1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later 2 /* 3 * Security plug functions 4 * 5 * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com> 6 * Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> 7 * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com> 8 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies 9 * Copyright (C) 2023 Microsoft Corporation <paul@paul-moore.com> 10 */ 11 12 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt 13 14 #include <linux/bpf.h> 15 #include <linux/capability.h> 16 #include <linux/dcache.h> 17 #include <linux/export.h> 18 #include <linux/init.h> 19 #include <linux/kernel.h> 20 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h> 21 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> 22 #include <linux/fsnotify.h> 23 #include <linux/mman.h> 24 #include <linux/mount.h> 25 #include <linux/personality.h> 26 #include <linux/backing-dev.h> 27 #include <linux/string.h> 28 #include <linux/xattr.h> 29 #include <linux/msg.h> 30 #include <linux/overflow.h> 31 #include <net/flow.h> 32 33 /* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */ 34 #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info) 35 36 /* 37 * How many LSMs are built into the kernel as determined at 38 * build time. Used to determine fixed array sizes. 39 * The capability module is accounted for by CONFIG_SECURITY 40 */ 41 #define LSM_CONFIG_COUNT ( \ 42 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY) ? 1 : 0) + \ 43 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \ 44 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \ 45 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) ? 1 : 0) + \ 46 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \ 47 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) ? 1 : 0) + \ 48 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) ? 1 : 0) + \ 49 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) ? 1 : 0) + \ 50 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ 51 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ 52 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \ 53 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0) + \ 54 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM) ? 1 : 0)) 55 56 /* 57 * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the 58 * security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows 59 * all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing 60 * purposes. 61 */ 62 const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX + 1] = { 63 [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none", 64 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading", 65 [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", 66 [LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access", 67 [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", 68 [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", 69 [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access", 70 [LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access", 71 [LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access", 72 [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables", 73 [LOCKDOWN_DEVICE_TREE] = "modifying device tree contents", 74 [LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage", 75 [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO", 76 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters", 77 [LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio", 78 [LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access", 79 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access", 80 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM", 81 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM", 82 [LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION] = "RTAS error injection", 83 [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", 84 [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", 85 [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", 86 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", 87 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM", 88 [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf", 89 [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs", 90 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access", 91 [LOCKDOWN_XFRM_SECRET] = "xfrm SA secret", 92 [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", 93 }; 94 95 struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __ro_after_init; 96 static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain); 97 98 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; 99 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; 100 101 char *lsm_names; 102 static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __ro_after_init; 103 104 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ 105 static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order; 106 static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm; 107 108 static __initconst const char *const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM; 109 110 /* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */ 111 static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms; 112 static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive; 113 114 static __initdata bool debug; 115 #define init_debug(...) \ 116 do { \ 117 if (debug) \ 118 pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \ 119 } while (0) 120 121 static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm) 122 { 123 if (!lsm->enabled) 124 return false; 125 126 return *lsm->enabled; 127 } 128 129 /* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */ 130 static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1; 131 static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0; 132 static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled) 133 { 134 /* 135 * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use 136 * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state. 137 */ 138 if (!lsm->enabled) { 139 if (enabled) 140 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 141 else 142 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; 143 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) { 144 if (!enabled) 145 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; 146 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) { 147 if (enabled) 148 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 149 } else { 150 *lsm->enabled = enabled; 151 } 152 } 153 154 /* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */ 155 static bool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 156 { 157 struct lsm_info **check; 158 159 for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++) 160 if (*check == lsm) 161 return true; 162 163 return false; 164 } 165 166 /* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */ 167 static int last_lsm __initdata; 168 static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from) 169 { 170 /* Ignore duplicate selections. */ 171 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 172 return; 173 174 if (WARN(last_lsm == LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM slots!?\n", from)) 175 return; 176 177 /* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */ 178 if (!lsm->enabled) 179 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 180 ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm; 181 182 init_debug("%s ordered: %s (%s)\n", from, lsm->name, 183 is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); 184 } 185 186 /* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */ 187 static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm) 188 { 189 /* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */ 190 if (!is_enabled(lsm)) 191 return false; 192 193 /* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */ 194 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) { 195 init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name); 196 return false; 197 } 198 199 return true; 200 } 201 202 static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs) 203 { 204 int offset; 205 206 if (*need <= 0) 207 return; 208 209 offset = ALIGN(*lbs, sizeof(void *)); 210 *lbs = offset + *need; 211 *need = offset; 212 } 213 214 static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) 215 { 216 if (!needed) 217 return; 218 219 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred); 220 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file); 221 /* 222 * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to 223 * what the modules might need. 224 */ 225 if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0) 226 blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head); 227 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode); 228 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); 229 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); 230 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); 231 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); 232 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_xattr_count, 233 &blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count); 234 } 235 236 /* Prepare LSM for initialization. */ 237 static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 238 { 239 int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm); 240 241 /* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */ 242 set_enabled(lsm, enabled); 243 244 /* If enabled, do pre-initialization work. */ 245 if (enabled) { 246 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) { 247 exclusive = lsm; 248 init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name); 249 } 250 251 lsm_set_blob_sizes(lsm->blobs); 252 } 253 } 254 255 /* Initialize a given LSM, if it is enabled. */ 256 static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 257 { 258 if (is_enabled(lsm)) { 259 int ret; 260 261 init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name); 262 ret = lsm->init(); 263 WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret); 264 } 265 } 266 267 /* 268 * Current index to use while initializing the lsm id list. 269 */ 270 u32 lsm_active_cnt __ro_after_init; 271 const struct lsm_id *lsm_idlist[LSM_CONFIG_COUNT]; 272 273 /* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */ 274 static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin) 275 { 276 struct lsm_info *lsm; 277 char *sep, *name, *next; 278 279 /* LSM_ORDER_FIRST is always first. */ 280 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 281 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST) 282 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " first"); 283 } 284 285 /* Process "security=", if given. */ 286 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 287 struct lsm_info *major; 288 289 /* 290 * To match the original "security=" behavior, this 291 * explicitly does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major 292 * if the selected one was separately disabled: disable 293 * all non-matching Legacy Major LSMs. 294 */ 295 for (major = __start_lsm_info; major < __end_lsm_info; 296 major++) { 297 if ((major->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) && 298 strcmp(major->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0) { 299 set_enabled(major, false); 300 init_debug("security=%s disabled: %s (only one legacy major LSM)\n", 301 chosen_major_lsm, major->name); 302 } 303 } 304 } 305 306 sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL); 307 next = sep; 308 /* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */ 309 while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) { 310 bool found = false; 311 312 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 313 if (strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) { 314 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE) 315 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin); 316 found = true; 317 } 318 } 319 320 if (!found) 321 init_debug("%s ignored: %s (not built into kernel)\n", 322 origin, name); 323 } 324 325 /* Process "security=", if given. */ 326 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 327 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 328 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 329 continue; 330 if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) == 0) 331 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "security="); 332 } 333 } 334 335 /* LSM_ORDER_LAST is always last. */ 336 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 337 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_LAST) 338 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " last"); 339 } 340 341 /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */ 342 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 343 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 344 continue; 345 set_enabled(lsm, false); 346 init_debug("%s skipped: %s (not in requested order)\n", 347 origin, lsm->name); 348 } 349 350 kfree(sep); 351 } 352 353 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred); 354 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task); 355 356 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result); 357 358 static void __init report_lsm_order(void) 359 { 360 struct lsm_info **lsm, *early; 361 int first = 0; 362 363 pr_info("initializing lsm="); 364 365 /* Report each enabled LSM name, comma separated. */ 366 for (early = __start_early_lsm_info; 367 early < __end_early_lsm_info; early++) 368 if (is_enabled(early)) 369 pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", early->name); 370 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 371 if (is_enabled(*lsm)) 372 pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", (*lsm)->name); 373 374 pr_cont("\n"); 375 } 376 377 static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) 378 { 379 struct lsm_info **lsm; 380 381 ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms), 382 GFP_KERNEL); 383 384 if (chosen_lsm_order) { 385 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 386 pr_warn("security=%s is ignored because it is superseded by lsm=%s\n", 387 chosen_major_lsm, chosen_lsm_order); 388 chosen_major_lsm = NULL; 389 } 390 ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline"); 391 } else 392 ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin"); 393 394 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 395 prepare_lsm(*lsm); 396 397 report_lsm_order(); 398 399 init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred); 400 init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file); 401 init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode); 402 init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); 403 init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); 404 init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); 405 init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task); 406 init_debug("xattr slots = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count); 407 408 /* 409 * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs 410 */ 411 if (blob_sizes.lbs_file) 412 lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache", 413 blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0, 414 SLAB_PANIC, NULL); 415 if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode) 416 lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache", 417 blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0, 418 SLAB_PANIC, NULL); 419 420 lsm_early_cred((struct cred *) current->cred); 421 lsm_early_task(current); 422 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 423 initialize_lsm(*lsm); 424 425 kfree(ordered_lsms); 426 } 427 428 int __init early_security_init(void) 429 { 430 struct lsm_info *lsm; 431 432 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ 433 INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&security_hook_heads.NAME); 434 #include "linux/lsm_hook_defs.h" 435 #undef LSM_HOOK 436 437 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { 438 if (!lsm->enabled) 439 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 440 prepare_lsm(lsm); 441 initialize_lsm(lsm); 442 } 443 444 return 0; 445 } 446 447 /** 448 * security_init - initializes the security framework 449 * 450 * This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence. 451 */ 452 int __init security_init(void) 453 { 454 struct lsm_info *lsm; 455 456 init_debug("legacy security=%s\n", chosen_major_lsm ? : " *unspecified*"); 457 init_debug(" CONFIG_LSM=%s\n", builtin_lsm_order); 458 init_debug("boot arg lsm=%s\n", chosen_lsm_order ? : " *unspecified*"); 459 460 /* 461 * Append the names of the early LSM modules now that kmalloc() is 462 * available 463 */ 464 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { 465 init_debug(" early started: %s (%s)\n", lsm->name, 466 is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); 467 if (lsm->enabled) 468 lsm_append(lsm->name, &lsm_names); 469 } 470 471 /* Load LSMs in specified order. */ 472 ordered_lsm_init(); 473 474 return 0; 475 } 476 477 /* Save user chosen LSM */ 478 static int __init choose_major_lsm(char *str) 479 { 480 chosen_major_lsm = str; 481 return 1; 482 } 483 __setup("security=", choose_major_lsm); 484 485 /* Explicitly choose LSM initialization order. */ 486 static int __init choose_lsm_order(char *str) 487 { 488 chosen_lsm_order = str; 489 return 1; 490 } 491 __setup("lsm=", choose_lsm_order); 492 493 /* Enable LSM order debugging. */ 494 static int __init enable_debug(char *str) 495 { 496 debug = true; 497 return 1; 498 } 499 __setup("lsm.debug", enable_debug); 500 501 static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm) 502 { 503 const char *last; 504 505 if (WARN_ON(!list || !lsm)) 506 return false; 507 last = strrchr(list, ','); 508 if (last) 509 /* Pass the comma, strcmp() will check for '\0' */ 510 last++; 511 else 512 last = list; 513 return !strcmp(last, lsm); 514 } 515 516 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result) 517 { 518 char *cp; 519 520 if (*result == NULL) { 521 *result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL); 522 if (*result == NULL) 523 return -ENOMEM; 524 } else { 525 /* Check if it is the last registered name */ 526 if (match_last_lsm(*result, new)) 527 return 0; 528 cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new); 529 if (cp == NULL) 530 return -ENOMEM; 531 kfree(*result); 532 *result = cp; 533 } 534 return 0; 535 } 536 537 /** 538 * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. 539 * @hooks: the hooks to add 540 * @count: the number of hooks to add 541 * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module 542 * 543 * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure. 544 */ 545 void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, 546 const struct lsm_id *lsmid) 547 { 548 int i; 549 550 /* 551 * A security module may call security_add_hooks() more 552 * than once during initialization, and LSM initialization 553 * is serialized. Landlock is one such case. 554 * Look at the previous entry, if there is one, for duplication. 555 */ 556 if (lsm_active_cnt == 0 || lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt - 1] != lsmid) { 557 if (lsm_active_cnt >= LSM_CONFIG_COUNT) 558 panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__); 559 lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt++] = lsmid; 560 } 561 562 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { 563 hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid; 564 hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head); 565 } 566 567 /* 568 * Don't try to append during early_security_init(), we'll come back 569 * and fix this up afterwards. 570 */ 571 if (slab_is_available()) { 572 if (lsm_append(lsmid->name, &lsm_names) < 0) 573 panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__); 574 } 575 } 576 577 int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data) 578 { 579 return blocking_notifier_call_chain(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 580 event, data); 581 } 582 EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_blocking_lsm_notifier); 583 584 int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) 585 { 586 return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 587 nb); 588 } 589 EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_blocking_lsm_notifier); 590 591 int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) 592 { 593 return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 594 nb); 595 } 596 EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier); 597 598 /** 599 * lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob 600 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob 601 * @gfp: allocation type 602 * 603 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules 604 * 605 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 606 */ 607 static int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 608 { 609 if (blob_sizes.lbs_cred == 0) { 610 cred->security = NULL; 611 return 0; 612 } 613 614 cred->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp); 615 if (cred->security == NULL) 616 return -ENOMEM; 617 return 0; 618 } 619 620 /** 621 * lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob 622 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob 623 * 624 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules 625 */ 626 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred) 627 { 628 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL); 629 630 if (rc) 631 panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__); 632 } 633 634 /** 635 * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob 636 * @file: the file that needs a blob 637 * 638 * Allocate the file blob for all the modules 639 * 640 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 641 */ 642 static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file) 643 { 644 if (!lsm_file_cache) { 645 file->f_security = NULL; 646 return 0; 647 } 648 649 file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL); 650 if (file->f_security == NULL) 651 return -ENOMEM; 652 return 0; 653 } 654 655 /** 656 * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob 657 * @inode: the inode that needs a blob 658 * 659 * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules 660 * 661 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 662 */ 663 int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) 664 { 665 if (!lsm_inode_cache) { 666 inode->i_security = NULL; 667 return 0; 668 } 669 670 inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS); 671 if (inode->i_security == NULL) 672 return -ENOMEM; 673 return 0; 674 } 675 676 /** 677 * lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob 678 * @task: the task that needs a blob 679 * 680 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules 681 * 682 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 683 */ 684 static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) 685 { 686 if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) { 687 task->security = NULL; 688 return 0; 689 } 690 691 task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL); 692 if (task->security == NULL) 693 return -ENOMEM; 694 return 0; 695 } 696 697 /** 698 * lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob 699 * @kip: the ipc that needs a blob 700 * 701 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules 702 * 703 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 704 */ 705 static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip) 706 { 707 if (blob_sizes.lbs_ipc == 0) { 708 kip->security = NULL; 709 return 0; 710 } 711 712 kip->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL); 713 if (kip->security == NULL) 714 return -ENOMEM; 715 return 0; 716 } 717 718 /** 719 * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob 720 * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob 721 * 722 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules 723 * 724 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 725 */ 726 static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp) 727 { 728 if (blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg == 0) { 729 mp->security = NULL; 730 return 0; 731 } 732 733 mp->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg, GFP_KERNEL); 734 if (mp->security == NULL) 735 return -ENOMEM; 736 return 0; 737 } 738 739 /** 740 * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob 741 * @task: the task that needs a blob 742 * 743 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules 744 */ 745 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) 746 { 747 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); 748 749 if (rc) 750 panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__); 751 } 752 753 /** 754 * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob 755 * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob 756 * 757 * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules 758 * 759 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 760 */ 761 static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb) 762 { 763 if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) { 764 sb->s_security = NULL; 765 return 0; 766 } 767 768 sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL); 769 if (sb->s_security == NULL) 770 return -ENOMEM; 771 return 0; 772 } 773 774 /** 775 * lsm_fill_user_ctx - Fill a user space lsm_ctx structure 776 * @uctx: a userspace LSM context to be filled 777 * @uctx_len: available uctx size (input), used uctx size (output) 778 * @val: the new LSM context value 779 * @val_len: the size of the new LSM context value 780 * @id: LSM id 781 * @flags: LSM defined flags 782 * 783 * Fill all of the fields in a userspace lsm_ctx structure. If @uctx is NULL 784 * simply calculate the required size to output via @utc_len and return 785 * success. 786 * 787 * Returns 0 on success, -E2BIG if userspace buffer is not large enough, 788 * -EFAULT on a copyout error, -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 789 */ 790 int lsm_fill_user_ctx(struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx, u32 *uctx_len, 791 void *val, size_t val_len, 792 u64 id, u64 flags) 793 { 794 struct lsm_ctx *nctx = NULL; 795 size_t nctx_len; 796 int rc = 0; 797 798 nctx_len = ALIGN(struct_size(nctx, ctx, val_len), sizeof(void *)); 799 if (nctx_len > *uctx_len) { 800 rc = -E2BIG; 801 goto out; 802 } 803 804 /* no buffer - return success/0 and set @uctx_len to the req size */ 805 if (!uctx) 806 goto out; 807 808 nctx = kzalloc(nctx_len, GFP_KERNEL); 809 if (nctx == NULL) { 810 rc = -ENOMEM; 811 goto out; 812 } 813 nctx->id = id; 814 nctx->flags = flags; 815 nctx->len = nctx_len; 816 nctx->ctx_len = val_len; 817 memcpy(nctx->ctx, val, val_len); 818 819 if (copy_to_user(uctx, nctx, nctx_len)) 820 rc = -EFAULT; 821 822 out: 823 kfree(nctx); 824 *uctx_len = nctx_len; 825 return rc; 826 } 827 828 /* 829 * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and 830 * can be accessed with: 831 * 832 * LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) 833 * 834 * The macros below define static constants for the default value of each 835 * LSM hook. 836 */ 837 #define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default) 838 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME) 839 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \ 840 static const int __maybe_unused LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT); 841 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ 842 DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME) 843 844 #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h> 845 #undef LSM_HOOK 846 847 /* 848 * Hook list operation macros. 849 * 850 * call_void_hook: 851 * This is a hook that does not return a value. 852 * 853 * call_int_hook: 854 * This is a hook that returns a value. 855 */ 856 857 #define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \ 858 do { \ 859 struct security_hook_list *P; \ 860 \ 861 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \ 862 P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ 863 } while (0) 864 865 #define call_int_hook(FUNC, ...) ({ \ 866 int RC = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(FUNC); \ 867 do { \ 868 struct security_hook_list *P; \ 869 \ 870 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \ 871 RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ 872 if (RC != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(FUNC)) \ 873 break; \ 874 } \ 875 } while (0); \ 876 RC; \ 877 }) 878 879 /* Security operations */ 880 881 /** 882 * security_binder_set_context_mgr() - Check if becoming binder ctx mgr is ok 883 * @mgr: task credentials of current binder process 884 * 885 * Check whether @mgr is allowed to be the binder context manager. 886 * 887 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 888 */ 889 int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr) 890 { 891 return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, mgr); 892 } 893 894 /** 895 * security_binder_transaction() - Check if a binder transaction is allowed 896 * @from: sending process 897 * @to: receiving process 898 * 899 * Check whether @from is allowed to invoke a binder transaction call to @to. 900 * 901 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 902 */ 903 int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from, 904 const struct cred *to) 905 { 906 return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, from, to); 907 } 908 909 /** 910 * security_binder_transfer_binder() - Check if a binder transfer is allowed 911 * @from: sending process 912 * @to: receiving process 913 * 914 * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer a binder reference to @to. 915 * 916 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 917 */ 918 int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from, 919 const struct cred *to) 920 { 921 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, from, to); 922 } 923 924 /** 925 * security_binder_transfer_file() - Check if a binder file xfer is allowed 926 * @from: sending process 927 * @to: receiving process 928 * @file: file being transferred 929 * 930 * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer @file to @to. 931 * 932 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 933 */ 934 int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from, 935 const struct cred *to, const struct file *file) 936 { 937 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, from, to, file); 938 } 939 940 /** 941 * security_ptrace_access_check() - Check if tracing is allowed 942 * @child: target process 943 * @mode: PTRACE_MODE flags 944 * 945 * Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the @child 946 * process. Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check 947 * during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of tracing check 948 * during an execve in the bprm_set_creds hook of binprm_security_ops if the 949 * process is being traced and its security attributes would be changed by the 950 * execve. 951 * 952 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 953 */ 954 int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) 955 { 956 return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, child, mode); 957 } 958 959 /** 960 * security_ptrace_traceme() - Check if tracing is allowed 961 * @parent: tracing process 962 * 963 * Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the 964 * current process before allowing the current process to present itself to the 965 * @parent process for tracing. 966 * 967 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 968 */ 969 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) 970 { 971 return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, parent); 972 } 973 974 /** 975 * security_capget() - Get the capability sets for a process 976 * @target: target process 977 * @effective: effective capability set 978 * @inheritable: inheritable capability set 979 * @permitted: permitted capability set 980 * 981 * Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the 982 * @target process. The hook may also perform permission checking to determine 983 * if the current process is allowed to see the capability sets of the @target 984 * process. 985 * 986 * Return: Returns 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained. 987 */ 988 int security_capget(const struct task_struct *target, 989 kernel_cap_t *effective, 990 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 991 kernel_cap_t *permitted) 992 { 993 return call_int_hook(capget, target, effective, inheritable, permitted); 994 } 995 996 /** 997 * security_capset() - Set the capability sets for a process 998 * @new: new credentials for the target process 999 * @old: current credentials of the target process 1000 * @effective: effective capability set 1001 * @inheritable: inheritable capability set 1002 * @permitted: permitted capability set 1003 * 1004 * Set the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the 1005 * current process. 1006 * 1007 * Return: Returns 0 and update @new if permission is granted. 1008 */ 1009 int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 1010 const kernel_cap_t *effective, 1011 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 1012 const kernel_cap_t *permitted) 1013 { 1014 return call_int_hook(capset, new, old, effective, inheritable, 1015 permitted); 1016 } 1017 1018 /** 1019 * security_capable() - Check if a process has the necessary capability 1020 * @cred: credentials to examine 1021 * @ns: user namespace 1022 * @cap: capability requested 1023 * @opts: capability check options 1024 * 1025 * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated 1026 * credentials. @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>. 1027 * @opts contains options for the capable check <include/linux/security.h>. 1028 * 1029 * Return: Returns 0 if the capability is granted. 1030 */ 1031 int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, 1032 struct user_namespace *ns, 1033 int cap, 1034 unsigned int opts) 1035 { 1036 return call_int_hook(capable, cred, ns, cap, opts); 1037 } 1038 1039 /** 1040 * security_quotactl() - Check if a quotactl() syscall is allowed for this fs 1041 * @cmds: commands 1042 * @type: type 1043 * @id: id 1044 * @sb: filesystem 1045 * 1046 * Check whether the quotactl syscall is allowed for this @sb. 1047 * 1048 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1049 */ 1050 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, const struct super_block *sb) 1051 { 1052 return call_int_hook(quotactl, cmds, type, id, sb); 1053 } 1054 1055 /** 1056 * security_quota_on() - Check if QUOTAON is allowed for a dentry 1057 * @dentry: dentry 1058 * 1059 * Check whether QUOTAON is allowed for @dentry. 1060 * 1061 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1062 */ 1063 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) 1064 { 1065 return call_int_hook(quota_on, dentry); 1066 } 1067 1068 /** 1069 * security_syslog() - Check if accessing the kernel message ring is allowed 1070 * @type: SYSLOG_ACTION_* type 1071 * 1072 * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing 1073 * logging to the console. See the syslog(2) manual page for an explanation of 1074 * the @type values. 1075 * 1076 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 1077 */ 1078 int security_syslog(int type) 1079 { 1080 return call_int_hook(syslog, type); 1081 } 1082 1083 /** 1084 * security_settime64() - Check if changing the system time is allowed 1085 * @ts: new time 1086 * @tz: timezone 1087 * 1088 * Check permission to change the system time, struct timespec64 is defined in 1089 * <include/linux/time64.h> and timezone is defined in <include/linux/time.h>. 1090 * 1091 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1092 */ 1093 int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz) 1094 { 1095 return call_int_hook(settime, ts, tz); 1096 } 1097 1098 /** 1099 * security_vm_enough_memory_mm() - Check if allocating a new mem map is allowed 1100 * @mm: mm struct 1101 * @pages: number of pages 1102 * 1103 * Check permissions for allocating a new virtual mapping. If all LSMs return 1104 * a positive value, __vm_enough_memory() will be called with cap_sys_admin 1105 * set. If at least one LSM returns 0 or negative, __vm_enough_memory() will be 1106 * called with cap_sys_admin cleared. 1107 * 1108 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted by the LSM infrastructure to the 1109 * caller. 1110 */ 1111 int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) 1112 { 1113 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1114 int cap_sys_admin = 1; 1115 int rc; 1116 1117 /* 1118 * The module will respond with a positive value if 1119 * it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be 1120 * made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules 1121 * agree that it should be set it will. If any module 1122 * thinks it should not be set it won't. 1123 */ 1124 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) { 1125 rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); 1126 if (rc <= 0) { 1127 cap_sys_admin = 0; 1128 break; 1129 } 1130 } 1131 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); 1132 } 1133 1134 /** 1135 * security_bprm_creds_for_exec() - Prepare the credentials for exec() 1136 * @bprm: binary program information 1137 * 1138 * If the setup in prepare_exec_creds did not setup @bprm->cred->security 1139 * properly for executing @bprm->file, update the LSM's portion of 1140 * @bprm->cred->security to be what commit_creds needs to install for the new 1141 * program. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for 1142 * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec 1143 * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. @bprm 1144 * contains the linux_binprm structure. 1145 * 1146 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 1147 */ 1148 int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1149 { 1150 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, bprm); 1151 } 1152 1153 /** 1154 * security_bprm_creds_from_file() - Update linux_binprm creds based on file 1155 * @bprm: binary program information 1156 * @file: associated file 1157 * 1158 * If @file is setpcap, suid, sgid or otherwise marked to change privilege upon 1159 * exec, update @bprm->cred to reflect that change. This is called after 1160 * finding the binary that will be executed without an interpreter. This 1161 * ensures that the credentials will not be derived from a script that the 1162 * binary will need to reopen, which when reopend may end up being a completely 1163 * different file. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for 1164 * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec 1165 * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. The 1166 * hook must add to @bprm->per_clear any personality flags that should be 1167 * cleared from current->personality. @bprm contains the linux_binprm 1168 * structure. 1169 * 1170 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 1171 */ 1172 int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file) 1173 { 1174 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, bprm, file); 1175 } 1176 1177 /** 1178 * security_bprm_check() - Mediate binary handler search 1179 * @bprm: binary program information 1180 * 1181 * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will begin. 1182 * It allows a check against the @bprm->cred->security value which was set in 1183 * the preceding creds_for_exec call. The argv list and envp list are reliably 1184 * available in @bprm. This hook may be called multiple times during a single 1185 * execve. @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. 1186 * 1187 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 1188 */ 1189 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1190 { 1191 return call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, bprm); 1192 } 1193 1194 /** 1195 * security_bprm_committing_creds() - Install creds for a process during exec() 1196 * @bprm: binary program information 1197 * 1198 * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being 1199 * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials pointed to 1200 * by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by the 1201 * bprm_creds_for_exec hook. @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure. This 1202 * hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such as closing 1203 * open file descriptors to which access will no longer be granted when the 1204 * attributes are changed. This is called immediately before commit_creds(). 1205 */ 1206 void security_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1207 { 1208 call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm); 1209 } 1210 1211 /** 1212 * security_bprm_committed_creds() - Tidy up after cred install during exec() 1213 * @bprm: binary program information 1214 * 1215 * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a process 1216 * being transformed by an execve operation. The new credentials have, by this 1217 * point, been set to @current->cred. @bprm points to the linux_binprm 1218 * structure. This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the 1219 * process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal state. This is called 1220 * immediately after commit_creds(). 1221 */ 1222 void security_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1223 { 1224 call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm); 1225 } 1226 1227 /** 1228 * security_fs_context_submount() - Initialise fc->security 1229 * @fc: new filesystem context 1230 * @reference: dentry reference for submount/remount 1231 * 1232 * Fill out the ->security field for a new fs_context. 1233 * 1234 * Return: Returns 0 on success or negative error code on failure. 1235 */ 1236 int security_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *reference) 1237 { 1238 return call_int_hook(fs_context_submount, fc, reference); 1239 } 1240 1241 /** 1242 * security_fs_context_dup() - Duplicate a fs_context LSM blob 1243 * @fc: destination filesystem context 1244 * @src_fc: source filesystem context 1245 * 1246 * Allocate and attach a security structure to sc->security. This pointer is 1247 * initialised to NULL by the caller. @fc indicates the new filesystem context. 1248 * @src_fc indicates the original filesystem context. 1249 * 1250 * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on failure. 1251 */ 1252 int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc) 1253 { 1254 return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, fc, src_fc); 1255 } 1256 1257 /** 1258 * security_fs_context_parse_param() - Configure a filesystem context 1259 * @fc: filesystem context 1260 * @param: filesystem parameter 1261 * 1262 * Userspace provided a parameter to configure a superblock. The LSM can 1263 * consume the parameter or return it to the caller for use elsewhere. 1264 * 1265 * Return: If the parameter is used by the LSM it should return 0, if it is 1266 * returned to the caller -ENOPARAM is returned, otherwise a negative 1267 * error code is returned. 1268 */ 1269 int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, 1270 struct fs_parameter *param) 1271 { 1272 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1273 int trc; 1274 int rc = -ENOPARAM; 1275 1276 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.fs_context_parse_param, 1277 list) { 1278 trc = hp->hook.fs_context_parse_param(fc, param); 1279 if (trc == 0) 1280 rc = 0; 1281 else if (trc != -ENOPARAM) 1282 return trc; 1283 } 1284 return rc; 1285 } 1286 1287 /** 1288 * security_sb_alloc() - Allocate a super_block LSM blob 1289 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1290 * 1291 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field. The 1292 * s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is allocated. 1293 * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified. 1294 * 1295 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful. 1296 */ 1297 int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb) 1298 { 1299 int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb); 1300 1301 if (unlikely(rc)) 1302 return rc; 1303 rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, sb); 1304 if (unlikely(rc)) 1305 security_sb_free(sb); 1306 return rc; 1307 } 1308 1309 /** 1310 * security_sb_delete() - Release super_block LSM associated objects 1311 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1312 * 1313 * Release objects tied to a superblock (e.g. inodes). @sb contains the 1314 * super_block structure being released. 1315 */ 1316 void security_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb) 1317 { 1318 call_void_hook(sb_delete, sb); 1319 } 1320 1321 /** 1322 * security_sb_free() - Free a super_block LSM blob 1323 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1324 * 1325 * Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field. @sb contains the super_block 1326 * structure to be modified. 1327 */ 1328 void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb) 1329 { 1330 call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb); 1331 kfree(sb->s_security); 1332 sb->s_security = NULL; 1333 } 1334 1335 /** 1336 * security_free_mnt_opts() - Free memory associated with mount options 1337 * @mnt_opts: LSM processed mount options 1338 * 1339 * Free memory associated with @mnt_ops. 1340 */ 1341 void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts) 1342 { 1343 if (!*mnt_opts) 1344 return; 1345 call_void_hook(sb_free_mnt_opts, *mnt_opts); 1346 *mnt_opts = NULL; 1347 } 1348 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts); 1349 1350 /** 1351 * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts() - Consume LSM mount options 1352 * @options: mount options 1353 * @mnt_opts: LSM processed mount options 1354 * 1355 * Eat (scan @options) and save them in @mnt_opts. 1356 * 1357 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1358 */ 1359 int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts) 1360 { 1361 return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, options, mnt_opts); 1362 } 1363 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts); 1364 1365 /** 1366 * security_sb_mnt_opts_compat() - Check if new mount options are allowed 1367 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1368 * @mnt_opts: new mount options 1369 * 1370 * Determine if the new mount options in @mnt_opts are allowed given the 1371 * existing mounted filesystem at @sb. @sb superblock being compared. 1372 * 1373 * Return: Returns 0 if options are compatible. 1374 */ 1375 int security_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, 1376 void *mnt_opts) 1377 { 1378 return call_int_hook(sb_mnt_opts_compat, sb, mnt_opts); 1379 } 1380 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat); 1381 1382 /** 1383 * security_sb_remount() - Verify no incompatible mount changes during remount 1384 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1385 * @mnt_opts: (re)mount options 1386 * 1387 * Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes are 1388 * being made to those options. 1389 * 1390 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1391 */ 1392 int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, 1393 void *mnt_opts) 1394 { 1395 return call_int_hook(sb_remount, sb, mnt_opts); 1396 } 1397 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount); 1398 1399 /** 1400 * security_sb_kern_mount() - Check if a kernel mount is allowed 1401 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1402 * 1403 * Mount this @sb if allowed by permissions. 1404 * 1405 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1406 */ 1407 int security_sb_kern_mount(const struct super_block *sb) 1408 { 1409 return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, sb); 1410 } 1411 1412 /** 1413 * security_sb_show_options() - Output the mount options for a superblock 1414 * @m: output file 1415 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1416 * 1417 * Show (print on @m) mount options for this @sb. 1418 * 1419 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1420 */ 1421 int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) 1422 { 1423 return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, m, sb); 1424 } 1425 1426 /** 1427 * security_sb_statfs() - Check if accessing fs stats is allowed 1428 * @dentry: superblock handle 1429 * 1430 * Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt 1431 * mountpoint. @dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem. 1432 * 1433 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1434 */ 1435 int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) 1436 { 1437 return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, dentry); 1438 } 1439 1440 /** 1441 * security_sb_mount() - Check permission for mounting a filesystem 1442 * @dev_name: filesystem backing device 1443 * @path: mount point 1444 * @type: filesystem type 1445 * @flags: mount flags 1446 * @data: filesystem specific data 1447 * 1448 * Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on the 1449 * mount point named by @nd. For an ordinary mount, @dev_name identifies a 1450 * device if the file system type requires a device. For a remount 1451 * (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant. For a loopback/bind mount 1452 * (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the pathname of the object being 1453 * mounted. 1454 * 1455 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1456 */ 1457 int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, 1458 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) 1459 { 1460 return call_int_hook(sb_mount, dev_name, path, type, flags, data); 1461 } 1462 1463 /** 1464 * security_sb_umount() - Check permission for unmounting a filesystem 1465 * @mnt: mounted filesystem 1466 * @flags: unmount flags 1467 * 1468 * Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted. 1469 * 1470 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1471 */ 1472 int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) 1473 { 1474 return call_int_hook(sb_umount, mnt, flags); 1475 } 1476 1477 /** 1478 * security_sb_pivotroot() - Check permissions for pivoting the rootfs 1479 * @old_path: new location for current rootfs 1480 * @new_path: location of the new rootfs 1481 * 1482 * Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem. 1483 * 1484 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1485 */ 1486 int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, 1487 const struct path *new_path) 1488 { 1489 return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, old_path, new_path); 1490 } 1491 1492 /** 1493 * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() - Set the mount options for a filesystem 1494 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1495 * @mnt_opts: binary mount options 1496 * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) 1497 * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) 1498 * 1499 * Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock. 1500 * 1501 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1502 */ 1503 int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, 1504 void *mnt_opts, 1505 unsigned long kern_flags, 1506 unsigned long *set_kern_flags) 1507 { 1508 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1509 int rc = mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : LSM_RET_DEFAULT(sb_set_mnt_opts); 1510 1511 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.sb_set_mnt_opts, 1512 list) { 1513 rc = hp->hook.sb_set_mnt_opts(sb, mnt_opts, kern_flags, 1514 set_kern_flags); 1515 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(sb_set_mnt_opts)) 1516 break; 1517 } 1518 return rc; 1519 } 1520 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts); 1521 1522 /** 1523 * security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() - Duplicate superblock mount options 1524 * @oldsb: source superblock 1525 * @newsb: destination superblock 1526 * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) 1527 * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) 1528 * 1529 * Copy all security options from a given superblock to another. 1530 * 1531 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1532 */ 1533 int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, 1534 struct super_block *newsb, 1535 unsigned long kern_flags, 1536 unsigned long *set_kern_flags) 1537 { 1538 return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, oldsb, newsb, 1539 kern_flags, set_kern_flags); 1540 } 1541 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts); 1542 1543 /** 1544 * security_move_mount() - Check permissions for moving a mount 1545 * @from_path: source mount point 1546 * @to_path: destination mount point 1547 * 1548 * Check permission before a mount is moved. 1549 * 1550 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1551 */ 1552 int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, 1553 const struct path *to_path) 1554 { 1555 return call_int_hook(move_mount, from_path, to_path); 1556 } 1557 1558 /** 1559 * security_path_notify() - Check if setting a watch is allowed 1560 * @path: file path 1561 * @mask: event mask 1562 * @obj_type: file path type 1563 * 1564 * Check permissions before setting a watch on events as defined by @mask, on 1565 * an object at @path, whose type is defined by @obj_type. 1566 * 1567 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1568 */ 1569 int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask, 1570 unsigned int obj_type) 1571 { 1572 return call_int_hook(path_notify, path, mask, obj_type); 1573 } 1574 1575 /** 1576 * security_inode_alloc() - Allocate an inode LSM blob 1577 * @inode: the inode 1578 * 1579 * Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security. The 1580 * i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is 1581 * allocated. 1582 * 1583 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 1584 */ 1585 int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) 1586 { 1587 int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode); 1588 1589 if (unlikely(rc)) 1590 return rc; 1591 rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, inode); 1592 if (unlikely(rc)) 1593 security_inode_free(inode); 1594 return rc; 1595 } 1596 1597 static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) 1598 { 1599 /* 1600 * The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob 1601 */ 1602 kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head); 1603 } 1604 1605 /** 1606 * security_inode_free() - Free an inode's LSM blob 1607 * @inode: the inode 1608 * 1609 * Deallocate the inode security structure and set @inode->i_security to NULL. 1610 */ 1611 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) 1612 { 1613 call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode); 1614 /* 1615 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and 1616 * a call to security_inode_permission() can be made 1617 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS 1618 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder 1619 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and 1620 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact. 1621 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too. 1622 */ 1623 if (inode->i_security) 1624 call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security, 1625 inode_free_by_rcu); 1626 } 1627 1628 /** 1629 * security_dentry_init_security() - Perform dentry initialization 1630 * @dentry: the dentry to initialize 1631 * @mode: mode used to determine resource type 1632 * @name: name of the last path component 1633 * @xattr_name: name of the security/LSM xattr 1634 * @ctx: pointer to the resulting LSM context 1635 * @ctxlen: length of @ctx 1636 * 1637 * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available since NFSv4 1638 * has no label backed by an EA anyway. It is important to note that 1639 * @xattr_name does not need to be free'd by the caller, it is a static string. 1640 * 1641 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1642 */ 1643 int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, 1644 const struct qstr *name, 1645 const char **xattr_name, void **ctx, 1646 u32 *ctxlen) 1647 { 1648 return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, dentry, mode, name, 1649 xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen); 1650 } 1651 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security); 1652 1653 /** 1654 * security_dentry_create_files_as() - Perform dentry initialization 1655 * @dentry: the dentry to initialize 1656 * @mode: mode used to determine resource type 1657 * @name: name of the last path component 1658 * @old: creds to use for LSM context calculations 1659 * @new: creds to modify 1660 * 1661 * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available and set 1662 * that context in passed in creds so that new files are created using that 1663 * context. Context is calculated using the passed in creds and not the creds 1664 * of the caller. 1665 * 1666 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1667 */ 1668 int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, 1669 struct qstr *name, 1670 const struct cred *old, struct cred *new) 1671 { 1672 return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, dentry, mode, 1673 name, old, new); 1674 } 1675 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as); 1676 1677 /** 1678 * security_inode_init_security() - Initialize an inode's LSM context 1679 * @inode: the inode 1680 * @dir: parent directory 1681 * @qstr: last component of the pathname 1682 * @initxattrs: callback function to write xattrs 1683 * @fs_data: filesystem specific data 1684 * 1685 * Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly 1686 * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode. This 1687 * hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation transaction and 1688 * provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike the post_create/mkdir/... 1689 * hooks called by the VFS. 1690 * 1691 * The hook function is expected to populate the xattrs array, by calling 1692 * lsm_get_xattr_slot() to retrieve the slots reserved by the security module 1693 * with the lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure. For each 1694 * slot, the hook function should set ->name to the attribute name suffix 1695 * (e.g. selinux), to allocate ->value (will be freed by the caller) and set it 1696 * to the attribute value, to set ->value_len to the length of the value. If 1697 * the security module does not use security attributes or does not wish to put 1698 * a security attribute on this particular inode, then it should return 1699 * -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing. 1700 * 1701 * Return: Returns 0 if the LSM successfully initialized all of the inode 1702 * security attributes that are required, negative values otherwise. 1703 */ 1704 int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, 1705 const struct qstr *qstr, 1706 const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data) 1707 { 1708 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1709 struct xattr *new_xattrs = NULL; 1710 int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP, xattr_count = 0; 1711 1712 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1713 return 0; 1714 1715 if (!blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count) 1716 return 0; 1717 1718 if (initxattrs) { 1719 /* Allocate +1 as terminator. */ 1720 new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count + 1, 1721 sizeof(*new_xattrs), GFP_NOFS); 1722 if (!new_xattrs) 1723 return -ENOMEM; 1724 } 1725 1726 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security, 1727 list) { 1728 ret = hp->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs, 1729 &xattr_count); 1730 if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) 1731 goto out; 1732 /* 1733 * As documented in lsm_hooks.h, -EOPNOTSUPP in this context 1734 * means that the LSM is not willing to provide an xattr, not 1735 * that it wants to signal an error. Thus, continue to invoke 1736 * the remaining LSMs. 1737 */ 1738 } 1739 1740 /* If initxattrs() is NULL, xattr_count is zero, skip the call. */ 1741 if (!xattr_count) 1742 goto out; 1743 1744 ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); 1745 out: 1746 for (; xattr_count > 0; xattr_count--) 1747 kfree(new_xattrs[xattr_count - 1].value); 1748 kfree(new_xattrs); 1749 return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret; 1750 } 1751 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security); 1752 1753 /** 1754 * security_inode_init_security_anon() - Initialize an anonymous inode 1755 * @inode: the inode 1756 * @name: the anonymous inode class 1757 * @context_inode: an optional related inode 1758 * 1759 * Set up the incore security field for the new anonymous inode and return 1760 * whether the inode creation is permitted by the security module or not. 1761 * 1762 * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EACCES if the security module denies the 1763 * creation of this inode, or another -errno upon other errors. 1764 */ 1765 int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, 1766 const struct qstr *name, 1767 const struct inode *context_inode) 1768 { 1769 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, inode, name, 1770 context_inode); 1771 } 1772 1773 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH 1774 /** 1775 * security_path_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed 1776 * @dir: parent directory 1777 * @dentry: new file 1778 * @mode: new file mode 1779 * @dev: device number 1780 * 1781 * Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called even 1782 * if mknod operation is being done for a regular file. 1783 * 1784 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1785 */ 1786 int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1787 umode_t mode, unsigned int dev) 1788 { 1789 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1790 return 0; 1791 return call_int_hook(path_mknod, dir, dentry, mode, dev); 1792 } 1793 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod); 1794 1795 /** 1796 * security_path_post_mknod() - Update inode security after reg file creation 1797 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 1798 * @dentry: new file 1799 * 1800 * Update inode security field after a regular file has been created. 1801 */ 1802 void security_path_post_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry) 1803 { 1804 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1805 return; 1806 call_void_hook(path_post_mknod, idmap, dentry); 1807 } 1808 1809 /** 1810 * security_path_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed 1811 * @dir: parent directory 1812 * @dentry: new directory 1813 * @mode: new directory mode 1814 * 1815 * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory. 1816 * 1817 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1818 */ 1819 int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1820 umode_t mode) 1821 { 1822 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1823 return 0; 1824 return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, dir, dentry, mode); 1825 } 1826 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir); 1827 1828 /** 1829 * security_path_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed 1830 * @dir: parent directory 1831 * @dentry: directory to remove 1832 * 1833 * Check the permission to remove a directory. 1834 * 1835 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1836 */ 1837 int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1838 { 1839 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1840 return 0; 1841 return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, dir, dentry); 1842 } 1843 1844 /** 1845 * security_path_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed 1846 * @dir: parent directory 1847 * @dentry: file 1848 * 1849 * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. 1850 * 1851 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1852 */ 1853 int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1854 { 1855 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1856 return 0; 1857 return call_int_hook(path_unlink, dir, dentry); 1858 } 1859 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink); 1860 1861 /** 1862 * security_path_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed 1863 * @dir: parent directory 1864 * @dentry: symbolic link 1865 * @old_name: file pathname 1866 * 1867 * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. 1868 * 1869 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1870 */ 1871 int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1872 const char *old_name) 1873 { 1874 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1875 return 0; 1876 return call_int_hook(path_symlink, dir, dentry, old_name); 1877 } 1878 1879 /** 1880 * security_path_link - Check if creating a hard link is allowed 1881 * @old_dentry: existing file 1882 * @new_dir: new parent directory 1883 * @new_dentry: new link 1884 * 1885 * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. 1886 * 1887 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1888 */ 1889 int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, 1890 struct dentry *new_dentry) 1891 { 1892 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) 1893 return 0; 1894 return call_int_hook(path_link, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); 1895 } 1896 1897 /** 1898 * security_path_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed 1899 * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file 1900 * @old_dentry: the old file 1901 * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file 1902 * @new_dentry: the new file 1903 * @flags: flags 1904 * 1905 * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. 1906 * 1907 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1908 */ 1909 int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 1910 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 1911 unsigned int flags) 1912 { 1913 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || 1914 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && 1915 IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) 1916 return 0; 1917 1918 return call_int_hook(path_rename, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, 1919 new_dentry, flags); 1920 } 1921 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename); 1922 1923 /** 1924 * security_path_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed 1925 * @path: file 1926 * 1927 * Check permission before truncating the file indicated by path. Note that 1928 * truncation permissions may also be checked based on already opened files, 1929 * using the security_file_truncate() hook. 1930 * 1931 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1932 */ 1933 int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path) 1934 { 1935 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1936 return 0; 1937 return call_int_hook(path_truncate, path); 1938 } 1939 1940 /** 1941 * security_path_chmod() - Check if changing the file's mode is allowed 1942 * @path: file 1943 * @mode: new mode 1944 * 1945 * Check for permission to change a mode of the file @path. The new mode is 1946 * specified in @mode which is a bitmask of constants from 1947 * <include/uapi/linux/stat.h>. 1948 * 1949 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1950 */ 1951 int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) 1952 { 1953 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1954 return 0; 1955 return call_int_hook(path_chmod, path, mode); 1956 } 1957 1958 /** 1959 * security_path_chown() - Check if changing the file's owner/group is allowed 1960 * @path: file 1961 * @uid: file owner 1962 * @gid: file group 1963 * 1964 * Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory. 1965 * 1966 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1967 */ 1968 int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) 1969 { 1970 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1971 return 0; 1972 return call_int_hook(path_chown, path, uid, gid); 1973 } 1974 1975 /** 1976 * security_path_chroot() - Check if changing the root directory is allowed 1977 * @path: directory 1978 * 1979 * Check for permission to change root directory. 1980 * 1981 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1982 */ 1983 int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path) 1984 { 1985 return call_int_hook(path_chroot, path); 1986 } 1987 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */ 1988 1989 /** 1990 * security_inode_create() - Check if creating a file is allowed 1991 * @dir: the parent directory 1992 * @dentry: the file being created 1993 * @mode: requested file mode 1994 * 1995 * Check permission to create a regular file. 1996 * 1997 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1998 */ 1999 int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 2000 umode_t mode) 2001 { 2002 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 2003 return 0; 2004 return call_int_hook(inode_create, dir, dentry, mode); 2005 } 2006 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create); 2007 2008 /** 2009 * security_inode_post_create_tmpfile() - Update inode security of new tmpfile 2010 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2011 * @inode: inode of the new tmpfile 2012 * 2013 * Update inode security data after a tmpfile has been created. 2014 */ 2015 void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2016 struct inode *inode) 2017 { 2018 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2019 return; 2020 call_void_hook(inode_post_create_tmpfile, idmap, inode); 2021 } 2022 2023 /** 2024 * security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed 2025 * @old_dentry: existing file 2026 * @dir: new parent directory 2027 * @new_dentry: new link 2028 * 2029 * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. 2030 * 2031 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2032 */ 2033 int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, 2034 struct dentry *new_dentry) 2035 { 2036 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) 2037 return 0; 2038 return call_int_hook(inode_link, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry); 2039 } 2040 2041 /** 2042 * security_inode_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed 2043 * @dir: parent directory 2044 * @dentry: file 2045 * 2046 * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. 2047 * 2048 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2049 */ 2050 int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 2051 { 2052 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2053 return 0; 2054 return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, dir, dentry); 2055 } 2056 2057 /** 2058 * security_inode_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed 2059 * @dir: parent directory 2060 * @dentry: symbolic link 2061 * @old_name: existing filename 2062 * 2063 * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. 2064 * 2065 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2066 */ 2067 int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 2068 const char *old_name) 2069 { 2070 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 2071 return 0; 2072 return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, dir, dentry, old_name); 2073 } 2074 2075 /** 2076 * security_inode_mkdir() - Check if creation a new director is allowed 2077 * @dir: parent directory 2078 * @dentry: new directory 2079 * @mode: new directory mode 2080 * 2081 * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory 2082 * associated with inode structure @dir. 2083 * 2084 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2085 */ 2086 int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) 2087 { 2088 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 2089 return 0; 2090 return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, dir, dentry, mode); 2091 } 2092 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir); 2093 2094 /** 2095 * security_inode_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed 2096 * @dir: parent directory 2097 * @dentry: directory to be removed 2098 * 2099 * Check the permission to remove a directory. 2100 * 2101 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2102 */ 2103 int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 2104 { 2105 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2106 return 0; 2107 return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, dir, dentry); 2108 } 2109 2110 /** 2111 * security_inode_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed 2112 * @dir: parent directory 2113 * @dentry: new file 2114 * @mode: new file mode 2115 * @dev: device number 2116 * 2117 * Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo file 2118 * created via the mknod system call). Note that if mknod operation is being 2119 * done for a regular file, then the create hook will be called and not this 2120 * hook. 2121 * 2122 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2123 */ 2124 int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 2125 umode_t mode, dev_t dev) 2126 { 2127 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 2128 return 0; 2129 return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, dir, dentry, mode, dev); 2130 } 2131 2132 /** 2133 * security_inode_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed 2134 * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file 2135 * @old_dentry: the old file 2136 * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file 2137 * @new_dentry: the new file 2138 * @flags: flags 2139 * 2140 * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. 2141 * 2142 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2143 */ 2144 int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 2145 struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 2146 unsigned int flags) 2147 { 2148 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || 2149 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && 2150 IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) 2151 return 0; 2152 2153 if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { 2154 int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, new_dir, new_dentry, 2155 old_dir, old_dentry); 2156 if (err) 2157 return err; 2158 } 2159 2160 return call_int_hook(inode_rename, old_dir, old_dentry, 2161 new_dir, new_dentry); 2162 } 2163 2164 /** 2165 * security_inode_readlink() - Check if reading a symbolic link is allowed 2166 * @dentry: link 2167 * 2168 * Check the permission to read the symbolic link. 2169 * 2170 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2171 */ 2172 int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) 2173 { 2174 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2175 return 0; 2176 return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, dentry); 2177 } 2178 2179 /** 2180 * security_inode_follow_link() - Check if following a symbolic link is allowed 2181 * @dentry: link dentry 2182 * @inode: link inode 2183 * @rcu: true if in RCU-walk mode 2184 * 2185 * Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname. If 2186 * @rcu is true, @inode is not stable. 2187 * 2188 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2189 */ 2190 int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, 2191 bool rcu) 2192 { 2193 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2194 return 0; 2195 return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, dentry, inode, rcu); 2196 } 2197 2198 /** 2199 * security_inode_permission() - Check if accessing an inode is allowed 2200 * @inode: inode 2201 * @mask: access mask 2202 * 2203 * Check permission before accessing an inode. This hook is called by the 2204 * existing Linux permission function, so a security module can use it to 2205 * provide additional checking for existing Linux permission checks. Notice 2206 * that this hook is called when a file is opened (as well as many other 2207 * operations), whereas the file_security_ops permission hook is called when 2208 * the actual read/write operations are performed. 2209 * 2210 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2211 */ 2212 int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) 2213 { 2214 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2215 return 0; 2216 return call_int_hook(inode_permission, inode, mask); 2217 } 2218 2219 /** 2220 * security_inode_setattr() - Check if setting file attributes is allowed 2221 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2222 * @dentry: file 2223 * @attr: new attributes 2224 * 2225 * Check permission before setting file attributes. Note that the kernel call 2226 * to notify_change is performed from several locations, whenever file 2227 * attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod operations, 2228 * transferring disk quotas, etc). 2229 * 2230 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2231 */ 2232 int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2233 struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) 2234 { 2235 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2236 return 0; 2237 return call_int_hook(inode_setattr, idmap, dentry, attr); 2238 } 2239 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr); 2240 2241 /** 2242 * security_inode_post_setattr() - Update the inode after a setattr operation 2243 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2244 * @dentry: file 2245 * @ia_valid: file attributes set 2246 * 2247 * Update inode security field after successful setting file attributes. 2248 */ 2249 void security_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, 2250 int ia_valid) 2251 { 2252 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2253 return; 2254 call_void_hook(inode_post_setattr, idmap, dentry, ia_valid); 2255 } 2256 2257 /** 2258 * security_inode_getattr() - Check if getting file attributes is allowed 2259 * @path: file 2260 * 2261 * Check permission before obtaining file attributes. 2262 * 2263 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2264 */ 2265 int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) 2266 { 2267 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 2268 return 0; 2269 return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, path); 2270 } 2271 2272 /** 2273 * security_inode_setxattr() - Check if setting file xattrs is allowed 2274 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2275 * @dentry: file 2276 * @name: xattr name 2277 * @value: xattr value 2278 * @size: size of xattr value 2279 * @flags: flags 2280 * 2281 * This hook performs the desired permission checks before setting the extended 2282 * attributes (xattrs) on @dentry. It is important to note that we have some 2283 * additional logic before the main LSM implementation calls to detect if we 2284 * need to perform an additional capability check at the LSM layer. 2285 * 2286 * Normally we enforce a capability check prior to executing the various LSM 2287 * hook implementations, but if a LSM wants to avoid this capability check, 2288 * it can register a 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hook and return a value of 1 for 2289 * xattrs that it wants to avoid the capability check, leaving the LSM fully 2290 * responsible for enforcing the access control for the specific xattr. If all 2291 * of the enabled LSMs refrain from registering a 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hook, 2292 * or return a 0 (the default return value), the capability check is still 2293 * performed. If no 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hooks are registered the capability 2294 * check is performed. 2295 * 2296 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2297 */ 2298 int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2299 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 2300 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2301 { 2302 int rc; 2303 2304 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2305 return 0; 2306 2307 /* enforce the capability checks at the lsm layer, if needed */ 2308 if (!call_int_hook(inode_xattr_skipcap, name)) { 2309 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); 2310 if (rc) 2311 return rc; 2312 } 2313 2314 return call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, idmap, dentry, name, value, size, 2315 flags); 2316 } 2317 2318 /** 2319 * security_inode_set_acl() - Check if setting posix acls is allowed 2320 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2321 * @dentry: file 2322 * @acl_name: acl name 2323 * @kacl: acl struct 2324 * 2325 * Check permission before setting posix acls, the posix acls in @kacl are 2326 * identified by @acl_name. 2327 * 2328 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2329 */ 2330 int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2331 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, 2332 struct posix_acl *kacl) 2333 { 2334 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2335 return 0; 2336 return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); 2337 } 2338 2339 /** 2340 * security_inode_post_set_acl() - Update inode security from posix acls set 2341 * @dentry: file 2342 * @acl_name: acl name 2343 * @kacl: acl struct 2344 * 2345 * Update inode security data after successfully setting posix acls on @dentry. 2346 * The posix acls in @kacl are identified by @acl_name. 2347 */ 2348 void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, 2349 struct posix_acl *kacl) 2350 { 2351 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2352 return; 2353 call_void_hook(inode_post_set_acl, dentry, acl_name, kacl); 2354 } 2355 2356 /** 2357 * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed 2358 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2359 * @dentry: file 2360 * @acl_name: acl name 2361 * 2362 * Check permission before getting osix acls, the posix acls are identified by 2363 * @acl_name. 2364 * 2365 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2366 */ 2367 int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2368 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) 2369 { 2370 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2371 return 0; 2372 return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2373 } 2374 2375 /** 2376 * security_inode_remove_acl() - Check if removing a posix acl is allowed 2377 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2378 * @dentry: file 2379 * @acl_name: acl name 2380 * 2381 * Check permission before removing posix acls, the posix acls are identified 2382 * by @acl_name. 2383 * 2384 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2385 */ 2386 int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2387 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) 2388 { 2389 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2390 return 0; 2391 return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2392 } 2393 2394 /** 2395 * security_inode_post_remove_acl() - Update inode security after rm posix acls 2396 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2397 * @dentry: file 2398 * @acl_name: acl name 2399 * 2400 * Update inode security data after successfully removing posix acls on 2401 * @dentry in @idmap. The posix acls are identified by @acl_name. 2402 */ 2403 void security_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2404 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) 2405 { 2406 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2407 return; 2408 call_void_hook(inode_post_remove_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2409 } 2410 2411 /** 2412 * security_inode_post_setxattr() - Update the inode after a setxattr operation 2413 * @dentry: file 2414 * @name: xattr name 2415 * @value: xattr value 2416 * @size: xattr value size 2417 * @flags: flags 2418 * 2419 * Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation. 2420 */ 2421 void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 2422 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2423 { 2424 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2425 return; 2426 call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); 2427 } 2428 2429 /** 2430 * security_inode_getxattr() - Check if xattr access is allowed 2431 * @dentry: file 2432 * @name: xattr name 2433 * 2434 * Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes identified by 2435 * @name for @dentry. 2436 * 2437 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2438 */ 2439 int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 2440 { 2441 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2442 return 0; 2443 return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, dentry, name); 2444 } 2445 2446 /** 2447 * security_inode_listxattr() - Check if listing xattrs is allowed 2448 * @dentry: file 2449 * 2450 * Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute names for 2451 * @dentry. 2452 * 2453 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2454 */ 2455 int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) 2456 { 2457 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2458 return 0; 2459 return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, dentry); 2460 } 2461 2462 /** 2463 * security_inode_removexattr() - Check if removing an xattr is allowed 2464 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2465 * @dentry: file 2466 * @name: xattr name 2467 * 2468 * This hook performs the desired permission checks before setting the extended 2469 * attributes (xattrs) on @dentry. It is important to note that we have some 2470 * additional logic before the main LSM implementation calls to detect if we 2471 * need to perform an additional capability check at the LSM layer. 2472 * 2473 * Normally we enforce a capability check prior to executing the various LSM 2474 * hook implementations, but if a LSM wants to avoid this capability check, 2475 * it can register a 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hook and return a value of 1 for 2476 * xattrs that it wants to avoid the capability check, leaving the LSM fully 2477 * responsible for enforcing the access control for the specific xattr. If all 2478 * of the enabled LSMs refrain from registering a 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hook, 2479 * or return a 0 (the default return value), the capability check is still 2480 * performed. If no 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hooks are registered the capability 2481 * check is performed. 2482 * 2483 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2484 */ 2485 int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2486 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 2487 { 2488 int rc; 2489 2490 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2491 return 0; 2492 2493 /* enforce the capability checks at the lsm layer, if needed */ 2494 if (!call_int_hook(inode_xattr_skipcap, name)) { 2495 rc = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); 2496 if (rc) 2497 return rc; 2498 } 2499 2500 return call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, idmap, dentry, name); 2501 } 2502 2503 /** 2504 * security_inode_post_removexattr() - Update the inode after a removexattr op 2505 * @dentry: file 2506 * @name: xattr name 2507 * 2508 * Update the inode after a successful removexattr operation. 2509 */ 2510 void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 2511 { 2512 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2513 return; 2514 call_void_hook(inode_post_removexattr, dentry, name); 2515 } 2516 2517 /** 2518 * security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required 2519 * @dentry: associated dentry 2520 * 2521 * Called when an inode has been changed to determine if 2522 * security_inode_killpriv() should be called. 2523 * 2524 * Return: Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation, return 0 if 2525 * security_inode_killpriv() does not need to be called, return >0 if 2526 * security_inode_killpriv() does need to be called. 2527 */ 2528 int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) 2529 { 2530 return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, dentry); 2531 } 2532 2533 /** 2534 * security_inode_killpriv() - The setuid bit is removed, update LSM state 2535 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2536 * @dentry: associated dentry 2537 * 2538 * The @dentry's setuid bit is being removed. Remove similar security labels. 2539 * Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held. 2540 * 2541 * Return: Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation 2542 * causing setuid bit removal is failed. 2543 */ 2544 int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2545 struct dentry *dentry) 2546 { 2547 return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, idmap, dentry); 2548 } 2549 2550 /** 2551 * security_inode_getsecurity() - Get the xattr security label of an inode 2552 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2553 * @inode: inode 2554 * @name: xattr name 2555 * @buffer: security label buffer 2556 * @alloc: allocation flag 2557 * 2558 * Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the security 2559 * label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer. Note that @name is the 2560 * remainder of the attribute name after the security prefix has been removed. 2561 * @alloc is used to specify if the call should return a value via the buffer 2562 * or just the value length. 2563 * 2564 * Return: Returns size of buffer on success. 2565 */ 2566 int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2567 struct inode *inode, const char *name, 2568 void **buffer, bool alloc) 2569 { 2570 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2571 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); 2572 2573 return call_int_hook(inode_getsecurity, idmap, inode, name, buffer, 2574 alloc); 2575 } 2576 2577 /** 2578 * security_inode_setsecurity() - Set the xattr security label of an inode 2579 * @inode: inode 2580 * @name: xattr name 2581 * @value: security label 2582 * @size: length of security label 2583 * @flags: flags 2584 * 2585 * Set the security label associated with @name for @inode from the extended 2586 * attribute value @value. @size indicates the size of the @value in bytes. 2587 * @flags may be XATTR_CREATE, XATTR_REPLACE, or 0. Note that @name is the 2588 * remainder of the attribute name after the security. prefix has been removed. 2589 * 2590 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2591 */ 2592 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, 2593 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2594 { 2595 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2596 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); 2597 2598 return call_int_hook(inode_setsecurity, inode, name, value, size, 2599 flags); 2600 } 2601 2602 /** 2603 * security_inode_listsecurity() - List the xattr security label names 2604 * @inode: inode 2605 * @buffer: buffer 2606 * @buffer_size: size of buffer 2607 * 2608 * Copy the extended attribute names for the security labels associated with 2609 * @inode into @buffer. The maximum size of @buffer is specified by 2610 * @buffer_size. @buffer may be NULL to request the size of the buffer 2611 * required. 2612 * 2613 * Return: Returns number of bytes used/required on success. 2614 */ 2615 int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, 2616 char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) 2617 { 2618 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2619 return 0; 2620 return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, inode, buffer, buffer_size); 2621 } 2622 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity); 2623 2624 /** 2625 * security_inode_getsecid() - Get an inode's secid 2626 * @inode: inode 2627 * @secid: secid to return 2628 * 2629 * Get the secid associated with the node. In case of failure, @secid will be 2630 * set to zero. 2631 */ 2632 void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) 2633 { 2634 call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid); 2635 } 2636 2637 /** 2638 * security_inode_copy_up() - Create new creds for an overlayfs copy-up op 2639 * @src: union dentry of copy-up file 2640 * @new: newly created creds 2641 * 2642 * A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of overlay 2643 * filesystem. Security module can prepare a set of new creds and modify as 2644 * need be and return new creds. Caller will switch to new creds temporarily to 2645 * create new file and release newly allocated creds. 2646 * 2647 * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on error. 2648 */ 2649 int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) 2650 { 2651 return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, src, new); 2652 } 2653 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up); 2654 2655 /** 2656 * security_inode_copy_up_xattr() - Filter xattrs in an overlayfs copy-up op 2657 * @src: union dentry of copy-up file 2658 * @name: xattr name 2659 * 2660 * Filter the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is copied up from a 2661 * lower layer to the union/overlay layer. The caller is responsible for 2662 * reading and writing the xattrs, this hook is merely a filter. 2663 * 2664 * Return: Returns 0 to accept the xattr, 1 to discard the xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP 2665 * if the security module does not know about attribute, or a negative 2666 * error code to abort the copy up. 2667 */ 2668 int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, const char *name) 2669 { 2670 int rc; 2671 2672 /* 2673 * The implementation can return 0 (accept the xattr), 1 (discard the 2674 * xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or 2675 * any other error code in case of an error. 2676 */ 2677 rc = call_int_hook(inode_copy_up_xattr, src, name); 2678 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr)) 2679 return rc; 2680 2681 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr); 2682 } 2683 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr); 2684 2685 /** 2686 * security_kernfs_init_security() - Init LSM context for a kernfs node 2687 * @kn_dir: parent kernfs node 2688 * @kn: the kernfs node to initialize 2689 * 2690 * Initialize the security context of a newly created kernfs node based on its 2691 * own and its parent's attributes. 2692 * 2693 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2694 */ 2695 int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, 2696 struct kernfs_node *kn) 2697 { 2698 return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, kn_dir, kn); 2699 } 2700 2701 /** 2702 * security_file_permission() - Check file permissions 2703 * @file: file 2704 * @mask: requested permissions 2705 * 2706 * Check file permissions before accessing an open file. This hook is called 2707 * by various operations that read or write files. A security module can use 2708 * this hook to perform additional checking on these operations, e.g. to 2709 * revalidate permissions on use to support privilege bracketing or policy 2710 * changes. Notice that this hook is used when the actual read/write 2711 * operations are performed, whereas the inode_security_ops hook is called when 2712 * a file is opened (as well as many other operations). Although this hook can 2713 * be used to revalidate permissions for various system call operations that 2714 * read or write files, it does not address the revalidation of permissions for 2715 * memory-mapped files. Security modules must handle this separately if they 2716 * need such revalidation. 2717 * 2718 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2719 */ 2720 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) 2721 { 2722 return call_int_hook(file_permission, file, mask); 2723 } 2724 2725 /** 2726 * security_file_alloc() - Allocate and init a file's LSM blob 2727 * @file: the file 2728 * 2729 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the file->f_security field. The 2730 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 2731 * 2732 * Return: Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 2733 */ 2734 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) 2735 { 2736 int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file); 2737 2738 if (rc) 2739 return rc; 2740 rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, file); 2741 if (unlikely(rc)) 2742 security_file_free(file); 2743 return rc; 2744 } 2745 2746 /** 2747 * security_file_release() - Perform actions before releasing the file ref 2748 * @file: the file 2749 * 2750 * Perform actions before releasing the last reference to a file. 2751 */ 2752 void security_file_release(struct file *file) 2753 { 2754 call_void_hook(file_release, file); 2755 } 2756 2757 /** 2758 * security_file_free() - Free a file's LSM blob 2759 * @file: the file 2760 * 2761 * Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security. 2762 */ 2763 void security_file_free(struct file *file) 2764 { 2765 void *blob; 2766 2767 call_void_hook(file_free_security, file); 2768 2769 blob = file->f_security; 2770 if (blob) { 2771 file->f_security = NULL; 2772 kmem_cache_free(lsm_file_cache, blob); 2773 } 2774 } 2775 2776 /** 2777 * security_file_ioctl() - Check if an ioctl is allowed 2778 * @file: associated file 2779 * @cmd: ioctl cmd 2780 * @arg: ioctl arguments 2781 * 2782 * Check permission for an ioctl operation on @file. Note that @arg sometimes 2783 * represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer 2784 * value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used 2785 * by the security module. 2786 * 2787 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2788 */ 2789 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) 2790 { 2791 return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, file, cmd, arg); 2792 } 2793 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl); 2794 2795 /** 2796 * security_file_ioctl_compat() - Check if an ioctl is allowed in compat mode 2797 * @file: associated file 2798 * @cmd: ioctl cmd 2799 * @arg: ioctl arguments 2800 * 2801 * Compat version of security_file_ioctl() that correctly handles 32-bit 2802 * processes running on 64-bit kernels. 2803 * 2804 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2805 */ 2806 int security_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, 2807 unsigned long arg) 2808 { 2809 return call_int_hook(file_ioctl_compat, file, cmd, arg); 2810 } 2811 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl_compat); 2812 2813 static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) 2814 { 2815 /* 2816 * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect 2817 * it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about... 2818 */ 2819 if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ) 2820 return prot; 2821 if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC)) 2822 return prot; 2823 /* 2824 * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it. 2825 */ 2826 if (!file) 2827 return prot | PROT_EXEC; 2828 /* 2829 * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need 2830 * NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case 2831 */ 2832 if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) { 2833 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU 2834 if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) { 2835 unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file); 2836 if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC)) 2837 return prot; 2838 } 2839 #endif 2840 return prot | PROT_EXEC; 2841 } 2842 /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */ 2843 return prot; 2844 } 2845 2846 /** 2847 * security_mmap_file() - Check if mmap'ing a file is allowed 2848 * @file: file 2849 * @prot: protection applied by the kernel 2850 * @flags: flags 2851 * 2852 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g. if 2853 * mapping anonymous memory. 2854 * 2855 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2856 */ 2857 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, 2858 unsigned long flags) 2859 { 2860 return call_int_hook(mmap_file, file, prot, mmap_prot(file, prot), 2861 flags); 2862 } 2863 2864 /** 2865 * security_mmap_addr() - Check if mmap'ing an address is allowed 2866 * @addr: address 2867 * 2868 * Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr. 2869 * 2870 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2871 */ 2872 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) 2873 { 2874 return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, addr); 2875 } 2876 2877 /** 2878 * security_file_mprotect() - Check if changing memory protections is allowed 2879 * @vma: memory region 2880 * @reqprot: application requested protection 2881 * @prot: protection applied by the kernel 2882 * 2883 * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions. 2884 * 2885 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2886 */ 2887 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, 2888 unsigned long prot) 2889 { 2890 return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, vma, reqprot, prot); 2891 } 2892 2893 /** 2894 * security_file_lock() - Check if a file lock is allowed 2895 * @file: file 2896 * @cmd: lock operation (e.g. F_RDLCK, F_WRLCK) 2897 * 2898 * Check permission before performing file locking operations. Note the hook 2899 * mediates both flock and fcntl style locks. 2900 * 2901 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2902 */ 2903 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) 2904 { 2905 return call_int_hook(file_lock, file, cmd); 2906 } 2907 2908 /** 2909 * security_file_fcntl() - Check if fcntl() op is allowed 2910 * @file: file 2911 * @cmd: fcntl command 2912 * @arg: command argument 2913 * 2914 * Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd from 2915 * being performed on the file @file. Note that @arg sometimes represents a 2916 * user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer value. When 2917 * @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used by the 2918 * security module. 2919 * 2920 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2921 */ 2922 int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) 2923 { 2924 return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, file, cmd, arg); 2925 } 2926 2927 /** 2928 * security_file_set_fowner() - Set the file owner info in the LSM blob 2929 * @file: the file 2930 * 2931 * Save owner security information (typically from current->security) in 2932 * file->f_security for later use by the send_sigiotask hook. 2933 * 2934 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2935 */ 2936 void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) 2937 { 2938 call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file); 2939 } 2940 2941 /** 2942 * security_file_send_sigiotask() - Check if sending SIGIO/SIGURG is allowed 2943 * @tsk: target task 2944 * @fown: signal sender 2945 * @sig: signal to be sent, SIGIO is sent if 0 2946 * 2947 * Check permission for the file owner @fown to send SIGIO or SIGURG to the 2948 * process @tsk. Note that this hook is sometimes called from interrupt. Note 2949 * that the fown_struct, @fown, is never outside the context of a struct file, 2950 * so the file structure (and associated security information) can always be 2951 * obtained: container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner). 2952 * 2953 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2954 */ 2955 int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, 2956 struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) 2957 { 2958 return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, tsk, fown, sig); 2959 } 2960 2961 /** 2962 * security_file_receive() - Check if receiving a file via IPC is allowed 2963 * @file: file being received 2964 * 2965 * This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process to 2966 * receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC. 2967 * 2968 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2969 */ 2970 int security_file_receive(struct file *file) 2971 { 2972 return call_int_hook(file_receive, file); 2973 } 2974 2975 /** 2976 * security_file_open() - Save open() time state for late use by the LSM 2977 * @file: 2978 * 2979 * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon file_permission, 2980 * and recheck access if anything has changed since inode_permission. 2981 * 2982 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2983 */ 2984 int security_file_open(struct file *file) 2985 { 2986 int ret; 2987 2988 ret = call_int_hook(file_open, file); 2989 if (ret) 2990 return ret; 2991 2992 return fsnotify_open_perm(file); 2993 } 2994 2995 /** 2996 * security_file_post_open() - Evaluate a file after it has been opened 2997 * @file: the file 2998 * @mask: access mask 2999 * 3000 * Evaluate an opened file and the access mask requested with open(). The hook 3001 * is useful for LSMs that require the file content to be available in order to 3002 * make decisions. 3003 * 3004 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3005 */ 3006 int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask) 3007 { 3008 return call_int_hook(file_post_open, file, mask); 3009 } 3010 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_post_open); 3011 3012 /** 3013 * security_file_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed 3014 * @file: file 3015 * 3016 * Check permission before truncating a file, i.e. using ftruncate. Note that 3017 * truncation permission may also be checked based on the path, using the 3018 * @path_truncate hook. 3019 * 3020 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3021 */ 3022 int security_file_truncate(struct file *file) 3023 { 3024 return call_int_hook(file_truncate, file); 3025 } 3026 3027 /** 3028 * security_task_alloc() - Allocate a task's LSM blob 3029 * @task: the task 3030 * @clone_flags: flags indicating what is being shared 3031 * 3032 * Handle allocation of task-related resources. 3033 * 3034 * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. 3035 */ 3036 int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) 3037 { 3038 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); 3039 3040 if (rc) 3041 return rc; 3042 rc = ccs_alloc_task_security(task); 3043 if (likely(!rc)) 3044 rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, task, clone_flags); 3045 if (unlikely(rc)) 3046 security_task_free(task); 3047 return rc; 3048 } 3049 3050 /** 3051 * security_task_free() - Free a task's LSM blob and related resources 3052 * @task: task 3053 * 3054 * Handle release of task-related resources. Note that this can be called from 3055 * interrupt context. 3056 */ 3057 void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) 3058 { 3059 call_void_hook(task_free, task); 3060 ccs_free_task_security(task); 3061 3062 kfree(task->security); 3063 task->security = NULL; 3064 } 3065 3066 /** 3067 * security_cred_alloc_blank() - Allocate the min memory to allow cred_transfer 3068 * @cred: credentials 3069 * @gfp: gfp flags 3070 * 3071 * Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that 3072 * cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM. 3073 * 3074 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 3075 */ 3076 int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 3077 { 3078 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp); 3079 3080 if (rc) 3081 return rc; 3082 3083 rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, cred, gfp); 3084 if (unlikely(rc)) 3085 security_cred_free(cred); 3086 return rc; 3087 } 3088 3089 /** 3090 * security_cred_free() - Free the cred's LSM blob and associated resources 3091 * @cred: credentials 3092 * 3093 * Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials. 3094 */ 3095 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred) 3096 { 3097 /* 3098 * There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that 3099 * may result in a call here with ->security being NULL. 3100 */ 3101 if (unlikely(cred->security == NULL)) 3102 return; 3103 3104 call_void_hook(cred_free, cred); 3105 3106 kfree(cred->security); 3107 cred->security = NULL; 3108 } 3109 3110 /** 3111 * security_prepare_creds() - Prepare a new set of credentials 3112 * @new: new credentials 3113 * @old: original credentials 3114 * @gfp: gfp flags 3115 * 3116 * Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set. 3117 * 3118 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 3119 */ 3120 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) 3121 { 3122 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp); 3123 3124 if (rc) 3125 return rc; 3126 3127 rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, new, old, gfp); 3128 if (unlikely(rc)) 3129 security_cred_free(new); 3130 return rc; 3131 } 3132 3133 /** 3134 * security_transfer_creds() - Transfer creds 3135 * @new: target credentials 3136 * @old: original credentials 3137 * 3138 * Transfer data from original creds to new creds. 3139 */ 3140 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 3141 { 3142 call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); 3143 } 3144 3145 /** 3146 * security_cred_getsecid() - Get the secid from a set of credentials 3147 * @c: credentials 3148 * @secid: secid value 3149 * 3150 * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c. In case of 3151 * failure, @secid will be set to zero. 3152 */ 3153 void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) 3154 { 3155 *secid = 0; 3156 call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid); 3157 } 3158 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid); 3159 3160 /** 3161 * security_kernel_act_as() - Set the kernel credentials to act as secid 3162 * @new: credentials 3163 * @secid: secid 3164 * 3165 * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context). 3166 * The current task must be the one that nominated @secid. 3167 * 3168 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 3169 */ 3170 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) 3171 { 3172 return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, new, secid); 3173 } 3174 3175 /** 3176 * security_kernel_create_files_as() - Set file creation context using an inode 3177 * @new: target credentials 3178 * @inode: reference inode 3179 * 3180 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same as the 3181 * objective context of the specified inode. The current task must be the one 3182 * that nominated @inode. 3183 * 3184 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 3185 */ 3186 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) 3187 { 3188 return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, new, inode); 3189 } 3190 3191 /** 3192 * security_kernel_module_request() - Check if loading a module is allowed 3193 * @kmod_name: module name 3194 * 3195 * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for 3196 * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name. 3197 * 3198 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 3199 */ 3200 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) 3201 { 3202 return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, kmod_name); 3203 } 3204 3205 /** 3206 * security_kernel_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace 3207 * @file: file 3208 * @id: file identifier 3209 * @contents: trust if security_kernel_post_read_file() will be called 3210 * 3211 * Read a file specified by userspace. 3212 * 3213 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3214 */ 3215 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, 3216 bool contents) 3217 { 3218 return call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, file, id, contents); 3219 } 3220 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); 3221 3222 /** 3223 * security_kernel_post_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace 3224 * @file: file 3225 * @buf: file contents 3226 * @size: size of file contents 3227 * @id: file identifier 3228 * 3229 * Read a file specified by userspace. This must be paired with a prior call 3230 * to security_kernel_read_file() call that indicated this hook would also be 3231 * called, see security_kernel_read_file() for more information. 3232 * 3233 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3234 */ 3235 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, 3236 enum kernel_read_file_id id) 3237 { 3238 return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, file, buf, size, id); 3239 } 3240 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); 3241 3242 /** 3243 * security_kernel_load_data() - Load data provided by userspace 3244 * @id: data identifier 3245 * @contents: true if security_kernel_post_load_data() will be called 3246 * 3247 * Load data provided by userspace. 3248 * 3249 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3250 */ 3251 int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) 3252 { 3253 return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, id, contents); 3254 } 3255 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data); 3256 3257 /** 3258 * security_kernel_post_load_data() - Load userspace data from a non-file source 3259 * @buf: data 3260 * @size: size of data 3261 * @id: data identifier 3262 * @description: text description of data, specific to the id value 3263 * 3264 * Load data provided by a non-file source (usually userspace buffer). This 3265 * must be paired with a prior security_kernel_load_data() call that indicated 3266 * this hook would also be called, see security_kernel_load_data() for more 3267 * information. 3268 * 3269 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3270 */ 3271 int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, 3272 enum kernel_load_data_id id, 3273 char *description) 3274 { 3275 return call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, buf, size, id, description); 3276 } 3277 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data); 3278 3279 /** 3280 * security_task_fix_setuid() - Update LSM with new user id attributes 3281 * @new: updated credentials 3282 * @old: credentials being replaced 3283 * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag values 3284 * 3285 * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user identity 3286 * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates which of 3287 * the set*uid system calls invoked this hook. If @new is the set of 3288 * credentials that will be installed. Modifications should be made to this 3289 * rather than to @current->cred. 3290 * 3291 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3292 */ 3293 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 3294 int flags) 3295 { 3296 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, new, old, flags); 3297 } 3298 3299 /** 3300 * security_task_fix_setgid() - Update LSM with new group id attributes 3301 * @new: updated credentials 3302 * @old: credentials being replaced 3303 * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag value 3304 * 3305 * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the group identity 3306 * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates which of 3307 * the set*gid system calls invoked this hook. @new is the set of credentials 3308 * that will be installed. Modifications should be made to this rather than to 3309 * @current->cred. 3310 * 3311 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3312 */ 3313 int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 3314 int flags) 3315 { 3316 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, new, old, flags); 3317 } 3318 3319 /** 3320 * security_task_fix_setgroups() - Update LSM with new supplementary groups 3321 * @new: updated credentials 3322 * @old: credentials being replaced 3323 * 3324 * Update the module's state after setting the supplementary group identity 3325 * attributes of the current process. @new is the set of credentials that will 3326 * be installed. Modifications should be made to this rather than to 3327 * @current->cred. 3328 * 3329 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3330 */ 3331 int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 3332 { 3333 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgroups, new, old); 3334 } 3335 3336 /** 3337 * security_task_setpgid() - Check if setting the pgid is allowed 3338 * @p: task being modified 3339 * @pgid: new pgid 3340 * 3341 * Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the process 3342 * @p to @pgid. 3343 * 3344 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3345 */ 3346 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) 3347 { 3348 return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, p, pgid); 3349 } 3350 3351 /** 3352 * security_task_getpgid() - Check if getting the pgid is allowed 3353 * @p: task 3354 * 3355 * Check permission before getting the process group identifier of the process 3356 * @p. 3357 * 3358 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3359 */ 3360 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) 3361 { 3362 return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, p); 3363 } 3364 3365 /** 3366 * security_task_getsid() - Check if getting the session id is allowed 3367 * @p: task 3368 * 3369 * Check permission before getting the session identifier of the process @p. 3370 * 3371 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3372 */ 3373 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) 3374 { 3375 return call_int_hook(task_getsid, p); 3376 } 3377 3378 /** 3379 * security_current_getsecid_subj() - Get the current task's subjective secid 3380 * @secid: secid value 3381 * 3382 * Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the current task and return 3383 * it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. 3384 */ 3385 void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) 3386 { 3387 *secid = 0; 3388 call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid); 3389 } 3390 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj); 3391 3392 /** 3393 * security_task_getsecid_obj() - Get a task's objective secid 3394 * @p: target task 3395 * @secid: secid value 3396 * 3397 * Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p and 3398 * return it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. 3399 */ 3400 void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) 3401 { 3402 *secid = 0; 3403 call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid); 3404 } 3405 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj); 3406 3407 /** 3408 * security_task_setnice() - Check if setting a task's nice value is allowed 3409 * @p: target task 3410 * @nice: nice value 3411 * 3412 * Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice. 3413 * 3414 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3415 */ 3416 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) 3417 { 3418 return call_int_hook(task_setnice, p, nice); 3419 } 3420 3421 /** 3422 * security_task_setioprio() - Check if setting a task's ioprio is allowed 3423 * @p: target task 3424 * @ioprio: ioprio value 3425 * 3426 * Check permission before setting the ioprio value of @p to @ioprio. 3427 * 3428 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3429 */ 3430 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) 3431 { 3432 return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, p, ioprio); 3433 } 3434 3435 /** 3436 * security_task_getioprio() - Check if getting a task's ioprio is allowed 3437 * @p: task 3438 * 3439 * Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p. 3440 * 3441 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3442 */ 3443 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) 3444 { 3445 return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, p); 3446 } 3447 3448 /** 3449 * security_task_prlimit() - Check if get/setting resources limits is allowed 3450 * @cred: current task credentials 3451 * @tcred: target task credentials 3452 * @flags: LSM_PRLIMIT_* flag bits indicating a get/set/both 3453 * 3454 * Check permission before getting and/or setting the resource limits of 3455 * another task. 3456 * 3457 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3458 */ 3459 int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, 3460 unsigned int flags) 3461 { 3462 return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, cred, tcred, flags); 3463 } 3464 3465 /** 3466 * security_task_setrlimit() - Check if setting a new rlimit value is allowed 3467 * @p: target task's group leader 3468 * @resource: resource whose limit is being set 3469 * @new_rlim: new resource limit 3470 * 3471 * Check permission before setting the resource limits of process @p for 3472 * @resource to @new_rlim. The old resource limit values can be examined by 3473 * dereferencing (p->signal->rlim + resource). 3474 * 3475 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3476 */ 3477 int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, 3478 struct rlimit *new_rlim) 3479 { 3480 return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, p, resource, new_rlim); 3481 } 3482 3483 /** 3484 * security_task_setscheduler() - Check if setting sched policy/param is allowed 3485 * @p: target task 3486 * 3487 * Check permission before setting scheduling policy and/or parameters of 3488 * process @p. 3489 * 3490 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3491 */ 3492 int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) 3493 { 3494 return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, p); 3495 } 3496 3497 /** 3498 * security_task_getscheduler() - Check if getting scheduling info is allowed 3499 * @p: target task 3500 * 3501 * Check permission before obtaining scheduling information for process @p. 3502 * 3503 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3504 */ 3505 int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) 3506 { 3507 return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, p); 3508 } 3509 3510 /** 3511 * security_task_movememory() - Check if moving memory is allowed 3512 * @p: task 3513 * 3514 * Check permission before moving memory owned by process @p. 3515 * 3516 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3517 */ 3518 int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) 3519 { 3520 return call_int_hook(task_movememory, p); 3521 } 3522 3523 /** 3524 * security_task_kill() - Check if sending a signal is allowed 3525 * @p: target process 3526 * @info: signal information 3527 * @sig: signal value 3528 * @cred: credentials of the signal sender, NULL if @current 3529 * 3530 * Check permission before sending signal @sig to @p. @info can be NULL, the 3531 * constant 1, or a pointer to a kernel_siginfo structure. If @info is 1 or 3532 * SI_FROMKERNEL(info) is true, then the signal should be viewed as coming from 3533 * the kernel and should typically be permitted. SIGIO signals are handled 3534 * separately by the send_sigiotask hook in file_security_ops. 3535 * 3536 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3537 */ 3538 int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, 3539 int sig, const struct cred *cred) 3540 { 3541 return call_int_hook(task_kill, p, info, sig, cred); 3542 } 3543 3544 /** 3545 * security_task_prctl() - Check if a prctl op is allowed 3546 * @option: operation 3547 * @arg2: argument 3548 * @arg3: argument 3549 * @arg4: argument 3550 * @arg5: argument 3551 * 3552 * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the 3553 * current process. 3554 * 3555 * Return: Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value 3556 * to cause prctl() to return immediately with that value. 3557 */ 3558 int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, 3559 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) 3560 { 3561 int thisrc; 3562 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl); 3563 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3564 3565 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) { 3566 thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); 3567 if (thisrc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl)) { 3568 rc = thisrc; 3569 if (thisrc != 0) 3570 break; 3571 } 3572 } 3573 return rc; 3574 } 3575 3576 /** 3577 * security_task_to_inode() - Set the security attributes of a task's inode 3578 * @p: task 3579 * @inode: inode 3580 * 3581 * Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's 3582 * security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes. 3583 */ 3584 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) 3585 { 3586 call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode); 3587 } 3588 3589 /** 3590 * security_create_user_ns() - Check if creating a new userns is allowed 3591 * @cred: prepared creds 3592 * 3593 * Check permission prior to creating a new user namespace. 3594 * 3595 * Return: Returns 0 if successful, otherwise < 0 error code. 3596 */ 3597 int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred) 3598 { 3599 return call_int_hook(userns_create, cred); 3600 } 3601 3602 /** 3603 * security_ipc_permission() - Check if sysv ipc access is allowed 3604 * @ipcp: ipc permission structure 3605 * @flag: requested permissions 3606 * 3607 * Check permissions for access to IPC. 3608 * 3609 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3610 */ 3611 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) 3612 { 3613 return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, ipcp, flag); 3614 } 3615 3616 /** 3617 * security_ipc_getsecid() - Get the sysv ipc object's secid 3618 * @ipcp: ipc permission structure 3619 * @secid: secid pointer 3620 * 3621 * Get the secid associated with the ipc object. In case of failure, @secid 3622 * will be set to zero. 3623 */ 3624 void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) 3625 { 3626 *secid = 0; 3627 call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); 3628 } 3629 3630 /** 3631 * security_msg_msg_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc message LSM blob 3632 * @msg: message structure 3633 * 3634 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the msg->security field. The 3635 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3636 * 3637 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3638 */ 3639 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) 3640 { 3641 int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg); 3642 3643 if (unlikely(rc)) 3644 return rc; 3645 rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, msg); 3646 if (unlikely(rc)) 3647 security_msg_msg_free(msg); 3648 return rc; 3649 } 3650 3651 /** 3652 * security_msg_msg_free() - Free a sysv ipc message LSM blob 3653 * @msg: message structure 3654 * 3655 * Deallocate the security structure for this message. 3656 */ 3657 void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg) 3658 { 3659 call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg); 3660 kfree(msg->security); 3661 msg->security = NULL; 3662 } 3663 3664 /** 3665 * security_msg_queue_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob 3666 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3667 * 3668 * Allocate and attach a security structure to @msg. The security field is 3669 * initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3670 * 3671 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3672 */ 3673 int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) 3674 { 3675 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq); 3676 3677 if (unlikely(rc)) 3678 return rc; 3679 rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, msq); 3680 if (unlikely(rc)) 3681 security_msg_queue_free(msq); 3682 return rc; 3683 } 3684 3685 /** 3686 * security_msg_queue_free() - Free a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob 3687 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3688 * 3689 * Deallocate security field @perm->security for the message queue. 3690 */ 3691 void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) 3692 { 3693 call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq); 3694 kfree(msq->security); 3695 msq->security = NULL; 3696 } 3697 3698 /** 3699 * security_msg_queue_associate() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed 3700 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3701 * @msqflg: operation flags 3702 * 3703 * Check permission when a message queue is requested through the msgget system 3704 * call. This hook is only called when returning the message queue identifier 3705 * for an existing message queue, not when a new message queue is created. 3706 * 3707 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 3708 */ 3709 int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg) 3710 { 3711 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, msq, msqflg); 3712 } 3713 3714 /** 3715 * security_msg_queue_msgctl() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed 3716 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3717 * @cmd: operation 3718 * 3719 * Check permission when a message control operation specified by @cmd is to be 3720 * performed on the message queue with permissions. 3721 * 3722 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3723 */ 3724 int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd) 3725 { 3726 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, msq, cmd); 3727 } 3728 3729 /** 3730 * security_msg_queue_msgsnd() - Check if sending a sysv ipc message is allowed 3731 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3732 * @msg: message 3733 * @msqflg: operation flags 3734 * 3735 * Check permission before a message, @msg, is enqueued on the message queue 3736 * with permissions specified in @msq. 3737 * 3738 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3739 */ 3740 int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, 3741 struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) 3742 { 3743 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, msq, msg, msqflg); 3744 } 3745 3746 /** 3747 * security_msg_queue_msgrcv() - Check if receiving a sysv ipc msg is allowed 3748 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3749 * @msg: message 3750 * @target: target task 3751 * @type: type of message requested 3752 * @mode: operation flags 3753 * 3754 * Check permission before a message, @msg, is removed from the message queue. 3755 * The @target task structure contains a pointer to the process that will be 3756 * receiving the message (not equal to the current process when inline receives 3757 * are being performed). 3758 * 3759 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3760 */ 3761 int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, 3762 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) 3763 { 3764 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, msq, msg, target, type, mode); 3765 } 3766 3767 /** 3768 * security_shm_alloc() - Allocate a sysv shm LSM blob 3769 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3770 * 3771 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @shp security field. The 3772 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3773 * 3774 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3775 */ 3776 int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) 3777 { 3778 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp); 3779 3780 if (unlikely(rc)) 3781 return rc; 3782 rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, shp); 3783 if (unlikely(rc)) 3784 security_shm_free(shp); 3785 return rc; 3786 } 3787 3788 /** 3789 * security_shm_free() - Free a sysv shm LSM blob 3790 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3791 * 3792 * Deallocate the security structure @perm->security for the memory segment. 3793 */ 3794 void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) 3795 { 3796 call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp); 3797 kfree(shp->security); 3798 shp->security = NULL; 3799 } 3800 3801 /** 3802 * security_shm_associate() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed 3803 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3804 * @shmflg: operation flags 3805 * 3806 * Check permission when a shared memory region is requested through the shmget 3807 * system call. This hook is only called when returning the shared memory 3808 * region identifier for an existing region, not when a new shared memory 3809 * region is created. 3810 * 3811 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3812 */ 3813 int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg) 3814 { 3815 return call_int_hook(shm_associate, shp, shmflg); 3816 } 3817 3818 /** 3819 * security_shm_shmctl() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed 3820 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3821 * @cmd: operation 3822 * 3823 * Check permission when a shared memory control operation specified by @cmd is 3824 * to be performed on the shared memory region with permissions in @shp. 3825 * 3826 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 3827 */ 3828 int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd) 3829 { 3830 return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, shp, cmd); 3831 } 3832 3833 /** 3834 * security_shm_shmat() - Check if a sysv shm attach operation is allowed 3835 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3836 * @shmaddr: address of memory region to attach 3837 * @shmflg: operation flags 3838 * 3839 * Check permissions prior to allowing the shmat system call to attach the 3840 * shared memory segment with permissions @shp to the data segment of the 3841 * calling process. The attaching address is specified by @shmaddr. 3842 * 3843 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3844 */ 3845 int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, 3846 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) 3847 { 3848 return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, shp, shmaddr, shmflg); 3849 } 3850 3851 /** 3852 * security_sem_alloc() - Allocate a sysv semaphore LSM blob 3853 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3854 * 3855 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @sma security field. The 3856 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3857 * 3858 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3859 */ 3860 int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) 3861 { 3862 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma); 3863 3864 if (unlikely(rc)) 3865 return rc; 3866 rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, sma); 3867 if (unlikely(rc)) 3868 security_sem_free(sma); 3869 return rc; 3870 } 3871 3872 /** 3873 * security_sem_free() - Free a sysv semaphore LSM blob 3874 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3875 * 3876 * Deallocate security structure @sma->security for the semaphore. 3877 */ 3878 void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) 3879 { 3880 call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma); 3881 kfree(sma->security); 3882 sma->security = NULL; 3883 } 3884 3885 /** 3886 * security_sem_associate() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3887 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3888 * @semflg: operation flags 3889 * 3890 * Check permission when a semaphore is requested through the semget system 3891 * call. This hook is only called when returning the semaphore identifier for 3892 * an existing semaphore, not when a new one must be created. 3893 * 3894 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3895 */ 3896 int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg) 3897 { 3898 return call_int_hook(sem_associate, sma, semflg); 3899 } 3900 3901 /** 3902 * security_sem_semctl() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3903 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3904 * @cmd: operation 3905 * 3906 * Check permission when a semaphore operation specified by @cmd is to be 3907 * performed on the semaphore. 3908 * 3909 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3910 */ 3911 int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd) 3912 { 3913 return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, sma, cmd); 3914 } 3915 3916 /** 3917 * security_sem_semop() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3918 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3919 * @sops: operations to perform 3920 * @nsops: number of operations 3921 * @alter: flag indicating changes will be made 3922 * 3923 * Check permissions before performing operations on members of the semaphore 3924 * set. If the @alter flag is nonzero, the semaphore set may be modified. 3925 * 3926 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3927 */ 3928 int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops, 3929 unsigned nsops, int alter) 3930 { 3931 return call_int_hook(sem_semop, sma, sops, nsops, alter); 3932 } 3933 3934 /** 3935 * security_d_instantiate() - Populate an inode's LSM state based on a dentry 3936 * @dentry: dentry 3937 * @inode: inode 3938 * 3939 * Fill in @inode security information for a @dentry if allowed. 3940 */ 3941 void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) 3942 { 3943 if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 3944 return; 3945 call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode); 3946 } 3947 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate); 3948 3949 /* 3950 * Please keep this in sync with it's counterpart in security/lsm_syscalls.c 3951 */ 3952 3953 /** 3954 * security_getselfattr - Read an LSM attribute of the current process. 3955 * @attr: which attribute to return 3956 * @uctx: the user-space destination for the information, or NULL 3957 * @size: pointer to the size of space available to receive the data 3958 * @flags: special handling options. LSM_FLAG_SINGLE indicates that only 3959 * attributes associated with the LSM identified in the passed @ctx be 3960 * reported. 3961 * 3962 * A NULL value for @uctx can be used to get both the number of attributes 3963 * and the size of the data. 3964 * 3965 * Returns the number of attributes found on success, negative value 3966 * on error. @size is reset to the total size of the data. 3967 * If @size is insufficient to contain the data -E2BIG is returned. 3968 */ 3969 int security_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx, 3970 u32 __user *size, u32 flags) 3971 { 3972 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3973 struct lsm_ctx lctx = { .id = LSM_ID_UNDEF, }; 3974 u8 __user *base = (u8 __user *)uctx; 3975 u32 entrysize; 3976 u32 total = 0; 3977 u32 left; 3978 bool toobig = false; 3979 bool single = false; 3980 int count = 0; 3981 int rc; 3982 3983 if (attr == LSM_ATTR_UNDEF) 3984 return -EINVAL; 3985 if (size == NULL) 3986 return -EINVAL; 3987 if (get_user(left, size)) 3988 return -EFAULT; 3989 3990 if (flags) { 3991 /* 3992 * Only flag supported is LSM_FLAG_SINGLE 3993 */ 3994 if (flags != LSM_FLAG_SINGLE || !uctx) 3995 return -EINVAL; 3996 if (copy_from_user(&lctx, uctx, sizeof(lctx))) 3997 return -EFAULT; 3998 /* 3999 * If the LSM ID isn't specified it is an error. 4000 */ 4001 if (lctx.id == LSM_ID_UNDEF) 4002 return -EINVAL; 4003 single = true; 4004 } 4005 4006 /* 4007 * In the usual case gather all the data from the LSMs. 4008 * In the single case only get the data from the LSM specified. 4009 */ 4010 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getselfattr, list) { 4011 if (single && lctx.id != hp->lsmid->id) 4012 continue; 4013 entrysize = left; 4014 if (base) 4015 uctx = (struct lsm_ctx __user *)(base + total); 4016 rc = hp->hook.getselfattr(attr, uctx, &entrysize, flags); 4017 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { 4018 rc = 0; 4019 continue; 4020 } 4021 if (rc == -E2BIG) { 4022 rc = 0; 4023 left = 0; 4024 toobig = true; 4025 } else if (rc < 0) 4026 return rc; 4027 else 4028 left -= entrysize; 4029 4030 total += entrysize; 4031 count += rc; 4032 if (single) 4033 break; 4034 } 4035 if (put_user(total, size)) 4036 return -EFAULT; 4037 if (toobig) 4038 return -E2BIG; 4039 if (count == 0) 4040 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getselfattr); 4041 return count; 4042 } 4043 4044 /* 4045 * Please keep this in sync with it's counterpart in security/lsm_syscalls.c 4046 */ 4047 4048 /** 4049 * security_setselfattr - Set an LSM attribute on the current process. 4050 * @attr: which attribute to set 4051 * @uctx: the user-space source for the information 4052 * @size: the size of the data 4053 * @flags: reserved for future use, must be 0 4054 * 4055 * Set an LSM attribute for the current process. The LSM, attribute 4056 * and new value are included in @uctx. 4057 * 4058 * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL if the input is inconsistent, -EFAULT 4059 * if the user buffer is inaccessible, E2BIG if size is too big, or an 4060 * LSM specific failure. 4061 */ 4062 int security_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx, 4063 u32 size, u32 flags) 4064 { 4065 struct security_hook_list *hp; 4066 struct lsm_ctx *lctx; 4067 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setselfattr); 4068 u64 required_len; 4069 4070 if (flags) 4071 return -EINVAL; 4072 if (size < sizeof(*lctx)) 4073 return -EINVAL; 4074 if (size > PAGE_SIZE) 4075 return -E2BIG; 4076 4077 lctx = memdup_user(uctx, size); 4078 if (IS_ERR(lctx)) 4079 return PTR_ERR(lctx); 4080 4081 if (size < lctx->len || 4082 check_add_overflow(sizeof(*lctx), lctx->ctx_len, &required_len) || 4083 lctx->len < required_len) { 4084 rc = -EINVAL; 4085 goto free_out; 4086 } 4087 4088 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setselfattr, list) 4089 if ((hp->lsmid->id) == lctx->id) { 4090 rc = hp->hook.setselfattr(attr, lctx, size, flags); 4091 break; 4092 } 4093 4094 free_out: 4095 kfree(lctx); 4096 return rc; 4097 } 4098 4099 /** 4100 * security_getprocattr() - Read an attribute for a task 4101 * @p: the task 4102 * @lsmid: LSM identification 4103 * @name: attribute name 4104 * @value: attribute value 4105 * 4106 * Read attribute @name for task @p and store it into @value if allowed. 4107 * 4108 * Return: Returns the length of @value on success, a negative value otherwise. 4109 */ 4110 int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, int lsmid, const char *name, 4111 char **value) 4112 { 4113 struct security_hook_list *hp; 4114 4115 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { 4116 if (lsmid != 0 && lsmid != hp->lsmid->id) 4117 continue; 4118 return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value); 4119 } 4120 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr); 4121 } 4122 4123 /** 4124 * security_setprocattr() - Set an attribute for a task 4125 * @lsmid: LSM identification 4126 * @name: attribute name 4127 * @value: attribute value 4128 * @size: attribute value size 4129 * 4130 * Write (set) the current task's attribute @name to @value, size @size if 4131 * allowed. 4132 * 4133 * Return: Returns bytes written on success, a negative value otherwise. 4134 */ 4135 int security_setprocattr(int lsmid, const char *name, void *value, size_t size) 4136 { 4137 struct security_hook_list *hp; 4138 4139 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { 4140 if (lsmid != 0 && lsmid != hp->lsmid->id) 4141 continue; 4142 return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); 4143 } 4144 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr); 4145 } 4146 4147 /** 4148 * security_netlink_send() - Save info and check if netlink sending is allowed 4149 * @sk: sending socket 4150 * @skb: netlink message 4151 * 4152 * Save security information for a netlink message so that permission checking 4153 * can be performed when the message is processed. The security information 4154 * can be saved using the eff_cap field of the netlink_skb_parms structure. 4155 * Also may be used to provide fine grained control over message transmission. 4156 * 4157 * Return: Returns 0 if the information was successfully saved and message is 4158 * allowed to be transmitted. 4159 */ 4160 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 4161 { 4162 return call_int_hook(netlink_send, sk, skb); 4163 } 4164 4165 /** 4166 * security_ismaclabel() - Check if the named attribute is a MAC label 4167 * @name: full extended attribute name 4168 * 4169 * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name represents a MAC label. 4170 * 4171 * Return: Returns 1 if name is a MAC attribute otherwise returns 0. 4172 */ 4173 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) 4174 { 4175 return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, name); 4176 } 4177 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel); 4178 4179 /** 4180 * security_secid_to_secctx() - Convert a secid to a secctx 4181 * @secid: secid 4182 * @secdata: secctx 4183 * @seclen: secctx length 4184 * 4185 * Convert secid to security context. If @secdata is NULL the length of the 4186 * result will be returned in @seclen, but no @secdata will be returned. This 4187 * does mean that the length could change between calls to check the length and 4188 * the next call which actually allocates and returns the @secdata. 4189 * 4190 * Return: Return 0 on success, error on failure. 4191 */ 4192 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) 4193 { 4194 return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, secid, secdata, seclen); 4195 } 4196 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx); 4197 4198 /** 4199 * security_secctx_to_secid() - Convert a secctx to a secid 4200 * @secdata: secctx 4201 * @seclen: length of secctx 4202 * @secid: secid 4203 * 4204 * Convert security context to secid. 4205 * 4206 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4207 */ 4208 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) 4209 { 4210 *secid = 0; 4211 return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, secdata, seclen, secid); 4212 } 4213 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid); 4214 4215 /** 4216 * security_release_secctx() - Free a secctx buffer 4217 * @secdata: secctx 4218 * @seclen: length of secctx 4219 * 4220 * Release the security context. 4221 */ 4222 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) 4223 { 4224 call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen); 4225 } 4226 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx); 4227 4228 /** 4229 * security_inode_invalidate_secctx() - Invalidate an inode's security label 4230 * @inode: inode 4231 * 4232 * Notify the security module that it must revalidate the security context of 4233 * an inode. 4234 */ 4235 void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) 4236 { 4237 call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode); 4238 } 4239 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx); 4240 4241 /** 4242 * security_inode_notifysecctx() - Notify the LSM of an inode's security label 4243 * @inode: inode 4244 * @ctx: secctx 4245 * @ctxlen: length of secctx 4246 * 4247 * Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should 4248 * be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module 4249 * for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize 4250 * the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server 4251 * for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client. 4252 * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked. 4253 * 4254 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4255 */ 4256 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) 4257 { 4258 return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, inode, ctx, ctxlen); 4259 } 4260 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx); 4261 4262 /** 4263 * security_inode_setsecctx() - Change the security label of an inode 4264 * @dentry: inode 4265 * @ctx: secctx 4266 * @ctxlen: length of secctx 4267 * 4268 * Change the security context of an inode. Updates the incore security 4269 * context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed 4270 * (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the 4271 * context. Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security 4272 * context in its incore inode and on the backing filesystem to a value 4273 * provided by the client on a SETATTR operation. Must be called with 4274 * inode->i_mutex locked. 4275 * 4276 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4277 */ 4278 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) 4279 { 4280 return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, dentry, ctx, ctxlen); 4281 } 4282 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx); 4283 4284 /** 4285 * security_inode_getsecctx() - Get the security label of an inode 4286 * @inode: inode 4287 * @ctx: secctx 4288 * @ctxlen: length of secctx 4289 * 4290 * On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security 4291 * context for the given @inode. 4292 * 4293 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4294 */ 4295 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) 4296 { 4297 return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, inode, ctx, ctxlen); 4298 } 4299 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx); 4300 4301 #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE 4302 /** 4303 * security_post_notification() - Check if a watch notification can be posted 4304 * @w_cred: credentials of the task that set the watch 4305 * @cred: credentials of the task which triggered the watch 4306 * @n: the notification 4307 * 4308 * Check to see if a watch notification can be posted to a particular queue. 4309 * 4310 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4311 */ 4312 int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, 4313 const struct cred *cred, 4314 struct watch_notification *n) 4315 { 4316 return call_int_hook(post_notification, w_cred, cred, n); 4317 } 4318 #endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */ 4319 4320 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS 4321 /** 4322 * security_watch_key() - Check if a task is allowed to watch for key events 4323 * @key: the key to watch 4324 * 4325 * Check to see if a process is allowed to watch for event notifications from 4326 * a key or keyring. 4327 * 4328 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4329 */ 4330 int security_watch_key(struct key *key) 4331 { 4332 return call_int_hook(watch_key, key); 4333 } 4334 #endif /* CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */ 4335 4336 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK 4337 /** 4338 * security_unix_stream_connect() - Check if a AF_UNIX stream is allowed 4339 * @sock: originating sock 4340 * @other: peer sock 4341 * @newsk: new sock 4342 * 4343 * Check permissions before establishing a Unix domain stream connection 4344 * between @sock and @other. 4345 * 4346 * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because 4347 * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix 4348 * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name 4349 * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod 4350 * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to 4351 * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient 4352 * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible 4353 * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target 4354 * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code. 4355 * 4356 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4357 */ 4358 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, 4359 struct sock *newsk) 4360 { 4361 return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, sock, other, newsk); 4362 } 4363 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect); 4364 4365 /** 4366 * security_unix_may_send() - Check if AF_UNIX socket can send datagrams 4367 * @sock: originating sock 4368 * @other: peer sock 4369 * 4370 * Check permissions before connecting or sending datagrams from @sock to 4371 * @other. 4372 * 4373 * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because 4374 * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix 4375 * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name 4376 * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod 4377 * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to 4378 * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient 4379 * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible 4380 * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target 4381 * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code. 4382 * 4383 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4384 */ 4385 int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) 4386 { 4387 return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, sock, other); 4388 } 4389 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send); 4390 4391 /** 4392 * security_socket_create() - Check if creating a new socket is allowed 4393 * @family: protocol family 4394 * @type: communications type 4395 * @protocol: requested protocol 4396 * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested 4397 * 4398 * Check permissions prior to creating a new socket. 4399 * 4400 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4401 */ 4402 int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) 4403 { 4404 return call_int_hook(socket_create, family, type, protocol, kern); 4405 } 4406 4407 /** 4408 * security_socket_post_create() - Initialize a newly created socket 4409 * @sock: socket 4410 * @family: protocol family 4411 * @type: communications type 4412 * @protocol: requested protocol 4413 * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested 4414 * 4415 * This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security 4416 * structure. Note that the security field was not added directly to the socket 4417 * structure, but rather, the socket security information is stored in the 4418 * associated inode. Typically, the inode alloc_security hook will allocate 4419 * and attach security information to SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security. This hook 4420 * may be used to update the SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security field with additional 4421 * information that wasn't available when the inode was allocated. 4422 * 4423 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4424 */ 4425 int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, 4426 int type, int protocol, int kern) 4427 { 4428 return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, sock, family, type, 4429 protocol, kern); 4430 } 4431 4432 /** 4433 * security_socket_socketpair() - Check if creating a socketpair is allowed 4434 * @socka: first socket 4435 * @sockb: second socket 4436 * 4437 * Check permissions before creating a fresh pair of sockets. 4438 * 4439 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted and the connection was 4440 * established. 4441 */ 4442 int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb) 4443 { 4444 return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, socka, sockb); 4445 } 4446 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair); 4447 4448 /** 4449 * security_socket_bind() - Check if a socket bind operation is allowed 4450 * @sock: socket 4451 * @address: requested bind address 4452 * @addrlen: length of address 4453 * 4454 * Check permission before socket protocol layer bind operation is performed 4455 * and the socket @sock is bound to the address specified in the @address 4456 * parameter. 4457 * 4458 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4459 */ 4460 int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, 4461 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 4462 { 4463 return call_int_hook(socket_bind, sock, address, addrlen); 4464 } 4465 4466 /** 4467 * security_socket_connect() - Check if a socket connect operation is allowed 4468 * @sock: socket 4469 * @address: address of remote connection point 4470 * @addrlen: length of address 4471 * 4472 * Check permission before socket protocol layer connect operation attempts to 4473 * connect socket @sock to a remote address, @address. 4474 * 4475 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4476 */ 4477 int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, 4478 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 4479 { 4480 return call_int_hook(socket_connect, sock, address, addrlen); 4481 } 4482 4483 /** 4484 * security_socket_listen() - Check if a socket is allowed to listen 4485 * @sock: socket 4486 * @backlog: connection queue size 4487 * 4488 * Check permission before socket protocol layer listen operation. 4489 * 4490 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4491 */ 4492 int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) 4493 { 4494 return call_int_hook(socket_listen, sock, backlog); 4495 } 4496 4497 /** 4498 * security_socket_accept() - Check if a socket is allowed to accept connections 4499 * @sock: listening socket 4500 * @newsock: newly creation connection socket 4501 * 4502 * Check permission before accepting a new connection. Note that the new 4503 * socket, @newsock, has been created and some information copied to it, but 4504 * the accept operation has not actually been performed. 4505 * 4506 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4507 */ 4508 int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) 4509 { 4510 return call_int_hook(socket_accept, sock, newsock); 4511 } 4512 4513 /** 4514 * security_socket_sendmsg() - Check if sending a message is allowed 4515 * @sock: sending socket 4516 * @msg: message to send 4517 * @size: size of message 4518 * 4519 * Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket. 4520 * 4521 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4522 */ 4523 int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) 4524 { 4525 return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, sock, msg, size); 4526 } 4527 4528 /** 4529 * security_socket_recvmsg() - Check if receiving a message is allowed 4530 * @sock: receiving socket 4531 * @msg: message to receive 4532 * @size: size of message 4533 * @flags: operational flags 4534 * 4535 * Check permission before receiving a message from a socket. 4536 * 4537 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4538 */ 4539 int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, 4540 int size, int flags) 4541 { 4542 return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, sock, msg, size, flags); 4543 } 4544 4545 /** 4546 * security_socket_getsockname() - Check if reading the socket addr is allowed 4547 * @sock: socket 4548 * 4549 * Check permission before reading the local address (name) of the socket 4550 * object. 4551 * 4552 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4553 */ 4554 int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) 4555 { 4556 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, sock); 4557 } 4558 4559 /** 4560 * security_socket_getpeername() - Check if reading the peer's addr is allowed 4561 * @sock: socket 4562 * 4563 * Check permission before the remote address (name) of a socket object. 4564 * 4565 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4566 */ 4567 int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) 4568 { 4569 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, sock); 4570 } 4571 4572 /** 4573 * security_socket_getsockopt() - Check if reading a socket option is allowed 4574 * @sock: socket 4575 * @level: option's protocol level 4576 * @optname: option name 4577 * 4578 * Check permissions before retrieving the options associated with socket 4579 * @sock. 4580 * 4581 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4582 */ 4583 int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) 4584 { 4585 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, sock, level, optname); 4586 } 4587 4588 /** 4589 * security_socket_setsockopt() - Check if setting a socket option is allowed 4590 * @sock: socket 4591 * @level: option's protocol level 4592 * @optname: option name 4593 * 4594 * Check permissions before setting the options associated with socket @sock. 4595 * 4596 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4597 */ 4598 int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) 4599 { 4600 return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, sock, level, optname); 4601 } 4602 4603 /** 4604 * security_socket_shutdown() - Checks if shutting down the socket is allowed 4605 * @sock: socket 4606 * @how: flag indicating how sends and receives are handled 4607 * 4608 * Checks permission before all or part of a connection on the socket @sock is 4609 * shut down. 4610 * 4611 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4612 */ 4613 int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) 4614 { 4615 return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, sock, how); 4616 } 4617 4618 /** 4619 * security_sock_rcv_skb() - Check if an incoming network packet is allowed 4620 * @sk: destination sock 4621 * @skb: incoming packet 4622 * 4623 * Check permissions on incoming network packets. This hook is distinct from 4624 * Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the incoming 4625 * sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk. Must not 4626 * sleep inside this hook because some callers hold spinlocks. 4627 * 4628 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4629 */ 4630 int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 4631 { 4632 return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, sk, skb); 4633 } 4634 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb); 4635 4636 /** 4637 * security_socket_getpeersec_stream() - Get the remote peer label 4638 * @sock: socket 4639 * @optval: destination buffer 4640 * @optlen: size of peer label copied into the buffer 4641 * @len: maximum size of the destination buffer 4642 * 4643 * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state 4644 * for unix or connected tcp sockets to userspace via getsockopt SO_GETPEERSEC. 4645 * For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the socket is associated with an 4646 * ipsec SA. 4647 * 4648 * Return: Returns 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return 4649 * values. 4650 */ 4651 int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval, 4652 sockptr_t optlen, unsigned int len) 4653 { 4654 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, sock, optval, optlen, 4655 len); 4656 } 4657 4658 /** 4659 * security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() - Get the remote peer label 4660 * @sock: socket 4661 * @skb: datagram packet 4662 * @secid: remote peer label secid 4663 * 4664 * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state 4665 * for udp sockets on a per-packet basis to userspace via getsockopt 4666 * SO_GETPEERSEC. The application must first have indicated the IP_PASSSEC 4667 * option via getsockopt. It can then retrieve the security state returned by 4668 * this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY ancillary message type. 4669 * 4670 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4671 */ 4672 int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, 4673 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 4674 { 4675 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, sock, skb, secid); 4676 } 4677 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram); 4678 4679 /** 4680 * security_sk_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a sock's LSM blob 4681 * @sk: sock 4682 * @family: protocol family 4683 * @priority: gfp flags 4684 * 4685 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field, which 4686 * is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets. 4687 * 4688 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4689 */ 4690 int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) 4691 { 4692 return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, sk, family, priority); 4693 } 4694 4695 /** 4696 * security_sk_free() - Free the sock's LSM blob 4697 * @sk: sock 4698 * 4699 * Deallocate security structure. 4700 */ 4701 void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk) 4702 { 4703 call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk); 4704 } 4705 4706 /** 4707 * security_sk_clone() - Clone a sock's LSM state 4708 * @sk: original sock 4709 * @newsk: target sock 4710 * 4711 * Clone/copy security structure. 4712 */ 4713 void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) 4714 { 4715 call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk); 4716 } 4717 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone); 4718 4719 /** 4720 * security_sk_classify_flow() - Set a flow's secid based on socket 4721 * @sk: original socket 4722 * @flic: target flow 4723 * 4724 * Set the target flow's secid to socket's secid. 4725 */ 4726 void security_sk_classify_flow(const struct sock *sk, struct flowi_common *flic) 4727 { 4728 call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &flic->flowic_secid); 4729 } 4730 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow); 4731 4732 /** 4733 * security_req_classify_flow() - Set a flow's secid based on request_sock 4734 * @req: request_sock 4735 * @flic: target flow 4736 * 4737 * Sets @flic's secid to @req's secid. 4738 */ 4739 void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, 4740 struct flowi_common *flic) 4741 { 4742 call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, flic); 4743 } 4744 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow); 4745 4746 /** 4747 * security_sock_graft() - Reconcile LSM state when grafting a sock on a socket 4748 * @sk: sock being grafted 4749 * @parent: target parent socket 4750 * 4751 * Sets @parent's inode secid to @sk's secid and update @sk with any necessary 4752 * LSM state from @parent. 4753 */ 4754 void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) 4755 { 4756 call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent); 4757 } 4758 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft); 4759 4760 /** 4761 * security_inet_conn_request() - Set request_sock state using incoming connect 4762 * @sk: parent listening sock 4763 * @skb: incoming connection 4764 * @req: new request_sock 4765 * 4766 * Initialize the @req LSM state based on @sk and the incoming connect in @skb. 4767 * 4768 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4769 */ 4770 int security_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, 4771 struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) 4772 { 4773 return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, sk, skb, req); 4774 } 4775 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request); 4776 4777 /** 4778 * security_inet_csk_clone() - Set new sock LSM state based on request_sock 4779 * @newsk: new sock 4780 * @req: connection request_sock 4781 * 4782 * Set that LSM state of @sock using the LSM state from @req. 4783 */ 4784 void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, 4785 const struct request_sock *req) 4786 { 4787 call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req); 4788 } 4789 4790 /** 4791 * security_inet_conn_established() - Update sock's LSM state with connection 4792 * @sk: sock 4793 * @skb: connection packet 4794 * 4795 * Update @sock's LSM state to represent a new connection from @skb. 4796 */ 4797 void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, 4798 struct sk_buff *skb) 4799 { 4800 call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb); 4801 } 4802 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established); 4803 4804 /** 4805 * security_secmark_relabel_packet() - Check if setting a secmark is allowed 4806 * @secid: new secmark value 4807 * 4808 * Check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to @secid. 4809 * 4810 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4811 */ 4812 int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid) 4813 { 4814 return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, secid); 4815 } 4816 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet); 4817 4818 /** 4819 * security_secmark_refcount_inc() - Increment the secmark labeling rule count 4820 * 4821 * Tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded. 4822 */ 4823 void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void) 4824 { 4825 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc); 4826 } 4827 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc); 4828 4829 /** 4830 * security_secmark_refcount_dec() - Decrement the secmark labeling rule count 4831 * 4832 * Tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded. 4833 */ 4834 void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void) 4835 { 4836 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec); 4837 } 4838 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec); 4839 4840 /** 4841 * security_tun_dev_alloc_security() - Allocate a LSM blob for a TUN device 4842 * @security: pointer to the LSM blob 4843 * 4844 * This hook allows a module to allocate a security structure for a TUN device, 4845 * returning the pointer in @security. 4846 * 4847 * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. 4848 */ 4849 int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) 4850 { 4851 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, security); 4852 } 4853 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security); 4854 4855 /** 4856 * security_tun_dev_free_security() - Free a TUN device LSM blob 4857 * @security: LSM blob 4858 * 4859 * This hook allows a module to free the security structure for a TUN device. 4860 */ 4861 void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) 4862 { 4863 call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security); 4864 } 4865 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security); 4866 4867 /** 4868 * security_tun_dev_create() - Check if creating a TUN device is allowed 4869 * 4870 * Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device. 4871 * 4872 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4873 */ 4874 int security_tun_dev_create(void) 4875 { 4876 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create); 4877 } 4878 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create); 4879 4880 /** 4881 * security_tun_dev_attach_queue() - Check if attaching a TUN queue is allowed 4882 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4883 * 4884 * Check permissions prior to attaching to a TUN device queue. 4885 * 4886 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4887 */ 4888 int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) 4889 { 4890 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, security); 4891 } 4892 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue); 4893 4894 /** 4895 * security_tun_dev_attach() - Update TUN device LSM state on attach 4896 * @sk: associated sock 4897 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4898 * 4899 * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated 4900 * with the TUN device's sock structure. 4901 * 4902 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4903 */ 4904 int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) 4905 { 4906 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, sk, security); 4907 } 4908 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach); 4909 4910 /** 4911 * security_tun_dev_open() - Update TUN device LSM state on open 4912 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4913 * 4914 * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated 4915 * with the TUN device's security structure. 4916 * 4917 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4918 */ 4919 int security_tun_dev_open(void *security) 4920 { 4921 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, security); 4922 } 4923 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open); 4924 4925 /** 4926 * security_sctp_assoc_request() - Update the LSM on a SCTP association req 4927 * @asoc: SCTP association 4928 * @skb: packet requesting the association 4929 * 4930 * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association INIT packet to the LSM. 4931 * 4932 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4933 */ 4934 int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, 4935 struct sk_buff *skb) 4936 { 4937 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, asoc, skb); 4938 } 4939 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request); 4940 4941 /** 4942 * security_sctp_bind_connect() - Validate a list of addrs for a SCTP option 4943 * @sk: socket 4944 * @optname: SCTP option to validate 4945 * @address: list of IP addresses to validate 4946 * @addrlen: length of the address list 4947 * 4948 * Validiate permissions required for each address associated with sock @sk. 4949 * Depending on @optname, the addresses will be treated as either a connect or 4950 * bind service. The @addrlen is calculated on each IPv4 and IPv6 address using 4951 * sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) or sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6). 4952 * 4953 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4954 */ 4955 int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, 4956 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 4957 { 4958 return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, sk, optname, address, addrlen); 4959 } 4960 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect); 4961 4962 /** 4963 * security_sctp_sk_clone() - Clone a SCTP sock's LSM state 4964 * @asoc: SCTP association 4965 * @sk: original sock 4966 * @newsk: target sock 4967 * 4968 * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) (i.e. a TCP style 4969 * socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace calls 4970 * sctp_peeloff(3). 4971 */ 4972 void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk, 4973 struct sock *newsk) 4974 { 4975 call_void_hook(sctp_sk_clone, asoc, sk, newsk); 4976 } 4977 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone); 4978 4979 /** 4980 * security_sctp_assoc_established() - Update LSM state when assoc established 4981 * @asoc: SCTP association 4982 * @skb: packet establishing the association 4983 * 4984 * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association COOKIE_ACK packet to the 4985 * security module. 4986 * 4987 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4988 */ 4989 int security_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc, 4990 struct sk_buff *skb) 4991 { 4992 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_established, asoc, skb); 4993 } 4994 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established); 4995 4996 /** 4997 * security_mptcp_add_subflow() - Inherit the LSM label from the MPTCP socket 4998 * @sk: the owning MPTCP socket 4999 * @ssk: the new subflow 5000 * 5001 * Update the labeling for the given MPTCP subflow, to match the one of the 5002 * owning MPTCP socket. This hook has to be called after the socket creation and 5003 * initialization via the security_socket_create() and 5004 * security_socket_post_create() LSM hooks. 5005 * 5006 * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on failure. 5007 */ 5008 int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk) 5009 { 5010 return call_int_hook(mptcp_add_subflow, sk, ssk); 5011 } 5012 5013 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ 5014 5015 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND 5016 /** 5017 * security_ib_pkey_access() - Check if access to an IB pkey is allowed 5018 * @sec: LSM blob 5019 * @subnet_prefix: subnet prefix of the port 5020 * @pkey: IB pkey 5021 * 5022 * Check permission to access a pkey when modifying a QP. 5023 * 5024 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5025 */ 5026 int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey) 5027 { 5028 return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey); 5029 } 5030 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access); 5031 5032 /** 5033 * security_ib_endport_manage_subnet() - Check if SMPs traffic is allowed 5034 * @sec: LSM blob 5035 * @dev_name: IB device name 5036 * @port_num: port number 5037 * 5038 * Check permissions to send and receive SMPs on a end port. 5039 * 5040 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5041 */ 5042 int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, 5043 const char *dev_name, u8 port_num) 5044 { 5045 return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, sec, dev_name, port_num); 5046 } 5047 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet); 5048 5049 /** 5050 * security_ib_alloc_security() - Allocate an Infiniband LSM blob 5051 * @sec: LSM blob 5052 * 5053 * Allocate a security structure for Infiniband objects. 5054 * 5055 * Return: Returns 0 on success, non-zero on failure. 5056 */ 5057 int security_ib_alloc_security(void **sec) 5058 { 5059 return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, sec); 5060 } 5061 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_alloc_security); 5062 5063 /** 5064 * security_ib_free_security() - Free an Infiniband LSM blob 5065 * @sec: LSM blob 5066 * 5067 * Deallocate an Infiniband security structure. 5068 */ 5069 void security_ib_free_security(void *sec) 5070 { 5071 call_void_hook(ib_free_security, sec); 5072 } 5073 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_free_security); 5074 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */ 5075 5076 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM 5077 /** 5078 * security_xfrm_policy_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm policy LSM blob 5079 * @ctxp: xfrm security context being added to the SPD 5080 * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace 5081 * @gfp: gfp flags 5082 * 5083 * Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security field 5084 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated. 5085 * 5086 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 5087 */ 5088 int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, 5089 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, 5090 gfp_t gfp) 5091 { 5092 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp); 5093 } 5094 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc); 5095 5096 /** 5097 * security_xfrm_policy_clone() - Clone xfrm policy LSM state 5098 * @old_ctx: xfrm security context 5099 * @new_ctxp: target xfrm security context 5100 * 5101 * Allocate a security structure in new_ctxp that contains the information from 5102 * the old_ctx structure. 5103 * 5104 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 5105 */ 5106 int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, 5107 struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) 5108 { 5109 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, old_ctx, new_ctxp); 5110 } 5111 5112 /** 5113 * security_xfrm_policy_free() - Free a xfrm security context 5114 * @ctx: xfrm security context 5115 * 5116 * Free LSM resources associated with @ctx. 5117 */ 5118 void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) 5119 { 5120 call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx); 5121 } 5122 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free); 5123 5124 /** 5125 * security_xfrm_policy_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm policy is allowed 5126 * @ctx: xfrm security context 5127 * 5128 * Authorize deletion of a SPD entry. 5129 * 5130 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5131 */ 5132 int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) 5133 { 5134 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, ctx); 5135 } 5136 5137 /** 5138 * security_xfrm_state_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob 5139 * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD 5140 * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace 5141 * 5142 * Allocate a security structure to the @x->security field; the security field 5143 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the context to 5144 * correspond to @sec_ctx. 5145 * 5146 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 5147 */ 5148 int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, 5149 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) 5150 { 5151 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, x, sec_ctx); 5152 } 5153 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc); 5154 5155 /** 5156 * security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob 5157 * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD 5158 * @polsec: associated policy's security context 5159 * @secid: secid from the flow 5160 * 5161 * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security field 5162 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the context to 5163 * correspond to secid. 5164 * 5165 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful. 5166 */ 5167 int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, 5168 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) 5169 { 5170 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, x, polsec, secid); 5171 } 5172 5173 /** 5174 * security_xfrm_state_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm state is allowed 5175 * @x: xfrm state 5176 * 5177 * Authorize deletion of x->security. 5178 * 5179 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5180 */ 5181 int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) 5182 { 5183 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, x); 5184 } 5185 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete); 5186 5187 /** 5188 * security_xfrm_state_free() - Free a xfrm state 5189 * @x: xfrm state 5190 * 5191 * Deallocate x->security. 5192 */ 5193 void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) 5194 { 5195 call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x); 5196 } 5197 5198 /** 5199 * security_xfrm_policy_lookup() - Check if using a xfrm policy is allowed 5200 * @ctx: target xfrm security context 5201 * @fl_secid: flow secid used to authorize access 5202 * 5203 * Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing XFRMs on a 5204 * packet. The hook is called when selecting either a per-socket policy or a 5205 * generic xfrm policy. 5206 * 5207 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ESRCH otherwise, or -errno on 5208 * other errors. 5209 */ 5210 int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid) 5211 { 5212 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, ctx, fl_secid); 5213 } 5214 5215 /** 5216 * security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match() - Check for a xfrm match 5217 * @x: xfrm state to match 5218 * @xp: xfrm policy to check for a match 5219 * @flic: flow to check for a match. 5220 * 5221 * Check @xp and @flic for a match with @x. 5222 * 5223 * Return: Returns 1 if there is a match. 5224 */ 5225 int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, 5226 struct xfrm_policy *xp, 5227 const struct flowi_common *flic) 5228 { 5229 struct security_hook_list *hp; 5230 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match); 5231 5232 /* 5233 * Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment 5234 * becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately, 5235 * we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux 5236 * supplies this call. 5237 * 5238 * For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than 5239 * using the macro 5240 */ 5241 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, 5242 list) { 5243 rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, flic); 5244 break; 5245 } 5246 return rc; 5247 } 5248 5249 /** 5250 * security_xfrm_decode_session() - Determine the xfrm secid for a packet 5251 * @skb: xfrm packet 5252 * @secid: secid 5253 * 5254 * Decode the packet in @skb and return the security label in @secid. 5255 * 5256 * Return: Return 0 if all xfrms used have the same secid. 5257 */ 5258 int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 5259 { 5260 return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, skb, secid, 1); 5261 } 5262 5263 void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi_common *flic) 5264 { 5265 int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, skb, &flic->flowic_secid, 5266 0); 5267 5268 BUG_ON(rc); 5269 } 5270 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow); 5271 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ 5272 5273 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS 5274 /** 5275 * security_key_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a kernel key LSM blob 5276 * @key: key 5277 * @cred: credentials 5278 * @flags: allocation flags 5279 * 5280 * Permit allocation of a key and assign security data. Note that key does not 5281 * have a serial number assigned at this point. 5282 * 5283 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. 5284 */ 5285 int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, 5286 unsigned long flags) 5287 { 5288 return call_int_hook(key_alloc, key, cred, flags); 5289 } 5290 5291 /** 5292 * security_key_free() - Free a kernel key LSM blob 5293 * @key: key 5294 * 5295 * Notification of destruction; free security data. 5296 */ 5297 void security_key_free(struct key *key) 5298 { 5299 call_void_hook(key_free, key); 5300 } 5301 5302 /** 5303 * security_key_permission() - Check if a kernel key operation is allowed 5304 * @key_ref: key reference 5305 * @cred: credentials of actor requesting access 5306 * @need_perm: requested permissions 5307 * 5308 * See whether a specific operational right is granted to a process on a key. 5309 * 5310 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. 5311 */ 5312 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, 5313 enum key_need_perm need_perm) 5314 { 5315 return call_int_hook(key_permission, key_ref, cred, need_perm); 5316 } 5317 5318 /** 5319 * security_key_getsecurity() - Get the key's security label 5320 * @key: key 5321 * @buffer: security label buffer 5322 * 5323 * Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key for 5324 * the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY. This function allocates the 5325 * storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller should free it. 5326 * 5327 * Return: Returns the length of @buffer (including terminating NUL) or -ve if 5328 * an error occurs. May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if 5329 * there is no security label assigned to the key. 5330 */ 5331 int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **buffer) 5332 { 5333 *buffer = NULL; 5334 return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, key, buffer); 5335 } 5336 5337 /** 5338 * security_key_post_create_or_update() - Notification of key create or update 5339 * @keyring: keyring to which the key is linked to 5340 * @key: created or updated key 5341 * @payload: data used to instantiate or update the key 5342 * @payload_len: length of payload 5343 * @flags: key flags 5344 * @create: flag indicating whether the key was created or updated 5345 * 5346 * Notify the caller of a key creation or update. 5347 */ 5348 void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, 5349 const void *payload, size_t payload_len, 5350 unsigned long flags, bool create) 5351 { 5352 call_void_hook(key_post_create_or_update, keyring, key, payload, 5353 payload_len, flags, create); 5354 } 5355 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ 5356 5357 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT 5358 /** 5359 * security_audit_rule_init() - Allocate and init an LSM audit rule struct 5360 * @field: audit action 5361 * @op: rule operator 5362 * @rulestr: rule context 5363 * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct 5364 * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc 5365 * 5366 * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. 5367 * 5368 * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of 5369 * an invalid rule. 5370 */ 5371 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule, 5372 gfp_t gfp) 5373 { 5374 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule, gfp); 5375 } 5376 5377 /** 5378 * security_audit_rule_known() - Check if an audit rule contains LSM fields 5379 * @krule: audit rule 5380 * 5381 * Specifies whether given @krule contains any fields related to the current 5382 * LSM. 5383 * 5384 * Return: Returns 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise. 5385 */ 5386 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) 5387 { 5388 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, krule); 5389 } 5390 5391 /** 5392 * security_audit_rule_free() - Free an LSM audit rule struct 5393 * @lsmrule: audit rule struct 5394 * 5395 * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by 5396 * audit_rule_init(). 5397 */ 5398 void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) 5399 { 5400 call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule); 5401 } 5402 5403 /** 5404 * security_audit_rule_match() - Check if a label matches an audit rule 5405 * @secid: security label 5406 * @field: LSM audit field 5407 * @op: matching operator 5408 * @lsmrule: audit rule 5409 * 5410 * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved by 5411 * security_audit_rule_known(). 5412 * 5413 * Return: Returns 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on 5414 * failure. 5415 */ 5416 int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) 5417 { 5418 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, secid, field, op, lsmrule); 5419 } 5420 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ 5421 5422 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL 5423 /** 5424 * security_bpf() - Check if the bpf syscall operation is allowed 5425 * @cmd: command 5426 * @attr: bpf attribute 5427 * @size: size 5428 * 5429 * Do a initial check for all bpf syscalls after the attribute is copied into 5430 * the kernel. The actual security module can implement their own rules to 5431 * check the specific cmd they need. 5432 * 5433 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5434 */ 5435 int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) 5436 { 5437 return call_int_hook(bpf, cmd, attr, size); 5438 } 5439 5440 /** 5441 * security_bpf_map() - Check if access to a bpf map is allowed 5442 * @map: bpf map 5443 * @fmode: mode 5444 * 5445 * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF 5446 * maps. 5447 * 5448 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5449 */ 5450 int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) 5451 { 5452 return call_int_hook(bpf_map, map, fmode); 5453 } 5454 5455 /** 5456 * security_bpf_prog() - Check if access to a bpf program is allowed 5457 * @prog: bpf program 5458 * 5459 * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF 5460 * programs. 5461 * 5462 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5463 */ 5464 int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) 5465 { 5466 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, prog); 5467 } 5468 5469 /** 5470 * security_bpf_map_create() - Check if BPF map creation is allowed 5471 * @map: BPF map object 5472 * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF map 5473 * @token: BPF token used to grant user access 5474 * 5475 * Do a check when the kernel creates a new BPF map. This is also the 5476 * point where LSM blob is allocated for LSMs that need them. 5477 * 5478 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5479 */ 5480 int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr, 5481 struct bpf_token *token) 5482 { 5483 return call_int_hook(bpf_map_create, map, attr, token); 5484 } 5485 5486 /** 5487 * security_bpf_prog_load() - Check if loading of BPF program is allowed 5488 * @prog: BPF program object 5489 * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF program 5490 * @token: BPF token used to grant user access to BPF subsystem 5491 * 5492 * Perform an access control check when the kernel loads a BPF program and 5493 * allocates associated BPF program object. This hook is also responsible for 5494 * allocating any required LSM state for the BPF program. 5495 * 5496 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5497 */ 5498 int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr, 5499 struct bpf_token *token) 5500 { 5501 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_load, prog, attr, token); 5502 } 5503 5504 /** 5505 * security_bpf_token_create() - Check if creating of BPF token is allowed 5506 * @token: BPF token object 5507 * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF token 5508 * @path: path pointing to BPF FS mount point from which BPF token is created 5509 * 5510 * Do a check when the kernel instantiates a new BPF token object from BPF FS 5511 * instance. This is also the point where LSM blob can be allocated for LSMs. 5512 * 5513 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5514 */ 5515 int security_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr, 5516 struct path *path) 5517 { 5518 return call_int_hook(bpf_token_create, token, attr, path); 5519 } 5520 5521 /** 5522 * security_bpf_token_cmd() - Check if BPF token is allowed to delegate 5523 * requested BPF syscall command 5524 * @token: BPF token object 5525 * @cmd: BPF syscall command requested to be delegated by BPF token 5526 * 5527 * Do a check when the kernel decides whether provided BPF token should allow 5528 * delegation of requested BPF syscall command. 5529 * 5530 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5531 */ 5532 int security_bpf_token_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd) 5533 { 5534 return call_int_hook(bpf_token_cmd, token, cmd); 5535 } 5536 5537 /** 5538 * security_bpf_token_capable() - Check if BPF token is allowed to delegate 5539 * requested BPF-related capability 5540 * @token: BPF token object 5541 * @cap: capabilities requested to be delegated by BPF token 5542 * 5543 * Do a check when the kernel decides whether provided BPF token should allow 5544 * delegation of requested BPF-related capabilities. 5545 * 5546 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5547 */ 5548 int security_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap) 5549 { 5550 return call_int_hook(bpf_token_capable, token, cap); 5551 } 5552 5553 /** 5554 * security_bpf_map_free() - Free a bpf map's LSM blob 5555 * @map: bpf map 5556 * 5557 * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf map. 5558 */ 5559 void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) 5560 { 5561 call_void_hook(bpf_map_free, map); 5562 } 5563 5564 /** 5565 * security_bpf_prog_free() - Free a BPF program's LSM blob 5566 * @prog: BPF program struct 5567 * 5568 * Clean up the security information stored inside BPF program. 5569 */ 5570 void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog) 5571 { 5572 call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free, prog); 5573 } 5574 5575 /** 5576 * security_bpf_token_free() - Free a BPF token's LSM blob 5577 * @token: BPF token struct 5578 * 5579 * Clean up the security information stored inside BPF token. 5580 */ 5581 void security_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token) 5582 { 5583 call_void_hook(bpf_token_free, token); 5584 } 5585 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ 5586 5587 /** 5588 * security_locked_down() - Check if a kernel feature is allowed 5589 * @what: requested kernel feature 5590 * 5591 * Determine whether a kernel feature that potentially enables arbitrary code 5592 * execution in kernel space should be permitted. 5593 * 5594 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5595 */ 5596 int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) 5597 { 5598 return call_int_hook(locked_down, what); 5599 } 5600 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down); 5601 5602 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS 5603 /** 5604 * security_perf_event_open() - Check if a perf event open is allowed 5605 * @attr: perf event attribute 5606 * @type: type of event 5607 * 5608 * Check whether the @type of perf_event_open syscall is allowed. 5609 * 5610 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5611 */ 5612 int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) 5613 { 5614 return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, attr, type); 5615 } 5616 5617 /** 5618 * security_perf_event_alloc() - Allocate a perf event LSM blob 5619 * @event: perf event 5620 * 5621 * Allocate and save perf_event security info. 5622 * 5623 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5624 */ 5625 int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event) 5626 { 5627 return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, event); 5628 } 5629 5630 /** 5631 * security_perf_event_free() - Free a perf event LSM blob 5632 * @event: perf event 5633 * 5634 * Release (free) perf_event security info. 5635 */ 5636 void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event) 5637 { 5638 call_void_hook(perf_event_free, event); 5639 } 5640 5641 /** 5642 * security_perf_event_read() - Check if reading a perf event label is allowed 5643 * @event: perf event 5644 * 5645 * Read perf_event security info if allowed. 5646 * 5647 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5648 */ 5649 int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event) 5650 { 5651 return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, event); 5652 } 5653 5654 /** 5655 * security_perf_event_write() - Check if writing a perf event label is allowed 5656 * @event: perf event 5657 * 5658 * Write perf_event security info if allowed. 5659 * 5660 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5661 */ 5662 int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) 5663 { 5664 return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, event); 5665 } 5666 #endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */ 5667 5668 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING 5669 /** 5670 * security_uring_override_creds() - Check if overriding creds is allowed 5671 * @new: new credentials 5672 * 5673 * Check if the current task, executing an io_uring operation, is allowed to 5674 * override it's credentials with @new. 5675 * 5676 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5677 */ 5678 int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) 5679 { 5680 return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, new); 5681 } 5682 5683 /** 5684 * security_uring_sqpoll() - Check if IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL is allowed 5685 * 5686 * Check whether the current task is allowed to spawn a io_uring polling thread 5687 * (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL). 5688 * 5689 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5690 */ 5691 int security_uring_sqpoll(void) 5692 { 5693 return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll); 5694 } 5695 5696 /** 5697 * security_uring_cmd() - Check if a io_uring passthrough command is allowed 5698 * @ioucmd: command 5699 * 5700 * Check whether the file_operations uring_cmd is allowed to run. 5701 * 5702 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5703 */ 5704 int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) 5705 { 5706 return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, ioucmd); 5707 } 5708 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ 5709
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