev_name, u8 port_num)
 {
         return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, sec, dev_name, port_num);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet);
 
 /**
  * security_ib_alloc_security() - Allocate an Infiniband LSM blob
  * @sec: LSM blob
  *
  * Allocate a security structure for Infiniband objects.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, non-zero on failure.
  */
 int security_ib_alloc_security(void **sec)
 {
         return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, sec);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_alloc_security);
 
 /**
  * security_ib_free_security() - Free an Infiniband LSM blob
  * @sec: LSM blob
  *
  * Deallocate an Infiniband security structure.
  */
 void security_ib_free_security(void *sec)
 {
         call_void_hook(ib_free_security, sec);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_free_security);
 #endif  /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 /**
  * security_xfrm_policy_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm policy LSM blob
  * @ctxp: xfrm security context being added to the SPD
  * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace
  * @gfp: gfp flags
  *
  * Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security field
  * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated.
  *
  * Return:  Return 0 if operation was successful.
  */
 int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
                                struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
                                gfp_t gfp)
 {
         return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc);
 
 /**
  * security_xfrm_policy_clone() - Clone xfrm policy LSM state
  * @old_ctx: xfrm security context
  * @new_ctxp: target xfrm security context
  *
  * Allocate a security structure in new_ctxp that contains the information from
  * the old_ctx structure.
  *
  * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful.
  */
 int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
                                struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
 {
         return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, old_ctx, new_ctxp);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_xfrm_policy_free() - Free a xfrm security context
  * @ctx: xfrm security context
  *
  * Free LSM resources associated with @ctx.
  */
 void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 {
         call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free);
 
 /**
  * security_xfrm_policy_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm policy is allowed
  * @ctx: xfrm security context
  *
  * Authorize deletion of a SPD entry.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 {
         return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, ctx);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_xfrm_state_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob
  * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD
  * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace
  *
  * Allocate a security structure to the @x->security field; the security field
  * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the context to
  * correspond to @sec_ctx.
  *
  * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful.
  */
 int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
                               struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
 {
         return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, x, sec_ctx);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc);
 
 /**
  * security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob
  * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD
  * @polsec: associated policy's security context
  * @secid: secid from the flow
  *
  * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security field
  * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated.  Set the context to
  * correspond to secid.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful.
  */
 int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
                                       struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
 {
         return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, x, polsec, secid);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_xfrm_state_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm state is allowed
  * @x: xfrm state
  *
  * Authorize deletion of x->security.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
         return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, x);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete);
 
 /**
  * security_xfrm_state_free() - Free a xfrm state
  * @x: xfrm state
  *
  * Deallocate x->security.
  */
 void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
         call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_xfrm_policy_lookup() - Check if using a xfrm policy is allowed
  * @ctx: target xfrm security context
  * @fl_secid: flow secid used to authorize access
  *
  * Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing XFRMs on a
  * packet.  The hook is called when selecting either a per-socket policy or a
  * generic xfrm policy.
  *
  * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ESRCH otherwise, or -errno on
  *         other errors.
  */
 int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid)
 {
         return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, ctx, fl_secid);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match() - Check for a xfrm match
  * @x: xfrm state to match
  * @xp: xfrm policy to check for a match
  * @flic: flow to check for a match.
  *
  * Check @xp and @flic for a match with @x.
  *
  * Return: Returns 1 if there is a match.
  */
 int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
                                        struct xfrm_policy *xp,
                                        const struct flowi_common *flic)
 {
         struct security_hook_list *hp;
         int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match);
 
         /*
          * Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment
          * becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately,
          * we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux
          * supplies this call.
          *
          * For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than
          * using the macro
          */
         hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
                              list) {
                 rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, flic);
                 break;
         }
         return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * security_xfrm_decode_session() - Determine the xfrm secid for a packet
  * @skb: xfrm packet
  * @secid: secid
  *
  * Decode the packet in @skb and return the security label in @secid.
  *
  * Return: Return 0 if all xfrms used have the same secid.
  */
 int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
 {
         return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, skb, secid, 1);
 }
 
 void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi_common *flic)
 {
         int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, skb, &flic->flowic_secid,
                                0);
 
         BUG_ON(rc);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
 #endif  /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 /**
  * security_key_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a kernel key LSM blob
  * @key: key
  * @cred: credentials
  * @flags: allocation flags
  *
  * Permit allocation of a key and assign security data. Note that key does not
  * have a serial number assigned at this point.
  *
  * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
  */
 int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
                        unsigned long flags)
 {
         return call_int_hook(key_alloc, key, cred, flags);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_key_free() - Free a kernel key LSM blob
  * @key: key
  *
  * Notification of destruction; free security data.
  */
 void security_key_free(struct key *key)
 {
         call_void_hook(key_free, key);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_key_permission() - Check if a kernel key operation is allowed
  * @key_ref: key reference
  * @cred: credentials of actor requesting access
  * @need_perm: requested permissions
  *
  * See whether a specific operational right is granted to a process on a key.
  *
  * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
  */
 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
                             enum key_need_perm need_perm)
 {
         return call_int_hook(key_permission, key_ref, cred, need_perm);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_key_getsecurity() - Get the key's security label
  * @key: key
  * @buffer: security label buffer
  *
  * Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key for
  * the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY.  This function allocates the
  * storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller should free it.
  *
  * Return: Returns the length of @buffer (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
  *         an error occurs.  May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if
  *         there is no security label assigned to the key.
  */
 int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **buffer)
 {
         *buffer = NULL;
         return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, key, buffer);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_key_post_create_or_update() - Notification of key create or update
  * @keyring: keyring to which the key is linked to
  * @key: created or updated key
  * @payload: data used to instantiate or update the key
  * @payload_len: length of payload
  * @flags: key flags
  * @create: flag indicating whether the key was created or updated
  *
  * Notify the caller of a key creation or update.
  */
 void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
                                         const void *payload, size_t payload_len,
                                         unsigned long flags, bool create)
 {
         call_void_hook(key_post_create_or_update, keyring, key, payload,
                        payload_len, flags, create);
 }
 #endif  /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 /**
  * security_audit_rule_init() - Allocate and init an LSM audit rule struct
  * @field: audit action
  * @op: rule operator
  * @rulestr: rule context
  * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct
  * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc
  *
  * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure.
  *
  * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of
  *         an invalid rule.
  */
 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
                              gfp_t gfp)
 {
         return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule, gfp);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_audit_rule_known() - Check if an audit rule contains LSM fields
  * @krule: audit rule
  *
  * Specifies whether given @krule contains any fields related to the current
  * LSM.
  *
  * Return: Returns 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise.
  */
 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
 {
         return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, krule);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_audit_rule_free() - Free an LSM audit rule struct
  * @lsmrule: audit rule struct
  *
  * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by
  * audit_rule_init().
  */
 void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
 {
         call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_audit_rule_match() - Check if a label matches an audit rule
  * @secid: security label
  * @field: LSM audit field
  * @op: matching operator
  * @lsmrule: audit rule
  *
  * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved by
  * security_audit_rule_known().
  *
  * Return: Returns 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on
  *         failure.
  */
 int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
 {
         return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
 /**
  * security_bpf() - Check if the bpf syscall operation is allowed
  * @cmd: command
  * @attr: bpf attribute
  * @size: size
  *
  * Do a initial check for all bpf syscalls after the attribute is copied into
  * the kernel. The actual security module can implement their own rules to
  * check the specific cmd they need.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
 {
         return call_int_hook(bpf, cmd, attr, size);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_bpf_map() - Check if access to a bpf map is allowed
  * @map: bpf map
  * @fmode: mode
  *
  * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF
  * maps.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
 {
         return call_int_hook(bpf_map, map, fmode);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_bpf_prog() - Check if access to a bpf program is allowed
  * @prog: bpf program
  *
  * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF
  * programs.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
         return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, prog);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_bpf_map_create() - Check if BPF map creation is allowed
  * @map: BPF map object
  * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF map
  * @token: BPF token used to grant user access
  *
  * Do a check when the kernel creates a new BPF map. This is also the
  * point where LSM blob is allocated for LSMs that need them.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
                             struct bpf_token *token)
 {
         return call_int_hook(bpf_map_create, map, attr, token);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_bpf_prog_load() - Check if loading of BPF program is allowed
  * @prog: BPF program object
  * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF program
  * @token: BPF token used to grant user access to BPF subsystem
  *
  * Perform an access control check when the kernel loads a BPF program and
  * allocates associated BPF program object. This hook is also responsible for
  * allocating any required LSM state for the BPF program.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
                            struct bpf_token *token)
 {
         return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_load, prog, attr, token);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_bpf_token_create() - Check if creating of BPF token is allowed
  * @token: BPF token object
  * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF token
  * @path: path pointing to BPF FS mount point from which BPF token is created
  *
  * Do a check when the kernel instantiates a new BPF token object from BPF FS
  * instance. This is also the point where LSM blob can be allocated for LSMs.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr,
                               struct path *path)
 {
         return call_int_hook(bpf_token_create, token, attr, path);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_bpf_token_cmd() - Check if BPF token is allowed to delegate
  * requested BPF syscall command
  * @token: BPF token object
  * @cmd: BPF syscall command requested to be delegated by BPF token
  *
  * Do a check when the kernel decides whether provided BPF token should allow
  * delegation of requested BPF syscall command.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_bpf_token_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
 {
         return call_int_hook(bpf_token_cmd, token, cmd);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_bpf_token_capable() - Check if BPF token is allowed to delegate
  * requested BPF-related capability
  * @token: BPF token object
  * @cap: capabilities requested to be delegated by BPF token
  *
  * Do a check when the kernel decides whether provided BPF token should allow
  * delegation of requested BPF-related capabilities.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
 {
         return call_int_hook(bpf_token_capable, token, cap);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_bpf_map_free() - Free a bpf map's LSM blob
  * @map: bpf map
  *
  * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf map.
  */
 void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
 {
         call_void_hook(bpf_map_free, map);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_bpf_prog_free() - Free a BPF program's LSM blob
  * @prog: BPF program struct
  *
  * Clean up the security information stored inside BPF program.
  */
 void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
         call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free, prog);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_bpf_token_free() - Free a BPF token's LSM blob
  * @token: BPF token struct
  *
  * Clean up the security information stored inside BPF token.
  */
 void security_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
 {
         call_void_hook(bpf_token_free, token);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
 
 /**
  * security_locked_down() - Check if a kernel feature is allowed
  * @what: requested kernel feature
  *
  * Determine whether a kernel feature that potentially enables arbitrary code
  * execution in kernel space should be permitted.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
 {
         return call_int_hook(locked_down, what);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
 /**
  * security_perf_event_open() - Check if a perf event open is allowed
  * @attr: perf event attribute
  * @type: type of event
  *
  * Check whether the @type of perf_event_open syscall is allowed.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
 {
         return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, attr, type);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_perf_event_alloc() - Allocate a perf event LSM blob
  * @event: perf event
  *
  * Allocate and save perf_event security info.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
 {
         return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, event);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_perf_event_free() - Free a perf event LSM blob
  * @event: perf event
  *
  * Release (free) perf_event security info.
  */
 void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
 {
         call_void_hook(perf_event_free, event);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_perf_event_read() - Check if reading a perf event label is allowed
  * @event: perf event
  *
  * Read perf_event security info if allowed.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
 {
         return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, event);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_perf_event_write() - Check if writing a perf event label is allowed
  * @event: perf event
  *
  * Write perf_event security info if allowed.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
 {
         return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, event);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
 /**
  * security_uring_override_creds() - Check if overriding creds is allowed
  * @new: new credentials
  *
  * Check if the current task, executing an io_uring operation, is allowed to
  * override it's credentials with @new.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
 {
         return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, new);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_uring_sqpoll() - Check if IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL is allowed
  *
  * Check whether the current task is allowed to spawn a io_uring polling thread
  * (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL).
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_uring_sqpoll(void)
 {
         return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_uring_cmd() - Check if a io_uring passthrough command is allowed
  * @ioucmd: command
  *
  * Check whether the file_operations uring_cmd is allowed to run.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
 int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 {
         return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, ioucmd);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */